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Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the second part of sub-section (6) of section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. Whether the State Government's power to extend the duration of an order under section 144 imposes an unreasonable restriction on fundamental rights. 3. Judicial scrutiny and machinery for rescission or alteration of the order. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Validity of the second part of sub-section (6) of section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: The High Court of Patna declared the second part of sub-section (6) of section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ultra vires. This part reads: "No order under this section shall remain in force for more than two months from the making thereof; unless, in cases of danger to human life, health or safety, or a likelihood of a riot or an affray, the State Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, otherwise directs." The High Court found that the power vested in the State Government to extend the duration of an order under section 144 imposes an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental freedoms of citizens, as it is not subject to judicial scrutiny and lacks a mechanism for rescission or alteration. 2. Whether the State Government's power to extend the duration of an order under section 144 imposes an unreasonable restriction on fundamental rights: Section 144 is designed to provide temporary orders in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger, where immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable. The section allows a Magistrate to make an order in writing against any person or the public generally to prevent obstruction, annoyance, injury, or risk to human life, health, safety, public tranquility, or a riot or affray. The order remains in force for not more than two months unless extended by the State Government in cases of danger to human life, health, or safety, or a likelihood of a riot or an affray. The Supreme Court in Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra held that section 144 is intended to secure public welfare by preventing disorders and that the powers conferred by it are exercisable by a Magistrate who acts judicially. The restrictions authorized by the section are temporary and imposed only in emergencies. The Court observed that the wide power under the section is conditioned by the need to prevent obstruction, annoyance, or injury, and therefore, the power is not unlimited or untrammeled. 3. Judicial scrutiny and machinery for rescission or alteration of the order: The Supreme Court noted that the validity of section 144 in its entirety was upheld in Babulal Parate's case, but the validity of the power vested in the State executive to extend the duration of the order beyond two months was not considered. The power conferred upon a Magistrate to make an order under section 144(1) is subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court under sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. An order under sub-section (4) refusing to rescind or alter any order may be rectified by the High Court. The Court held that the power to "otherwise direct" involves the authority to extend the duration of the Magisterial order for the duration of the danger or emergency. However, sub-section (6) does not authorize the State to make the order permanent. The State must consider whether it is necessary to extend the period beyond two months and then direct that the order shall remain in force for a longer period, but not after the apprehension of danger or emergency ceases. The absence of statutory restrictions on the exercise of power by the State Government does not invalidate the statute. The order, whose duration is extended by the State, remains the order of the Magistrate, and its source of authority is derived from the Magistrate. The direction of the State Government only extends its duration. The direction under sub-section (6) does not depend on the subjective satisfaction of the Government and can be challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court highlighted that the Magistrate, even after the State Government extends the duration of the order, is competent to rescind or alter the order on a judicial consideration of the materials placed before him. The Magistrate is independent of the State Government and can rescind or alter the order if justified by circumstances. Separate Judgment by Hegde, J.: Hegde, J. noted that the High Court of Patna struck down the second part of sub-section (6) of section 144 as violative of sub-clauses (b), (c), and (d) of clause (1) of Article 19 of the Constitution. The respondents were not represented in the Supreme Court, and Mr. Ramamurthi was appointed as amicus curiae. The Union of India intervened, and the Attorney General was represented by Dr. Singhvi. The main question was whether the words "unless, in cases of danger to human life, health or safety, or a likelihood of a riot or any affray, the (State Government) by notification in the Official Gazette, otherwise directs" are liable to be struck down as violative of Article 19(1). Hegde, J. emphasized that the power conferred on the State Government under sub-section (6) is an independent executive power, not expected to be exercised judicially. The direction given by the Government is an executive act and not subject to judicial review. The restriction imposed by the Government's power to extend the duration of the order is not reasonable as it lacks adequate safeguards against misuse, such as the right of representation by the aggrieved party, and is neither appealable nor revisable. The Supreme Court concluded that the impugned provision is violative of Article 19(1)(b), (c), and (d) and is not saved by Article 19(3), (4), or (5). The appeal was dismissed, and the order of the High Court was upheld.
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