TMI Blog1992 (11) TMI 208X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he show cause notice that the applicants/appellants herein, inter alia, have contravened the provisions of Section 6 of the Central Excises and Salt Act (C.E.S.A.), 1944 read with Rule 174 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and Rule 9(1). The appellants were also asked to show cause to the Collector of Central Excise, Bombay-1. 2.1 It is also observed from the said notice that goods valued at over Rs. 2,00,000 were seized and, thereafter provisionally released in terms of Bond B-II executed on 21-4-1981. 2.2 It has been proposed in the show cause notice as to why (a) duty of Rs. 6,79,864 be not demanded and recovered from them under Rule 10A and/or provisions (a) and (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 read with Rule 9(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and/or Section 11A of the CESA, 1944; (b) the seized goods should not be confiscated under Rule 173Q and other Rules; (c) penalty should not be imposed on them under Rule 173Q and Rule 52A; and (d) the land, building, plant, machinery, materials etc. used in connection with the manufacture, production, storage, removal or disposal of such goods be not confiscated under Rule 173Q: 3. Learned Consultant for the appellants has now so ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as to why the effect of Rule 6 should not be read in giving effect to the provisions of the Act. For this proposition he relies on Supreme Court s judgment in the case of Collector of Central Excise v. Parle Exports [1988 (38) E.L.T. 741 (SC) Para 12]. Apex Court in Para 12 of the Report has observed as follows:- ...........................When a notification is issued in accordance with power conferred by the statute, it has statutory force and validity and, therefore, the exemption under the notifications, as if it were contained in the Act itself. See in this connection the observations of this Court in Orient Weaving Mills (P) Ltd. v. UOI [1978 (2) E.L.T. J 311]. See also Kailash Nath v. State of Utter Pradesh [AIR 1957 SC 790].......... As regards the learned consultant s plea that the appellants have been deprived one right of appeal to the Collector (Appeals) because of extra-jurisdictional adjudication by the Collector of Central Excise, learned JDR submits that right of appeal is still available before the CEGAT and it cannot be said that the appellants have no right of appeal at all. The appellants right is merely a right of appeal and they cannot insist upon that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Collector who could have adjudicated and Collector could not have exercised those powers. (2) Provisions of the Act should be interpreted strictly and these cannot be enlarged except through proper amendment of me Act itself. (3) At the relevant time, the Govt. also knew that only an Assistant Collector had powers to adjudicate and that is why the Government introduced amendment in Section 11A(ii). (4) By the Act various authorities have been invested with various powers and wherever Parliament wanted a specific officer like Collector or Assistant Collector to exercise certain powers the Statute has specifically named that functionary in connection with that in the relevant provisions of the Act and it is only that functionary who could exercise the powers pursuant to relevant provision in the Act. (5) Provision of Rule 6 whereby the Collector might perform all or any of the duties or exercise all or any of the powers assigned to a subordinate officer could not be invoked because the Rule cannot travel beyond the Act and cannot amend the Act. (6) Apart from this, under Rule 6 the Collector was empowered to exercise duties and powers assigned to an officer under the Rules ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... follow the ratio of S. Kannan s case since as per Article 141 of the Constitution of India, Law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all Courts. 5.1 The reasons adduced by the Bench in the Meghmani Dyes and Intermediates case for not referring the matter to a larger Bench are set out below: 1. In one of this Tribunal s orders referred to above the issue whether provisions of the Act can be over-ridden by rules has been decided. 2. In all the cases except ORG Systems case the Tribunal was not made aware of the decision in S. Kannan s case. 3. In ORG. Systems case the Tribunal did not consider S. Kannan s case (even though it was referred to by the appellants). The Tribunal relied upon the earlier orders of the Tribunal in cases of DCW Ltd., UP Laminations and held the issue to have been settled. 4. The Tribunal is bound by the Law declared by the Supreme Court and in our view the Supreme Court has, in S. Kannan s case, laid down the law which is applicable to the facts of this case also and when we are made aware of this judgment we have not to follow earlier decision of the Tribunal. 5. We are basing our finding not on original interpretation only and thereby ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ision in S. Kannan s case. 6.2 Reason No. (3) given by the Bench in Meghmani Dyes Intermediates case that the Bench in ORG Systems case did not consider S. Kannan s case although it merely referred to it in the said judgment is in our respectful view very flimsy reason for differing from decision in ORG Systems case. The Bench in ORG Systems has not merely referred to S. Kannan s case relied upon by the learned advocate for the appellants therein but has also extracted the observation of the Supreme Court relied upon by the learned advocate as follows :- It is equally not possible to accept the submission that when a power is conferred on a lower authority that power can always be enjoyed by the authority higher in the hierarchy in relation to lower authority. Therefore, when the Tribunal s Bench had come to a different conclusion holding that there was no impropriety or lack of jurisdiction in the Collector in passing the impugned order that Bench is deemed to have fully considered the judgment of the Supreme Court in S. Kannan s case and also the precise observation relied upon by the learned advocate for the appellants. It would be incorrect in our view to hold, as ha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t to accept the submission that the expression Regional Transport Authority used in Section 62 will comprehend State Transport Authority. It is equally not possible to accept the submission that when a power is conferred on a lower authority that power can always be enjoyed by the authority higher in the hierarchy in relation to the lower authority. There is no express provision in the statute which provides that the State Transport Authority can always and without any fetter enjoy the power of the Regional Transport Authority and in the absence of such provision it is difficult to read merely on the basis of vertical hierarchy wherever the lower authority is mentioned in the statute, the higher authority be included therein. Viewed from mis angle, we do not propose to undertake the exercise of ascertaining whether State Transport Authority can be said to be the higher authority in relation to Regional Transport Authority." (Emphasis supplied) From the emphasised portion it is apparent that the Court held that the power conferred on a lower authority cannot be enjoyed because there was no express provision in the statute that State Transport Authority can always and without any ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ghtly disregard the decision of another Bench of the same Tribunal on an identical question. This is particularly true when the earlier decision is rendered by a larger Bench. The rationale of this rule is the need for continuity, certainty and predectibility in the administration of justice. Persons affected by decisions of Tribunals or Courts have a right to expect that those exercising judicial functions will follow the reason or ground of the judicial decision in the earlier cases on identical matters. Classification of particular goods adopted in earlier decisions must not be lightly disregarded in subsequent decisions, lest such judicial inconsistency should shake public confidence in the administration of justice. It is, however, equally true that it is vital to the administration of justice that those exercising judicial powers must have the necessary freedom to doubt the correctness of an earlier decision if and when subsequent proceedings bring to light what is perceived by them as an erroneous decision in the earlier case. In such circumstances, it is but natural and reasonable and indeed efficacious that the case is referred to a larger Bench. This is what was done by t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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