1995 (9) TMI 286 - SC - VAT and Sales Tax

Whether the High Court could issue a writ or direction prohibiting a statutory authority viz. the appellate authority under section 9 of the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act 1948 from discharging the quasi-judicial functions; direction to the State Government to withdraw all powers from it and transferring the pending cases before the officer to any other authority? Whether advocates would be justified to go on strike as a pressure group in that behalf? Held that - Appeal allowed. Having given our anxious and careful consideration we are of the considered view that the High Court does not have the aforesaid power. Exercise of such power generates its rippling effect on the subordinate judiciary and statutory functionaries. On slightest pretext by the aggrieved parties or displeased members of the Bar by their concerted action they would browbeat the judicial officers or authorities who would always be deterred from discharging their duties according to law without fear or favour or ill-will. Therefore we hold that writ petition is not maintainable. The impugned orders are clearly and palpably illegal and are accordingly quashed.

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the High Court could issue a writ or direction prohibiting a statutory authority from discharging quasi-judicial functions.
2. Whether the High Court could direct the State Government to withdraw powers from the statutory authority and transfer pending cases to another authority.
3. Whether advocates would be justified in going on strike as a pressure group.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Prohibition of Statutory Authority from Discharging Quasi-Judicial Functions:
The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court could issue a writ or direction prohibiting a statutory authority, specifically the appellate authority under section 9 of the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948, from discharging its quasi-judicial functions. The Court emphasized that judicial review is a basic structure of the Constitution, entrusting the judiciary to protect the liberty and rights of citizens. The Court noted that the appellate authority's powers are conferred by section 9 of the Act, which is a complete code in itself for jurisdiction, procedure, and power to pass orders. The Court found no adverse remarks or allegations of corruption against the officer in his confidential service records. The allegations of corruption were first made on September 2, 1993, and appeared to be an invention by the advocates to avoid an inconvenient officer. The High Court's interim order practically allowed the writ petition at the admission stage, which the Supreme Court found to be inappropriate. The Supreme Court held that the High Court does not have the power to prohibit a statutory authority from discharging its statutory functions, as it would undermine the authority and confidence in the judicial process.

2. Direction to Withdraw Powers and Transfer Pending Cases:
The Supreme Court addressed whether the High Court could direct the State Government to withdraw powers from the statutory authority and transfer pending cases to another authority. The Court noted that the High Court has the power to issue a writ of prohibition in certain situations, such as when an inferior court or tribunal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, violates natural justice, acts under unconstitutional law, or contravenes fundamental rights. However, none of these situations arose in this case. The Court emphasized that the appellate authority was acting within its statutory powers under section 9 of the Act. The Court held that the High Court's orders restraining the authority from exercising its statutory powers and transferring those powers to another jurisdiction were palpably illegal and quashed them.

3. Justification of Advocates' Strike:
The Supreme Court examined whether advocates were justified in going on strike as a pressure group. The Court cited several precedents and articles highlighting the adverse effects of advocates' strikes on the judicial system and the litigant public. The Court emphasized that advocates are officers of the court and have a duty to protect the courts and the administration of justice. The Court noted that boycotting courts and striking work at the slightest provocation undermines public confidence in the judicial system. The Court referenced the Common Cause case, where interim measures were suggested to prevent strikes or boycotts by advocates. The Court reiterated that making wild allegations of corruption against judicial officers amounts to scandalizing the court and undermines the efficacy of the judicial process. The Court concluded that the advocates' strike in this case was unjustified and that the writ petition filed by the Bar Association was not maintainable.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashed the High Court's orders, and dismissed the writ petition without costs. The Court emphasized the importance of maintaining the dignity and authority of judicial officers and statutory authorities, and condemned the conduct of advocates resorting to strikes and boycotts. The interim order passed by the High Court became non-functional automatically.

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