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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 365 Records
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1997 (5) TMI 434 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nd to the erstwhile owners? It is settled law that land is acquired for a public purpose was achieved, the rest of the land could be used for any other purpose. In case there is no other public purpose for which the land is needed, then instead of disposal by way of sale to the erstwhile owner, the land should be put to public auction and the amount Fetched in the public auction can be better utilised for the public purpose envisaged in the Directive Principles of Constitution. In the present case, what we find is that the executive order is not in consonance with the provision of the Act and is, therefore, invalid. under these circumstances, the Division Bench is well justified in declaring the executive order as invalid. whatever assignment is made, should be for a public purpose. otherwise, the land of the Government should be sold only through the public actions so that the public also gets benefited by getting higher value. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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1997 (5) TMI 433 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f the Act. Sec. 40 (a)(i) of the Act provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in ss. 30 to 38, any interest (not being interest on a loan issued for public subscription before the 1st day of April, 1938) royalty, fees for technical services or other sum chargeable under this Act, which is payable outside India, on which tax has not been paid or deducted under Chapter XVII-B shall not be deducted in computing the income chargeable under this Act as profits and gains of business or profession. From the delineated portion it is manifest that only the interest which is payable outside India, shall not be deducted. In this case it is undisputed that the interest has been credited in the books of assessee in India and, therefore, s. 40 (a)(i) is not attracted to the facts of the case and the interest paid to Smt. Meera Agarwal cannot be disallowed under that provision. The question is answered in the affirmative i.e. in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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1997 (5) TMI 432 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the direction issued by the single judge. it would appear that prices of DHR were reduced from ₹ 5.81 to ₹ 2.48 the appellants felt aggrieved and contend that the reduction is bad in law. it is not in dispute that since subsequently HAL became sick industry, the matter was referred to the Board for Industrial and financial Reconstruction which has gone into that question. M/s Voltas Ltd. has started functioning after take over of all the units except watch manufacturing Division which was taken over by the State Government with regard to the respective assets and liabilities. The decision of the BIFR binds the parties. We are informed that ₹ 27 lacs have already been paid to the appellants. The appellants are claiming the balance amount, whatever be the liability, as per the undertaking before the BIFR that binds the parties; the State Government is also bound to implement the direction issued by the BIFR. The appeals are accordingly disposed of. No costs.
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1997 (5) TMI 431 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... sal was attempted to the recalled by doing the needful at a belated stage. As per office report, no effective steps have been taken to have the defects removed. The appeal is thus dismissed for non-prosecution.
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1997 (5) TMI 430 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... sed to the revenue. In this case it may be that a prejudice is caused to the revenue by adopting a view favourable to the assessee, yet, the order cannot be said to erroneous as a possible view in accordance with the decisions of the Tribunal (supra) was adopted by the Assessing Officer. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the view that the action of the CIT under section 263 was not warranted as the view taken by the Assessing Officer cannot be said to be erroneous in view of the decisions of the Tribunal quoted elsewhere in this order. We, accordingly, cancel the orders of the CIT under section 263 and restore the orders of the Assessing Officer. 9. We may point out that the controversy with regard to the meaning of export profits, profits and gains of business and total turn-over has been put at rest by various amendments in section 80HHC by the Finance Act (No. 2) of 1991 w.e.f. 1-4-1992. 10. In the result, appeals of the assessee are allowed.
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1997 (5) TMI 429 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... sales, increase in expenses, etc. which is nothing but reliance on conjuctures and surmises only. In view of these facts, we are of the opinion that the disallowance is liable to be deleted on legal grounds itself as well as for want of proper investigation on the part of lower authorities. The assessee's these grounds of appeal are allowed. 10. Ground No. 6 Addition of ₹ 3,000 and ₹ 6,079 on account of disallowance out of motor-car expenses and depreciation respectively. The Commissioner (Appeals) dismissed the ground relating to issue of disallowance out of motor-car expenses and depreciation on car on the ground that the issue was not pressed before him. As the assessee has not refuted the finding of the Commissioner (Appeals) either in his pleadings or by way of evidence, we are of the opinion that this ground do not arise out of the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and consequently the same is rejected. 11. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1997 (5) TMI 428 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... was in substance a loan." Here also, therefore, the judgment proceeded on the basis that the original debt was not a loan and was only a part of unpaid purchase money but the parties had treated the purchase money as paid off in its entirety and the amount equivalent to the unpaid purchase money as being due by the purchaser to the vendor by way of a loan. On such a basis, the transaction may in substance be a loan. We have already stated that there is no evidence of such treatment in this case. We find nothing here to show that the moneys originally due as price had come to be treated as a loan. The appellants, therefore, cannot contend that they are "borrowers" or are being made to pay in respect of a "loan" as these terms are defined in the Act. They cannot, therefore claim any benefit Under Section 30 of the Act. (9) In the result this appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs. 9. In the result this appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs.
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1997 (5) TMI 427 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... and Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin vs. Fatmabai Ibrahim CA No. 5023/85 decided on August 22, 1996 . We find no force in the contention. It is seen that the order of ejectment against the applicant has become final. Section 21 of the Mamalatdar’s Court Act does not prescribe any limitation within which the order needs to be executed. In the absence of any specific limitation provided thereunder, necessary implication is that the general law of limitation provided in Limitation Act (Act 2 of 1963) stands excluded. The Division Bench, Therefore, has rightly held that no limitation has been prescribed and it can be executed at any time, especially when the law of limitation for the purpose of this appeal is not there. Where there is statutory rule operating in the field, the implied power of exercise of the right within reasonable limitation does not arise. The cited decisions deal with that area and bear no relevance to the facts. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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1997 (5) TMI 426 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... nce found as a result of the search or requisition of the books of account or documents and such other materials or information as are available with the Assessing Officer. The Legislature has used the words, "such other materials" and not "any other materials". The word ‘such’ is defined in Concise Oxford Dictionary, 5th Edition at page 1289 as "Of the kind or degree already described or implied or intelligible from the context or circumstances." But what material is available? There is absolutely nothing except the gift book (1994-95), which was impounded at the time of search. This, in our opinion, is not relevant for making such addition. 26. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and after considering the precedents relied upon, we hold that the Assessing Officer was not justified in making the addition. Accordingly, we direct him to delete the same. 27. In the result, the appeal of the assessee stands allowed.
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1997 (5) TMI 425 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... roneous, illegal and unconstitutional. Thus, we hold that the reservation in post graduation speciality or super- speciality is valid under Articles 14, 15(1) and 15(4) of the Constitution. These appeals are accordingly allowed with no order as to costs. The writ Petition 781/95 filed by Scheduled Association relates to withdrawal of the reservations in the Institute. The action taken by the Institute is pursuant to the directions issued by the High Court. In view of the fact that we allowed the appeals, the Institute, hereafter, should follow the reservation and make appointments to the posts of Assistant professors and other posts in accordance with Regulation 32(2) and in other faculties as well as admission to the various courses in the Institute by applying the rule of reservation. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of, but, in the circumstances, without costs. We place on record the valuable assistance rendererd by the learned counsel appearing for the parties.
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1997 (5) TMI 424 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nce money. The weighment of the goods at Hyderabad or the collection of documents from the bank or payment of price through the bank at Hyderabad were immaterial inasmuch as the property in the goods had already passed at Kerala and it was not dependent upon the payment of price or the delivery of goods to the respondent. 43. We are in full agreement with the view expressed by the High Court and are also of the opinion that having regard to the evidence on record which indicated that on the order placed by respondent, the stocks were loaded into the trucks for despatch to Hyderabad with the dear stipulation that the despatch was at the risk of the purchaser and that the seller had no liability with regard to any future losses and that the stock was insured and the insurance premium was paid by the respondent, the sale took place in the State of Kerala and not at Hyderabad. 44. In view of the above, the appeal has no merit and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1997 (5) TMI 423 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... isturbed. Therein, the candidates appointed on the basis of economic backwardness, social status or occupation etc. were eligible for appointment against the post reserved for backward classes if their income did not exceed ₹ 18,000/- per annum and they were given accelerated promotion on the basis of reservation. In that backdrop, the above directions came to be issued. In fact, it did not touch upon Article 16(4) or 16(4-A). Therefore, desperate attempts of the appellants to re-do the seniority had by them in various cadres/grades though in the same services according to 1974 Rules or 1980 Rule, are not amenable to judicial review at this belated stage. The High Court, therefore, has rightly dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay as well. Thus we hold that the decision of the High Court is not vitiated by any error of application of wrong principle of law warranting interference. The appeal is accordingly dismissed but, in the circumstance, without costs.
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1997 (5) TMI 422 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... site party should be afforded a fair or properly opportunity to meet the same. It is not any legal plea that could be raised at the stage of second appeal. It should be a substantial question of law. The reasons for permitting the plea to be raised should also be recorded. Thereafter, the opposite party should be given a fair or proper opportunity to meet the same. In the present case, as the extracts from the judgment quoted hereinabove would show, the High Court has totally ignored the mandatory provisions of Section 100 C.P.C. The High Court proceeded to entertain the new plea and rendered it decision without following the mandatory provision of Section 100 C.P.C. On this short ground we are of the view that judgment and decree of the High Court dated 30th November, 1982 are illegal and in excess of jurisdiction and so unsustainable and deserve to be set aside. We hereby do so. The appeal is allowed with cost, including advocates fee which we estimate at ₹ 10,000/-.
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1997 (5) TMI 421 - SUPREME COURT
whether to grant an injunction which has the effect of restraining the encashment of a bank guarantee?
Held that:- It is unfortunate that the High Court did not consider it necessary to refer to various judicial pronouncements of this Court in which the principles which have to be fullowed while examining an application for grant of interim relief have been clearly laid down. Yet another scrious for which was carmnitted by the High Court, in the present case, was not to examine the tenns of the bank guarantee and consider the letters of invocation which had been written by the appellant. If the High Court had trail the trouble of examining the documents on record, which had been referred to by the trial court, in its order refiling to grant injunction, the court would not have granted the interim injunction. No justification for the High Court in invoking the alleged principle of adjust enrichment to the facts of the present case and then deny the appellant the Iight to encash the bank guarantee. If the High Court had taken the trouble to see the law on the point it would have been clear that in encashment of bank guarantee the applicability of the principle of undue enrichment has no application.
From the facts stated hereinabove it appears to us that the respondent bank has not shown professional efficiency, to say the least, and has acted in a partisan manner with a view to help and assist respondent no. 1. At the time when there was no restraint order from any Court, the bank was under a legal and moral obligation to honour its commitments. It, however, failed to do so. It appears that the bank deliberately draged its feet so as to enable respondent no.1 to secure favourable order of injunction from the Court. Such conduct of a bank is difficult to appreciate we do not wish to say anything more but it may feel that it will be prejudicial in the event of the appellant taking action against it.
Appeal is allowed. The judgment and order of the Allahabad High Court set aside and the order of the trial court dismissing the injunction application is restored.
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1997 (5) TMI 420 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... by the Supreme Court, we agree with the contention of the petitioners that limitation should be reckoned from the date of the knowledge of the order of the Tribunal. The relevant facts about the date of the order of the Tribunal and date when the order of the Tribunal was communicated to the petitioners, as stated in the petition, have not been denied in the counter-affidavit and, therefore, the averment that the order of the Tribunal was communicated to the petitioners in the month of October, 1994, remains uncontroverted. We, therefore, hold that limitation in the case of the petitioner will run from October, 1994, when they acquired knowledge of the Tribunal s order. 8.. On these facts, the petition succeeds and is allowed impugned orders, annexure 4 to the writ petition passed by respondent No. 1 are quashed and the said respondent is directed to entertain the refund applications of the petitioners and decide them on merits in accordance with law. Writ petition allowed.
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1997 (5) TMI 419 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... amely, taraibati as demonstrated before us cannot be said to be bamboos. These are not merely split and cut-pieces of bamboos, but processed in such a way that these can be used for construction of huts both as walls and shades. In our opinion, in common parlance these goods cannot be called bamboos, because if a purchaser goes to purchase a bamboo, he will not be offered these goods for sale. We, therefore, hold that these are articles made of bamboo within entry 1 of Schedule I to the Act of 1994. 8.. Accordingly, the impugned seizures, orders imposing penalty and the revisional orders dated January 22, 1997 are all quashed. Respondent No. 2, Commercial Tax Officer, Baxirhat More Check-Post is directed to refund the amounts realised from the applicants as penalties at Rs. 1,800 from each of them, within a period of four weeks from now. 9.. Thus the two applications in RN-65 of 1997 and RN-66 of 1997 are finally disposed of without any order for costs. Applications allowed.
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1997 (5) TMI 418 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and 11 per cent in the assessing year 1988-89 of the quantity consumed. The assessing officer collected no material to show that the quantity of the coal received by the dealer did not contain any amount inferior coal or that the dealer s contention that only specified type of coal was useable in its furnace was not correct. Therefore, the circular issued by the Commissioner and Director of Industries supported the stand of the dealer that the consignments of coal contained a certain quantity that cannot be used for purposes like that of the revisionist. The Tribunal having failed to hold that there was no reasonable excuse for the sale of coal by the dealer, there was no legal authority for reversing the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner. 7.. These revision petitions are, therefore, allowed with costs and setting aside the Tribunal s order dated 12th December, 1996 it is ordered that the Commissioner s two appeals, referred to above stand dismissed. Petitions allowed.
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1997 (5) TMI 417 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... ril 28, 1995 and the order of the Deputy Commissioner, Central Section dated May 21, 1996 and direct that the original certificate of registration granted by the C.T.O., Howrah by his order dated August 12, 1992 be considered to be a registration certificate granted under the 1941 Act. We further direct that in order to avoid further harassment to the applicant, the assessments for the period up to March 31, 1994 which was made under section 9A of the 1954 Act should not be reopened and the declaration forms XXIVA issued to the applicant on October 14, 1993 also may be considered to be valid and should not be rejected. The registration certificate will be so read and construed up to April 30, 1995. Applications for declaration forms under the 1941 Act for the period up to April 30, 1995 shall be disposed of by the respondents according to law. There shall be no order as to cost. 16.. L.N. RAY (Chairman).-I agree. 17.. J. GUPTA (Judicial Member).-I agree. Application allowed.
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1997 (5) TMI 416 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the goods until they were formly delivered to the buyer and, therefore, the collection of tendu leaves did not make the collector the owner thereof. Consequently, it was the State that has to be treated as a manufacturer and it is on that basis that the statutory agreement provides for payment of sales tax by the purchaser to the State of Uttar Pradesh which has to pay it to the sales tax department. It may be mentioned that in the earlier case decided by me the provisions of the aforesaid Act and Rules were not brought to my notice. Accordingly, agreeing with the view taken by this Court in Damodar Dass and Sons 1997 UPTC 470. I hold that the revisionist was not a manufacturer and no tax was leviable on its turnover on the sale of tendu leaves. 5.. This revision petition is, accordingly, allowed and setting aside the Tribunal s order dated February 13, 1989 it is ordered that the Tribunal shall decide the aforesaid appeal in accordance with this judgment. Petition allowed.
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1997 (5) TMI 415 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... not used for transmission of electrical energy. 5.. The item dealing with the electrical equipments, plants and their accessories and electrical motors shows that it would cover electrical equipments, plants and their accessories and electrical motors required for generation, distribution and transmission of electrical energy and refers to things that fall in the description of equipments, plants and their accessories directly used for generation, distribution and transmission of electrical energy. Things like aluminium conductors which indirectly help in the transmission of electrical energy through the wires fixed on the electrical poles cannot be roped in the aforesaid description. Therefore, in my view, the Tribunal was right in holding that the aforesaid articles do not come within the aforesaid description and were taxable as unclassified items. Therefore, there is no illegality in the Tribunal s order and the revision petition is hereby dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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