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2010 (1) TMI 1289
... ... ... ... ..... liability - My client further states that your client is not at all the holder in due course of the cheque for a valid consideration. 10. In spite of such reply of the Respondent as stated above, the complainant has not chosen to examine the payee namely Gnanavel to prove that consideration was passed to the payee at the time of transfer and it was given in lieu of the debt. However, as no endorsement had been made on the overleaf of the cheques thereby enabling the complainant to possess the same in his own name, so as to receive or recover the contents thereof from the accused thereto, the complainant could not be considered to be a "holder" much less a "holder in due course". Even the date of endorsement is missing below the signature of the endorsee. 11. Under such circumstances, I do not find any reason to interfere with the finding of the lower Appellate Court and these Criminal Appeals are liable to be dismissed and accordingly, they are dismissed.
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2010 (1) TMI 1288
Negotiable Instruments Act (NIA) - Petitioner No. 1 issued two cheques - Presented for Encashment - returned unpaid with the remarks signature different - In lieu of the previously dishonoured cheques, they issued three other cheques - Out of 3 cheques issued one cheque returned unpaid with the remarks stop payment - No payment made in notice period - complaint u/s 138/141 NIA and also u/s 420 of IPC - HELD THAT- Considering the matter on record, I hold that the complaint, subject matter of Crl.M.C. No. 2225/2009 is liable to be quashed because the complainant presented the cheque for encashment of the whole amount of ₹ 49,47,600/- though the amount due to him on the date of the presentation of the cheque was ₹ 32,9600/- and he also demanded the whole of the amount of ₹ 49,47,600/- as principal sum without even indicating the principal amount due to him under the cheque was ₹ 32,97,600/- and without even referring to the part- payment of ₹ 16,50,000/- which he had received by RTGS on 7.10.2008. The criminal complaint, subject matter of Crl.M.C.2224/2009 is liable to be quashed as the complainant presented the cheque for encashment of whole of its amount of ₹ 31,91,650/- though he had already received a sum of ₹ 10,50,000/- before presentation of the cheque and the principal amount due to him on the date of presentation of the cheque was only ₹ 21,41,650/-.
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2010 (1) TMI 1287
... ... ... ... ..... can be found with the view taken by the Tribunal. The view taken is reasonable and possible view in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. No substantial question of law is involved in these appeals. Appeals are dismissed in limine with no order as to costs.
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2010 (1) TMI 1286
... ... ... ... ..... Supreme Court rendered in the cases of P.R. Prabhakar v. CIT (2006)284 ITR 548 154 Taxman 503, Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan (2003)263 ITR 706 132 Taxman 373 and Commissioner of Customs v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. (2004) 3 SCC 488. 8. It is conceded position that the Assessee-Petitioner has filed the application on 23-9-2008 seeking exemption under Section 10(23C)(vi) in respect of assessment year 2008-09, which could have been filed during the financial year 2007-08, ie., on or before 31-3-2008. It is, thus, evident that the application by the Assessee-Petitioner has been filed after the prescribed period and the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax has rightly rejected the same being not maintainable. 9. As a sequel to the above discussion, we find no ground to interfere with the impugned order passed by the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax. There is no merit in the instant petition warranting its admission. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and the same is dismissed.
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2010 (1) TMI 1285
Petition Challenging the order of HC reversing the judgment of Additional Sessions Judge for Aquittal - convicted appellant for the offence of rape punishable u/s 376 of IPC - The accused feeling aggrieved filled appeal before us - HELD THAT:- In the first information report and also in the evidence of PW-1, it has come on record that Victim could not cry out for help since her mouth was gagged by the accused. It has also come in the evidence that the victim was aged about 40 years and the accused persons were young and aged about 20 years and, therefore, she was not in a position of equal strength so as to resist the appellants. Even in the absence of any injuries on the person of the victim, in our view, with the other evidence on record, the prosecution is able to establish that the offence was committed.
the blood stained clothes which were said to have been handed over to the Officer-in-Charge at the Police Station by the husband of the victim were not sent for chemical examination and, therefore, the corroboration with which such evidence could offer was absent. In our view, the failure of the investigating agency cannot be a ground to discredit the testimony of the victim. The victim had no control over the investigating agency and the negligence, if any, of the investigating officer could not affect the credibility of the statement of PW-1 - the victim. we are satisfied that on the basis of the evidence on record, the conviction of the appellant can be sustained.
the doctor who has been examined as PW-2 has found that the victim PW-1 was used to sexual intercourse and as such absence of injury on the private parts of the victim may not be very significant. PW-1 was also used to sexual intercourse. The evidence of the victim has been corroborated by the evidence of PWs.2 and 3, the two post occurrence witnesses, as well as by the FIR which was lodged without any delay. Therefore, it is difficult to differ from the findings of the High Court.
In the present case, the High Court on re-appreciation of evidence on record has differed with the findings of the Sessions Court on the innocence of the accused and has found him guilty of the charges leveled against him. The High Court after evaluating the manner in which the evidence and other materials on record has been appreciated as well as the conclusions arrived at by the Sessions Court, has come to the conclusion that the findings of the Sessions Court are perverse and has resulted in miscarriage of justice has re-appreciated the evidence and materials on record and has found that the appellant is guilty of the offence alleged. Therefore, in our view, the decision on which reliance has been placed by learned Counsel for the appellant would not assist him in any manner whatsoever.
The result of the aforesaid discussion leads to only one conclusion that the accused committed forcible rape on the victim on the intervening night of 12/13th August, 1989, as alleged by her, and his conviction by the High Court is quite justified being based on evidence on record. It is, therefore, confirmed.
We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal and the appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.
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2010 (1) TMI 1284
... ... ... ... ..... y he had taken such a decision in the matter which was before him. A judge cannot be expected to give reasons other than those that have been enumerated in the judgment or order. The application filed by the petitioner before the public authority is per se illegal and unwarranted. A judicial officer is entitled to get protection and the object of the same is not to protect malicious or corrupt judges, but to protect the public from the dangers to which the administration of justice would be exposed if the concerned judicial officers were subject to inquiry as to malice, or to litigation with those whom their decisions might offend. If anything is done contrary to this, it would certainly affect the independence of the judiciary. A judge should be free to make independent decisions. 8. As the petitioner has misused the provisions of the RTI Act, the High Court had rightly dismissed the writ petition. 9. In view of the above, the Special Leave Petition is dismissed accordingly.
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2010 (1) TMI 1283
... ... ... ... ..... d Assessing Officer has not brought any evidence on record that assessee has income from other sources also, therefore, there is not reason to sustain the orders of the authorities below. We accordingly set aside the orders of authorities below and delete the addition of ₹ 1,50,000/-.” 6. Considering the facts of the case, in the light of the above order, it is clear that assessee has rental and interest income which is ascertained. Assessee has no other source of income except the agricultural income. The Assessing Officer has not brought any evidence on record as to what was the other income of the assessee being income from other sources. Therefore, both the addition are unjustified and are liable to be deleted. By following the earlier order of the Tribunal, we delete both the addition of ₹ 1,58,217/- and ₹ 3,10,941/-. As a result, ground no.2 and 3 of the appeal of the assessee are allowed. 7. As a result, appeal of the assessee is partly allowed.
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2010 (1) TMI 1282
Dishonour of Cheque - money lending business - legally enforceable debt or not - whether a person can be debarred from filing and prosecuting complaint u/s 138, if he is doing business of money lending without holding a valid licence - HELD THAT:- Since explanation to Section 138 of the N.I. Act clearly stipulated that the debt or liability means legally enforceable debt or other liability the claim by money lender against her borrower without production of valid and operative money lending license covering period of transaction was unenforceable claim u/s 138 of the N.I. Act was bound to be dismissed.
The complainant moneylender despite availing of sufficient opportunity in the trial Court could not produce valid and operative money lending license at the time of transaction of loan, hence dismissal of complaint can not be faulted as the complainant failed to establish legally enforceable debt or liability of the accused.
Hence this Court is of the considered view that the complainant could not establish her case against the accused so as to bring home the guilt on the part of the accused. The cheque in question was not issued to discharge loan enforceable according to law and, therefore, notwithstanding that it was dishonoured by nonpayment of loan remaining unpaid despite demand notice in writing, it cannot came within the purview of Section 138 of the N.I. Act.
As such, it would not be possible for this Court to reverse the acquittal and to fasten criminal liability upon the accused, u/s 138 of the N.I. Act. The Appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
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2010 (1) TMI 1281
... ... ... ... ..... rectors of the Company to ensure that the cheques when presented for encashment were honoured or that Notice of Demand sent to the Company was duly complied with by making payments of the amount of the cheques. Therefore, the petitioners are not covered even under Sub-section 2 of Section 141 of Negotiable Instruments Act. 12. For the reasons given in the preceding paragraphs, the criminal complaints No. 4140/1, 4141/1, 2338/1, 4139/1, 4145/1 and 4138/1 filed against the petitioners and pending in the Court of Shri Naveen Kumar Kashyap, MM, Dwarka Court, Delhi, cannot be allowed to continue and are hereby quashed to the extent they pertain to the petitioners. The trial will, however, continue to proceed against the other accused persons. The quashing against petitioner Sanjeev Kumar Gupta however is subject to the condition that a certified copy of the Form No. 32 will be filed by him before the Trial Court within six weeks, failing which the trial would continue against him.
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2010 (1) TMI 1280
... ... ... ... ..... nd disruption of supply of gas and the operations remaining standstill. 16. Thus, the circumstances prevailing during the period had adversely impacted the CIRP process in achieving the objectives of the Code i.e., maximisation of value of the assets of the Corporate Debtor and running the Corporate Debtor as a going concern. 17. This Adjudicating Authority is of the view that the above facts and circumstances of the instant case will squarely fall within the category of "unforeseen circumstances" which have adversely impacted the CIRP process. 18. Taking into consideration all the facts obtaining in the case, we are of the view that the period during which the supply of gas remain suspended/disrupted i.e., from 04.07.2019 to 04.10.2019 should be excluded from the CIRP period and therefore we allow exclusion of a period of 92 days from computation of 270 days with immediate effect for completion of the CIRP process. 19. IA No. 71/2020 stands disposed of accordingly.
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2010 (1) TMI 1279
... ... ... ... ..... cco Co., Cr. Khandige Sham Bhatt and Avinder Singh, clearly support the case of the respondents. Undisputedly, the State has wide discretion to impose higher taxes or levies. Several fiscal considerations are involved in the Government's decision to impose higher tax on certain items. The courts are therefore, not expected to interfere with the discretion of the State unless a very strong case of hostile discrimination is made out and unless the taxing statute operates unequally within the range of its selection. No such case is made out by the petitioner. 63. We are of the opinion that since imported wines never loose their character as imported wines, if they are classified as a group and subjected to heavier duty, the classification would be a reasonable classification founded on an intelligible differentia. This submission of Mr. Kotwal must, therefore, fail. 64. In view of the above, in our opinion, there is no substance in the petition and the petition is dismissed.
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2010 (1) TMI 1278
... ... ... ... ..... accordingly deleted the addition of ₹ 3,08,980/-. 10. We have heard both the parties and gone through the material available on record. From the facts stated above, it is clear that the amounts written off as bad debt were earlier given either as loan in the ordinary course of money lending business by the erstwhile company which got merged with the assessee company or entered in computation of income in earlier years. Some of the amounts represent the sale proceeds or security deposit out of the work done earlier. Therefore, the entire amount has been taken as income in earlier years or represents the money lent in the ordinary course of money lending business. Hence the condition of section 36(2) stands satisfied. The ld. CIT (A) has therefore, rightly deleted the addition. Hence no interference in the order passed by ld CIT(A) is called for. 11. In the result, the appeal filed by the Revenue is dismissed. The order pronounced in the open court on 29th January, 2010.
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2010 (1) TMI 1277
... ... ... ... ..... ents and their functioning was for the benefit of the assessee as well. Therefore, the evidence produced by the Assessee cannot be wished away on the ground that the agents only provided services to the buyer and not to the assessee. In view of the above facts and circumstances, we are of the view that the commission payment is to be allowed to the assessee and accordingly, we allow the claim of the assessee, and the orders of the lower authorities are revered. This issue of the assessee's appeal is allowed." 27. As the facts are exactly identical in the present case as narrated above to the facts of case of Shri Samir A Batra (supra), respectfully following the co-ordinate Bench decision, we confirm the order of CIT(A) deleting the addition. This issue of the Revenue's appeals is dismissed. 28. In the result, assessee's appeals are partly allowed as indicated above and that of Revenue's appeals are dismissed. Order pronounced in Open Court on 08/01/2010.
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2010 (1) TMI 1276
... ... ... ... ..... eld that the activities carried on by the trust are in accordance with the objects for which it was formed. Such objects have been approved as for Charitable purposes by Ld CIT by granting registration u/s 12A of the Act. Hence, in our opinion, the purposes specified by the assessee trust in Form No.10 are only in connection with the advancement of the objects of the trust and they cannot be termed as general. Accordingly the AO is directed to take into account the application filed by the assessee in terms of section 11(2) while computing the income of the assessee. 13. In view of the foregoing discussions, we hold that the assessee trust is entitled to exemption u/s 11 of the Act. Since the computation of income made by the AO is not in accordance with the views expressed by us, we direct the AO to re-compute the income in the light of the principles stated above. 14. In the result all the appeals filed by the assessee are allowed. Pronounced in the open Court on 08-01-2010
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2010 (1) TMI 1275
... ... ... ... ..... ad of contest the suit seek time to vacate the premises. It is not the case that any new fact has come to the notice of the petitioner and/or which was not known to him earlier. 26. I may observe that even otherwise the court is to order a trial only when disputed questions of facts necessary for adjudication are found to arise. A litigation which in the opinion of the court is doomed to fail would not further be allowed to be used as a device to harass a litigant; the provisions of the CPC are to be interpreted in such a manner so as to save expenses, achieve expedition and avoid the courts resources being used up on cases which will serve no useful purpose, as held in Liverpool & London SP & I Association Ltd. Vs. M.V. Sea Success I 2004 (9) SCC 512. 27. Accordingly, there is no merit in the petition. The petition, therefore, fails. The interim order earlier made is vacated. The petitioner to also pay costs of ₹ 20,000/- of these proceedings to the respondent.
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2010 (1) TMI 1274
... ... ... ... ..... transportation of coal mined so that the business of the assessee could be conducted more efficiently and profitably. There is also no dispute to the fact that the said road is a public road and belongs to the Burdwan Zilla Parishad and the assessee is not owner of the road. In view of the settled position on the issue, we find that the sum of ₹ 3.57 cr. incurred during the relevant previous year by the assessee towards contribution for up-gradation/construction of the link road belonging to the Burdwan Zilla Parishad is allowable as revenue expenditure in the year under appeal having been incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business of the Company. We, accordingly, uphold the order of CIT(A) allowing the claim of deduction of the sum of ₹ 3.57 cr. as revenue expenditure. This issue of the revenue's appeal is dismissed. 12. In the result, appeal of revenue and C.O. of assessee, both are dismissed. Order pronounced in open court on 30.6.2011
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2010 (1) TMI 1273
... ... ... ... ..... gements, we are of the view that provisions of section 269SS and 269T were introduced with the intention to curb the transactions of the black money. While levying a penalty u/s 271D one has to examine the surrounding circumstances under which the loan in cash was obtained by the assessees. In case of family transactions, the bonafide of the assessees should not be doubted as held in the case of CIT Vs. Sunil Kumar Goel (supra). In the instant case, assessee has made out a case that the family loan was obtained to clear the loan liabilities of the outsiders and Revenue has not placed anything on record to falsify the claim of the assessees. Under the given facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the invocation of provisions of section 271D is not proper. We therefore, following the aforesaid judgements set aside the order of the CIT(A) and delete the penalty. 8. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed. Pronounced in the open Court on 7.1.2010
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2010 (1) TMI 1272
... ... ... ... ..... ismissed the appeal without considering that court of Tribunal should take liberal approach in the matter of delay consideration. The facts of the case are that an ex-partee order of assessment was made on 7.11.1997. The assessee filed an appeal, which was 40 days beyond time and it was not accompanied by the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The appeal was dismissed on this ground on 10.3.2000. The Tribunal has upheld the order of the first appellate authority by its order dated 21.12.2000. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the case a liberal view may be taken. The assessee's first appeal may be heard on merits and in accordance with law provided the assessee files an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, within a period of 10 days from the date of issuance of a certified copy of this order. The order of the Tribunal dated 21.12.2001 shall be kept in abeyance till then. With the above observations, this revision is disposed of.
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2010 (1) TMI 1271
... ... ... ... ..... on was allowed to the assessee for AY 1999-00 by completing the assessment u/s 143(3) and the assessee has not reduced the amount of deprecation allowed for AY 1999-00. Accordingly, the assessment was reopened in view of sec. 147/148. Since the Tribunal has confirmed thrusting upon the deprecation on the assessee for AY 1999-00; therefore, the amount of depreciation allowed for AY 1999-00 has to be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining the WDV so that depreciation of subsequent year can be determined accordingly. Since the effect of the order of the Tribunal passed for AY 1999-00 has to be given for the year under consideration also on account of determination of correct value of depreciation; therefore, in our considered view, the issue in respect to reopening assessment has become academic in nature and therefore, need not be adjudicated upon. 7 In the result, the appeal of the department as well as the assessee are dismissed. Order pronounced on 20.1.2010
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2010 (1) TMI 1270
... ... ... ... ..... ustoms dated 25th January, 2010 is taken on record. In view of this undertaking no further orders are necessary. The petition is dismissed keeping all rival contentions open. No order as to costs.
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