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Showing 181 to 200 of 241 Records
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1992 (11) TMI 61 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Speculation, Speculative Transactions ... ... ... ... ..... enue that the benefit of the proviso is available only to manufacturers in respect of purchase of raw materials. It clearly applies also to persons carrying on merchanting business. So far as the facts are concerned the finding is clear as set out above. The requirements of this proviso are fully met in this case. Both the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal have arrived at a concurrent finding of fact. There is no challenge to this finding by raising any specific question in regard to its perversity or otherwise. Under the circumstances, the finding of fact is binding. If that be so, proviso (a) to section 43(5) clearly applies to the facts of the present case. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the sum of Rs. 34,870 represented business loss and not speculation loss. The question referred to us is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1992 (11) TMI 60 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... re informed by Mr. Aggarwal that in respect of the assessment year 1978-79, in order to avoid future litigation, and despite the decision of the Tribunal in its favour, the assessee has agreed to the stand of the Department, namely, that the dividend from the said 308 shares of Madan Mohan Lal Sri Ram Pvt. Ltd. belongs to the Hindu undivided family. Mr. Aggarwal further states that as the assessee has accepted this position in respect of the later assessment year, namely, 1978-79, he has instructions from his client to contend that the question of law referred at the instance of the Department may be answered in favour of the Department. He submits that this is being done so that the litigation between the Department and the assessee, in this connection, comes to an end. In view of the aforesaid statement of learned counsel for the assessee, the question of law referred to this court by the Tribunal is answered in favour of the Department. There will be no order as to costs.
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1992 (11) TMI 59 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Circulars, Disallowance ... ... ... ... ..... s finding on the basis of the circular of the Central Board of Direct Taxes bearing No. F. No. 10/93/68-IT(All) dated October 29, 1969. The Tribunal, following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Navnit Lal C. Javeri v. K.K. Sen, AAC of I.T 1965 56 ITR 198, held that the circular of the Board was binding on the departmental authorities under the Act and, following the same, allowed relief to the assessee. There is no dispute before us that the circular of the Board covers the controversy. According to that, the amount in question cannot be disallowed. That being so, in our opinion, the Tribunal was right in holding that the departmental authorities were bound by the circular of the Board and to act accordingly. We do not see any error in the decision of the Tribunal in that regard. In view of the foregoing discussion, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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1992 (11) TMI 58 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Depreciation On Scientific Research Assets, Provisos In Taxing Statutes, Remuneration To Employee Directors
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1992 (11) TMI 57 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
CBDT, Return ... ... ... ... ..... are complied with. Therefore, having regard to the number of matters which would be received by the Board, we are of the view that the aforesaid procedure would be just and expedient and would also be in conformity with the principles of natural justice. In the instant case, no opportunity whatsoever has been afforded to the assessee. His application for condonation of delay in filing the returns has been rejected on obtaining information from the Income-tax Officer behind the back of the assessee. Therefore, we are of the view that the order ( annexure-M ) cannot at all be sustained. For the reasons stated above, the writ appeal is allowed. The order of the learned single judge is set aside. The order dated July 17, 1990, passed by the Board in No. F. 212/5/90-ITA. II, produced as annexure-M in the writ petition, is quashed. The Board is directed to consider the application of the assessee afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this order.
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1992 (11) TMI 56 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Revision, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... rcised jurisdiction, not vested in it, in imposing the penal interest. For the reasons stated above, these appeals are allowed. The order dated November 30, 1990, passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax (Investigation), Circle IV(I), Bangalore, for the assessment year 1984-85 produced as annexure A in the writ petition, in so far it imposes the penal interest amounting to Rs. 3,88,509, is quashed. In other respects, the said order is not disturbed. The submission made by Sri Raghavendra Rao, learned counsel for the Department, that unless the application filed as per rule II of Schedule II of the Act is decided, the authorities will not proceed with the auction is placed on record. In view of this, it is not necessary to quash the sale proclamation notification because the validity of the same will have to be considered under rule 11 of Schedule II of the Act. We also further make it clear that the attachment effected by the authority is not, in any way, disturbed.
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1992 (11) TMI 55 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Reassessment, Reassessment Notice ... ... ... ... ..... ess during the next year also. Assuming that the value of goods pledged to the bank in the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1973-74 was in excess of the stock shown in the accounts for that year, the fact that the difference in value was not added to the income of that assessment year cannot be a ground to hold that an addition should not be made for the assessment year 1972-73. We do not think the observations in the above decisions relied on by the assessee have any application to the facts of the present case. Question No. 2 has to be answered in the affirmative, that is, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. We answer questions Nos. 1 and 2 in the affirmative, i.e., against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. A copy of this judgment under the signature of the Registrar and seal of the High Court will be transmitted to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The assessee shall pay the costs of the reference to the Revenue. N. G. DAS J. -I agree.
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1992 (11) TMI 54 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... . Therefore, it cannot be ascertained as to what was the precise statement of the Bombay party in so far as the instant assessee is concerned. The Appellate Tribunal was, therefore, absolutely right in holding that the proposal sent by the Income-tax Officer to the Commissioner of Income-tax was wholly vague and ambiguous and, on the basis of the reasons recorded by the Income-tax Officer, no reasonable belief could be had that the income of the assessee in the years under consideration had escaped assessment. The reasons as set out by the Income-tax Officer in his proposals sent to the Commissioner of Income-tax are nothing but a mere pretence to invoke section 147/148 of the Act and, therefore, the proceedings initiated under section 147/148 by the Income-tax Officer were rightly cancelled by the Appellate Tribunal. In the result, we answer both the questions in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs.
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1992 (11) TMI 53 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Debt Due, Deduction, Disallowance, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... n respect of which the exemption was allowed to the assessee under section 5(1)(iv) of the Act. The mere fact that the amount thrown into the common hotchpotch came to be invested in the property held by the Hindu undivided family on which the family may have sought exemption in computation of its net wealth (though it is not evident from the record ), that the assessee cannot be denied the deduction of the liability in question nor is the deduction hit by the mischief contemplated under section 2(m)(ii) of the Act. Section 2(m)(ii) in terms has no application to the case of the assessee. The assessee owed a debt of Rs. 43,022 to the firm on the valuation date and that liability is clearly deductible in computing the net wealth of the assessee within the meaning of section 2(m) of the Act. For what has been stated above, we answer the question in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The assessee is entitled to costs which is assessed at Rs. 250.
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1992 (11) TMI 52 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Developement Rebate ... ... ... ... ..... the light of the ratio of Sunil s judgment 1985 156 ITR 509 (SC), it would appear to us that the exclusive rights of the two partners to partnership having been reduced to a shared right, albeit between themselves, and the test laid down by the Supreme Court in the above case would equally apply to the situation of the assessee. The definition in section 2(47) of the Act of the expression transfer is wide enough to apply to the throwing of the individual shares of Malatibai and Mrs. Somawanshi into the capital of the partnership. Hence, there was transfer of the assets which had been used by the deceased Karajgar in his business, and in regard to which development rebate had been allowed under section 33 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, within the period of eight years. Consequently, the development rebate allowed on the assets was liable to be withdrawn. In these circumstances, the question referred is answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. No order as to costs.
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1992 (11) TMI 51 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he loan and had to pay interest for the purpose of raising money to participate in the auction and to acquire the licence for the purpose of conducting the business of buying and selling arrack during the following year. It is also an admitted fact that, for many years previous to the assessment year, the assessee had been carrying on the same business. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is perfectly justified in contending that it is entitled to claim deduction in respect of the amount paid as interest for raising the loan during the relevant assessment year. In the result, exhibits P-1 and P-2 are set aside to the extent it has refused the claim of the petitioner regarding allowable expenses only on the ground that the petitioner had no business activity in arrack and brandy during the assessment year 1984-85. The second respondent is directed to pass fresh assessment order in the light of the findings in this judgment. The original petition stands allowed as above.
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1992 (11) TMI 50 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... office or employment. A plain reading of the section makes it clear that one of the preconditions for the claim of exemption is that the allowance in question should have been specifically granted to meet expenses and the exemption is only to the extent such expenses were actually incurred. As noted above, there is no evidence worth the name to suggest that any part or whole of the amount in question represents the expenses actually incurred by the assessee. One of the necessary ingredients of section 10(14) being absent in this case, the assessee, in my opinion, cannot claim any exemption in respect of the amount in question. For the reasons stated above, I am of the opinion that the Tribunal erred in law in allowing the exemption as claimed by the assessee. The reference is accordingly answered in the negative, that is to say, in favour, of the Revenue and against the assessee. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. G. C. BHARUKA J. -I agree.
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1992 (11) TMI 49 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... ifference whether the assessee manufactured surgical cotton on its own account or on job work basis for others. This change by no stretch of imagination, can be said to be a discontinuance of business. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Tribunal was right in holding that the assessee was entitled to set off of unabsorbed loss and unabsorbed depreciation of earlier years. We may, however, observe that so far as the unabsorbed loss is concerned, it will be governed by the provisions of section 72(1)(ii) of the Act and it can be adjusted only against the income under the same head. But so far as the carried forward of unabsorbed depreciation is concerned, as under section 32 such carried forward depreciation is deemed to be depreciation of the subsequent year to which it is carried forward, it would be permissible to set off such depreciation against the income of the subsequent year under any head. We, therefore, answer question No. 4 accordingly. No order as to costs.
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1992 (11) TMI 48 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sessee. This decision was affirmed by the Division Bench which we have already referred to and reported in A. V Thomas case 1986 160 ITR 818 (Ker). In K. P. Abdul Kareem Hajee v. ITO 1983 141 ITR 120 (Ker), the learned judge held that the assessment order which was modified or reversed by the appellate authority which in turn was reversed by the Appellate Tribunal revives the original assessment order and, therefore, the liability for interest under section 220(2) gets attracted from the date of the original demand. No doubt, in the said case, the assessee had not paid the tax demanded earlier, but, obviously, the assessee had the advantage of the interim order of stay made by the higher authorities. Having regard to the nature and quality of interest leviable under section 220(2), we have no hesitation in upholding the claim made by the Revenue in the instant case. The writ petitions are accordingly dismissed and rule discharged. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1992 (11) TMI 47 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Computation Of Capital, Fixed Deposit, Industrial Undertaking, Special Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... z., the first amount of Rs. 1,80,000 transferred towards paid up value of shares and the balance of Rs. 1,80,000 which was transferred to calls in advance account. This distinction, in our opinion, is not relevant for deciding the present controversy. For the purpose of determining the claim of the assessee to exemption under section 10(15)(iv)(c) of the Act, it is sufficient to note that the original nature of the debt which was a debt incurred in respect of purchase of plant and machinery outside India had changed so far as this amount is concerned. That being so the second condition laid down in clause (c) was no more fulfilled and, therefore, it cannot be treated as a loan contemplated by sub-clause (c) of clause 15(iv) and, accordingly, the interest payable on such amount cannot be exempt by virtue of section 10(15)(iv)(c) of the Act. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we answer both the questions in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. No order as to costs.
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1992 (11) TMI 46 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Bad Debt, Business Loss ... ... ... ... ..... d to be the conduct of a prudent businessman. We need not go into any other factor that might have weighed in the mind of the assessee while advancing the loans in question to the textile mills in the instant case as we are certain in our mind that it had no connection with the trade or business of the assessee. The loan was not incidental to the carrying on of the business of supply of goods by the assessee. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to hold that such loans are loans in connection with the trade or business, or incidental to the carrying on of the business of the assessee. The bad debt of the same or any part thereof, therefore, cannot be treated as an allowable deduction. It is nothing but plain and simple capital loss. As such, we do not find any infirmity in the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal in the instant case. In the premises aforesaid, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. No order as to costs.
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1992 (11) TMI 45 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t was completed within time. The contention of the petitioner that, as there was no levy of interest in the original assessment, there cannot be any levy of interest in the order of reassessment has been considered in exhibit P-7 order. It is true that interest was levied for the first time in the order of reassessment made on November 22, 1981. Section 139(8) does not prohibit levy of interest when reassessment is made. It also does not specifically mention that levy of interest can be made only during the course of regular assessment. Interest can be levied under section 139(8) either in the course of regular assessment or in any other proceedings including reassessment. There cannot be any doubt that, under section 139(8), interest can be levied either in the course of regular assessment or in any other proceedings including reassessment. The contention of the petitioner that exhibit P-7 is liable to, be quashed is not tenable. The original petition is dismissed. No costs.
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1992 (11) TMI 44 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Offences And Prosecution ... ... ... ... ..... am in entire agreement with the view expressed by the learned judge. Applying the said ratio to the facts of this case, the proceedings before the criminal court cannot be stayed because a petition for Compounding of the offence is pending before the Commissioner of Income-tax. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed. However, in view of the request made by learned counsel for the petitioner that if the criminal case is disposed of expeditiously and subsequently the pending application before the Income-tax Department is allowed, the relief prayed for will become infructuous. Hence, a direction may be given to the authorities to dispose of the pending petition within a reasonable time to which course counsel for the Department has no objection. Accordingly, the Commissioner of Income-tax IV, Madras, before whom the compounding petition is said to be pending is directed to dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible, and, in any event, within three months from this day.
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1992 (11) TMI 43 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he principles to determine as to when the income is said to have accrued or arisen are already well-settled by a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court and need no reiteration. It is well-settled that the income is held to accrue only when the assessee acquires a right to receive that income. In other words, or to say it differently, income can be said to accrue on a date when the debt becomes due., As observed by the Supreme Court in CIT v. Ashokbhai Chimanbhai 1965 56 ITR 42, unless the right to profits comes into existence there is no accrual of profits. In the instant case, in the face of the clear agreement between the parties contained in clause 9 of the agreement, it cannot be said that the entire amount of Rs. 8 lakhs accrued to the assessee on the date of the agreement. In view of the foregoing discussion, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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1992 (11) TMI 42 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Company, Exemptions, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... e is curative or merely declares the previous law retroactive operation would be more rightly ascribed to it than the legislation which may prejudicially affect past rights and transactions. In the instant case, no right would be prejudicially affected by the interpretation which is sought to be attributed to the amended provision by the assessee. In Sha Chunnilal Sohanraj v. T. Gurushantappa 1972 1 Mys. L. J.327, it was stated that, when an amending Act has stated that the old sub section has been substituted by the new sub-section, the inference is that the Legislature intended that the substituted provision should be deemed to have been part of the Act from the very inception. The above principle would certainly govern the present fact situation.Consequently, we are of the view that the Appellate Tribunal has rightly accepted the contention of the assessee. The second question is also answered in the affirmative and against the Revenue. References are answered accordingly.
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