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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 84 Records
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1970 (9) TMI 79 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Winding up – Power of court to assess damages against delinquent directors, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... eath of the delinquent officer or officers concerned. In my view as the liquidator s right to proceed against the legal representatives of such persons survives subject to the limitation that the order for repayment or restoration that is ultimately made would be limited to the assets of the deceased delinquent officer, this application for substitution of the legal representatives of a deceased director cannot be resisted. For all the reasons aforesaid, there will be an order in terms of clause (a) of the summons herein limited to the assets of Dr, Sailendra Nath Sinha, since deceased, in the hands of the said heirs and legal representatives. There will also be an order in terms of clauses (b), (c), (d ) and (e) of the summons. The costs of and incidental to this application would be costs in the misfeasance proceedings. The official liquidator s costs may be retained and paid out of the assets of the company (in liquidation) in the first instance. Certified for two counsel.
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1970 (9) TMI 70 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Share capital - Further issue of, Inter-corporate investment, Power to compromise or make arrangements with creditors and members, Compromise and arrangement, Amalgamation
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1970 (9) TMI 62 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the court has only to consider the correctness of the view of the High Court refusing to grant the certificate?
Held that:- It would be a futile exercise if we come to the conclusion that the view taken by the High Court on the merits of the case is true, still to certify the case for appeal. The proposed appeal only involves the question about the maintainability of the execution proceeding commenced by the plaintiff and against the company in liquidation without leave of the High Court which has ordered the company to be wound up. We entertain no doubt that the High Court was right in the view it has taken on the merits and the contentions raised. We do not think that we will be justified in certifying an appeal in which the only question which may be urged is the one on which we have expressed our opinion against the appellant. The appeal fails and is dismissed
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1970 (9) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the exchange was entitled to retain the balance after satisfying the debts, liabilities and engagements of the appellant to the other members or to the exchange?
Held that:- If the company is permitted to retain the balance of the amount after satisfying the debts, liabilities and engagements of the shareholder, the transaction would not be different from one purchasing the share of the defaulting shareholder for a value equal to the amount of his obligations. That would be plainly illegal. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the High Court that the exchange was entitled to retain the balance after satisfying the debts, liabilities and engagements of the appellant to the other members or to the exchange.
The decree passed by the High Court is set aside and the case remanded to the High Court for determining the extent of the liabilities of the appellant to the exchange not only in respect of the transactions with Johurmull Daga but in respect of all other outstanding liabilities of the appellant to other members of the exchange and to the. exchange which are. enforceable under the articles. The appellant is entitled to receive from the exchange the balance remaining due after deducting the aggregate amount or value of the obligations. He will be entitled to interest on the balance at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the institution of the suit. Parties will bear their own costs throughout.
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1970 (9) TMI 59 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Winding up – Power of court to assess damages against delinquent directors, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... of Shri Bine Chand s decree. It was, however, for the official liquidator and judgment-creditor to work out a detailed statement about the assets and liabilities of the company and with the help that was forthcoming from these quarters, the learned company judge could not have made a better job of assessing the damages. He has taken into account all the material made available to him by the parties and has tried to work out the damages in a judicious manner. The only plea in the cross-appeal of the official liquidator, etc., that succeeds is that the liability of the three directors is made joint and several. For reasons given above, L.P.A. No. 364 of 196G filed by Mulkh Raj Mehta and others is dismissed with costs while L.P.A. No. 359 by the official liquidator and Bine Chand partly succeeds only to this extent that all the three directors are made jointly and severally liable in respect of the sum of Rs. 26,600. There shall be no order as to costs in L.P.A. No. 359 of 1966.
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1970 (9) TMI 55 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the directors acted in the interest of the company?
Whether they acted on a wrong principle?
Whether they acted with an oblique motive or for a collateral purpose?
Held that:- The discretion of the directors is to be tested as the opinion of fair and sensible men in the interest of the company. In the present case, the directors did not act bona fide nor did they act in the general interest of the company. On the contrary, they acted upon a wrong principle and for the oblique motive of squeezing out Firodia. The in scapable conclusion is that the directors acted arbitrarily and unjustifiably.
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1970 (9) TMI 38 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Prosecution (Customs) - Smuggling - Onus ... ... ... ... ..... pically examined at the Customs Berrier at Vapi and every point, like number, jewels, etc. were scrutinised before allowing clearance. Once it is realised that examination at the Custom House could at best be formal, if not perfunctory, there is reason for saying that the entire lot of watches that were transported to Bombay under the various Collectors certificates were in fact watches covered by the Despatches and the invoices produced on the side of the accused. There is, under the circumstances, no adequate reason to reject the accused s explanation that all these watches were lawfully imported. Such burden, as rested on the accused under Section 123 of the Customs Act, having thus been satisfactorily discharged, the accused is clearly entitled to an acquittal. 28.This appeal is accordingly allowed, the conviction as well as the sentence of the accused are set aside and the accused is acquitted of the charges levelled against him. His bail bond is ordered to be cancelled.
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1970 (9) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT
Breach of the licence - Held that:- The view of the High Court does not seem to be sustainable on the statutory language and on the Import Control Policy of which the respondents were fully aware. Their own application is proof positive of their awareness of the true position and the breach of the conditions of the licence on their part was deliberate. Indeed, as observed earlier, the permission for the import of the second press was apparently sought with the object of its resale. Breach of conditions for import of goods is a serious matter because it prejudicially affects our country's national economy. The import licence for the second press having, in our view, been sought on false representation with the object and purpose of its resale the breach of the licence was, therefore, fully intended and designed. The respondents are guilty of malpractices and of abuse of the import licence with the object of making money. We, however, think that in view of the fact that this litigation has been pending since a long time it would meet the ends of justice if we impose merely fine and do not sentence anyone to imprisonment. The final result is that the order of the High Court is set aside and accused Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 are convicted under Section 120-B, I.P.C. and Section 5 of the Imports & Exports Act, 1947 read with Clause 5 of the Import Control Order 1955 and each of the accused Nos. 2, 3 and 5 are sentence to pay a fine of ₹ 2,000/- under each count. Accused No. 1 who is the principal culprit and who was sentenced by the trial court to imprisonment and fine is sentenced to pay a fine of ₹ 5,000/- under each count. In default of payment of fine the defaulting accused persons will undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months. The Company is convicted only under Section 5 of the Imports & Exports Act read with Clause 5 of the Import Control Order and sentenced to pay a fine of ₹ 2,000/-.
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1970 (9) TMI 36 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the facts of this case the mare "Jury Maid" can be considered as a "pet animal" within the meaning of that expression in the notification issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industries, Import Trade Control Public Notice No. 1-I.T.C. (PN)/61, dated 2nd January, 1961?
Whether the expression "prohibition" contained in Section 111(d) of the Customs Act, 1962 (which will hereinafter be referred to as the Act) includes prohibition of imports coupled with a power to permit importation under certain conditions?
Held that:- There is no evidence to show that "Jury Maid" was tamed. That apart the "Jury Maid" was not fondled or treated with fondness by the appellant. He obtained that animal on lease for certain specified purpose. In respect of that animal he had only a business connection. We entirely agree with those observations and reject the contention of the appellant that "Jury Maid" was a pet animal.
What clause (d) of Section 111 says is that any goods which are imported or attempted to be imported contrary to "any prohibition imposed by any law for the time being in force in this country" is liable to be confiscated. "Any prohibition" referred to in that section applies to every type of "prohibition". That prohibition may be complete or partial. Any restriction on import or export is to an extent a prohibition. The expression "any prohibition" in Section 111(d) of the Customs Act, 1962 includes restrictions. Merely because Section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 uses three different expressions "prohibiting", "restricting" or "otherwise controlling," we cannot cut down the amplitude of the word "any prohibition" in Section 111(d) of the Act. "Any prohibition" means every prohibition. In other words all types of prohibitions. Restriction is one type of prohibition. From Item (I) of Schedule I, Part IV to Import Control Order, 1955, it is clear that import of living animals of all sorts is prohibited. But certain exceptions are provided for. But none the less the prohibition continues. Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (9) TMI 35 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Recovery of sums due to Government - `May' - Connotation of - Writ of Mandamus - Attachment and sale of property
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1970 (9) TMI 34 - SUPREME COURT
Validity of a warrant issued by Assistant Collector, Central Excise, Allahabad, authorising the Superintendent, Central Excise, Varanasi to enter certain premises, search the same and seize the documents therefrom challenged
Held that:- In the notifications which were issued applying, inter alia, Section 105(1) and Section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962 no such changes have been made as can possibly fall within the meaning of the word "alterations".Objection was taken only with regard to the word "alterations" but that word must be understood in the sense in which it was open to the legislature to employ it legitimately and in a constitutional manner. No question is thus involved of delegation, either of any essential legislative functions or any change of legislative policy.
It is unnecessary to mention the other provisions because a comparison of the recognised formulae with the text of Section 12 of the Act shows that the provisions of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 were not meant to be incorporated in the Act and were only to be applicable to the extent notified by the Central Government for the purpose of the duty leviable under Section 3. It was in these circumstances that it was held that section 129 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 could not be made applicable so as to whittle down the substantive right of appeal conferred by Section 35 of the Act. The previous notification under the Sea Customs Act, 1878 stood superseded and no question survives with regard to the validity of the notification issued in 1963 and amended in 1965. Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (9) TMI 33 - SUPREME COURT
Whether seniority list must be quashed?
Held that:- The High Court was right in observing that the proviso was intended to neutralise the effect of the minimum service rule in determining seniority in the grade of Assistant Commissioners. Rule (iii) is not intended, contrary to all notions of justice and fair-play, to confer upon an officer, who was junior in the list of Income-tax Officers and who could not be considered for promotion on an earlier occasion, a right to be placed in the list of Assistant Commissioners above an officer senior to him in the list of Income-tax Officers and who was promoted before him.
If respondents Nos. 6 to 34 had been considered and selected for promotion when Nadkarni and Karnik were promoted after their officiation period was over, they could not have been placed in the list of Assistant Commissioners above Nadkarni and Karnik. The circumstance that respondents Nos. 6 to 34 were not considered because they had not completed the specified minimum period of gazetted service and were considered and promoted later did not, when they were promoted, confer upon them the privilege of being placed in the list of Assistant Commissioners above Nadkarni and Karnik. We, accordingly, agree with the High Court that the seniority list must be quashed. Appeal dismissed.
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1970 (9) TMI 32 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Preference Shares ... ... ... ... ..... ad in law, even though, the assessee did not ask under section 5(7C) for reopening of the case or for personal hearing by the officer, who passed the order. Now, that case again on the facts is entirely different from the instant reference before us, for there the assessee asked for a personal hearing which the assessee has not done in the instant reference. Secondly, the hearing was concluded before one officer but the order that was passed was by a different officer. That again is a fact which is very different from the fact in the instant reference before us. Therefore, that case is clearly distinguishable. For the reasons stated above and on the authorities discussed and also for the reasons stated in our judgment in Income-tax Reference No. 100 of 1967 (Smt. Aparna Roy v. Commissioner of Income-tax (Cal)) we answer both the questions in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. The costs should follow the event and be paid by the assessee. T. K. BASU J. --- I agree.
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1970 (9) TMI 31 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Assessee is a company manufacturing, among other things, medicines. Before May, 1959, the assessee used also to manufacture serum. The assessee appears to have suffered loss of income from the production of serum for a considerable number of years as a result of which the assessee finally decided to stop the manufacture of serum with effect from May, 1959. As a consequence of this stoppage certain animals which were kept by the assessee for the manufacture of serum became actually useless to it for its business. The assessee, therefore, sold away these animals. By reason of this sale the company suffered a loss - company claimed deduction of the said sum u/s 10(2)(viii) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 – it could not be said that the animals had become useless on the closure of the assessee's business before the assessee was entitled to deduction of loss
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1970 (9) TMI 30 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Whether, the penalty imposed on the assessee under section 27 1 (1)(a) for the assessment years 1960-61 and 1961-62 is liable to be cancelled - no force in the contention that the registration certificate being issued only on March 26, 1962, the assessee had an obligation to file a return under section 22(1). As we pointed out earlier, the certificate will have effect for the year of assessment and must therefore apply not only in regard to the assessment proceedings but in regard to the proceedings relating to the filing of the return - We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the department
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1970 (9) TMI 29 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Revisional order passed without hearing the assessee – validity of the order - as opportunity of hearing had not been given, the impugned order of the Income-tax Commissioner cannot be supported so it is quashed and matter is remanded
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1970 (9) TMI 28 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Applicability of provisions of the Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act, 1962 after coming into force of the Income-tax Act, 1961
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1970 (9) TMI 27 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Business of deep sea fishing with the help of trawlers and selling the same - proper construction of the expression "any profits and gains derived from a ship" occurring in section 80J of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - applicability provisions of section 80J(1) of the profits and gains from fishing using ships
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1970 (9) TMI 26 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Opportunity of being heard to assessee before commissioner - no material considered without assessee's knowledge - held that tribunal was justified in maintaining the order of the CIT under section 33B of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, setting aside the assessments and directing the Income-tax Officer to make fresh assessments
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1970 (9) TMI 25 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Application by the CIT for grant of a certificate, u/s 66A(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act of fitness of the case for an appeal to the Supreme Court - plea of private importance is open to an assessee whose private interest are affected and not to the department - leave to appeal to SC not granted
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