9911796707
TMI Blog1971 (9) TMI 103X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s, namely, Fian Chand Jain and P. K. Ray. In that application the Union of India prayed for a finding that the respondents in that application were not fit and proper persons to hold the office of directors or any other office connected with the conduct or management of Benett Coleman and Co. Ltd. and/or any other company. There was also a prayer for such further or other orders as the circumstances of the case might require. The Tribunal admitted the application and numbered it as Case No. 1 of 1964. A second application was filed before the Tribunal by the first respondent, under section 388C of the Act, asking for an interim direction upon the petitioner and some other persons not to discharge their duties as directors of Benett Coleman and Co. Ltd. until further orders of the Tribunal. On this application the Tribunal made an order by consent of parties and without prejudice to their rights and contentions and in particular to the respondents' contention that they had properly resigned from the board of directors on September 13, 1964, and September 8, 1964. In that order it was recorded that the appellant gave an undertaking to the Tribunal not to discharge his duties and fun ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... aining the respondent from proceeding in Case No. 1 of 1964, for a period of three weeks in the first instance and thereafter until disposal of the rule. By a judgment and order dated April 20, 1966, Banerjee J. discharged the rule and this appeal is directed against this judgment and order. Before proceeding any further it is to be noticed that by Act 17 of 1967, Chapter IV of of the Companies Act, 1956, was extensively amended. The effect of the amending Act was that the Tribunal ceased to exist and all cases pending before the Tribunal stood transferred to the High Court which would have had jurisdiction in the matter. The result is that the pending application regarding the appellant before the Tribunal stood transferred to the High Court of Bombay and is now pending before that court. The amendment, it is to be noticed, came into force after the judgment of the trial court. Mr. S. Banerjee, counsel for respondent No. 1, raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of this appeal. He contended that having regard to the amendment of the Act this appeal has become infructuous because no relief could be granted as against the Tribunal, which ceased to exist and because ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... se the Tribunal ceased to exist by virtue of the amendment to the Act. These are the contentions of the parties on the question of relief to the appellant in this appeal having regard to the subsequent event, namely, the amendment to the Act, by which the Tribunal was abolished. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions in Act No. 17 of 1967. Section 2 provides that on the commencement of the Act the Companies Tribunal constituted under section 10A of the Companies Act, 1956, shall stand abolished. Sub-section (3) of section 3 runs as follows : "(3) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (1) and sub-section (2), every proceeding under the said Act, pending before the Tribunal immediately before its abolition, shall, on such abolition, stand transferred to the court having jurisdiction in relation to such proceeding, under section 10 of the said Act, and every such court shall deal with such proceeding as if it were a proceeding instituted before itself and where the Tribunal has taken down, or made memorandum of any evidence in the proceeding, the court may proceed with the proceeding from the stage at which ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... B(1) of the Act. In paragraph 31 it is stated that after due consideration of the facts presented to the applicant, the applicant is of opinion that there are circumstances suggesting the charges mentioned above and also an additional charge, namely, that the respondents in that application have been conducting and managing Benett Coleman and Co. Ltd. in a manner which has or is likely to cause serious injury and damage to the interest of the industry and business to which the company pertains. This charge is in conformity with clause (c) of section 388B(1) of the Act. It is to be noticed that this charge was not set out in paragraph 5 of the application. I shall refer to the particulars of the charges at greater length later in the judgment. Mr. S. Banerjee, counsel for the respondents, contended that the appellant and other directors of the company were not fit and proper persons to hold the office of directors or any other office connected with the management of the company. Mr. R. C. Deb, counsel for the appellant, on the other hand, contended that the facts, as set out in the application before the Tribunal, did not disclose circumstances suggesting, so far as the appellant w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ve Mr. Deb, firstly, relied on a decision of the Supreme Court Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board [1966] 36 Comp. Cas. 639 , 662 ; [1966] Supp. S.C.R. 311 A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 295. In that case the question that arose for decision of the court was whether the words "If in the opinion of the Central Government" in section 237(b) of the Act required that existence of circumstances suggesting inference of what has been set out in sub-clause (i), (ii) or (iii ) must be made out or whether those words merely required formation of opinion as a subjective process. The majority of the Supreme Court was of the opinion that though the formation of the opinion was subjective, the existence of circumstances relevant to the inference was the sine qua non to the formation of opinion and that that action must be demonstrable and that if the action was questioned on the ground that no circumstances leading to the inference of the kind contemplated by the section existed, the action might be exposed to interference, unless the existence of circumstances was made out. It was further held that since the existence of circumstances was a condition to the formation of an opinion, if the existence of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed of had happened, and, therefore, the appellant could not have participated in the acts of misfeasance, fraud and corrupt practice. It was argued that since the appellant was not. a director of the company at the time when the wrongful acts were alleged to have been committed there could be no occasion for investigation into the conduct of the appellant by an application under section 388B of the Act. Counsel for the appellant further contended that his client became a director of the company on April 13, 1963, but resigned the directorship on September 13, 1964. Before the appellant became a director of the company the Central Government in exercise of its power under section 237 of the Act made an order on April 11, 1963, appointing one S. Prakash Chopra as an inspector to investigate the affairs of the company for a period prior to the time when the appellant became a director. Therefore, counsel for the appellant contended, there could be nothing against the appellant in the interim report submitted by the inspector. It was also argued that the allegations of fraud against the appellant, such as they were, were vague and entirely devoid of particulars and should, therefore, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ction taken against the appellant under section 388B of the Act was based on irrelevant materials or that the decision of the Central Government to commence proceedings was unjustified. It was next argued that the word "may" used in the section should not be read as "shall" or "must" and should be construed to invest the Central Government with absolute discretion. It was further contended that there was nothing in section 388E to hold that discretion was coupled with duty, so as to construe the word "may" to mean "shall" or "must" (sic ) in so far as the two sections invested the Central Government with absolute discretion to proceed against one individual under the penal sections 388B and 388E, while leaving other individuals out, in similar circumstances. The law as stated in those two sections, it was submitted, was violative of article 14 of the Constitution. It was next contended that discretion to proceed against particular individuals, to pick and choose among persons similarly situated, was left to the subjective satisfaction of the Central Government and that, it was argued, was not permissible under article 14. In support of this contention reliance was placed on a dec ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... unsel for the appellant was a decision of the House of Lords, Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] A.C. 997 (H.L.). In that case a parliamentary statute contained provisions relating to the milk marketing scheme. The statute provided that if a complaint was made to the minister regarding the operation of any scheme, the Minister shall appoint a committee of investigation, which should report to the Minister on the complaint. The producers in one region made a complaint to the Minister but he refused to appoint a committee of investigation. Thereupon the complainants applied to the court for an order of mandamus. Following the decision in Frederick Guilder Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford [1880] 5 App. Cas. 214 (H.L.) it was held that an order should be made directing the Minister to consider the complaint according to law. The two decisions mentioned above make it clear that when the word "may" is used in a statute, the context in which it has been used may be sufficiently indicative of a mandate of the statute, that the word "may" confers a duty which must be performed in certain circumstances. In our view, in the circumstances in which the word "may" has ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dustries case (supra), it was held that if the existence of circumstances suggesting an inference of matters set out in clause (i), (ii) or (iii ) of section 237(b) was challenged, the existence of such circumstances had to be proved at least prima facie, and it was not enough to assert that circumstances existed and give no indication of what they were. But it was also held, however, that formation of opinion by the Central Government was a subjective process and could not be questioned. In this case the Central Government came to a decision that a reference should be made under section 388B of the Act and the formation of the opinion by the Central Government or the conclusion to which it came, namely, that such a reference ought to be made is not open to review by the court. But, since there is a challenge on the ground that circumstances did not exist to justify a reference under section 388B, I shall now proceed to examine if the materials on record in this case, prima facie, fulfil the condition relating to existence of circumstances to justify a reference under section 388B of the Act. Those circumstances have been set out in the application filed before the Companies Tribun ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ce would be impossible. S. P. Jain thereupon directed that the company's sales should not be accounted for truly or in full in the books of the company. S. P. Jain also directed that the proceeds shown in the company's books should be lower than those actually received, and the difference should be paid to him. The items in respect of which such operations were to be carried out were newsprint waste, machinery and other miscellaneous items. In accordance with this suggested practice, full sale proceeds of newsprint wastes were not credited in the company's books, but only a part thereof was recorded and the balance was handed over to S. P. Jain. This practice, it is alleged, continued up to September, 1968, when it was severely curtailed consequent upon an order of the Registrar of Newspapers. It is alleged that during the period mentioned above cash sales of newsprint wastes approximated to Rs. 21,94,620.69, but a sum of Rs. 4,80,995.34 only was credited in the company's books and the balance of Rs. 17,13,625.30 was paid to S. P. Jain or to his order. It is next alleged that the previous practice of sale of newsprint wastes, according to weight, was given up, and the practice of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uld be paid in the year ended December 31, 1954. Yet, on October 5, 1955, it was resolved to borrow Rs. 30 lakhs from Bharat Nidhi Ltd., a company controlled by S. P. Jain and his associates, and a resolution was passed on October 28, 1955, to pay out the aforesaid, amount representing arrears of dividend on preference shares up to December 31, 1954. The payment of dividend was made without compliance with the prescribed procedure for approval and declaration of dividends. It is next alleged that the accounting practice followed by the company is in violation of section 209 and section 211 read with Schedule VI, Parts (i) and (ii) of the Act. It is also alleged that there has been a deliberate misrepresentation of the company's true position so as to suit the interest of the management or the persons associated with them. The next allegation relates to payment of travelling allowance which was fixed at a very high rate bearing no relation to actual expenditure. S. P. Jain is alleged to have been charging travelling allowance from the company although he had drawn such allowance for the same journeys from some of the companies under his control. The charges mentioned above are ba ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pick and choose between one person and another and, for that reason, powers to discriminate between person and person have been created and conferred by those sections, which, therefore, should be held to be violative of article 14 and declared void. It was argued that in similar circumstances the Central Government might pick and choose among several persons and might commence proceedings under section 388B of the Act against a particular individual, while ignoring same or similar charges against others. Secondly, it was argued that after the Tribunal had found several individuals guilty of the charges under section 388B, the Central Government might ignore the finding against a favoured person, but proceed to take steps against one who was disliked by the Central Government. This question was raised before the Supreme Court in Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board [1966] 36 Comp. Cas. 639 ; 1966 Supp. S.C.R. 311 ; A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 295. In that case it was held that similar powers conferred on the Central Government by sections 235, 237(a) and 237(b) of the Act, which enabled the Central Government to make an order appointing an inspector to investigate the affairs of the c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... iate case a declaration may be prayed for, and the court, in exercise of its power under article 226, is competent to grant such a prayer. But the question in this case is not merely whether a declaration such as mentioned above should be granted but whether a writ should be issued or an order made to stop the proceedings before the Bombay High Court, where the proceedings now stand transferred by reason of the operation of the statute. The next case relied on was also a decision of the Supreme Court in Kunnathat Thathunni Moopil Nair v. State of Kerala A I.R. 1961 S.C. 552. In that case the question was whether a taxing statute, namely, the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act, 1955, as amended by an Act of 1957, was violative of article 14 of the Constitution. It was held that the provisions in the Act were unconstitutional as they were discriminatory and imposed unreasonable restrictions on holding of property and were confiscatory in character. In effect certain provisions of the Act were also declared to offend article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. We do not see how this decision is of any assistance to the appellant in this case, inasmuch as what was considered in that case was th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ngs in that reference. As it is, however, we are of the view that section 388B of the Act does not infringe article 14 and also of the view that no writ or order can be issued by this court to stay, stop or interfere with a proceeding before another High Court in an application under article 226 of the Constitution. Reliance was next placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in Hari Chand Sarda v. Mizo District Council A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 829. In that case certain regulations relating to tribals in Mizo Hills were held to be void as they provided no principles on which the policy of safeguarding the tribals from exploitation could be followed. It was held that the impugned regulations contained no principle or criterion on which the licence could be granted or renewed. The impugned regulation contained no provision on the basis of which an applicant for a licence could know what he was to satisfy in order to have a licence. This decision again is of no assistance to the appellant as we have held that section 388B of the Act incorporated sufficient criterion and guidelines for the Central Government to initiate proceeding under that section. On the question of exercise of discretion by ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... laced by counsel for the respondents on the decision of the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Bhogilal Shah v. State of Maharashtra A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1511. In that case it was contended that for the offence of smuggling of goods a person could either be dealt with by the customs authorities by proceeding under section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, or in the alternative or in addition to such proceedings, by instituting a prosecution in a criminal court under section 187A read with section 167(81). It was contended that it was left to the unfettered and unguided discretion of the customs authorities to proceed against certain persons under section 167(8) and others under section 167(81) or under both the sections. This contention on behalf of the appellant was overruled and it was held that there were enough indications of policy or guidelines in the object, purpose and scheme of the Act. It was further held that in deciding whether a complaint should be instituted for an offence which was covered by both items 8 and 81 of section 167 of the Act, the customs officer must take into consideration the nature of the contravention and the available evidence and that in certain cases the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... appellant as a director of the company acted in violation of section 240 of the Act by denying or directing denial by the company's employees of production of relevant books, and also denying assistance to the inspector appointed to investigate into the company's affairs. It is also alleged that such denial embraced refusal to answer questions by the company's officers, and to produce books of the company before the inspector when requested to do so. There are also allegations of destruction of and tampering with relevant records, of suppression of evidence, of fraud and irregularities. These allegations in the affidavit were denied by the appellant. In paragraph 11 of the affidavit affirmed by him on December 4, 1964, the appellant alleged that the materials mentioned above were not considered by the Central Government in forming its opinion as the allegations were not made in the application before the Company's Tribunal nor were they made in the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the respondents in the writ petition. I do not see how the materials contained in the affidavit of Davinder Singh Dang mentioned above make out a case of non-application of mind by the Central G ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y submit to the orders of the court without objection but would consent to such orders being passed whatever be the nature of the orders. Thereafter, the court invited learned counsel for the parties to make their submissions with regard to the nature of the orders that the court should make. Upon this direction, counsel for the 4th respondent in that petition (appellant in this appeal) stated that his client submitted to the orders of the court. On these submissions being made on behalf of the respondents in that petition, Nain J. made certain orders to which I will presently refer. But before doing so I should refer to some of the observations of the learned judge, as a good deal of arguments were advanced on the question of admission by the respondents or a finding against them. The learned judge said : "I have already made it clear in my observations above that making of this order does not involve any admission by any of the respondents of the allegations made against them in the petition, nor my giving a finding on any of the issues framed by the Companies Tribunal or in respect of the truth or correctness of the allegations in the petition". After making these observatio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... should be made without making a finding, a finding had, in fact, been made in so far as it was held that some of the existing and former directors of the company were disqualified from becoming directors again and in so far as the order of injunction was issued restraining them from interfering or intermeddling with the affairs of the company. In dealing with this contention that the order made amounts to a finding, the learned judge observed as follows : "I do not agree with the contention that this amounts to a finding. The above passage starts with a part of the sentence which begins like this : 'the allegations of malversation and misfeasance and embezzlement of the funds of the company made against the past directors and Mrs. Rama Jain are indeed serious....' In several places in my order, I have made it amply clear that the order I was making was based on the submission of the party and with a view to prevent recurrence of what was alleged in the petition. The passage which according to the contention on behalf of these respondents is a finding, is not, in my opinion, a finding at all". It is on the facts mentioned above, and in the events that have happened, that we are t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... duct which is singularly lacking in this case. Far from there being any evidence of indecisive procrastination the Central Government appears to us to have been extremely prompt, diligent and active in bringing to an end the mismanagement in the affairs of the company. We have therefore no hesitation in rejecting the contention of the counsel for the appellant that the order of reference is bad on the ground of non-application of mind by the Central Government. I now turn to the effect of the judgment of the Bombay High Court so far as this appeal is concerned. It is true that the appellant and the other directors of the company made it clear that they were prepared to submit to an order without admitting any of the allegations made in the petition and also on condition that no finding was made against them; it is also true that Nain J., in his order dated September 2, 1969, made it amply clear that there was no finding against the appellant and the other directors of the company in the order made on August 28, 1969. But whether a finding was arrived at or not, it is clear that Nain J. was satisfied that, prima facie, there were materials to justify the order disqualifying the app ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ce held by him, and he is barred from holding the office for a term of 5 years from the date of the order. This is all that the appellant will suffer in the event of the decision of the Bombay High Court going against him in the proceedings under section 388B of the Act. But as I have noticed earlier the judgment and order of the Bombay High Court, dated August 28, 1969, imposes a very much more severe penalty upon the appellant, as he has been disqualified from becoming a director of the company again. Whereas, in the proceedings under section 388B of the Act, if the decision of the High Court went against him, the appellant is liable to be removed from the directorship of the company by the Central Government and remains disqualified from becoming a director for a term of 5 years only, he has voluntarily and willingly submitted to an order imposing a much greater penalty upon him, namely, a disqualification from ever becoming a director of the company and has also submitted to an injunction not to interfere with the affairs of the company. This is the position in which the appellant has placed himself and we see no justification in his efforts, in the events that have happened, t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and was not protected by clause (6) of the article as it stood at the time of enactment and before amendment of the Constitution by the First Amendment Act of 1951. After amendment of article 19(6) of the Constitution in 1951, the State Government was given the power to carry on any trade or business to the exclusion of private citizens wholly or in part. The question was whether this amendment which came after the impugned enactment could save the enactment from being void. It was held that the amendment of the Constitution which came later could not be invoked to invalidate an earlier legislation which must be regarded as unconstitutional when it was passed. This decision, to our mind, is of no assistance to the appellant because the question considered and the decision were on entirely different points altogether. The question before the Supreme Court was not whether an amendment could be made in a section of the Act without re-enactment of the whole section itself, but whether an enactment which was void under the provisions of the Constitution as it stood at the time when the enactment was made could be protected by a subsequent amendment of the Constitution. The second case ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... oard. These are the material provisions in the Act relating to delegation of powers by the Central Government to the Board. Before proceeding to deal with Mr. Deb's contentions, I should refer to sub-section (6) of section 10E of the Act which is as follows: "(6) In the exercise of its powers and discharge of its functions, the Company Law Board shall be subject to the control of the Central Government". Relying on the provisions mentioned above, Mr. Deb submitted that once having delegated its powers under section 388B of the Act, the Central Government had completely divested itself of the powers created and conferred by that section. The powers under that section, it was argued, could be exercised by the Board alone by virtue of the delegation made by the Central Government. Once having delegated the powers, Mr. Deb argued, it was beyond the competence of the Central Government to make the impugned order of reference, which must, therefore, be held to be void. In support of this contention reliance was placed by the counsel for the appellant, firstly, on Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board [1966] 36 Comp. Cas. 639 ; A.I.R 1967 S.C. 295. As we read that decision, we do n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ishable from the facts in the appeal now before us because by virtue of sub-section (6) of section 10E of the Act, which I have quoted earlier, the Central Government retained the overall control over the Company Law Board in exercise of its powers under the Act. The Central Government, therefore, retained full control over the acts of the Board in discharge of its functions. But, in the decision mentioned above the Minister by his delegation had retained no power for himself and it was, therefore, held that he completely stood divested of all his powers in the regulation. It seems to us that having regard to the provisions in the statute, namely, sub-section (6) of section 10E, it must be held that the contention of the counsel for the appellant suffers from a fallacy. It is not a case of absolute delegation so as to hold that the delegating authority stood divested of all its powers. Far from that being the position, the delegating authority, namely, the Central Government, retained full control over the Board under section 10E(6). Faced with this statutory provision, counsel for the appellant argued that although the Central Government retained control over the Board, that did ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . Ruttonjee & Co. A.I.R. 1970 Cal. 548, for the proposition that the word "control" contemplated by section 8(1) of the Bengal Excise Act meant control to be exercised by issuing general instructions or directions, but that power could not authorise the State Government to issue specific instructions about the disposal of a particular application. Quite apart from the fact that words and terms used in a particular statute in one context cannot be interpreted to have the same meaning used in a different statute in a different context, I am of the opinion that the decision mentioned above does not support the contention of the counsel for the appellant. No instruction, in this case, was issued by the Central Government to the Board, which was left free to decide the question raised by the applicant in the reference under section 388B of the Act. Counsel for the appellant next relied on a decision in Imperial Hydropathic Hotel Company v. Hampson [1883] 23 Ch. D. 1 (C.A.). That was an action by some shareholders who were appointed directors of a company in place of the existing directors. The newly appointed directors brought the action against the existing directors to restrain them ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... at case, that delegation implied abdication or denudation of power and the power so delegated could not be resumed until the delegation had been specifically revoked. Lord Coleridge C.J., in rejecting the contentions, held as follows : "The word 'delegation' implies that powers are committed to another person or body which are, as a rule, always subject to resumption by the power delegating, and many examples of this might be given. Unless therefore, it is controlled by statute, the delegating power can at any time resume its authority". In the same case Wills J. held that delegation did not imply a parting with power by the person who granted the delegation but pointed to the conferring of authority to do things which otherwise that person would have to do himself. The next case relied on by Mr. Banerjee was Metropolitan Borough and Town Clerk of Lewisham v. Roberts [1949] 2 K.B. 608 (C.A.). Dealing with the question of delegation of power by the Minister of Health, under regulation 51 of the Defence Regulations, to a town clerk, Denning M.R. held that the Minister was not bound to apply his mind personally to the question of requisitioning a property and that it was sufficient ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... having regard to the amendment of the Act, by which the Companies Tribunal was abolished and the High Court was substituted in place of the Companies Tribunal and all proceedings pending before the Tribunal stood transferred to the High Court. But, before doing so, I will briefly refer to one other matter. The company involved in this case is Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd. The charges against the appellant relate to the affairs and administration of this company. The registered office of this company is at Bombay. The principal business of the company, namely, publication of newspapers, journals, etc., is carried on in Bombay. The various acts of misfeasance, fraud, maladministration, misappropriation, etc., alleged against the appellant and other directors of the company, were committed in Bombay. The court, having jurisdiction under the Companies Act, 1956, with regard to this company, is the High Court of Bombay. Against the orders made by the Tribunal in the application for particulars of pleadings and inspection of documents, appeals were preferred to the High Court of Bombay and interim orders were also obtained from the Bombay High Court for stay of proceedings in Case No. 1 of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and all pending proceedings before the Tribunal, stand transferred to the High Court. In this case, as I have noticed earlier, the proceedings stand transferred to the Bombay High Court and is now pending in that court. The amendment of the Act mentioned above, as I have noticed earlier, was made after the judgment of the trial court and during pendency of this appeal. In the petition, as it stands, no amendment has been made for the purpose of removing the Companies Tribunal from the category of respondents, nor has any amendment been made in the prayers of the petitioner. In prayer (a) a declaration is prayed that sections 388B to 388E are ultra vires and void. In prayer (b) a writ of mandamus or a writ of prohibition or other appropriate writ or directions or orders have been prayed for prohibiting the respondents from proceeding with the application, namely, Case No. 1 of 1964, and ordering them to desist from proceeding with the said application. Prayer (c) is a prayer for a writ or direction or order directing the respondent No. 1 (Union of India) to withdraw or drop the proceedings initiated before the Tribunal. Prayer (d) is a prayer for a direction or order prohibiting th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... application which is now pending before another High Court. This would have the effect of doing indirectly what this court is prevented by law from doing directly. Any attempt to prevent or prohibit the hearing of the pending application before the Bombay High Court in exercise of its statutory jurisdiction would plainly be an abuse of the process of the court and if this court issues an injunction as prayed for restraining the proceedings before the Bombay High Court, it would be acting in excess of its jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution. In our view, the writ jurisdiction of this court does not enable this court to issue writs or orders which would have the effect of interfering with the proceedings before another High Court. For these reasons the objections raised by the counsel for the respondents must be upheld and it must be held that the petition is not maintainable, after amendment of the Act mentioned above, having regard to the abolition of the Companies Tribunal and the transfer of the application to the High Court of Bombay. I have dealt with all the contentions raised by the counsel for the parties, and I see no reason to interfere with the judgment a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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