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Showing 21 to 40 of 547 Records
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1997 (12) TMI 650 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nd against the respondent. That has to be done by the Court Martial. Therefore, the matter has to be remanded back to the Court Martial for deciding that question. 26. Consequently the appeal is partly allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside except with reference to its conclusion on charge No.9. The sentence awarded by the Court Martial is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Court Martial for considering and passing an appropriate sentence on the basis of findings on Charges 2, 3 and 8. 27. In the facts and circumstances of the case we find it necessary to invite attention of appellants 2 to 4 to consider initiating appropriate proceedings against PWs 6, 21 26, 30 and 32 who deposed at the Court Martial that they had signed or prepared official record on the oral directions of the respondent without verifying the correctness thereof which act of their was in direction of duties. These state of affairs is highly distressing. We record our displeasure.
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1997 (12) TMI 649 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... red us that this Model law will be taken into consideration in the framing of the proposed new Rent Control Act. We, accordingly, dispose of these appeals without granting any immediate relief but we hold that the decision of the High Court upholding validity of the impugned provisions relating to standard rent was not correct. We however refrain from striking down the said provision as the existing Act elapses on 31.31998 and we hope that new Rent Control Act will be enacted with effect from 1st April, 1998 keeping in view the observations made in this judgment in so far as fixation of standard rent is concerned. It is, however, made clear that any further extension of the existing provisions without bringing them in line with the views expressed in this judgment, would be invalid as being arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and therefore of no consequence. The respondents will pay the Costs. In view of the aforesaid the writ petitions are disposed of.
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1997 (12) TMI 648 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o far as new inam estates with which we are concerned, to rebut the presumption in Section 65(1) of the Act 26/1963. In other words, while the presumption under Section 65(1) might operate against other land holders claiming ryotwari patta under Section 9(2)(a), the position so far as temples governed by the Madras HR & CE Act, 1959 are concerned, proof of personal cultivation is statutorily dispersed with, even for the period of three years mentioned in Section 9(2)(a). That is now, the statutory presumption gets rebutted. For the above reasons, we uphold the conlusion arrived at by the Madras High Court which affirmed the grant of ryotwari patta to the respondents. It is therefore held that the authorities were right in granting ryotwari patta to the respondent-temple and in treating the Dr. Devadoss only as an ordinary cultivating tenant in the private land of the temple. In the result, the appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances, without costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1997 (12) TMI 647 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... reason to fault procedure prescribed or the qualifications prescribed or to set aside these selections and consequent appointments since none of the grounds on which the amendments, circulars and selection have been challenged, is sustainable in law. We have been informed that after the stay of the judgment of the Tribunal by this Court, those who were selected/appointed under the prescribed procedure have been given appointments and they have been functioning as Assistant Teachers. In the case of selected candidates not joining, the persons kept on the relevant waiting list in order of merit have been given appointments. There is no reason to set aside these appointments. In the premises, the impugned amendments to the Recruitment Rules as also the circulars relating to the procedure for selection and the criteria for selection are upheld. All these are allowed and the impugned judgments and orders of the Tribunal are set aside. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1997 (12) TMI 646 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... th by distillation of tar, it is not “tar distillation product”. 9. We are unable to uphold this distinction for another reason. According to “Webster Comprehensive Dictionary International Edition ”coal tar" means “the black viscid pitch distilled from bituminous coal, and yielding a large variety of organic compounds used in the making of dye stuffs explosives flavoring extracts, drugs, plastics etc”. Therefore, in a sense, coal tar itself is a variety of pitch. By distillation of coal tar a type of pitch is obtained. That must come within the phrase tar distillation product’. Moreover, if there is any doubt in the construction of any provision of a taxing statute, that doubt must be resolved in favour of the assessee. 10. In the premises, we are of the view that the appeal must succeed. 11. The judgment under appeal is set aside on the point in dispute. The appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1997 (12) TMI 645 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s nothing on the record to show as to whether the petitioners had the notice of the hearing of the case on that day. we are of the view, when Mr. Adhia withdrew from the case, the interests of justice required, that a fresh notice for actual date hearing should have been sent to the parties. In any case in the facts and circumstances of this case we feel that t he party in person was not at fault and as such should not be made to suffer." In view of what we have said above, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order of the trial Court dated 18.11.1991 and the ex-parte decree dated 8.2.1991 and the ex-parted decree dated 8.2.1992 are set aside. we also set aside the order of the District Judge and that of the High Court dismissing the civil revision petition. The case is remanded to the trial court for its disposal in accordance with law. The trial court shall proceed with the case from the stage, where the case was on 18.11.1991. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1997 (12) TMI 644 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in disturbing the settled position which is not justifiable. There was inordinate delay in the present case for making such a grievance. This alone was sufficient to decline interference under Article 226 and to reject the writ petition. In view of the above conclusion it is not necessary for us to express any opinion on the merits of the point raised buy B.S. Bajwa and B.D. Gupta. We make it clear that the view thereon taken by the High Court is not to be treated as concluded or having affirmation of any kind. The appeals of B.S.Bajwa and B.D.Gupta are dismissed and the appeal filed by D.P.Bajaj and Jagir Singh is allowed. With the result that the judgment of the Single Judge of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed by B.S.Bajwa and B.D.Gupta stand dismissed. CA7411-7614/96 For the reasons stated above, these appeals are dismissed. CA Nos 8914-15/97 in SLP (C) No23599-23600/97 (CC Nos. 8677-8678/97) For the reasons stated above, these appeals are allowed.
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1997 (12) TMI 643 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ve Petition is dismissed on the ground of delay as well as on merit.
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1997 (12) TMI 642 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... t be solely extended to interpret the scope of an entry, in an exemption notification. The rules are for interpretation, for the purposes of classification of a commodity, under the Customs Tariff. Only after the classification of the goods is determined, the question of applicability of notification arises. Since I have already held that the impugned goods are components, for the facsimile machines, they would therefore, be appropriately classifiable under the appropriate Heading, for components, and only that notification, if any, will be applicable, which will be applicable to the components, of facsimile machines. 27. After examining the situation in the correct perspective we agree with the view that the benefit of Notification No. 59/88-Cus. was not available to the goods imported in both the case. 28. After giving our careful thought and consideration to the matter we do not find any merit in both these appeals. The appeals are rejected. Ordered accordingly.
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1997 (12) TMI 641 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... J. ORDER The Civil Appeal is dismissed.
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1997 (12) TMI 640 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... uired to be placed for decision before a larger Bench of three learned Judges of this Court for reconsideration of the judgment in Bihar Distillery Case (Supra). We therefore direct the Registry to place all these appeals for disposal before a larger Bench of three learned Judges. Registry to obtain orders of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India in this connection so that the matters can be disposed of at the earliest. We make it clear that learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Sanghi, appearing for one of the appellants, also sought to challenge the decision of the High Court even on merits and submitted that according to him, final order passed by the Commissioner runs counter to the show-cause notice issued to the appellant and similar contentions were also advanced by learned counsel appearing for the appellants in the cognate appeals. These questions also will obviously be considered by the larger Bench as all the matters are being referred for decision of the larger Bench.
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1997 (12) TMI 639 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rugs and which has its office in the suit premises since 1966 and as there is an air conditioned godown in the said premises, may be given reasonable time to vacate the premises so that it can search out any alternative premises. Learned senior counsel for the respondent has fairly left to us this question of giving time to the appellant. In the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, while dismissing this appeal we deem it fit to grant time to the appellant company to vacate the suit premises till 31st December 1998 on the appellant filing a usual undertaking within four weeks in this Country. If such an undertaking is not filed or if any of the conditions of the undertaking is committed breach of by the appellant , the grant of time to vacate the premises will stand recalled. Appeal is dismissed subject to the aforesaid grant of time to vacate, with no order as to costs n the facts and circumstances of the case. Ad interim relief granted earlier will stand vacated.
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1997 (12) TMI 638 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... bruary 12, 1991, refers to only deposit of ₹ 11.5 lakhs on June 29, 1990, and not the deposit of ₹ 8.5 lakhs. There was no dispute about the payment of ₹ 8.5 lakhs. It was payable on or before June 30, 1990. In the face of these facts the plea that the sum of ₹ 8.5 lakhs was deposited in the names of respondents Nos. 4 and 5 with the authority on June 29, 1990, cannot be accepted. The point regarding the effect of non-payment within stipulated period is covered against the respondents by the decision of the Supreme Court dated February 17, 1995, in the case of Shri Chand V. Raheja v. Union of India, Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 18415-16 of 1994. In this view, the order of pre-emptive purchase stands abrogated and, therefore, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. For the aforesaid reasons, I agree with the conclusions of brother Ramamoorthy J. that all the writ petitions deserve to be allowed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
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1997 (12) TMI 637 - CEGAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... 994 (74) E.L.T. 966, in which mercury, while functioning as an electrode in the process of electrolysis continues to remain mercury, does not become a part of the machinery. 4. In the decision relied upon by the Collector (Appeals), the Tribunal had declined to accept the plea made before it, that mercury is a part of machinery because mercury was being used up in the process. There is nothing in the appeal to rebut this specific finding, which derives support from the other decisions cited by the respondent. Even if we accept the point in the appeal that mercury is a part of the machinery in electrolysis, that fact by itself would not be sufficient to deny the credit. The Tribunal has held in Union Carbide (India) Ltd. v. C.C.E. - 1996 (86) E.L.T. 613 that parts of machines, machinery, apparatus etc. do not come within the scope of the Explanation to Rule 57A which specifies the excluded category of inputs. 5. We, therefore, decline to interfere. Appeal dismissed.
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1997 (12) TMI 636 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... adhwa, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed
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1997 (12) TMI 635 - SUPREME COURT
Acquittal of a government servant from graft charge - Held that:- The reasoning of the High Court that reliability of the trap was impaired as the solution collected in the phial was not sent to chemical Examiner is too puerile for acceptance. We have not come across any case where a trap was conducted by the police in which the phenolphtalein solution was sent to the Chemical Examiner. We know that the said solution is always used not because there is any such direction by the statutory public servant would have really handled the bribed money. There is no material discrepancy in the evidence regarding preparation of recovery-memo and the minor contradiction mentioned by the learned single judge is not worth considering.
No doubt that the High Court has misdirected itself by such patently wrong and tenuous considerations and it resulted in the unmerited acquittal of accused against whom the prosecution succeeded in making out a fool-proof case under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. Allow that state appeal and restore the conviction passed by the trial court.
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1997 (12) TMI 634 - SUPREME COURT
Whether paper based laminated Sheets/Boards are classifiable for the purpose of excise duty under Heading 3920.21 of the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 or under Heading 4818.90 of the said Schedule till February 28,1988 and under Heading 4823.90 of the said Schedule on and after March 1,1988 ?
Held that:- In view of the CCE Hyderabad v. Bakelite Hylam Ltd. [1997 (3) TMI 598 - SUPREME COURT] decision the products manufactured by the appellants, namely, paper based decorative laminated sheets do not fall under sub-heading 4923.90. The appellants are, therefore, not entitled to claim the benefit of concessional rate of duty on the basis of Notification No. 135/89 dated May 12, 1989 and the Notification No. 20/94 dated March 1,1994. The fact that products known commercially as decorative laminates have been expressly mentioned in entry at serial No. 6, as substituted on the basis of Notification No. 144/94 dated December 22, 1994, does not mean that prior to the issuance of the Notification No. 144/94 dated December 22, 1994 products known commercially as decorative laminates fell within the ambit of the Notification No. 135/89 dated May, 12 1989 and No. 20/94 dated March 1, 1994 for the purpose of concessional rate of duty. The insertion of products known commercially as decorative laminates by Notification No. 144/94 dated December 22,1994 only means that these products have been expressly excluded for the purpose of applicability of the concessional rate of duty. Appeal dismissed.
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1997 (12) TMI 633 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rinting, packing and wrapping purposes. Therefore, craft paper does not cease to be paper merely because it is also used for packing purposes. Indeed, any type of paper can be used for the purpose of packing. Packing material as used in the notifications in question is such a product which by its manufacturing process or adaptation is meant to be used only as packing material. 21.. Our answer to the question formulated earlier is the craft paper manufactured by the petitioner is paper and not packing material as the terms are used in the notification dated December 31, 1976. 22.. The main ground on which the impugned notice and the proceedings under section 4-B of the Act were challenged in the writ petition has been considered and negatived in the discussions in the preceding paragraphs of the judgment. No other point was raised before us. Therefore, the writ petition being devoid of merits is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Writ petition dismissed.
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1997 (12) TMI 632 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the transactions in their accounts. The admitted fact is that the assessee-company disclosed the entire transactions in their turnover. But, what was done was that a portion of the turnover was claimed to be exempted from tax, as if the said turnover represented stock transfer to its branch for open market sale . In such state of affairs, it cannot at all be stated that the assessee-company had refracted or violated the salient provisions adumbrated under clause (iii) of sub-section (4) of section 12, attracting penalty imposable under clause (iii) of sub-section (5) of section 12 of TNGSTA, read with section 9(2-A) of CSTA. We are therefore of the view that the order of the Tribunal in retaining the penalty to the extent of fifty per cent-the minimum prescribed, cannot at all be allowed to stand and the same deserves to be set aside and the same is accordingly set aside. 16.. Both the Tax Case (Revisions) are thus disposed of. No costs. Petitions disposed of accordingly.
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1997 (12) TMI 631 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... t of his duty under any taxing statute. Nor does the source of fund out of which assistance is offered a part of sales tax collected under any taxing statute of the State. Even the notification giving rise to the scheme does not owe its origin to any such taxing statute. Therefore, anything done or any order passed under the scheme does not become a matter connected with or incidental to levy, assessment, collection or enforcement of sales tax under any statute and for that matter, the same does not become an action or order pertaining to matters over which this Tribunal can exercise jurisdiction under section 8 of the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987. Hence, we hold that this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant application. 9.. In view of the above decision we are not required to examine the other issues. 10.. In the result, the application is dismissed. We make no order as to costs. M.K. KAR GUPTA (Technical Member).-I agree. Application dismissed.
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