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Showing 201 to 209 of 209 Records
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1989 (5) TMI 9 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... in joint possession. Therefore, the provisions of section 9(3) of the old Act and section 26 of the new Act are applicable in the matter of assessment of their respective income from the property. In Biswa Ranjan Sarvadhikary 1963 47 ITR 927 (Cal) and numerous decisions thereafter including CWT v. Bishwanath Chatterjee 1976 103 ITR 536 (SC), this court and the Supreme Court consistently held that income from house properties which are in joint possession of the coparceners of a Hindu undivided family governed by the Dayabhaga school of Hindu law should be assessed separately in their individual hands in proportion to their shares in the family properties under section 9(3) of the 1922 Act and section 26 of the 1961 Act. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of the Revenue. For the reasons aforesaid, we answer the question in this reference in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE J. -I agree.
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1989 (5) TMI 8 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... jurisdiction of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner to levy penalty, where penalty proceedings were referred to him prior to the coming into force of the Amendment Act cannot be taken away. We agree with the views expressed by the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Mohinder Lal s case 1987 168 ITR 101 to the effect that an authority once seized of a matter lawfully would have jurisdiction to deal with it and its jurisdiction cannot be divested by a later amendment of law taking away its jurisdiction unless the amendment expressly or impliedly takes away that right with retrospective effect. For the reasons aforesaid, we are of the view that the Tribunal was not right in cancelling the penalty on the ground that the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner had lost jurisdiction over this case. We, therefore, answer this question in this reference in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE J. - I agree.
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1989 (5) TMI 7 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Closely Held Company, Investment Company ... ... ... ... ..... hould be allowed to declare dividend short of the statutory percentage. The question of soundness is an irrelevant question. The real question is the commercial prudence and prudence implies the judgment of practical requirements. If the requirements of the company call for an exercise of prudent restraint, the restraint would be reasonable. Therefore, in this case it has been only reasonable for the company to refrain from declaring a larger dividend than was declared for the reasons grounded on practicality. The declaration of a larger dividend would have left the assessee short of liquidity. We, therefore, answer the question referred under section 66(1) in the negative and in favour of the assessee. In view of our answer to the question referred to us under section 66(1), the question referred under section 66(2) need not be answered separately. We, therefore, decline to answer the latter question. There will be no order as to costs. BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE J. -I agree.
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1989 (5) TMI 6 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Income Tax Authorities ... ... ... ... ..... herwise. Under the circumstances, it appears that the issuance of such notice by the Income tax Officer was without jurisdiction. It has been averred in paragraph 10 of the writ petition that in respect of proceedings which were pending similar notices were issued by the Income-tax Officer and those had been duly complied with. Under the circumstances, as very rightly observed by the learned court below, the Income-tax Officer was not entitled to exercise such power as a mere cloak for the purpose of making a fishing investigation and a roving enquiry in order to take proceedings under section 147 of the Act. Dr. Pal appearing in support of the writ petitioner had drawn our attention to the fact that in fact proceedings were initiated under section 148 and ultimately those proceedings had been dropped. Under those circumstances, this court does not find any merit in this appeal. As a result, this appeal is dismissed. No order is made as to costs. MAHITOSH MAJUMDAR J.-I agree.
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1989 (5) TMI 5 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Failure To Disclose Fully And Truly, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... e-tax Officer that there was omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment for the assessment year in question. The nature and content of the confession and the credentials of the creditor had not been discussed in the reasons recorded by the Income-tax Officer. He has relied on the letter of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. We do not know what the letter contained, ID the premises, we are of the view that the condition precedent and necessary for assumption of jurisdiction under section 147(a) had not been satisfied. We, therefore, answer the question for the assessment year 1962-63 in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The first question for the assessment year 1964-65 is also answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The third question is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE J.-I agree.
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1989 (5) TMI 4 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Failure To File, Income Tax Return ... ... ... ... ..... nothing to do with the carrying on of or carrying out of the business activity. The liability to tax no doubt arises out of the business activity. But the income-tax itself is not deductible in computing the income of the assessee. The interest which is paid for any infraction of the provisions of the Income-tax Act by the assessee must derive its colour from the principal payment, i.e., income-tax and will partake of it. Under the Income-tax Act interest or penalty is inextricably connected with the tax liability. If income-tax is not a permissible deduction under section 37, any interest payable for default committed by the assessee in discharging its statutory obligation under the Income-tax Act which is calculated with reference to the tax or income cannot be allowed as a deduction. For the reasons aforesaid, we answer the question in this reference in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE J.--I agree.
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1989 (5) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT
Technical know-how and services received form non-resident - Whether CIT is justified in refusing no objection of certificate - It is inconceivable that a law should be made by Parliament in India which has no relationship with anything in India - question whether the ingredients, in terms of the impugned provision, indicate a nexus is one of substantial importance, as it concerns collaboration agreements with foreign companies - case is referred to Constitution Bench
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1989 (5) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT
Co-operative Society - Interest on Borrowed Capital - Whether the credit balances in the Loss Equalisation and Capital Redemption Reserve Fund which were actually used by the assessee for the purposes of its business represented capital borrowed by the assessee for the purpose of its business within the meaning of section 36(1)(iii) - Whether the Tribunal was right in law in allowing interest on such balances as a deduction in computing the total income of the assessee
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1989 (5) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Penalty - Delay in Filing Return - mens rea is not essential for imposing penalty - but mens rea has to be established for prosecution under s. 276C
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