TMI Blog1962 (5) TMI 20X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... led the "Act" and under section 471 read with section 468 and section 417 of the Indian Penal Code. They were all acquitted of the charge under section 468. Jagannath Prasad was convicted under sections 471 and 417 of the Indian Penal Code and section 14(d) of the Act and was sentenced to two years' rigorous imprisonment under section 471, to one year rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000 under section 417 and to a fine of Rs. 1,000 under section 14(d) of the Act. Bhagwan Das was convicted under section 14(d) of the Act and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 1,000. Romesh was acquitted. The sentences passed on Jagannath Prasad were concurrent. Their appeal to the Sessions Judge was dismissed and in revision to the High Court Jagannath Prasad was acquitted of the offence under section 417 of the Indian Penal Code but the other convictions and sentences were upheld. Against this judgment and order of the High Court of Allahabad the appellants have come to this Court by special leave. The facts leading to the appeal are these: In 1950-51, the firm of the appellants purchased vegetable ghee valued at about Rs. 3 lacs from places outside the State of U.P. in the name of four fictitiou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ommitted by them. Both parties are agreed on that and therefore we have to see the Act as it stood on the date when the offence is alleged to have been committed. According to the charge the offence was committed on or about July 16, 1951, when forged invoices were produced by the appellants before the Sales Tax Officer. So what we have to see is the law as it stood on that day. Section 3 of the Act deals with liability to tax under the Act and section 3-A with single point taxation. Under section 3 every dealer was required to pay on his turnover of each assessment year a tax at the rate of three pies a rupee. Thus the tax was payable in regard to all sales but under section 3-A(1) the tax was leviable only at a single point. That section provided: Section 3-A(1): "Notwithstanding anything contained in section 3, the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare that the turnover in respect of any goods or class of goods shall not be liable to tax except at such single point in the series of sales by successive dealers as may be prescribed." The Government could declare the tax to be payable at a single point but there were two requirements; there had to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... from those fictitious dealers and in this manner the appellants escaped payment of sales tax under section 3. In other words they tried to take advantage of section 3-A by producing false documents and thereby evaded payment of tax under section 3 which every dealer was required to pay on his turnover. In trying to get the benefit under the ineffective notification issued under section 3-A the appellants evaded payment of tax under section 3 which they were in any case liable to pay. It cannot be said therefore that no offence was committed under section 14(d) of the Act which provides: Section 14. "Offences and Penalties-Any person who (a) ..................... (b) ..................... (c) ..................... (d) fraudulently evades the payment of any tax due under this Act, shall, without prejudice to his liability under any other law for the time being in force, on conviction by a Magistrate of the first class, be liable to a fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, and where the breach is a continuing breach, to a further fine which may extend to fifty rupees for every day after the first during which the breach continues." It is no defence to say that the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... courts in the strict sense of exercising judicial power." Lord Sankey also enumerated some negative propositions as to when a tribunal is not a court. At page 297 his Lordship said: "In that connection it may be useful to enumerate some negative propositions on this subject: 1. A tribunal is not necessarily a court in this strict sense because it gives a final decision. 2. Nor because it hears witnesses on oath. 3. Nor because two or more contending parties appear before it between whom it has to decide. 4. Nor because it gives decisions which affect the rights of subjects. 5. Nor because there is an appeal to a court. 6. Nor because it is a body to which a matter is referred by another body. See Rex v. Electricity Commissioners(3)." Hidayatullah, J., in Shrimathi Ujjam Bai's case(1) described Sales Tax Authorities thus: "The taxing authorities are instrumentalities of the State. They are not a part of the legislature, nor are they a part of the judiciary. Their functions are the assessment and collection, of taxes, and in the process of assessing taxes, they have to follow a pattern of action, which is considered judicial. They are not thereby converted into Courts of civil judi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... icer to calculate turnover when goods are sold for consideration other than money and this is after such enquiry as he considers necessary. All these provisions show that the Sales Tax Officer cannot be equated with a Court. In our opinion therefore the Sales Tax Officer is not a Court. In Krishna v. GoverdhanaiahA.I.R. 1954 Mad. 822., it was held that the Income-tax Officer is not a Court within the meaning of section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code and this view was accepted by this Court in Shrimati Ujjam Bai's caseA.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1621. In Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain[1955] 2 S.C.R. 955., a Commissioner appointed under the Public Enquiries Act, 1950, was held not to be a Court. Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation[1931] A.C. 275. was referred to in that case. At page 967 the following passage from Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailsham Edition, Volume 8, page 526 was approved: "Many bodies are not courts, although they have to decide questions, and in so doing have to act judicially, in the sense that the proceedings must be conducted with fairness and impartiality, such as assessment committees, guardians committees, the Court of referee constitute ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Iyer [1913] I.L.R. 36 Mad. 72., held that a Divisional Officer hearing appeals under the Incometax Act was a court within the meaning of section 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code but a Tahsildar who was the original assessing authority was not because there was no lis before him. There is one passage in the judgment of Sundara Ayyar, J., at p. 86 which is of significance. It was said: "I may observe that I am prepared to agree with Dr. Swaminathan that mere authority to receive evidence would not make the officer recording it a court." At page 84, it was said that the determination of the assessment in the first instance may not be of a court although the assessing officer may have the power to record statements. But an appeal against the assessment is dealt with by the Collector in the manner in which an appeal is disposed of by a Civil Court. In this connection reference may be made to the statement of the law contained in the judgment of Venkatarama Ayyar, J., in Shri Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. The State of Punjab [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1013, 1018. There the distinction between a quasi-judicial tribunal and a court was given as follows: "It may be stated broadly that what dist ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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