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Showing 181 to 200 of 200 Records
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1992 (4) TMI 21 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the value of the shares held by the assessee in M/s. Krishna Mills Ltd., Beawar, should be taken on the basis of the yield method ? We have heard learned counsel for the parties. A number of decisions of the Supreme Court were cited before us. Among those to be mentioned are CWT v. Mahadeo Jalan 1972 86 ITR 621 CGT v. Smt. Kusumben D. Mahadevia 1980 122 ITR 38 and CGT v. Executors and Trustees of the Estate of Late Sh. Ambalal Sarabhai 1988 170 ITR 144. In all these cases, the Supreme Court has taken the view that the method of valuation should have been the yield method and not the break-up method. In a going concern, as it was in the present case, the consistent view of the Supreme Court is that it should be on the basis of dividends received. Consequently, we answer the question-against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee and the Registry is directed to send the record to the Tribunal with the aforesaid answer. The assessee would be entitled to get Rs. 600 as costs.
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1992 (4) TMI 20 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Offences And Prosecution ... ... ... ... ..... omers by borrowing the same from Sushil Trading Company and they had made payment of the said bags to Messrs. Sushil Trading Company on March 6, 1979. No concealment of income can be spelled out from the aforesaid proved facts. The sale and purchase transactions had taken place during the year 1979-80. P. W.-3, R. D. Gupta, has admitted in his cross-examination that during the assessment year 1979-80, according to the account books, the accused had purchased 95,816 bags for Rs. 4,45,286.60 and had sold the same for Rs. 4,59,938.40. It is, thus, clear that the accused had sold the same number of bags which had been purchased by them during the relevant year. From the overall facts that had come on the records of the case, the learned Magistrate after appraisal of the entire evidence came to a correct conclusion. We find no ground whatsoever to interfere with the order of acquittal recorded by the Chief judicial Magistrate and, finding no force in this appeal, dismiss the same.
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1992 (4) TMI 19 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal ... ... ... ... ..... us that there was no mistake apparent from the record liable to rectification by the Tribunal under section 254(2). In fact, the instant order of the Tribunal cannot but be construed as re-evaluation of the total effect of the facts found by it and the Tribunal in effect assumed the power of review which the Tribunal is not entitled to do in law. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the view that the Tribunal fell into error in recalling its earlier order dated August 7, 1990, inasmuch as there was no mistake apparent from the record. The Tribunal went into the merits of the contentions raised at the time of hearing the appeal and is, therefore, barred from rehearing and amending its conclusion on merits. For the reasons aforesaid, we answer the first and second questions in this reference in the negative and the third question in the affirmative, all in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. SHYAMAL KUMAR SEN J. -I agree.
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1992 (4) TMI 18 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Intercorporate Dividends, Special Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... ing such dividend income ? In our view, only the actual expenditure incurred by the assessee in earning the dividend income shall be deducted from the gross dividend income. There is no scope for any estimate of expenditure being made and no notional expenditure can be allocated also for the purpose of earning income unless the facts of a particular case warrant such allocation. In that view of the matter, we are of the view that only the actual expenses should be taken into account in reducing the dividend income and not any notional expenditure as has been done in the instant case. We, therefore, decline to answer the question. The Tribunal will find out the expenditure, if any, actually incurred in earning the dividend and, to that extent, the dividend income should be reduced and relief under section 80M should be allowed on that. There will be no order as to costs. Leave is given to file vakalatnama to Miss Seal within a fortnight from date. SHYAMAL KUMAR SEN J.-I agree.
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1992 (4) TMI 17 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Deduction U/Ss 80J And 80HH, Depreciation, Foreign Exchange, New Industrial Undertaking, Scientific Research
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1992 (4) TMI 16 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Interest, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... tion 194A by the Amending Act, 1987, and urged that the same being clarificatory, it has made clear what was implied in section 194A. We are unable to accept the submission. The explanatory note regarding the amendment states that section 194A has been amended to provide that the tax will be deducted at source on accrual of interest at the end of the accounting year or at the time of crediting it to the account of the payee or at the time of payment, whichever is earlier, and it further states that it was done with a view to prevent postponement of liability relating to such deduction of tax at source. Thus, the explanatory note itself reveals that there was a lacuna or loophole in the unamended provisions of section 194A. This Explanation was prospective in operation. It did not, therefore, apply to the present case. For the reasons given above, the question referred to above is answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee with costs which are fixed at Rs. 500.
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1992 (4) TMI 15 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Assessment, Draft Assessment Order U/S 144B ... ... ... ... ..... sending the draft order under section 144B to the assessee after incorporating directions, of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner has not violated the law. In fact, the ultimate thrust of the assessee s argument is that the assessment is ineffective on account of being barred by limitation of time. This contention assumes that if a proceeding was initiated under section 144A, no proceeding can be initiated under section 144B. There is no such prohibition envisaged in the statute. The resort to section 144B on the facts and in the circumstances of this case cannot be said to be without jurisdiction and the consequential assessment order cannot be held to be barred by limitation. No illegalities result from the recourse taken to section 144B by the Income-tax Officer for completing the assessment. We, therefore, answer the fourth question in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. SHYAMAL KUMAR SEN J.-I agree.
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1992 (4) TMI 14 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Disallowance, New Industrial Undertaking, Special Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... erected or machinery and plant newly installed. Obviously, it was by way of an incentive for the new structures or the new installations. The amount of initial depreciation was not deductible in determining the written down value although under proviso (c) it was to be taken into account in the aggregate of all allowances so as not to permit them to exceed the maximum limit provided therein. In our view, these observations clinch the matter and there cannot be any manner of doubt that, in determining the written down value of depreciable assets, the special allowance under section 32(1)(v) is not to be reckoned as the true nature of the allowance is not depreciation though it bears the appellation initial depreciation . The enactment has not left the matter in any ambiguity, if we read all its related provisions conjointly. We, therefore, answer the third question in the negative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. SHYAMAL KUMAR SEN J.-I agree.
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1992 (4) TMI 13 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Income From Leased Asset ... ... ... ... ..... o forecast that it would be an impossibility for the assessee to re-enter into the mill for recommissioning its business of manufacturing. The paper book contains the copy of the plaint in the subject suit being Title Suit No. 42 of 1982 filed in the Second Court of the Subordinate judge at Alipore. On perusal it appears that the suit is for ejectment of the lessee as well as mesne profits for holding on. Therefore, the Tribunal s finding that the assessee either did not intend to nor could it be in a position to restart the business is based on no evidence. We accordingly answer the second question referred under section 256(2) in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Consequentially, the first question is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal is, however, directed to examine if any part of the running business expenses are disallowable otherwise. There will be no order as to costs. AJIT K. SENGUPTA J.-I agree.
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1992 (4) TMI 12 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal, Export Market Development Allowance, Weighted Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... me time, we direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to restore the appeals to its file and dispose of the appeals in accordance with law and in the light of the observations contained herein. We are fortified in doing so in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Greaves Cotton and Co. Ltd. 1968 68 ITR 200, CIT v. Indian Molasses Co. P. Ltd. 1970 78 ITR 474 and the Bench decision of this court in CIT v. Seshasayee Bros. (Travancore) Pvt. Ltd. 1976 102 ITR 372. As stated in paragraph 4 of the judgment, we decline to answer the sole question referred to this court in Income-tax Reference No. 100 of 1986 but we direct the Appellate Tribunal to consider that question afresh in the light of the circular of the Central Board of Direct Taxes dated December 28, 1981. The references are disposed of as above. A copy of this judgment, under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar, shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1992 (4) TMI 11 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Additional Grounds, Income Tax, Powers Of Tribunal, Supreme Court, Wealth Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... 99 (Mad) to the effect that the discretionary power in a public officer is to be exercised in favour of the person concerned unless there are good reasons for denying the benefit. Once again, we cannot go into this question in view of the fact that the question of proper exercise of discretion by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is not before us for consideration. We are only concerned with the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to permit additional grounds to be raised which do not arise out of the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. In the premises, we answer the two questions above for the assessment year 1962-63 and the second question in the assessment years 1963-64 and 1964-65 which have been referred to us, for the reasons set out in the order of the Division Bench dated April 6, 1991, in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal is, accordingly, directed to dispose of the case in conformity with our judgment. There will be no order as to costs.
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1992 (4) TMI 10 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Assessment Order, Natural Justice, Orders Passed ... ... ... ... ..... assessee to take the assistance of his advocate. The case was once heard and reserved and no orders were passed. Although a detailed reply was submitted it has not been fully considered while framing the assessment and levying the penalty. The office of the Commercial Taxes Officer was situated at Jaipur and that of the assessee at Beawar and, therefore, if the advocate of the assessee could not, for any reason, appear on the date fixed, the assessing authority could have either given an opportunity to the assessee or could have fixed the case at Jaipur. The assessment orders thus being contrary to the principles of natural justice are set aside and the matter is sent back to the assessing authority with the directions that the petitioner may be given reasonable opportunity and thereafter the orders of assessment and penalty be framed. The petitioner would be free to challenge the said orders in appeals. In the result, the writ petitions are partly allowed as indicated above.
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1992 (4) TMI 9 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Accrual Of Income, Assessment Year, Fixed Deposit ... ... ... ... ..... fore us a copy of the order of this court. On perusal, we find that the Tribunal s finding that the said order did not create any right which the assessee could enforce is correct. The assessee had no enforceable right to receive either the principal or the interest on the amount lying in the fixed deposit. The right to receive any part or whole of such amount is totally unsettled. Therefore, the Tribunal was correct in holding that the amount of interest on the principal sum did not accrue during the relevant previous year. Reliance has been placed on the decision of this court in CIT v. Hindusthan Housing and Land Development Trust Ltd. 1977 108 ITR 380 (Cal) affirmed by the Supreme Court in its decision in CIT v. Hindustan Housing and Land Development Trust Ltd. 1986 161 ITR 524 (SC). In the premises, we answer the question relating to the assessment year 1982-83 in the affirmative and against the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. SHYAMAL KUMAR SEN J.-- I agree.
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1992 (4) TMI 8 - SUPREME COURT
How the interest receipts by the assessee can be treated as receipts which flow to him de hors the business which is carried on by him - interest payable to him certainly partakes of the same character as the receipts for the payment of which he was otherwise entitled under the contract and which payment has been delayed as a result of certain disputes - It cannot be separated from the other amounts granted under the awards and treated as "income from other sources"
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1992 (4) TMI 7 - SUPREME COURT
Entitlement of the assessee to the investment allowance under section 32A - contention of the assessee ( sic ) in relation to the construction activity carried on by him cannot be said to be an industrial undertaking, becomes irrelevant - original finding of the Tribunal that assessee's machinery was used in the business of construction, manufacture etc., and that the assessee was a industrial undertaking entitled to investment allowance, was not challenged - petition of revenue is dismissed
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1992 (4) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT
Section 277 - Conspiracy - False Statement in Verification by enforcement officer under provisions of Foreign Exchange Regulation - income tax authorities are not allowed to start prosecution proceedings
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1992 (4) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on the facts and circumstances, the Tribunal is justified in law in cancelling the penalty levied on the assessee under section 271(1)(a) for the three assessment years 1964-65 to 1966-67 ?
Held that:- The Revenue is entitled to succeed. As a matter of fact, the very question with which we are concerned is no longer res integra as has rightly been pointed out by Mr. Ramamurthy. In Gujarat Travancore Agency v. CIT [1989 (5) TMI 1 - SUPREME Court] wherein held that there is nothing in section 271(1)(a) which requires that mens rea must be proved before penalty can be levied under that provision.
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1992 (4) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the assessee was entitled to claim partial exemption from payment of tax under section 15C of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, on profits and gains derived from an industrial undertaking established in a building taken on lease used previously for another business.
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1992 (4) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT
Depreciation - assessee claimed depreciation on the written down value of roads constructed by it as forming part of the cost of the factory building and also claimed development rebate on industrial transport used for transporting raw materials and finished goods within the factory premises - revenue appeal is dismissed
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1992 (4) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT
By the introduction of section 278B by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act of 1975, with effect from October 1, 1975, it is enacted that, where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence
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