Home
Issues Involved:
1. Extension of time for payment of court fees. 2. Exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act for winding up petitions. 3. Acknowledgment of liability through Tax Deduction Certificates (TDS). 4. Applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to winding up petitions and subsequent suits for recovery. Detailed Analysis: 1. Extension of Time for Payment of Court Fees: The court addressed applications for extending the time to pay court fees in several suits. The plaintiff had already paid the requisite court fees in some suits and sought additional time in others. The court granted extensions up to January 25, 2003, for the payment of court fees, allowing the plaintiff to proceed with the suits even if the decision went against them, intending to prefer an appeal. 2. Exclusion of Time Under Section 14 of the Limitation Act for Winding Up Petitions: The plaintiff sought to exclude the time spent in prosecuting winding up petitions under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, arguing that the period should be excluded to extend the limitation period for filing suits. The court had to decide whether the plaintiff was entitled to such exclusion. 3. Acknowledgment of Liability Through Tax Deduction Certificates (TDS): The plaintiff argued that the issuance of TDS certificates by the defendants amounted to an acknowledgment of liability, which should extend the limitation period for filing the suits. The court noted that even if this acknowledgment was considered, the suits would still be barred by limitation unless the time spent in winding up petitions was excluded. 4. Applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to Winding Up Petitions and Subsequent Suits for Recovery: The court examined whether the period spent in pursuing winding up petitions could be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The court referenced several judgments, including: - Yeshwant Deorao v. Walchand Ramchand: The Supreme Court held that time spent in insolvency proceedings could not be excluded for computing the period of limitation for executing a decree, as the reliefs sought in insolvency and execution proceedings were different. - Diwan Chand Kapoor v. The New Rialto Cinema Pvt. Ltd.: The court observed that winding up petitions and suits for recovery do not relate to the same matter in issue, as the former seeks to wind up a company unable to pay its debts, while the latter seeks to recover money. - Zafar Khan v. Board of Revenue, UP: The Supreme Court emphasized that for Section 14 to apply, the earlier proceedings must relate to the same matter in issue and be prosecuted in good faith in a court unable to entertain it due to jurisdictional defects or similar reasons. The court concluded that the winding up petitions were dismissed on merits, not due to jurisdictional defects or similar reasons. Therefore, the conditions for applying Section 14 were not met. The court also distinguished the plaintiff's reliance on cases like Chalisgaon Shri Laxmi Narayan Mills Co. Ltd. v. Armit Lal Kalidas Kanji and Pavan Om Parkash Kejriwal v. Partap Steel Rolling Mills (1935) Ltd., noting that these did not align with the present case's facts and legal principles. Conclusion: The court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to the benefit of exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act for the period during which the winding up petitions were pending. Consequently, the suits were barred by limitation and dismissed with no order as to costs.
|