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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 226 Records
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1982 (4) TMI 249 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Charges – Registration of ... ... ... ... ..... egistration Act, 1908. This disposes of all the contentions raised on behalf of all the parties. In the result this application succeeds. There will be order in terms of prayer (a) of the summons. There will also be an order in terms of prayer (d) of the summons directing respondent No. 1 to pay a sum of Rs. 50,000 to the applicant forthwith in protanto satisfaction of the decretal dues of the applicant. Such payment may be made by the official liquidator to the advocate-on-record of the applicant company. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. The applicant company would be at liberty to prove for the balance of its claim in the liquidation proceedings. In so far as the official liquidator is concerned, he will be entitled to retain the costs which is assessed at Rs. 2,000 out of the assets in his hands. All parties are to act on a signed copy of the minutes of the operative portion of the order on the usual undertaking.
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1982 (4) TMI 236 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Powers of court to grant relief in certain cases ... ... ... ... ..... s especially in this case where the evidence indicates that the stock of yarn could not have been removed from the mill without the knowledge of, or the gate passes issued by, the managing director. As regards the second point as to the applicability of section 633 of the Companies Act, it is seen that a relief may be prayed for under that section only if the applicant has acted quite honestly. In this case, the appellant has completely disowned any liability for the shortage and it is not a case where the shortage has occurred by an honest act of the managing director. In this view of the matter, it has been rightly held by the lower appellate court that section 633 of the Companies Act is not applicable to the facts of this case. We have to, therefore, agree with the findings of the courts below that the appellant is liable to make good the loss which arose out of the shortage of yarn. The second appeal is, therefore, dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1982 (4) TMI 228 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Accounts - Annual account and balance sheet ... ... ... ... ..... ined. Taking this factor into consideration we have to see whether in fact a development rebate reserve had been created in the relevant year of account. It would appear so to us that the resolution of the shareholders clearly directed this to be done. The auditors indicate that this has been done. The accounts are adjusted accordingly. The next year s balance-sheet and opening balance of accounts indicate this. However, the assessee does not draw up a fresh balance-sheet for the relevant year (on the advice of the auditors that this is not necessary) as the appropriations and adjustments have been made. There is no delay in complying with the specific directions of the members given while considering the accounts. As such, in the facts and circumstances of this case, we are clear that the development rebate reserve has been created before the finalisation of the accounts. For the reasons outlined above, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee.
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1982 (4) TMI 227 - HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH INDORE BENCH
Consequences of voluntary winding up ... ... ... ... ..... isions merely lay down that in the case of a voluntary winding up, the company shall, from the commencement of the winding-up, cease to carry on its business, except so far as may be required for a beneficial winding up of such business. The reference to that provision, in. our opinion, would not be relevant because that provision does not prohibit the company, which is being voluntarily wound up, from receiving income from other sources and interest on securities. The Commissioner, therefore, was right in holding that the order passed by the ITO was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. Our answer to the question referred to this court, therefore, is that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was not justified in law in cancelling the order under section 263 of the Act passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax for the assessment year 1976-77. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1982 (4) TMI 213 - ITAT PUNE
... ...
... ... ..... y the weavers but entries were made in Chukoti, it was submitted that it was not correct to say that the purchases were not verifiable. In the light of the commercial practice prevailing with regard to the entry by the books of accounts of purchases made in Gujri, it was also contended that when the profits were higher and the turnover double that of the earlier year there was no reason to reject the accounts. The 1d. Dept. Rep. Submitted that the assessee had submitted to the additions in the past years. 6. We find that it is the general practice to enter the purchases made in the Gujri and not a chukoti book which is contemporary record. The ITO has not referred to any defects in the chukoti book. Further the results declared are better than in the earlier year inspite of increased turnover. No comparable case has also been cited by the revenue. We, therefore, hold that there are no grounds for making any addition. Addition of Rs. 3,500 is deleted. 7. The appeal is allowed.
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1982 (4) TMI 210 - ITAT MADRAS-D
... ...
... ... ..... hus, all the requirements to allow the statutory liability have been satisfied. It is therefore wrong, in our opinion, to call this change a causal deviation. There is no restoration of the old practice, but on the contrary the balance sheet of the assessee showed that the change had been consistently followed. Therefore this change cannot be a causal deviation. 10. The entry been genuine, the departure not being casual and the liability being statutory the assessee is entitled to the claim of deduction as per the law pronounced by the Supreme Court in case reported in (1971) 82 ITR 363 (SC) and the Made as High Court decision reported in (1975) 99 ITR 226 (Mad). 11. We are therefore, of the opinion that the ITO, when he allowed the claim of the assessee, had not committed any mistake causing prejudice to the interests of the Revenue to be rectified by the CIT under s. 263 of the Act. We therefore for the above reasons vacate the order passed by the CIT and allow this appeal.
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1982 (4) TMI 208 - ITAT MADRAS-D
Capital Gains, Computation Of ... ... ... ... ..... agreed before us that section 64 can be invoked. But the assessee argued for a lesser relief, which is permissible within the framework of the grounds raised in cross-objection. It was pointed out that apportionment of long-term and short-term on the basis of 46 per cent and 54 per cent is not appropriate, particularly when exact separate figures of capital gains for land and separate figures for building are available. And more so when the whole of the land has been financed by the assessee-husband. We agree with that submission. So we direct that Rs. 18,665 which is the capital gains for land shall be assessed as long-term capital gains and the balance of Rs. 27,035 less Rs. 18,665 equal to Rs. 8,370 shall be assessed as short-term capital gains. Ground allowed in part accordingly. 8. WHETHER TIME-BARRED - We found no substance. We agree with the AAC that the assessment is within time. 9. Departmental appeal dismissed. The cross objection is allowed in part on ground No. 1.
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1982 (4) TMI 207 - ITAT MADRAS-D
Method Of Accounting ... ... ... ... ..... ts to allow the statutory liability have been satisfied. It is, therefore, wrong, in our opinion, to call this change a casual deviation. There is no restoration of the old practice but on the contrary the balance sheet of the assessee showed that the change had been consistently followed. Therefore, this change cannot be a casual deviation. 10. The entry being genuine, the departure not being casual and the liability being statutory, the assessee is entitled to the claim of deduction as per the law pronounced by the Supreme Court in the case reported in Kedarnath Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. and the Madras High Court decision reported in E.A.E.T. Sundararaj. 11. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the ITO when he allowed the claim of the assessee, had not committed any mistake causing prejudice to the interests of the revenue to be rectified by the Commissioner under section 263. We, therefore, for the above reasons vacate the order passed by the Commissioner and allow this appeal.
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1982 (4) TMI 206 - ITAT MADRAS-D
Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... t at all necessary. Even without it, it will be possible for an assessee to establish that the newly constructed house is for his own residence. 6. We asked the departmental representative to enlighten on us on the material on which this case of two years or, as the case may be, three years minimum residence is sought to be sustained. He pointed out that section 54(1)(i), which provides that for the purpose of computing, in respect of the new asset, any capital gain arising from its transfer within a period of three years of its purchase or construction, as the case may be, the cost shall be nil. We fail to understand how this provision could be relied on to insist on two or three years residence in the newly constructed house. It only lays down a procedure to estimate the cost in the event of sale within a period of three years, and the expression within , we may point out, even permit a sale of property even the next day after construction. 7. Departmental appeal dismissed.
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1982 (4) TMI 205 - ITAT MADRAS-D
Payment Not Deductible, Gratuity ... ... ... ... ..... payments are not made within a reasonable period, it may cease to be such a provision. Therefore, this question has to be verified in the light of the payments of these amounts into the fund and the exact dates of payments. So the Commissioner (Appeals) will verify these dates of payments and the amounts of payments and decide the question whether this provision of Rs. 26,202 is a provision made by the assessee for the purpose of payment of a sum by way of any contribution towards any approved gratuity fund. If it is such a provision, it will be allowed as a deduction. Otherwise, it will not be allowed as a deduction. The impugned appellate order is set aside to that extent and is restored to the Commissioner (Appeals) for decision afresh in the light of these findings. 4. This para is not printed here as it deals with a minor issue. 5. Appeal allowed in part. Appeal to the extent it relates to ground 1 (Gratuity) is restored to the Commissioner (Appeals) for decision afresh.
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1982 (4) TMI 203 - ITAT MADRAS-D
Actual Cost, Assessment Year, Business Expenditure, Central Excise, Exchange Fluctuation, Plant And Machinery, Provident Fund
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1982 (4) TMI 201 - ITAT MADRAS-C
... ...
... ... ..... s augmented by the profit during the year or gets reduced by the loss. The assumption that such profits accrue evenly is also not far-fetched in the absence of anything to suggest the contrary. Again the disallowance is not based on any correlation between borrowed funds and withdrawals as such. Both sides agree that it is a case where no identification is possible about the source of funds withdrawn. Since the assessee is not in appeal, the only dispute before us is related to the quantum of disallowance. Of course, we do not have the basis of the working either by the ITO or the working mentioned by the first appellate authority. The first appellate authority left the question of quantification back to the ITO when he directed acceptance of assessee rsquo s figure subject to verification. The principle consistently approved by the Tribunal in such circumstances has only been followed by him. Under the circumstances, the departmental appeal fails. 4. The appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (4) TMI 200 - ITAT MADRAS-C
... ...
... ... ..... 980) 15 CTR (P and H) 276 (1980) 123 ITR 558 (P and H) which held the levy to be constitutional. The second appeal is on the single ground that this decision is pending adjudication before the Supreme Court. There are, however, some other angels to the issue before us. Part of the land is said to be within 8 kms and part outside 8 Kms of the city limits and the consideration applicable for one part may not be applicable for another. The assessee has an alternative argument on the basis that part of it is used for business Premises and that there is no case for levy for additional wealth-tax on the part used for business. In view of these additional question we are of the opinion that the entire dispute should go back to the WTO for a fresh consideration de novo in accordance with law. The appeal on this point will be treated as allowed for statistical purpose 6. In the result, the appeals will be treated as partly allowed in the manner indicated in the proceedings paragraphs.
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1982 (4) TMI 197 - ITAT MADRAS-C
... ...
... ... ..... brother accepted it, he accepted it as a trustee and/or a de facto guardian for the minor s interest, at the instance and on behalf of natural guardian. Even ignoring the natural relationship he was the brother of the adoptive mother and, therefore, a maternal uncle on adoption. He can be next friend or next of kin. It is not as though the property is saddled with mortgage or any other liability. Non-acceptance of such a gift would, in such circumstances, be considered more damaging to the minor s interest and, hence, there is neither presumption nor material to suggest that there is no acceptance. Acceptance on behalf is implied when gift is made by the natural guardian, unless perhaps where the gift is onerous or possession had not been handed over. In this case, change of patta and transfer of possession are both mentioned in the gift deed itself. Hence, in any view of the matter, the orders of authorities below have to be upheld. 7. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (4) TMI 196 - ITAT MADRAS-C
Net Wealth, Debt Owed ... ... ... ... ..... fter pointing out those uncertainties, eventually the Gujarat High Court held that even assuming that the likelihood or obtaining refund is an asset, it is incapable of being evaluated on the valuation date and an asset not capable of being ascertained and evaluated, could not be treated as an asset for the purpose of arriving at the net wealth of an assessee. This, therefore, directly settles the issue and that the assessee s claim that the right to receive refund is an asset not includible in the net wealth is right and the stand taken by the revenue is erroneous. Bearing in mind the principle of law laid down by the Gujarat High Court as above, we hold that the revenue was not at all right in including the amounts of refund. Para 3 is not reproduced here as it deals with a minor issue not covered in the synopsis. 4. In the result, the appeals are partly allowed for the assessment years 1970-71, 1971-72 and 1974-75, and the appeal for the assessment year 1975-76 is allowed.
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1982 (4) TMI 193 - ITAT MADRAS-C
In Part, Minor Child, Partnership Deed, Partnership Firm, Share Income, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... that, there was no direct nexus between the capital and profit as in the case before us. As for assessee s reliance on the decision of the Madras High Court in CIT v. S. Chandappa Iyer 1976 103 ITR 810, it was found in that case that the wife whose income was sought to be included under section 64 was a member of a firm not merely because of her capital contribution, but because she was an active partner and that she was entitled to the income referable to her share, in her own right, and not merely because of the capital contribution. It was in this context that section 64 was held inapplicable. It is, therefore, seen that the cases relied upon by the assessee are not only distinguishable on facts but we also find that the rationale of these very decisions supports the case of the ITO in that there is no other nexus in this case than the capital contribution, which came from the assessee. 8. Hence, the departmental appeals are allowed and the orders and of the ITO restored.
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1982 (4) TMI 190 - ITAT MADRAS-B
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... ... ..... d to the assessee The AAC has failed to appreciate the fact that in the case of prize scheme the initial investment made by the depositors is never lost while in the case of lottery, the initial investment is lost. 3. We find no substance in the departmental appeal. The fact that initial investment is lost in lotteries and that it is not lost in this case makes no difference. It is really an irrelevant factor. The only question is whether the assessee got the prize unexpectedly and by mere chance. If it is so, it is a lottery. That is the only test. All other facts are irrelevant. In this case, the assessee got it by mere chance. Therefore the departmental appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (4) TMI 189 - ITAT MADRAS-B
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... ... ..... a and the department relied on the decision of the Madras High Court in Khateeb Mohmood. The ld. advocate for the assessee sought to distinguish the facts of the present case with the facts in Khateeb Mohmood rsquo s case by pointing out that the assessee rsquo s husband had a flourishing business in Singapore and had remittances both legal and illicit and that there was nexus between the withdrawals and the illicit remittances. The Tribunal after pointing out that there was no absolute prohibition of remittances from Singapore and Malaysia, applied the principles in Khateeb Mohmood rsquo s case and held that the assessee has extent of Rs. 21,450 during the asst. yr. 1971-72. And Rs. 51,500 during the asst. yr. 1972-73. So the Tribunal restored the orders of the ITO in respect of the addition of Rs. 21,450 during 1971-72 and Rs. 51,500 during 1972-73 as the income of the assessee from unexplained sources. Copy of the order of the Tribunal is marked as Annexure lsquo C rsquo .
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1982 (4) TMI 188 - ITAT MADRAS-B
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... ... ..... much as the difference leaves us no doubt as to the difference in base for reckoning interest under s. 214 and 217. There is no provision for interest on excess deduction of tax at source as in the case of advance tax. If the status does not provide for it, it cannot be given. As for the reference to mirror image between ss. 214 and 217 is (1980) 16 CTR (Guj) 1 at pages 3 and 4 (1980) 123 ITR 748 at 752 (Guj) the comparison is only with reference to the date from which interest is to be reckoned, any further inference from this observation will do violence to common sense as the observation cannot be torn out of context in which it was made. We find that interest as calculated by the ITO is in accordance with law. Hence the assessee has no case on merits. We have to accept even the alternative claim of the revenue that the argument of the assessee, at best, is debatable and could not have been entertained in a petition, under s. 154. 5. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (4) TMI 182 - ITAT MADRAS-B
Rectification Of Mistakes, Apparent From Record ... ... ... ... ..... ributors about the provisions of law which restricted the relief only to individual from 1969 to 1971 and thereafter extended the relief only to a specified categories of AOPs/BOIs consisting only of husband and wife governed by the system of community of property in force in the Union territories of Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Goa, Daman and Diu. We are no doubt unaware of the legislative policy behind making this concession unavailable to the HUF as none is discernible from the object of the relevant amendments. We are informed that repeated representations have been sent to the Government as to lack of justification in not extending this relief to HUF. We have no doubt that if these representations bear fruit retrospectively, persons in the position of these assessees will also be given such benefit notwithstanding the present orders, especially because of lack of publicity for the restricted nature of the concession in the past. 9. In the result, the appeals are dismissed.
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