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Showing 21 to 40 of 654 Records
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2003 (9) TMI 807 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s possible only in view of the provision contained in Section 5(ii) of the High Court Act. That right was taken away by the Amendment Act 22 of 2002. Since such an appeal was possible only in view of the provision contained in Section 5(ii) of the High Court Act, we are of the view that the amendment of Section 100A of the code of Civil Procedure, no litigant can have a substantive right for a further appeal after 1.7.2002 on the ground that the proceedings from which that appeal arises was initiated prior to 1.7.2002. We therefore hold that no further appeal under Section 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act is maintainable from the Judgment, decree or order passed by a Single Judge under Section 3(13)(b) of the High Court Act after 1.7.2002 in view of the amended Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure inserted by Act 22 of 2002. So, both the appeals are only to be dismissed as not maintainable. In the result, A.F.A. Nos. 83 of 2002 and 87 of 2002 are dismissed in limine.
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2003 (9) TMI 806 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... riate stage to approach the Court. There may be occasions where after consideration of report the government may not decide to take any action against the person concerned yet the observation and remarks may be such which may play upon the reputation of the person concerned and this aspect of the matter has been fully taken care of under clause (b) of Section 8B of the Act. It is not, therefore, necessary that one must wait till a decision is taken by the government to take action against the person after consideration of the report. We have already dealt with the point about the right to have and protect one's reputation. We, therefore, find no force in the submission that the respondent no.1 had approached the Court at pre-mature stage. No other point has been urged on behalf of the appellant. In our view, the judgment of the High Court calls for no interference. In view of the discussion held above, the appeal is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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2003 (9) TMI 805 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... appeal so far as their acquittal is concerned. Nothing could be shown to us as to why the conclusions are to be reversed and in what way they are fallacious. 28. Coming to the appeal filed by the State and the challenge of Ramakant Rai to the acquittal of accused respondents Sachidanand, Rasbehari and Janardan under Section 440 IPC, for which two years imprisonment was imposed, is concerned the High Court's judgment is reversed. The respondents Sachidanand, Rasbehari and Janardan were rightly convicted by the Trial Court under Section 440 IPC along with accused Madan Rai. The sentence of two years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹ 500/- as imposed can be in no way termed to be excessive to warrant a different sentence. 29. In the ultimate result, the judgment of the Trial Court is restored and that of the High Court is set aside. The respondents shall surrender to custody to serve the remainder of the sentence, if any, to be served. 30. The appeals are allowed.
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2003 (9) TMI 804 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o coercion of the minority by the majority of either the member or any class of creditors. (i) Since financial institutions and banks save SHF have agreed to the scheme it is obvious that prudent men of business have found it viable commercially for the class of secured creditors. (j) A living scheme like the present one approved by the vast majority, is preferable to compulsory liquidation. (k) The majority view of the shareholders and the creditors have to be given weight. (l) Neither the Regional Director, Department of Company Affairs nor the Official Liquidator attached to this Court have indicated any objections to the scheme. (m) All the classes of creditors and members were fairly represented in the meetings. 42. I am, Therefore, of the view that none of the objections to the scheme now survive and the scheme accordingly deserves to be sanctioned in view of the foregoing discussion. Company Petition No. 251/2000 Therefore stands disposed of in terms of this judgment.
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2003 (9) TMI 803 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ong range, the appellant is able to make some more profit than what was envisaged itself could not render the exercise undertaken or scheme executed vulnerable for being challenged to be either as one in improper abuse of powers or by means of any reprehensible/condemnable conduct, calling for interference in the hands of Court of Law. 18. The Division Bench, except cataloguing the catena of decisions, has not chosen to objectively consider the extent of their applicability, relevance or otherwise of the principle befitting the merits of the peculiar of the case. The case on hand does not constitute or at any rate can by no means said to be the outcome of any unreasonable or arbitrary exercise of power so as to warrant interference under. Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The appeal is allowed, the order of the Division Bench is set aside and the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition filed before the High Court shall stand restored. No costs.
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2003 (9) TMI 802 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... al picture only on the basis of the affidavits filed in the present petition. On the material on record, therefore, it is not possible to hold that the charge of having committed contempt of Court on account of alleged non-compliance of the orders passed by this Court on 8.7.1996, 1.5.1997 and 31.7.2000 has been established against any one of the respondents. 18. The petition is accordingly dismissed and the notices issued to the respondents are discharged. It is made clear that any observation made in this order is only for the limited purpose of deciding the present contempt petition and shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on the rights and claims of the parties. The order will also not come in the way of any party in seeking to recover its dues or to establish any kind of right or taking any other action. G.P. Mathur, J. 19. For the reasons given in Contempt Petition No. 210 of 2001 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 174 of 1991, the present petition is dismissed.
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2003 (9) TMI 801 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on that the matter should be heard by a larger Bench. We may hasten to state here that we are of the prima facie opinion that as long as the decision rendered in the case of Officers' Association, Bhilai Steel Plant (supra) is not overruled or clarified, it would be difficult to arrive at a conclusion that the present rule is not beyond the rule making power as conferred on the respondent No. 1 under section 295 of the Act. The decision rendered by the Division Bench is a binding precedent on us and the language used therein is unequivocal and clear. Quite apart from the above when various decisions have come into the field the matter should be heard by a larger Bench. We may further state here that there are no conflicting decisions but taking note of the complexity and importance of the matter it should be heard by a larger Bench. Accordingly we so recommend. 14. Let the matter be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constitution of appropriate larger Bench.
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2003 (9) TMI 800 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s not be confused with other doctrines, such as fraud, duress and actual undue influence, which apply to all persons whether they be pardahnashin ladies or not". The logic is equally applicable to an old, illiterate, ailing person who is unable to comprehend the nature of the document or the contents thereof. It should be established that there was not mere physical act of the executant involved, but the mental act. Observations of this Court, though in the context of pardahnashin lady in Mst. Kharduja Kuer v. Jang Bahadur Rai and Ors., AIR (1963) SC 1203 are logically applicable to the case of the old, invalid, infirm (physically and mentally) and illiterate persons. Above being the position, the High Court was justified in holding that the judgments of the trial Court and the first Appellate Court were perverse and indefensible. We find no scope for interference with the impugned judgment of the High Court. The appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2003 (9) TMI 798 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... han fast food. Once this is found the assets relating to R&D cannot be excluded because part of the assessee's business is closed to which also the R&D division might be rendering its services. It may not have been used for the business relating to the fast food division. It is not the requirement of section 32 that the depreciation claim in respect of any asset has to be allowed if it continues to be used for all the purpose which was being used earlier. In view of the findings of fact recorded in favour of the assessee that the R & D division was alive and all business of the assessee were not closed, depreciation ought to have been allowed as deduction as part of block assets of R&D division. There is no other ground to disallow that claim. We accordingly hold that the Tribunal was right in allowing the depreciation on R&D division on assessee. 17. As a result of above discussion, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. 18. No order as to costs.
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2003 (9) TMI 797 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... essed his inability in that regard. Considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case we feel it proper to direct the respondent-Bank to consider the case of the appellant, by extending the time, for submission of the application for one time settlement within one month from today and further direct that if the appellant approaches the respondent-Bank within one month from today with a prayer for consideration of his case for one time settlement the Bank shall consider his case for one time settlement within a further period of two months under intimation to the appellant. While deciding the application of the appellant under the aforesaid scheme for one time settlement, the Bank shall not be influenced by the non interference by this Court in the judgment and decree passed by the Court below and shall consider the case of the appellant sympathetically and pass appropriate orders. With these observations the appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2003 (9) TMI 796 - SECURITIES APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, MUMBAI
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... ... ..... shares to Shri Khadaria. Since it was an ongoing matter partly covered in the post FUTP notification period, in my view the Appellant's version that the said Regulations has no application to the case is not tenable. The Appellant's submission that the alleged action relates to the year 1995 and as such an order relating to the same issued in the year 2002 is not tenable, is baseless as the investigations involving market manipulations may in certain cases take considerable time. Since the Respondent has failed to substantiate the charge against the Appellant, the question of issuing any direction by the Respondent to the Appellant based on the finding that the Appellant has violated the FUTP Regulations does not arise. Therefore, I do not consider it necessary to go into the sustainability of the impugned directions. For the reasons stated above, the impugned order, to the extent it applies to the Appellant, is set aside and the appeal is allowed to the said extent.
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2003 (9) TMI 795 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s not be confused with other doctrines, such as fraud, duress and actual undue influence, which apply to all persons whether they be pardahnashin ladies or not". The logic is equally applicable to an old, illiterate, ailing person who is unable to comprehend the nature of the document or the contents thereof. It should be established that there was not mere physical act of the executant involved, but the mental act. Observations of this Court, though in the context of pardahnashin lady in Mst. Kharduja Kuer v. Jang Bahadur Rai and Ors., AIR (1963) SC 1203 are logically applicable to the case of the old, invalid, infirm (physically and mentally) and illiterate persons. Above being the position, the High Court was justified in holding that the judgments of the trial Court and the first Appellate Court were perverse and indefensible. We find no scope for interference with the impugned judgment of the High Court. The appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2003 (9) TMI 794 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... cree passed by the trial court, therefore, has not been accepted. The court has not granted a decree for specific performance of the contract. The question of eviction of the respondents in execution of the decree passed in Title Suit No 412 of 1977 had only a direct relationship with the right of the respondents to continue to possess the tenanted premises in furtherance of their plea of part performance of the terms and conditions of the agreement for sale. Such a right claimed by the respondents herein to continue to possess the same on the basis of her independent right in terms of Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act had been negatived by the court. The respondents cannot resist their eviction pursuant to or in furtherance of the decree for eviction passed against them in execution proceedings thereof. We, for the reasons aforementioned, are of the opinion that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. No costs.
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2003 (9) TMI 793 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... te has been applied, the assessee is also entitled for deduction of depreciation. This judgment of Jain Construction has also been followed by this Court in the case of Bharat Construction Co. v. CIT D.B. Civil IT Reference No. 55 of 1998, dated 13-9-2001 . 2. Following the consistent view of this Court, we see no reason to interfere in the appeal. The appeal stands dismissed.
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2003 (9) TMI 792 - CESTAT CHENNAI
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... ... ..... and we therefore direct the Commissioner not to charge any duty on the goods which were confiscated but not redeemed. To that extent the duty should be deducted and refund granted them suo moto. As regards mandatory penalty of ₹ 2,48,409/- imposed under Section 114A of the Customs Act, 1962, we reduce the same to ₹ 1.25 lakhs. As regards the imposition of penalty for the goods imported prior to 28.9.96 we confirm the penalty of ₹ 3.00 lakhs imposed under Section 112 (a) of the Customs Act, 1962 on the appellant assessee. As regards the penalty of ₹ 1.00 lakh on Shri Vikas Chandra, Managing Director, M/s. Comptech Electronics P. Ltd., Chennai under Section 112 (a) of the Customs Act, 1962, we find that the penalty of ₹ 1.00 lakhs is on the higher side and we reduce the same to ₹ 25,000/-. 8. We confirm the rest of the order passed by the ld. Commissioner. But for the above modification, the impugned order is sustained. Ordered accordingly.
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2003 (9) TMI 791 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... that there were factory gate sales and there was no evidence to show that the factory gate sales were not genuine and factory price was ascertainable, these appeals must be dismissed. The appeals are dismissed but without any order as to costs.
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2003 (9) TMI 790 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ase back to the High Court for decision in accordance with law. We would request the High Court to dispose of the matter at an early date and if possible within four months from the date of receipt/production of a certified copy of this judgment. 21. Since we are not deciding the dispute on merits and remitting the case back to the High Court for appropriate decision we refrain to go into merits of the dispute in writ petition No. 398 of 2002 and dismiss the same with liberty to the petitioner to approach the High Court, if so advised. 22. Shri D.C. Verma, Respondent No. 4 in the Writ Petition, is a Judicial Member of the Tribunal. Counsel for the parties are agreed that no relief has been claimed in the writ petition against him and he be deleted from the array of the parties. Accordingly the name of Shri D.C. Verma be deleted from the array of the parties in the writ petition. He is not required to appear before the High Court henceafter. 23. Appeals are allowed. No costs.
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2003 (9) TMI 789 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he finding recorded by the first appellate court was unwarranted. The finding on this point recorded by the first appellate court which was final court of fact was a pure finding of fact and could not have been interfered with by the High Court in the exercise of powers conferred upon it under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, more so when no question of law much less substantial one was involved. Apart from that, after giving our anxious consideration, we do not find any ground whatsoever to interfere with the said finding recorded by the final court of fact. This being the position, in our view, the High Court was not justified in allowing the appeals and decreeing the suit by restoring judgment and decree passed by the trial court. In the result, the appeals are allowed, impugned judgment and decree rendered by the High Court are set aside and those passed by the first appellate court are restored. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2003 (9) TMI 788 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that on petitioner’s filing objections within two weeks of the supply on the reasons, the Assessing Officer shall dispose of the same before proceeding further in the matter of assessment for the block period in question. It will be open to the petitioner to raise all the objections with regard to the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer in taking recourse to the proceedings in question. 2. The writ petition stands disposed of in the above terms.
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2003 (9) TMI 787 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... e connected records. We do not find any merit therein. The review petition is, therefore, dismissed.
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