|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 148 Records
-
1982 (10) TMI 68 - ITAT CALCUTTA-C
... ...
... ... ..... L A/c for the year under appeal as also for the immediately preceding year show that the assessee s income from interest on general finance was higher than other incomes. Although the expression principal business used in Explanation to s. 73 has not been defined in the Act, a clue can be found from s. 109 (iia), wherein it has been provided that trading company means a company whose business consists mainly in dealing in goods or merchandise manufactured, produced or processed by a person other than the company. The significance of the word mainly has been clarified further providing and whose income attributable to such business included in its gross total income is not less than fifty-one per cent of the amount of such gross total income . Bearing this principle in mind and considering the facts of the case, as stated herein before, we have no hesitation in upholding the order of the CIT(A). 6. The appeal by the revenue fails, as indicated above, and is hereby dismissed.
-
1982 (10) TMI 67 - ITAT BOMBAY-E
High Court, Levy Sugar Price, Purchase Price ... ... ... ... ..... In our opinion, the principles which we have applied in respect of the earlier addition of Rs. 16,86,799 are equally applicable in respect of this amount of Rs. 64,534 also. A mere credit entry in the assessee s books of account for this set off would not make it a receipt of income by the assessee or entitle the assessee to receive this amount from the sales tax department, who have to determine the exact amount of set off due to the assessee as per the Sales Tax Act while finalising the sales tax assessment. The entries in the books of account of the assessee are only in the nature of a claim made by the assessee before the sales tax authorities. In fact this is shown as a liability and included in the sundry creditors in the balance sheet of the assessee. On these facts, we are unable to agree with the revenue that this amount represented any income of the assessee in this year of account. Accordingly, we delete this addition also. 24. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
-
1982 (10) TMI 66 - ITAT BOMBAY-E
Assessment Year, Previous Year ... ... ... ... ..... 80, referred to therein, only lay down that a notification granting a deduction in respect of sales tax, which is issued during the course of particular year, must be given effect to as from the beginning of that assessment year. On this basis the assessee can successfully claim that the order in the present case, which was issued on 19-9-1975, should be treated as effective from 1-4-1975. The rulings do not support the claim of the learned counsel for the assessee that the order would be effective from the date on which the clause came into effect. It is not also possible to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the assessee that when a provision is introduced in a statute with retrospective effect, all subsequent orders or notifications issued under the provision will also automatically take effect from the date on which the provision came into effect. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the order of the AAC. 6. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
-
1982 (10) TMI 65 - ITAT BOMBAY-D
... ...
... ... ..... x). 5. The ld. counsel for the assessee also advanced a new contention, which had not been taken before the lower authorities. It was to the effect that s. 40A(8) will not be attracted in the case of the assessee because the assessee-company is a financial company within the meaning of the sub-section. Clause (c) of the Explanation defines the term financial company . Under sub-cl. (iii) it would include a housing finance company, that is to say, a company which carries on as its principal business, the business of financing of acquisition or construction of houses. It was claimed by the ld. counsel for the assessee that the assessee-company will be such a company. There is no merit in the contention because the business of the assessee-company is not financing of acquisition or construction of houses, but to construct flats on its own and to sell the same on ownership basis. This claim of the assessee also cannot, therefore, stand. 6. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
-
1982 (10) TMI 64 - ITAT BOMBAY-D
... ...
... ... ..... so. Keeping the above guide-lines in view, we now proceed to examine the contentions of the parties before us in relation to the facts of the instant case. The audit party is definitely an external source in the sense that it is extraneous to the records of the ITO. The opinion of the audit party admittedly came after the original assessment was made. Undoubtedly, it relates to a points of facts. Hence it clearly constituted information as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Indian and Eastern Newspapers Society. Respectfully following the aforesaid decision, we hold that the ld. CIT(A) erred in his conclusion. We, therefore, vacate his finding on this point and hold that the ITO validly reopened the assessment on the ground recorded by him. Hence, we restore this appeals to the file of the CIT(A) with a direction to dispose of the same on merits after giving reasonable opportunities of being heard to the parties concerned. 6. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
-
1982 (10) TMI 63 - ITAT BOMBAY-D
... ...
... ... ..... nditional offer made by the assessee. Independent investigation was possible in the matter as the assessee had furnished the particulars with regard to the payment of the interest and the principal of the loan amounts by cheque and also the particulars of the income-tax assessment of the two lenders. We are unable to agree with the Commissioner (A) that the circumstances of the case would warrant the quashing of the assessment. It appears to be a case where the ITO was misled by the offer contained in the letter into not making the further enquiry and investigation which he was required to make. 7. In the result, the order of the Commissioner (A) is set aside and the matter is restored to the ITO for fresh disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations above. We make it clear that it would be open to the ITO to accept the offer made by the assessee, if the assessee still stands by the same. The appeal will be treated as allowed for statistical purposes.
-
1982 (10) TMI 62 - ITAT BOMBAY-D
Capital Asset, Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... y that the assessee in fact received the sum of Rs. 68,000 under consideration. There is enough force on the other circumstantial evidence pointing to the contrary as explained on behalf of the assessee. Similar statements of this very broker have been found to be untrue in other cases. The sale proceeds declared by the assessee are more than the amounts considered fair by the income-tax department. Again, the broker, having falsely stated that the sum of Rs. 68,000 formed a part of the sale-proceeds had to charge the commission of 2 per cent on that sum also as, otherwise, his action would obviously arouse suspicion. However, that fact in itself does not show that the said sum of Rs. 68,000 was passed on by the broker to the assessee. Under the circumstances, we agree with the Commissioner (Appeals) that the assessee received nothing more than the sum of Rs. 2,25,000. Hence, we uphold her finding on the second point in dispute also. 8. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
-
1982 (10) TMI 61 - ITAT BOMBAY-D
Assessment Year, Charitable Institution ... ... ... ... ..... eby declared that no deduction shall be allowed in respect of any donation if it is not in cash. This Explanation came into force with effect from 1-4-1976, and so, it was not applicable to the assessment year under consideration. During the assessment year 1975-76, there was no express prohibition for allowance of relief under section 80G on donations paid in kind. In any case, there was definitely a doubt as is clearly recognised by the opening words of Explanation 5. Whenever there is a doubt, the benefit thereof should go to the assessee vide the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Vegetable Products Ltd. 1973 88 ITR 192. Hence, we agree with the Commissioner (Appeals) that the assessee was entitled to relief under section 80G on the donation made in kind in the year under consideration, if the other conditions stated in that section are satisfied. We, therefore, uphold the direction of the Commissioner (Appeals). 7. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
-
1982 (10) TMI 60 - ITAT BOMBAY-C
... ...
... ... ..... he expenditure is incurred, whatever be the ultimate motive. The Bombay High Court has referred to the distinction between the purpose and the motive of earning income in Kevalchand Namchand Meta, the ratio of which ruling would apply with equal force in the consideration of the deductibility of an expenditure . In Para 25 of its order, the Tribunal observed as under 25. To sum up, we first of all hold that even if we assume the entire expenditure to relate to the expansion of the business, it would be a revenue expenditure and wholly eligible for deduction. We also agree with respect with the ratio of the judgement of Gujarat High Court reported at (1981) 132 ITR 401 (Guj), which held that the expenditure incurred for an expansion of business, is revenue expenditure and allowable. Therefore, we see no justification to disallow the expenses amounting to Rs. 26,684, being the expenditure incurred on foreign tour to Iran. 20. In the result, assessee s appeal is partly allowed.
-
1982 (10) TMI 59 - ITAT BANGALORE
Diversion By Overriding Title, Diversion Of Income, Income By Overriding Title ... ... ... ... ..... e of M.M. Mehta. Those are not the cases where any advance or loan has been given by the company to the director. They are cases of use of car by the director. Hence, they are distinguishable. In fact, the decisions to which I have referred to above reported in the cases of Kulandaivelu Konar, A.K. Lakshmi as well as the decision reported in the case of Lakshmipat are directly on the point. I prefer to follow those decisions. Thus, in my view, the assessee has derived benefit by taking advance of Rs. 1,05,000 free of interest and it is taxable. The ITO was right in taxing Rs. 15,238 and the AAC was wrong in deleting the same. I set aside the order of the AAC and restore the order of the ITO in taxing Rs. 15,238. 7. In the Tribunal s order dated 7-5-1982 in the case of P. Dayananda Pai IT Appeal No. 534 (Bang.) of 1979 , no decision has been given on merits. That was only restored to the AAC. Hence, that order will not have any bearing. 8. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
-
1982 (10) TMI 58 - ITAT ALLAHABAD-B
... ...
... ... ..... of an approved valuer in respect of another plot of land in the assessee s locality which as admitted by the WTO was much smaller, Considering all this and looking to the totality of the facts and circumstances, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the reopening of the assessment u/s. 17(1)(i) was not justified. The re-assessments made by the WTO, therefore, for each of the four assessment year, under appeal before us, were not valid and are hereby cancelled. 8. The other grounds of appeal relating to the valuation of the Major Banks Road property and the claim of deduction of loans secured on Life Insurance Policies in respect of which additions were made in the re-assessments, therefore, do not survive for considerations. 9. The appeals filed by the assessee are partly allowed. The appeals filed by the revenue do not survive for consideration in view of the cancellation of the re-assessments and are therefore, for statistical purpose treated as dismissed.
-
1982 (10) TMI 57 - ITAT ALLAHABAD-B
... ...
... ... ..... ord we have no doubt in our mind that an attempt is made by the assessing officer to re-open the assessment on mere change of opinion on the facts already available on record, when he had framed the assessment originally. This action of the assessing officer is clearly bad in law and, therefore, the assessments framed by him on 28th March, 1980 cannot stand. We have, therefore, no hesitation in setting aside the orders of the IT Authorities. Before we part with this order, we may observe that the Hon ble Supreme Court and the Hon ble High Courts have time and again lamented that there should be some finality in the tax matter. The observations of the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of Parasuram Pottery Works vs. ITO (1977) 106 ITR 1 at 10 (SC), last para, are very illuminating, We wish that the IT Authorities would keep in mind the later observations whenever they think of reopening the assessment under s. 147/148 of the Act. 6. In the result, both the appeals are allowed.
-
1982 (10) TMI 56 - ITAT ALLAHABAD-B
Held By Assessee, Income From Property, Rental Income ... ... ... ... ..... both of the said associations are indeterminate or unknown, the wealth-tax shall be levied and recovered, from such association in the manner laid down in that section. The contention of the learned counsel for the assessee that section 21AA was meant to plug the lacuna in the Act is supported by the circular of the CBDT and the speech of the Finance Minister delivered in the Lok Sabha while moving the Finance Bill and that they are relevant to find out the object and purpose for which the legislation is enacted in the light of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of K.P. Varghese. The view we have taken has also the view of the Tribunal in the case of J.K. Srivastava. A copy of this order was also made available to us by the counsel for the assessees. We, therefore, uphold the order of the AAC excluding the value of Delhi property from the assessments of the two ladies for all the years under appeal. 19. In the result, all the appeals are partly allowed.
-
1982 (10) TMI 55 - ITAT ALLAHABAD-B
Minor Child, Partnership Deed, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... ited case was that the sum brought by the minor to the account of the firm was not in the nature of capital. I do not consider it necessary to deal with other cases. All of them are erroneous in their approach that the interest paid by the firm to its members on their contributions to the capital of the firm or on their accumulated profits arises directly or indirectly from their membership in the firm and falls within the provisions of section 64(1)(iii). On the other hand, they also lay down that the interest on loans or voluntary deposits is not so includible. This case falls in the first category. I am, therefore, in agreement with the finding of the learned Accountant Member that the interest of Rs. 5,840 paid by Chandoria Traders to Shri Rakesh Kumar and Shri Rajesh Kumar was rightly assessed by the ITO in the hands of the assessee, their father under section 64(1)(iii). 15. The case will now go back to the Bench for passing an order in accordance with my above opinion.
-
1982 (10) TMI 54 - ITAT ALLAHABAD
... ...
... ... ..... the provisional assessment or its recovery and that it affected only the extra amount found due by the final or regular assessment. The interpretation given by the Calcutta High Court equally applies to the Act whose provisions are now under my consideration. I will also, therefore, following the aforesaid decision, hold that the setting aside of the final or the regular assessments, did not affect the provisional assessments. It only affected the excess amount found due by the final or regular assessment which has already been made the subject of rectification by the IAC and has been adjusted against other demands. 19. My answer to the question proposed u/s 255(4) of the IT Act, 1961, therefore, is in the affirmative and I hold that on quashing of the regular assessments made under the Act, the provisional assessments did not cease to exist and that they survived. The case will now go back to the Bench for passing an order in conformity with the view expressed by me above.
-
1982 (10) TMI 53 - ITAT ALLAHABAD
... ...
... ... ..... very even after the assessments had been made. In that view of the matter, it was necessary that the AAC should have examined the various findings of the ITO given in the respective assessments and then give his own decision thereon dealing with each contention or addition separately. I, therefore, agree with the finding of the ld. A.M. that the matter must go back to the AAC with a direction that he should dispose of the appeals on merits. 9. I, however, do not agree with the ld. A.M. in his further finding that the ITO had rightly refused registration to the firm for the asst. yr. 1973-74 u/s 186(2) of the Act. In my opinion, this matter should also be restored to the file of the AAC and he should be directed to consider the order of the ITO passed u/s 186(2) of the Act on merits instead of setting aside and directing the ITO to dispose of the assessee s application afresh. 10. The matter will now go back to the Bench for passing orders in conformity with my above opinion.
-
1982 (10) TMI 52 - ITAT ALLAHABAD
Being Heard ... ... ... ... ..... ffording an opportunity of being heard to the assessee concerned. In other words, if in an order passed by the ITO, some illegality has crept in, the same could be cured as indicated above and his action could not be held to be null and void in the manner that no action could be taken. 15. Therefore, the order under consideration, under the circumstances, could be maintained at the stage where the illegality supervened. The decision of the Hon ble Supreme Court in Guduthur Bros. supports this conclusion. The above conclusion has been taken after reading the two sections, viz., section 155(1), read with section 154(3), and also section 267, harmoniously. Under the above circumstances, the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) is set aside and the matter is referred back to the ITO for taking the share income of the firm Auto Sales, after allowing an opportunity of being heard to the assessee under section 154(3). 16. In the result, the appeal is allowed for statistical purposes.
-
1982 (10) TMI 51 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-C
Capital Or Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... ness to the new territories, was not capital in nature. The expenditure on the employees tour being for the purpose of new business was rightly disallowed as capital expenditure. On reference it was held that half of the expenditure in connection with the director s visit to USA was allowable as a revenue expenditure. 9. Applying the above test to the facts of the case, it is clear firstly that the impugned expenditure was incurred in connection with the existing business of the assessee. Secondly, the new project was merely an extension of the assessee s existing business. Lastly, the details of expenditure show that there was no increase in the fixed capital of the assessee-company. In my view, therefore, the impugned expenditure was allowable as a revenue expenditure. I, therefore, agree with the view taken by the learned Accountant Member. 10. The matter may now be placed before the Bench which originally heard the appeal for disposal in accordance with the majority view.
-
1982 (10) TMI 50 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-C
Diversion By Overriding Title, Diversion Of Income, Income By Overriding Title ... ... ... ... ..... e date of each such transfer. This provision by itself excludes aggregation of sale consideration received in respect of all the assets during the year. As a corollary, the assets in respect of which the assessee has suffered a loss would stand clearly excluded. For these reasons, therefore, we agree with the reasoning and the conclusion of the AAC. 5. Now we return to IT Appeal No. 108 (Ahd.) of 1982. The controversy in this appeal is identical, except in regard to the capital gains realised on sale of shares and the capital loss incurred by the assessee on sale of certain shares. The assessee had realised capital gains of Rs. 1,13,634 on sale of 354 shares of Vikram Mills and had suffered capital loss on sale of shares of Dhrangadhra Chemicals and Sarangpur Cotton and Silver Cotton which in all amounted to Rs. 14,338. For the same reasons as recorded in the preceding paragraph, we decline to interfere with the decision of the AAC. 6. In the result the appeals are dismissed.
-
1982 (10) TMI 49 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-C
Assessment Order, Interest Payable By Assessee, Share Income ... ... ... ... ..... From reading of this order, we find force in the contention of the revenue that the ITO had merely tried to rectify the absence of a sentence to that effect in the assessment order and no more as the interest had already been charged at the assessment stage itself. The rectification, therefore, which the ITO was contemplating was verbal in nature without disturbing the calculation. It is for this reason, we find that he proceeded to recalculate the interest as per para 3 of his order. However, in one sense it is purely academic, to take note of this unnecessary order of the ITO as his action in charging the interest at the assessment stage is fully justifiable in view of our findings in the preceding para and the decision of the Allahabad High Court which is based on reading of the relevant section 217. We find, therefore, no substance in the second appeal of the assessee, i.e., IT Appeal No. 1728 (Ahd.) of 1981, and this is also dismissed. 8. Both the appeals are dismissed.
|
