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Showing 21 to 40 of 264 Records
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1986 (1) TMI 366
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... ... ..... the mouth of the respondent-State to take a contrary stand and it would be estopped from doing so. It was also pointed out that in fact such benefits of exemption in identical circumstances had been already extended to other newly set-up small-scale entrepreneurs and the denial of the same to the petitioner would be plainly discriminatory if not mala fide. In the context of the view which I have already taken in favour of the petitioner, it becomes unnecessary to examine and pronounce on these plausible submissions as well. 14.. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, this writ petition is hereby allowed and the impugned order dated 24th November, 1982 (annexure 10), passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Bhagalpur Circle (respondent No. 1), is quashed with the direction that the liability to sales tax be assessed afresh in accordance with the findings in this judgment. I leave the parties to bear their own costs. JHA, J.-I agree. UDAY SINHA, J.-I agree.
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1986 (1) TMI 365
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... ... ..... meal manufactured for sale as fertiliser in the market has a separate commercial identity distinct from these raw-bones purchased. We are clearly of the view that the purchase turnover of raw-bones is liable to tax under section 5A of the Act. The result of the foregoing discussion is we allow the tax revision case and set aside the impugned orders of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. The reassessment orders relating to the assessment years 1975-76, 1976-77 and 1977-78 are restored. The remand order relating to the assessment year 1978-79 will however remain and subject to the decision as stated above all other questions directed to be considered afresh will be considered and a fresh order of assessment will be passed by the assessing authority. Counsel for the assessee prays for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We do not see any substantial question of law of general importance that needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. The prayer for leave is accordingly rejected.
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1986 (1) TMI 364
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... ... ..... taken into account in assessing the escapement of the turnover. The value of the goods sent outside Bihar will not be the real value for purposes of taxation. The value of the goods purchased from Rohtas Industries will be the correct valuation of the turnover escaping assessment. The assessing officer, therefore, should proceed to assess on that basis. 22.. Before concluding I would like to observe that it would be advisable for the State Government to delete the condition of sale inside Bihar from form IX. The sales tax department may lose by such deletion, but industries with which the prosperity of any State is inextricably linked would benefit. This is not, however, our order, but only an advice to consider this aspect of the matter. 23.. For the reasons stated above, the applications lack substance. They must be dismissed accordingly with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 250 payable by the petitioner in each application. H.L. AGARWAL, J.-I entirely agree. Applications dismissed.
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1986 (1) TMI 363
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... ... ..... y bags. 8.. Our attention was drawn to a number of cases where the courts went into the question of classification of an item under one or the other entries in a schedule to the Sales Tax Act. It was submitted by Mr. Jetly, relying upon these decisions, that it was open to us to re-examine the evidence in order to decide whether the gunny bags of the kind in question would fall under entry 6 of Schedule C or whether they would be relegated to the residuary entry 22 of Schedule E. In our view we are not sitting in appeal over the judgment of the Tribunal. The Tribunal has arrived at its conclusion on the basis of the evidence which was before it. We, therefore, cannot reappraise this evidence in proceedings which are by way of reference under section 61(1) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act. In the premises the question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The applicants to pay to the respondents costs of the reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1986 (1) TMI 362
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... ... ..... the same had no effect on the assessees. We are, therefore, of the view that the conditions 1, 2 and 3 could not be enforced in order to claim the eligibility for the benefit, if any, under the Government Order. In the result we hold that in each of these tax cases the transactions relating to supply of food and drinks in the respective restaurants during the respective assessment years are not sales and that they are not liable to pay sales tax under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act. There are also no grounds for enhancing the percentage in respect of parcel sales. We accordingly dismiss the tax cases. In the writ appeals we also hold that the respective assessees are entitled to the benefits of waiver under G.O. Ms. No. 1187, Commercial Taxes and Religious Endowments Department, dated 22nd October, 1982, and accordingly we allow the writ appeals, setting aside the order of the learned single Judge. There will, however, be no order regarding costs. Writ appeals allowed.
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1986 (1) TMI 361
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... ... ..... ed against the importers as such and it is in the nature of a subsidy granted by the State to the second respondent and it is not in the nature of an impost which is discriminatory in character and this exemption in question which is in the nature of a subsidy or a rebate has no immediate or direct effect on free flow of trade and commerce within the State of Andhra Pradesh and the impugned notification is not vitiated as being violative of article 304(a) of the Constitution of India. In the result, all the contentions fail and the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250. The learned counsel for the petitioners seeks leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We do not think that this is a fit case where we can grant leave, as in our opinion, no substantial question of law arises which requires to be considered by the Supreme Court within the meaning of article 133 of the Constitution of India. Hence the oral leave sought is rejected. Writ petition dismissed.
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1986 (1) TMI 360
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... ... ..... the petitioners from 2nd February, 1983, or for the periods prior to that date mentioned in section 5D will in any way be unreasonable or arbitrary. Therefore, we hold that section 6 of the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1982, is constitutionally valid and sections 6 and 38 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1985, do not in any way offend articles 14, 19 and 21 nor are they violative of articles 141, 265 and 300-A. For the reasons stated above, the writ petitions fail and they are accordingly dismissed. But in the circumstances there shall be no order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150 each. Immediately after the judgment was delivered, the counsel for the petitioners made an oral request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We do not find any substantial question of law of general importance or any question of law which requires to be decided by the Supreme Court involved in these cases. Hence, leave declined. Writ petitions dismissed.
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1986 (1) TMI 359
Words and Phrases - Tram car - Dutiability - Valuation - Appellate Tribunal - Special Bench - Jurisdiction
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1986 (1) TMI 358
Appeal - Person who filed the appeal on behalf of appellant ... ... ... ... ..... es, 1982 read with Rule 3(2)(c) of the said Rules, which categorically lay down that in case of an appeal being filed before the Appellate Tribunal on behalf of a Company the only person competent to sign and verify the same is the Principal Officer of the said Company. It is clear from the title of the appeal that the appellant is a Private Limited Company. Shri Jagdish Kumar also confirms this fact. As stated, under the Statutory Rules the only person competent to sign and verify this appeal was a Principal Officer of the Company. Shri Jagdish Kumar is not even an employee of the Company, much less a Principal Officer. In view of this, it is clearly a case where appeal has been filed without a competent person having signed and verified the same, and we treat it to be a case where no proper appeal can be taken to have been filed to the Tribunal. The petition which purports to be an appeal listed for today has, therefore, to be rejected as non-competent. Ordered accordingly.
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1986 (1) TMI 349
Public deposits ... ... ... ... ..... ing such officer of the company who is in default cannot have any application and hence the period of limitation will not be six months or even one year. Needless to say, section 468, Criminal Procedure Code, lays down three periods of limitation ranging from six months to three years depending on the question whether the offence is punishable with fine only or with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. As the period of imprisonment may exceed three years under the penal provisions in section 58A(6)(b) of the Act, there is no question of limitation in this case under section 468, Criminal Procedure Code, and hence the petition of complaint cannot be barred by limitation. The proceedings cannot, therefore, be quashed. The application heard as a contested application is accordingly rejected. The prayer of the petitioner for granting special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is refused.
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1986 (1) TMI 341
Winding up - Preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... rvations of the Full Bench of this court in ITO v. Official liquidator 1985 155 ITR 510 58 Comp. Cas. 590 , learned counsel for the appellant contended that the validity of the demand for interest can be decided only when recovery is sought for and not at any previous stage. We do not think this argument is available to the appellant. It was the appellant who approached the liquidator for recognising the claim for arrears of interest. Naturally, the recognition would be followed by payment pari passu, subject to availability of funds. The claim put forward before the liquidator and the company court is part of the process of recovery. Further, the Department subjected itself to the jurisdiction of the liquidator and the company court in making the claim before them. The Department cannot now turn round and say that the liquidator and the company court have no jurisdiction to hold that the claim is not valid. We find no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed with costs.
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1986 (1) TMI 340
Oppression and mismanagement ... ... ... ... ..... ers and this requires that events have to be considered not in isolation but as a part of a consecutive story. There must be continuous acts on the part of the majority shareholders, continuing up to the date of petition, showing that the affairs of the company were being conducted in a manner oppressive to some part of the members. As regards the resolutions passed on December 30, 1982, we are in agreement with the view taken by the learned company judge that unless the new directors take over charge and conduct the affairs of the company, it cannot possibly be concluded that their conduct in any manner has affected the company or the conduct of the directors is prejudicial to the public interest or the interest of the company. In the result we find no merit in this special appeal. It is accordingly dismissed and the interim order passed therein is vacated. In the circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs. ------------------------- Supra p. 854.
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1986 (1) TMI 326
Remission of duty ... ... ... ... ..... akage could be foreseen. Therefore, the molasses lost by such overflow and leakage will not fall under the provisions of the proviso to Rule 49 of the Central Excise Rules as it cannot be attributed to natural causes or unavoidable accident. 5. Merely because the quality of the goods produced had deteriorated it does not follow that the goods cease to become dutiable. Molasses is a specific item in the Central Excise Tariff Schedule and once it is manufactured and comes into existence it becomes chargeable to duty. As observed by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Khandelwal Metal and Engg. Works v. Union of India 1985 (20) E.L.T. 222 (S.C.) even sub-standard goods produced during process of manufacture and which may have to be disposed of as rejects or scrap, are yet products of the manufacturing process. Hence, this argument of the appellant is unacceptable. 6. In the circumstances, the orders of the Collector (Appeals) are not sustainable. The appeals are allowed.
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1986 (1) TMI 325
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... glass headlight covers are classifiable under Tariff Item 68 and not under Item 23A(4) of the Central Excise Tariff and the headlight covers could not be described as glass or glassware falling under Tariff Item 23A(4). The learned Departmental Representative rsquo s argument to the effect that no glass item will go to Tariff Item 68 does not help him. The lenses manufactured by the appellant are optical glass with a definite refractive index. When the appellant had filed a classification list the onus was on the Revenue to prove that the item declared by the appellant in Tariff Item 68 falls in Tariff Item 23A(4). The Revenue has not been able to discharge the initial onus. 8. Keeping in view the aforesaid discussion and the earlier judgment of the Tribunal discussed above, we hold that the impugned items manufactured by the appellant, are classifiable under Tariff Item 68. In the result the order passed by the lower authority is quashed. In the result the appeal is allowed.
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1986 (1) TMI 322
Refund - Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... re satisfied that in view of their letter dated 23-3-1970, all later payments must be held to have been under protest. As earlier seen the lower authorities have declined to grant refund only on the basis of the bar of limitation. Since we have now held that all payments on and from 23-3-1970 during the relevant period must be held to have been made under protest, there will be no question of bar of limitation in respect of refund of such amounts. 7. ensp Shri Tripathi contended that at the relevant period there was no provision in Rule 11 as to payments under protest being saved from the bar of limitation in respect of claims for refund. But this contention is to be over-ruled in view of the majority decision of this Tribunal in M/s. Pure Drinks Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise (1985 ECR 696). 8. ensp Accordingly, we modify the order of the lower authorities and direct refund of duties paid on second-hand metal containers during the relevant period on and after 23-3-1970.
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1986 (1) TMI 321
Dutiability ... ... ... ... ..... Rule 9A would have had a suitable provision or perhaps an explanation to say that the rate of duty would not apply if the goods were manufactured when that rate was not applicable, or if there was no duty applicable to the goods at the time of manufacture. It is not possible that Rule 9A was framed in ignorance of the fact that goods could be manufactured when there is no duty on them and yet be cleared on a day when there was such a duty in force and which according to it (Rule 9A) would attached itself to such goods if they are cleared on such day. 11. ensp However in view of the majority decision of the Larger Bench M/s. Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. - 1985 (21) E.L.T. 957 and considering the fact that Shri Sundar Rajan said that this case would be covered by that decision and that therefore he had no further comments to submit, I join the learned President and the learned Judicial Member in discharging the show cause notice and confirming the order of the Appellate Collector.
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1986 (1) TMI 316
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... ver distances, and indicates that DZM-180 can receive input signals from a remote centre and transcribe it into graphic output. 13. The learned counsel claimed that according to the printed literature, the printing device was only 5 metres away from the computer. But what the paragraph refers to is not the distance of the printing device, but the speed with which a new signal may be sent after the moment of the confirmation of receipt of the character code. The speed is 5 ms. i.e. 5 mico seconds. 14. It may be true, as argued by the learned counsel for the importers, that use in telecommunication device is rare and that the preponderant use of the machine is as a computer sub-system and that possibly is a fact, but we do not need to go into it. It is enough for the present purpose that the machine has telecommunication application. That being the case, it is not possible to say that the assessment of the lower authorities was incorrect. 15. The appeal is accordingly rejected.
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1986 (1) TMI 315
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... sulphur-trioxide is an anhydride of sulphuric acid. Evidence has been produced before us that the Department in their Tariff Advice issued on 15.5.1982 bearing No. 26/82 have held that sulphur-trioxide produced as an intermediate product is chargeable to duty under Item 68 CET. We observe with respect that Tribunal is not bound by the Trade Notice issued by CBEC and in view of the specific inclusion of anhydride in the tariff entry 14-G, sulphur-trioxide would fall for the purpose of assessment under this tariff item. A similar issue had come up before the Tribunal in the case of M/s. Dai-ichi Karkaria Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Pune in Appeal No. 2307/83-C and Appeal No.l48/85-C and the Tribunal in their Order No. 199-200/85-C have held sulphur-trioxide manufactured is chargeable to duty under item 14G. For the reasons set out above, we are in agreement with these findings of the Tribunal and up hold its levy under 14G CET. The appeal is, therefore, rejected.
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1986 (1) TMI 314
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... ... ..... D.R. while accepting the facts submitted that the co-relation between the End-use Certificate and the Essentiality Certificate have to be done. 6. We have heard the submissions from both the sides. From a perusal of the copy of the refund application, copy of the Essentiality Certificate and a copy of the End-use Certificate we note that the appellants have satisfied the conditions laid down in 35/79-Cus. The Essent2iality Certificate is noted to have been filed in time. Therefore, the reasoning contained in the impugned order to the effect that the goods being identifiable having multiple uses are not entitled to the benefit of the notification cannot be upheld. 7. We, therefore, agree that the imported goods are entitled to the benefit of the Notification 35/79-Cus. In this view we set aside impugned order and direct the Assistant Collector of Customs to pass a fresh order granting the benefit to the appellants after examination of the Essentiality and End-use Certificates.
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1986 (1) TMI 307
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... ... ..... ts spread over the life span of the cylinder. It was only a single recovery and not a double recovery over and above the initial purchase price of the cylinder. The respondents cited two previous judgments of this Tribunal in their favour - 1. 1986 (26) E.L.T. 265 (T) - Collector of Central Excise, Bombay-III v. Century Spg. and Mfg. Co. Ltd., Kalyan. 2. Order No. 247/86-A, dated 27.3.1986 in E-Appeal No. 1216/84-A - Collector of Central Excise, Cochin v. M/s. Fertilizers and Chemicals Travancore Ltd. The learned representative of the department relied on the Tribunal rsquo s decision in Order No. 582/85-A in the case of M/s. Indian Vegetable Products. We find that in this case the cans were held to be not returnable in view of their being no agreement on record for their return. This case is, therefore, distinguishable from the one before us. 4. Following the ratio of our earlier two decisions relied on by the respondents, we uphold the impugned order and reject this appeal.
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