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1960 (11) TMI 115

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..... e petition fails and is dismissed with costs. - W.P.(C) 87 OF 1959 - - - Dated:- 21-11-1960 - P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A.K. SARKAR, K. SUBBARAO, K. N. WANCHOO AND J.R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ. For the Petitioners : M. P. Amin, Dara P. Mehta, P. M. Amin; S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra For the Respondents. : A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, R. Ganapathy Iyer, P. Kesava Pillai and T. M. Sen JUDGMENT This is a petition filed under Art. 32 of the Constitution in which the validity of the Orissa Mining Areas Development Fund Act,(-, 1952 (XXVII of 1952), is challenged. The first petitioner is a public limited company which has its registered office at Bombay. A large majority of its shareholders are citizens of India; some of them are themselves companies incorporated under the Indian Companies Act. Petitioners Nos. 2 to 7 are the Directors of Petitioner No. 1, the second petitioner being the Chairman of its Board of Directors. These petitioners are all citizens of India. At all material times the first petitioner carried on and still carries on the business of producing and selling coal excavated from its collieries at Rampur in the State of Orissa. Two le .....

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..... at the impugned Act and the rules framed under it were ultra vires and invalid; no action has, however, been taken on the said appeal presumably because the authority concerned could not entertain or deal with the objections about the vires of the Act and the rules. Thereafter on March 26, 1959, the Assistant Administrative Officer, respondent 3, called upon the first petitioner to submit monthly returns for the assessment of the cess. The first petitioner then represented that it had filed an appeal setting forth its objections against the notification, and added that until the said appeal was disposed of no returns would be filed by it. In spite of this representation respondent 3, by his letter of May 6, 1959, called upon the first petitioner to submit monthly returns in the prescribed form and issued the warning that failing compliance the first petitioner would be prosecuted under s. 9 of the impugned Act. A similiar demand was made and a similar warning issued by respondent 3 by his letter dated June 6, 1959. It is under these circumstances that the present petition has been filed. The petitioners contend that the impugned Act and the rules made thereunder are ultra vire .....

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..... before us Mr. Amin suggested-and Mr. Sastri did not object-that we should hear the learned Attorney-General on the question as to whether even if the levy imposed by the impugned Act is a fee relatable to Entries 23 and 66 in List II of the Seventh Schedule, it would nevertheless be ultra vires having regard to the provisions of Entry 54 in List I read with Central Act LIII of 1948. Accordingly we directed that a notice on this point should be served on the learned Attorney-General and the case should be set down for hearing on that point again. For the learned Attorney-General the learned Additional Solicitor-General appeared before us in response to this notice and we have had the benefit of hearing his arguments on the point in question. The first question which falls for consideration is whether the levy imposed by the impugned Act amounts to a fee relatable to Entry 23 read with Entry 66 in List II. Before we deal with this question it is necessary to consider the difference between the concept of tax and that of a fee. The neat and terse definition of tax which has been given by Latham, C. J., in Matthews v. Chicory Marketing Board (1938) 60 C.L.R. 263, 276 is often cited .....

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..... ation between the service and the levy, or whether the levy is either not co-related with service or is levied to such an excessive extent as to be a presence of a fee and not a fee in reality. In other words, whether or not a particular cess levied by a statute amounts to a fee or tax would always be a question of fact to be determined in the circumstances of each case. The distinction between a tax and a fee is, however, important, and it is recognised by the Constitution. Several Entries in the Three Lists empower the appropriate Legislatures to levy taxes; but apart from the power to levy taxes thus conferred each List specifically refers to the power to levy fees in respect of any of the matters covered in the said List excluding of course the fees taken in any Court. The question about the distinction between a tax and a fee has been considered by this Court in three decisions in 1954. In The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt [1954] S.C.R. 1005. the vires of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (Madras Act XIX of 195 1), came to be examined. Amongst the sections challenged was s. .....

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..... f the Act. The same view was taken by this Court in regard to s. 58 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 (Act XXIX of 1950) which imposed a similar contribution for a similar purpose in Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay [1954] S.C.R. 1055. It would thus be seen that the tests which have to be applied in determining the character of any impugned levy have been laid down by this Court in these three decisions; and it is in the light of these tests that we have to consider the merits of the rival contentions raised before us in the present petition. On behalf of the petitioners Mr. Amin has relied on three other decisions which may be briefly considered. In P. P. Kutti Keya v. The State of Madras A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 621., the Madras High Court was called upon to consider, inter alia, the validity of s. 11 of the Madras Commercial Crops Markets Act 20 of 1933 and Rules 28(1) and 28(3) framed thereunder. Section 11(1) levied a fee on the sales of commercial crops within the notified area and s. 12 provided that the amounts collected by the Market Committee shall be constituted into a Market Fund which would be utilised for acquiring a site for the market, constructing a bui .....

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..... heir property protected. It would thus appear that this decision proceeded on the basis that what was claimed to be a special service to the lands in question was in reality an item in public service itself, and so the element of quid pro quo was absent. It is true that when the Legislature levies a fee for rendering specific services to a specified area or to a specified class of persons or trade or business, in the last analysis such services may indirectly form part of services to the public in general. If the special service rendered is distinctly and primarily meant for the benefit of a specified class or area the fact that in benefiting the specified class or area the State as a whole may ultimately and indirectly be benefited would not detract from the character of the levy as a fee. Where, however, the specific service is indistinguishable from public service, and in essence is directly a part of it, different considerations may arise. In such a case it is necessary to enquire what is the primary object of the levy and the essential purpose which it is intended to achieve. Its primary object and the essential purpose must be distinguished from its ultimate or incidental res .....

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..... t the pit s mouth. Section 5 provides for the constitution of the Orissa Mining Areas Development Fund. This fund vests in the State Government and has to be administered by such officer or officers as may be appointed by the State Government in that, behalf Section 5(2) requires that there shall be paid to the credit of the said fund the proceeds of the cess recovered under s. 4 for each mining area during the quarter after deducting expenses, if any, for collection and recovery. Section 5(3) contemplates that to the credit of the said fund shall be placed all collections of cess under s. 5(2) as well as amounts from State Government and the local authorities and public subscriptions specifically given for any of the purposes of the fund. Section 5(4) deals with the topic of the application of the said fund. The fund has to be utilised to meet expenditure incurred in connection with such measures which in the opinion of the State Government are necessary or expedient for providing amenities like communications, water supply and electricity, for the better development of the mining areas, and to meet the welfare of the labour and other persons residing or working in the mining area .....

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..... rce sufficiently healthy and in congenial surroundings. The mineral development of the State, therefore, requires that provision should be made for improving the communications by constructing good roads and by providing means of transport such as tramways; supply of water and electricity would also help. It would also be necessary to provide for amenities of sanitation and education to the labour force in order to attract workmen to the area. Before the Act was passed it appears that the mine-owners tried to put up small-length roads and tramways for their own individual purpose, but that obviously could not be as effective as roads constructed by the State and tramway service provided by it. It- is on a consideration of these factors that the State Legislature decided to take an active part in unsystematic development of its mineral areas which would help the mine-owners in moving their minerals quickly through the shortest route and would attract labour to assist the excavation of the minerals. Thus there can be no doubt that the primary and the principal object of the Act is to develop the mineral areas in the State and to assist more efficient and extended exploitation of its .....

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..... stituted into a specific fund and it has not become a part of the consolidated fund, its application is regulated by a statute and is confined to its purposes, and there is a definite co-relation between the impost and the purpose of the Act which is to render service to the notified area. These features of the Act impress upon the levy the character of a fee as distinct from a tax. It is, however, urged that the cess levied by s. 4(2) is in substance and reality a duty of excise. As we have already noticed s. 4(2) provides that the rate of such levy shall not exceed 5 per centum of the valuation of the minerals at the pit s mouth; in other words it is the value of the minerals produced which is the basis for calculating the cess payable by mine-owners, and that precisely is the nature in which duty of excise is levied under Entry 84 in List I. The said Entry empowers Parliament to impose duties of excise, inter alia, on goods manufactured or produced in India. When minerals are produced from mines and a duty of excise is intended to be imposed on them it would be normally imposed at the pit s mouth, and that is precisely what the impugned Act purports to do. It is also contended .....

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..... e, or that the taxes levied have no relation to the said services, or that they are unreasonable and excessive. Therefore, in our opinion, the extent of the rate allowed to be imposed by s. 4(2) cannot by itself alter the character of the levy from a fee into that of a duty of excise. If the co-relation between the levy and the services was not genuine or real, or if the levy was disproportionately higher than the requirements of the services intended to be rendered it would have been another matter. Then as to the form in which the impost is levied, it is difficult to appreciate how the method adopted by the Legislature in recovering the impost can alter its character. The character of the levy must be determined in the light of the tests to which we have already referred. The method in which the fee is recovered is a matter of convenience, and by itself it cannot fix upon the levy the character of the duty of excise. This question has often been considered in the past, and it has always been held that though the method in which an impost is levied may be relevant in determining its character its significance and effect cannot be exaggerated. In Balla Ram v. The Provinceof East .....

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..... Bom. 58. This decision has been expressly approved by the Privy Council in Governor-General in Council v. Province of Madras (2) (1945) L.R. 72 I.A. 91. Consistently with the decision of the Federal Court their Lordships expressed the opinion that "a duty of excise is primarily a duty levied on a manufacturer or producer in respect of the commodity manufactured or produced. It is a tax on goods and not on sales or the proceeds of the sale of goods. The two taxes, the one levied on the manufacturer in respect of his goods and the other on the vendor in respect of his sales may in one sense overlap, but in law there is no overlapping; the taxes are separate and distinct imposts. If in, fact they overlap that may be because the taxing authority imposing a duty of excise finds it convenient to impose that duty at the moment when the excisable article leaves the factory or workshop for the first time on the occasion of its sale". In that case the question was whether the tax authorised by the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939, was a tax on the sale of goods or was a duty of excise, and the Privy Council held it was the former and not the latter. Therefore, in our opinion, the mere f .....

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..... position is not in dispute. It is urged by Mr. Amin that the field covered by the impugned Act has already been covered by the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1948, (LIII of 1948) and he contends that in view of the declaration made by s. 2 of this Act the impugned Act is ultra vires. This Central Act was passed to provide for the regulation of mines and oil fields and for the development of minerals. It may be stated at this stage that by Act LXVII of 1957 which has been subsequently passed by Parliament, Act LIII of 1948 has now been limited only to oil fields. We are, however, concerned with the operation of the said Act in 1952, and at that time it applied to mines as well as oil fields. Section 2 of the Act contains a declaration as to the expediency and control by the Central Government. It reads thus: "It is hereby declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the Central Government should take under its control the regulation of mines and oil fields and the development of minerals to the extent hereinafter provided". It is common ground that at the relevant time this Act applied to coal mines. Section 4 of the Act provides that no mining .....

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..... est to take the regulation and development of mines under the control of the Union. In such a case the test must be whether the legislative declaration covers the field or not. Judged by this test there can be no doubt that the field covered by the impugned Act is covered by the Central Act LIII of 1948. It still remains to consider whether s. 2 of the said Act amounts in law to a declaration by Parliament as required by Art. 54. When the said Act was passed in 1948 the legislative powers of the Central and the Provincial Legislatures were governed by the relevant Entries in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution Act of 1935. Entry 36 in List I corresponds to the present Entry 54 in List I. It reads thus: "Regulation of Mines and Oil Fields and mineral development to the extent to which such regulation and development under Dominion control is declared by Dominion law to be expedient in public interest". It would be noticed that the declaration required by Entry 36 is a declaration by Dominion law. Reverting then to s. 2 of the said Act it is clear that the declaration contained in the said section is put in the passive voice; but in the context there would be no difficulty in .....

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..... by or under the Constitution, have effect until duly repealed or amended as if it were a reference to that new authority. The petitioners contend that as a result of this clause the declaration made by the Dominion Legislature in s. 2 of the Central Act must now be held to be the declaration made by Parliament. Is this contention justified on a fair and reasonable construction of the clause? That is the crux of the problem. In considering this question it would be relevant to recall the scheme of the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950. It consists of Three Parts. Part 1 deals with the adaptation of Central Laws and indicates the adaptation made therein; Part 11 deals with the adaptation of Provincial Laws and follows the same pattern; and Part III is a Supplementary Part which contains provisions in the nature of supplementary provisions. A perusal of the clauses contained in Part I would show that though some adaptation was made in Act LIII of 1948 it was not thought necessary to make an adaptation in s. 2 of the said Act whereby the declaration implied in the said section has been expressly adapted into a declaration by Parliament. Now, the effect of el. 16 in substance is to .....

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..... ure was to be included as an authority under this clause. The Constitution Act of 1935 had been repealed by the Constitution and it was not, and could not obviously be, the object of the Adaptation of Laws Order to make any adaptation in regard to the said Act. Therefore, the competence of the Dominion Legislature which flowed from the relevant provisions of the Constitution Act of 1935 is wholly outside this clause. We have carefully considered the arguments urged before us by the learned Additional Solicitor-General and Mr. Amin but we are unable to hold that cl. 16 can be pressed into service for the purpose of supporting the conclusion that the declaration by the Dominion Legislature implied in s. 2 of Act LIII of 1948 can, by virtue of cl. 16, be held to be a declaration by Parliament within the meaning of the relevant Entries in the Constitution. If that be the true position then the alternative challenge to the vires of the Act based on el. 16 of the Adaptation of Laws Order must fail. There is another possible argument which may prima facie lead to the same conclusion. Let us assume that the result of reading Art. 372 and cl. 16 of the Adaptation of Laws Order is that und .....

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..... service for such a purpose. Therefore, we reach this position that the field covered by Act LIII of 1948 is substantially the same as the field covered by the impugned Act but the declaration made by s. 2 of the said Act does not constitutionally amount to the requisite declaration by Parliament, and so the limitation imposed by Entry 54 does not come into operation in the present case. Act LIII of 1948 continues in operation under Art. 372; with this modification that so far as the State of Orissa is concerned it is the impugned Act that governs and not the Central Act. Article 372(1) in fact provides for the continuance of the existing law until it is altered, repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority. In the absence of the requisite parliamentary declaration the legislative competence of the Orissa Legislature under Entry 23 read with Entry 66 is not impaired, and so the said Legislature is competent either to repeal, alter or amend the existing law which is the Central Act LIII of 1948; in effect, after the impugned Act was passed, so far as Orissa is concerned the Central Act must be deemed to be repealed. This position is fully consistent wi .....

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..... chapter IIIB is concerned with the topic of control of supply, distribution, price, etc, of certain articles. The last chapter deals with miscellaneous incidental matters. The functions of the Development Councils constituted under this Act prescribed by s. 6(4) bring out the real purpose and object of the Act. It is to increase the efficiency or productivity in the scheduled industry or group of scheduled industries, to improve or develop the service that such industry or group of industries renders or could render to the community, or to enable such industry or group of industries to render such service more economically. Section 9 authorises the imposition of cess on scheduled industries in certain cases. Section 9(4) provides that the Central Government may hand over the proceeds of the cess to the Development Council there specified and that the Development Council shall utilise the said proceeds to achieve the objects mentioned in cls. (a) to (d). These objects include the promotion of scientific and industrial research, of improvements in design and quality, and the provision for the training of technicians and labour in such industry or group of industries. It would thus be .....

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..... me and defined in the notification and to exclude from such area any local area comprised therein and defined in the notification. A notification under s. 3 is made, after hearing objections from owners or lessees of mines. After such an area is constituted under s. 3, a cess is imposed under s. 4 on all extracted minerals from any mine in any such area at the rate not exceeding five per centum of the value of the minerals at the pit s mouth. The cess so collected is credited to a fund called the Orissa Mining Area Development Fund created under s. 5 of the Act, besides other amounts with which we are not concerned in this case. The Fund is to be applied to meet expenditure incurred in connection with such measures, which in the opinion of the State Government, are necessary or expedient for providing amenities like communications, water-supply and electricity, for the better development of mining areas and to meet the welfare of labour and other persons residing or working in the mining areas. Then come other provisions for working out the above provisions including s. 8, which gives power to the State Government to frame rules to carry. into effect the purposes of the Act. The Ru .....

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..... it to be conferred on the payer of the tax. This is expressed by saying that the levy of tax is for the purposes of general revenue, which when collected forms part of the public revenues of the State. As the object of a tax is not to confer any special benefit upon any particular individual, there is, as it is said, no element of quid pro quo between the tax-payer and the public authority. Another feature of taxation is that as it is a part of the common burden, quantum of imposition upon the tax-payer depends generally upon his capacity to pay." As to fees, it was pointed out that- "a fee is generally defined to be a charge for a special service rendered to individuals by some governmental agency. The amount of fee levied is supposed to be based on the expenses incurred by the Government in rendering the service, though in many cases the costs are arbitrarily assessed. Ordinarily, the fees are uniform and no account is taken of the varying abilities of different recipients to pay." Finally, it was pointed out that- "the distinction between a tax and a fee lies primarily in the fact that a tax is levied as a part of a common burden, while a fee is a payment for a speci .....

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..... rendering of such services are not set apart or specifically appropriated for that purpose but are merged in the general revenue of the State to be spent for general public purposes." The Orissa imposition was held to be a fee because the collections made were not merged in the general public revenue and were meant for the purpose of meeting the expenses of the Commissioner and his office which was the machinery set up for due administration of the affairs of the religious institution. They went to constitute a fund which was contemplated by s. 50 of the Orissa Act and this fund was specifically set apart for rendering services involved in carrying out the provisions of the Act. The third case, namely, Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay [1954] S.C.R. 1055. came from Bombay. Sec. 58 of the Bombay Act, No. XXIX of 1950, provided for an imposition in proportion to the gross annual income of the trust. This imposition was levied for the purpose of due administration of the trust property and for defraying the expenses incurred in connection with the same. After referring to the two earlier cases, the Court went on to say that- "taxis a common burden and the only return .....

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..... ed in this case. The cess consists of a levy not exceeding five per centum of the value of the minerals at the pit s mouth on all extracted minerals. Prima facie such a levy is nothing more nor less than a duty of excise. Item 84 of List I gives power to levy duties of excise exclusively to the Union and is in these terms :- "Duties of excise on tobacco and other goods manufactured or produced in India except- (a) alcoholic liquors for human consumption; (b) opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs and narcotics, but including medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol or any substance included in subparagraph (b) of this entry." This item gives power to Parliament to impose duties of excise on all goods manufactured. or produced in India with certain exceptions mentioned therein. Taking this particular case, coal is produced from the mine and would clearly be covered by the words " other goods produced in India" and a duty of excise can be levied on it. What then exactly is meant by a duty of excise? Reference in this connection may be made to Governor-General in Council v. Province of Madras (1945) L.R. 72 I.A. 91. In that case the point arose whether the sales .....

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..... is that it is primarily a duty levied on a manufacturer or producer in respect of the commodity manufactured or produced. Let me therefore see what the Orissa Legislature has done in the present case. It has levied a cess at a rate not exceeding five per centum on the value of minerals at the pit s mouth on all extracted minerals. All the extracted minerals are nothing other than goods produced and the cess is levied on the goods produced at a rate not exceeding five per centum of the value at the pit s mouth. The cess therefore in the present case cannot be anything other than a duty of excise. The pith and substance of the cess in this case falls fairly and squarely within entry 84 of List I and is therefore a duty of excise, which cannot be levied by the Orissa State Legislature. I may in this connection refer to the cesses levied by the Central Legislature and Parliament by Act XXXII of 1947 and by the Act No. LXV of 1951. Sec. 3 of Act XXXII of 1947 lays down that there shall be levied and collected as a cess for the purposes of that Act a duty of excise on all coal and coke dispatched from collieries at such rate not less than four annas and not more than eight annas per t .....

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..... ase right because the intention of the legislature was not to tax the income of any one; the essential character of the tax in that case was to tax the lands and buildings and the annual value of the lands and buildings was only taken as a mode of levying the tax. In the present case, however, the very mode of the levy of the cess is nothing other than the levy of a duty of excise and therefore the principle of quantification for purposes of a fee cannot be extended to such an extent as to convert what is in pith and substance a tax into a fee on that basis. The next case to which reference was made is Municipal Corporation, Ahmedabad v. Patel Gordhandas Hargovandas I.L.R. 1954 Bom. 41. In that case the Ahmedabad Bo. rough Municipality had levied a rate on open lands and the basis of the levy was one per centum of the capital value of the land. It was urged that this amounted to a capital levy within entry 54 of List I; but the court repelled that contention and held that the levy was in pith and substance a tax on lands, which came within entry 42 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act. A distinction was made between a tax on land which is levied on th .....

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..... raded scale depending on the size of the mine as evidenced by its share capital. Or a similar graded fee could be levied on each mine depending on its size determined by the number of men employed therein. Where therefore the result of quantification is to bring a particular impost entirely within the ambit of a tax it would not be right to say that such an impost is still a fee, because certain services have to be rendered and a fund has been created in which collections of the impost are credited. If this were permissible many taxes not otherwise leviable would be converted into fees by the simple device of creating a special fund and attaching certain services to be rendered from the amount in that fund. That would in my opinion be a colourable exercise of the power of legislation, as explained in K. C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. The State of Orissa (1) [1954] S.C.R. 1.. Let me illustrate how taxes can be turned into fees on the so-called basis of quantification with the help of the device of creating a fund and attaching certain services to be rendered out of monies in the fund. Take the case of income-tax under item 82 of List I of the Seventh Schedule, which is exclusively reser .....

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..... these services to the residents of a district. The State Legislature is entitled to impose fees for rendering these services to the residents of the district; the costs of these services would obviously be limitless and in order to meet these costs, the State legislature levies a consolidated fee for all these purposes at 10 per centum of the total net income on the residents of the district (excluding his agricultural income) as a measure of quantification of the fee. Can it be said in the circumstances that such a levy would not be Income-tax, simply because a fund is created to be used in the district where collections are made and these services have to be rendered out of the fund so created to the residents of that district and to no others? The answer can only be one, viz., that the nature of the impost is to be seen in its pith and substance; and if in pith and substance it is income-tax within item 82 of List I of the Seventh Schedule it will still remain income-tax in spite of the creation of a fund and the attaching of certain services to the monies in that fund to be rendered in a particular area. Such an impost can never be justified as a consolidated fee on the ground .....

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..... uld be no difference between taxes on mineral rights and duties of excise under item 84 of List I. A comparison of Lists I and II of the Seventh Schedule shows that the same tax is not put in both the Lists. Therefore, taxes on mineral rights must be different from duties of excise which are taxes on minerals produced. The difference can be understood if one sees that before minerals are extracted and become liable to duties of excise somebody has got to work the mines. The usual method of working them is for the owner of the mine to grant mining leases to those who have got the capital to work the mines. There should therefore be no difficulty in holding that taxes on mineral rights are taxes on the right to extract minerals and not taxes on the minerals actually extracted. Thus tax on mineral rights would be confined, for example, to taxes on leases of mineral rights and on premium or royalty for that. Taxes on such premium and royalty would be taxes on mineral rights while taxes on the minerals actually extracted would be duties of excise. It is said that, there may be cases where the owner himself extracts minerals and does not give any right of extraction to somebody else and .....

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