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Showing 221 to 226 of 226 Records
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1982 (4) TMI 6 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Firm, Goodwill ... ... ... ... ..... tatives notwithstanding any clause in the deed of partnership that the death of a partner shall not dissolve the firm and that the surviving partners are entitled to carry on the business. The same view was taken by the Allahabad High Court in CED v. Smt. Laxmi Bai 1980 126 ITR 73, and by the Gauhati High Court in CED v. Kanta Devi Taneja 1981 132 ITR 437 (Gauhati). These cases have our respectful concurrence. The learned counsel for the assessee also brought to our notice a decision of the Gujarat High Court in Smt. Mrudula Nareshchandra v. CED 1975 100 ITR 297. This case is distinguishable because there was a clear provision in the partnership agreement that the heirs of the deceased partner will have no right in the goodwill. For the reasons given above, our answer to the question referred is as follows The value of the deceased s share in the goodwill of the firm was property passing on her death liable to estate duty. There will be no order as to costs of this reference.
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1982 (4) TMI 5 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Circular Issued By CBDT, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... the effect of the circular, it is not necessary for us, in view of the facts which we have set out hereinbefore, to discuss this principle in detail any more. Reference was also made to a decision in the case of CIT v. Swedish East Asia Co. Ltd. 1981 127 ITR 148 (Cal), on the instruction and effect of the circular of the CBDT. In the view we have taken and in view of the controversy and the position as explained before, it is also not necessary to examine this in further detail. So far as the valuation of shares of Mugneeram Bangur and Co. Pvt. Ltd. is concerned, in view of the fact that this was a partnership firm which was transformed into private limited company immediately before the preceding year, the Tribunal proceeded on a correct principle as set out hereinbefore. In the premises, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances of the case, parties will pay and bear their own costs. SUHAS CHANDRA SEN J.-I agree.
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1982 (4) TMI 4 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
HUF, Partial Partition In HUF ... ... ... ... ..... le to hold that the assessee and his wife after the partial partition constituted a HUF in respect of this property. The point is concluded against the assessee by the decision of this court in Jeetmal Nagri v. CWT 1984 148 ITR 139 (MP). In our opinion, the ITO was right in assessing the assessee in the status of individual. It automatically follows that the ITO was also right in adding the income of the minors under s. 64 of the Act. For these reasons, we answer the questions as follows (1) The Appellate Tribunal was not justified in law in holding that the share income from the firm constituted by the erstwhile members of the HUF will be the income of the HUF consisting of the karta and his wife. The share income of the assessee from the firm was his individual income. (2) The Appellate Tribunal was not justified in coming to the conclusion that the share income of the minors could not be included under s. 64 of the Act. There will be no order as to costs of this reference.
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1982 (4) TMI 3 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Export Market Development Allowance, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... circumstances of the case, the learned Tribunal was legally justified in confirming the order of the learned Appellate Assistant Commissioner allowing 75 of the salary expenses for the purposes of deduction under section 35B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ? It would be seen that the Revenue does not dispute the allowability of the claim of weighted deduction in respect of salary expenses. It disputes only the rate at which it has been allowed by the Appellate Tribunal. This issue is basically a question of fact and stands concluded by a finding of fact. There is no suggestion in the question mentioned above that the finding given by the Appellate Tribunal is not based on any material or that the exercise of discretion in fixing the percentage at which the claim is allowable is arbitrary or perverse. This being so, in our opinion, no statable question of law arises out of the order of the Tribunal. We, therefore, reject these reference applications but make no order as to costs.
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1982 (4) TMI 2 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... learned judge of the first instance that the authority concerned does not have any jurisdiction to exercise the power to initiate proceedings for the imposition of any penalty on the respondent company. The conditions for imposition of such penalty stipulated in section 271 for initiation of penalty proceedings, in the facts and circumstances of this case, are non-existent. We also agree with the learned judge of the court of the first instance that the notices may not be statutory notices but it is on the basis of the said notices that the penalty proceedings against the respondent company have been initiated and are being continued. In the above circumstances, in our view, it has been rightly held by the learned judge of the court of the first instance that the court in the exercise of its discretion under article 226 of the Constitution should interfere. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. SAMBHU CHANDRA GHOSE CJ. - I agree.
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1982 (4) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the respondent-assessee is entitled to relief under s. 25(4) - whether on a proper construction of the deed dated 30th March, 1959, it is a case of mere reconstitution of the old firm or a new firm succeeding to the business of the old firm entitling the respondent-assessee to claim the relief - Tribunal was right in upholding that the assessee-firm was dissolved on April 1, 1959, and was entitled to relief under s. 25(4), in respect of its income for the asst. yr. 1959-60
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