9911796707
TMI Blog1976 (11) TMI 179X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... years was fixed at Rs. 4500/- per annum. The rent was payable in advance on 1 January of each calendar year. The respondent's case is that since 1953 the appellant failed and neglected to pay rent fixed under the lease. Clause 4 of the lease provided that if the rent would be in arrears and unpaid for 30 days after the same would become due it would be lawful for the lessor respondent to forfeit the lease notwithstanding the fact that the term had not expired. The lease provided that the respondent lessor would re-enter the premises in that event and the lease would cease and determine. The respondant by notice dated 5 March, 1959 called upon the appellant to quit, vacate and deliver to the respondent vacant possession of the property. The notice was consequent upon the wilful default of the appellant to pay rent and consequent on the several breaches of covenants as alleged in the notice. The respondent filed the suit on 5 February, 1960. The defendant claimed possession of the property known as the Beenachi Estate together with movable, a declaration that the lease had determined and -claimed arrears of rent, mesne profits a sum of Rs. 2,20,394/- as 'damages for waste. At the tr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of persons who were entitled to fixity of tenure immediately before 21 January 1961 under any law then in force or persons claiming under .such persons". The High Court held that only rights of persons but not fixity of tenure were saved. Counsel for the appellant contended that the effect of proviso to section 3(1) (vii) of the 1964 Act as amended in 1969 is that fixity of tenure and rights with regard to the same are both saved, and, therefore, the High Court should have held that the appellant was entitled to fixity of tenure. The second contention of counsel for the appellant is that the High Court was in error in holding. that under section 23 of the Malabar Tenancy Act 1929 the appellant was liable to be evicted by the landlord and that the appellant had no right to resist eviction. The contention of the appellant was that assuming the High Court was right on the above conclusion, the provisions contained in section 108 sub-sections (2) and (3) of the 1964 Act as amended in. 1969 require the Court. to apply the law retrospectively in respect of pending suits, appeals, applications, decree where dispossession had not been effected. It is said by the appellant that the re ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ating tenant shall have a right to cut such trees and the landlord or the intermediary shall not have the right to cut any such trees. Section 73 of the 1964 Act which was introduced in 1969 is to the effect that the maximum amount that could be claimed by way of arrears of rent for the period ending May 1968 notwithstanding any contract, judgment or order of court is only 3 years and nothing more. These provisions, viz., Sections 50-A, 52 and 73 which were introduced by the 1969 Amendment Act were relied on by the appellant for the purpose of showing that the appellant would be entitled to use the holding and to cut trees and the maximum arrears of rent could be claimed for a period of three years and not more. Counsel for the appellant next contended that the trial Court was in error in finding that the holding of the appellant is a plantation in the context of section 3(1) (viii) of the 1964 Act. The contention on behalf of the appellant was that assuming that the trial Court was right in its conclusion as regards the area of 279.86 acres which according to the respondent was the extent of coffee plantation .on the date of the lease, in respect of the remaining extent of land ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as amended in 1969. The appellant also prayed that section 108(3) as introduced in 1969 and as amended in 1971 indicates that the appeal is to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the appeal is as amended in 1971. Section 132(3) of the 1964 Act is as follows :- "Notwithstanding the repeal of the enactments mentioned in sub-section (2) any decree passed before. the commencement of this Act for the eviction of a tenant from his holding, pursuant to which eviction has not been effected, may, on the application of the tenant or the landlord, be reopened and the matter may be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Act." This provision according to the appellant establishes that it applies to decree passed before the commencement of Act 1 of 1964 and also pursuant to which eviction has not been effected. In the present case, the decree was passed by the trial Court as well as by the High Court after the 1964 Act came into existence. The decree was passed in accordance with the provisions of the 1964 Act but before the amendment in 1969. The appellant claimed benefit of the proviso to section 3 (1) (vii)of the Act. The benefit claimed is fixity of tenure ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ration owned or controlled by the Government of Madhya Pradesh and, is, therefore, a Government company under the Indian Companies Act. The appellant is disentitled to claim fixity of tenure under section 13 of the Act inasmuch as under the 1964 Act and under amendment in 1969 leases of lands owned by the Government owned Companies are by section 3(1) (i) of the 1,964 Act specifically exempted from the provisions of Chapter II of the Act. Section 13 which is in Chapter 1I cannot therefore, be invoked by the appellant. The right to fixity of tenure is denied to a tenant in respect of a holding owned by or belonging to a Government controlled CompanY. The appellant is, therefore, not entitled to claim fixity of tenure under the 1964 Act as amended. The Beenachi Estate in the present case does not come within the definition of "plantation" in section 2(44) of the 1964 Act as amended in 1969 because the extent of coffee cultivated area has been found by the court to have dwindled to a little over 110 acres in extent out of the total extent of a little over 550 acres. Further, tapioca has been grown by the Receiver in the areas other than the coffee planted area. Therefore, the Estate c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... committed default in payment of rent for seven years. Therefore, the appellant was not entitled to any rights .of fixity of tenure under the proviso to clauses (i) to (vii) of section 3(1) of the 1964 Act is to be interpreted in the light of the provisions of-the Malabar Tenancy Act in the present case. The appellant invokes the provisions contained in section 125(3) of the Act for the purpose of determination in accordance with the provisions of the Act benefits, rights or remedies conferred by the Act and claimed by him are fixity of tenure, remedy against eviction and remedy against payment of damages and arrears of rent. The appellant also invokes the provisions contained in section 108(2) and (3) of the Act for the purpose of reopening of the decree and disposal of the same in accordance with the provisions of the Act on the same ground that the appellant claims benefits, rights and remedies conferred on him by the provisions of the Act. Counsel for the appellant relied on the Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in Anantha Narayana Iyer v. Pran (1976) K.L.T. 403. 1970 in support of the contention that by reason of the provisions contained in section 125(3) of the A ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t. It is unsound to suggest that pending proceedings which are excepted from the application of section 125 (1) of the Act will yet fall within section 125(1) of the Act by reference to section 125(3) of the Act. The Kerala High Court fell into the error of overlooking the purpose of section 125(3) of the Act. The purpose is that suit or other proceeding shall be stayed. In the present case the appeal in this Court which was pending on 1 January 1970 is a proceeding which was pending at the commencement of the Act and was not initiated or originated at the commencement of the Act. Therefore, the provisions contained in section 125 are not applicable in the present case. A statute has to be looked into for the general scope and purview of the statute and at the remedy sought to be applied. In that connection the former state of the law is to be considered and also the legislative changes contemplated by the statute. Words not requiring retrospective operation so as to effect an existing statutory provision prejudicially ought not be so construed. It is a well recognised rule that statute should be interpreted if possible so as to respect vested rights. Where the effect would be to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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