TMI Blog1961 (3) TMI 91X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r-General for India, R. Gana- Dar pathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent in W. P. No. 5 of 1958. JUDGMENT These six writ petitions filed Gaje, under Art. 32 of the Constitution have been placed before the Court for final disposal in a group because though they arise between separate parties and are unconnected with each other a common question of law arises in all of them. The opponents in all these petitions have raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the writ petitions on the ground that in each case the petitioners had moved the High Court for a similar writ under Art. 226 and the High Court has rejected the said petitions. The argument is that the dismissal of a writ petition filed by a party for obtaining an appropriate writ creates a bar of res judicata against a similar petition filed in this Court under Art. 32 on the same or similar facts and praying for the same or similar writ. The question as to whether such a bar of res judicata can be pleaded against a petition filed in this Court under Art. 32 has been adverted to in some of the reported decisions of this Court but it has not so far been fully considered or finally decided; an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he said decision was plainly against the petitioners' contentions, and so the learned advocate who appeared for the petitioners had no alternative but not to press the petition before the High Court. In consequence the said petition was dismissed on March 29, 1955. It appears that s. 20 has again been amended by s. 4 of Act XX of 1954. It is under these circumstances that the petitioners have filed the present petition under Art. 32 on March 14, 1956. It is plain that at the time when the present petition has been filed the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal under Art. 136 against the dismissal of the petitioners' petition before the- Allahabad High Court had already expired. It is also clear that the grounds of attack against the decision of the Board which the petitioners seek to raise by their present petition are exactly the same as the grounds which they had raised before the Allahabad High Court; and so it is urged by the respondents that the present petition is barred by res judicata. Mr. Agarwala who addressed the principal arguments on behalf of the petitioners in this group contends that the 'principle of res judicata which is no more than a tech ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... this position was put to Mr. Sen he fairly and rightly conceded that it was not possible for him to combat this position. 'To the same effect are the observations made by the same learned Chief Justice in Dewan Bahadur Seth Gopal Das Mohta v. The Union of India Another ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 773). It will, however, be noticed that the observations made in both the cases are obiter, and, with respect, it would be difficult to treat them as a decision on the question that the issue of an appropriate writ tinder Art. 32 is a matter of discretion, and that even if the petitioner proves his fundamental rights and their unconstitutional infringement this Court nevertheless can refused. to issue an appropriate writ in his favour Besides, the subsequent decision of this Court in Basheshar Nath v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi and, Rajasthan ([1959] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 528) tender to show that if a petitioner makes out a case of illegal contravention of his fundamental rights he may be entitled to claim an appropriate relief and a plea of waiver cannot be raised against his claim. It is true that the question of res judicata did not fall to be considered in that case but the tenor of all ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ividual's rights but they are based on high public policy. Liberty of the individual and the protection of his fundamental rights are the very essence of the democratic way of life adopted by the Constitution, and it is the privilege and the duty of this Court to uphold those rights. This Court would naturally refuse to circumscribe them or to curtail them except as provided by the Constitution itself. It is because of this aspect of the matter that in Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras ([1950] S.C.R. 594), in the very first year after the Constitution came into force, this Court rejected a preliminary objection raised against the competence of a petition filed under Art. 32 on the ground that as a matter of orderly procedure the petitioner should first have resorted to the High Court under Art. 226, and observed that this Court in thus constituted the protector and guarantor of the fundamental rights, and it cannot, consistently with the responsibility so laid upon it, refuse to entertain applications seeking protection against infringements of Ruch rights . Thus the right given to the citizen to move this Court by a petition under Art. 32 and claim an appropriate writ aga ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that there must be an end of litigation (2 ). Halsbury also adds that the doctrine applies equally in all courts, and it is immaterial in what court the former proceeding was taken, provided only that it was a court of competent jurisdiction, or what form the proceeding took, provided it was really for the same cause (p. 187, paragraph 362). Res judicata , it is observed in Corpus Juris, is a rule of universal law pervading every well regulated system of jurisprudence, and is put upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law; the one, public policy and necessity, which makes it to the, interest of the State that there should be an end to s litigation interest republican ut sit finis litium; the other, the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause-nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa (1). In this sense the recognised basis of the rule of res judicata is different from that of technical estoppel. Estoppel rests on equity able principles and res judicata rests on maxims which are taken from the Roman Law (2). Therefore, the argument that res judicata is a technical rule and as such is irrelevant in dealing with petitions under ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... urts pronounced in writ petitions under Art. 226. Thus, on general considerations of public policy there seems to be no reason why the rule of res judicata should be treated as inadmissible or irrelevant in dealing with petitions filed under Art,. 32 of the Constitution. It is true that the general rule can be invoked only in cases where a dispute between the parties has been referred to a court of competent jurisdiction, there has been a contest between the parties before the court, a fair opportunity has been given to both of them to prove their case, and at the end the court has pronounced its judgment or decision. Such a decision pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction is binding between the parties unless it is modified or reversed by adopting a procedure prescribed by the Constitution. In our opinion, therefore, the plea that the general rule of res judicata should not be allowed to be invoked cannot be sustained. This Court had occasion to consider the application of the rule of res judicata to a petition filed under Art. 32 in Pandit M. S. M. Sharma v. Dr. Shree Krishna Sinha ([1961] 1 S.C.R. 96). In that case the petitioner had moved this Court under Art. 32 and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n doing so it was observed by Fazl Ali, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court, that it may, however, be observed that in this case we have not considered it necessary to decide whether an application under Art. 32 is maintainable after a similar application under Art. 226 is dismissed by the High Court, and we reserve our opinion on that question . To the same effect are the observations made by Mukherjea, J., as he then was, in Syed Qasim Razvi v. The State of Hyderabad ([1953] S.C.R. 589). On the other hand, in Bhagubhai Dullabhabhai Bhandari v. The District Magistrate, Thana (1956 S.C.R. 533) the decision of the High Court was treated as binding between the parties when it was observed by reference to the said proceedings that but that is a closed chapter so far as the Courts including this Court also are concerned inasmuch as the petitioner's conviction stands confirmed as a result of the refusal of this Court to grant him special leave to appeal from the judgment of the Bombay High Court . In other words, these observations seem to suggest that the majority view was that if an order of conviction and sentence passed by the High Court would be binding on the convict ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sue an appropriate writ or order on the ground that the party applying for the writ is guilty of laches and in that sense the issue of a high prerogative writ may reasonably be treated as a matter of discretion. On the other hand, the right granted to a citizen to move this Court by appropriate proceedings under Art. 32(1) being itself a fundamental right this Court ordinarily may have to issue an appropriate writ or order provided it is shown that the petitioner has a fundamental right which has been illegally or unconstitutionally contravened. It is not unlikely that if a petition is filed even under Art. 32 after a long lapse of time, considerations ma arise whether rights in favour of third parties which may, have arisen in the meanwhile could be allowed to be' affected, and in such a case the effect of laches on the, part of the petitioner or of his acquirence may have to be considered; but, ordinarily if a petitioner makes out a case for the issue of an appropriate writ or' order he, would. be entitled to have such a writ or, order under Art. 32 and that may be said to constitute a difference in the right conferred on a citizen to move the High Court under Art. 226 as ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as corpus petition it is now settled in England that an applicant cannot move one Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division after ano- ther. The-said decision has been subsequently applied in Re Hastings (No. 3) to a writ petition filed for habeas corpus in a, Divisional Court of tile Chancery Division. In England, technically an order passed on a petition for habeas corpus is not regarded as a judgment and that places the petitions for habeas corpus in a class by themselves. Therefore we do not think that the English analogy of several habeas corpus applications can assist the petitioners in the present case when they seek to resist the application of res judicata to petitions filed under Art. 32. Before we part with the topic we would, however, like to add that we propose to express no opinion on the question as to whether repeated applications for habeas corpus would be competent under our Constitution. That is a matter with which we are not concerned in the present proceedings. There is one more argument Which still remains to be considered. It is urged that the remedies available to the petitioners to move the High Court under Art. 226 and this Court under Art. 32 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... efore, we are not satisfied that the ground of alternative remedies is well founded. We, must now proceed to state our conclusion on the preliminary objection raised by the respondents. We hold that if a writ petition filed by a party under Art. 226 is considered on the merits as -contested matter, and is dismissed the decision thus pronounced would continue to bind the parties unless it is otherwise modified or reversed by appeal or other appropriate proceedings permissible under the Constitution. It would not be open to a party to ignore the said judgment and move this Court under Art. 32 by an original petition made on the same facts and for obtaining the same or similar orders or writs. If the petition filed in the High Court under Art. 226 is dismissed not on the merits but because of the laches of the party applying for the writ or because it is held that the party had an alternative remedy available to it, then the dismissal of the writ petition would not constitute a bar to a subsequent petition under Art. 32 except in cases where and if the facts thus found by the High Court may themselves be relevant even under Art. 32. If a writ petition is dismissed in limine and an or ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and are dismissed; there would be no order as to costs. In Writ Petition No. 8 of 1960 the position is substantially different. The previous petition for a writ filed by the petitioner (No. 68 of 1952) in the Allahabad High Court was withdrawn by his learned counsel and the High Court therefore dismissed the said petition with the express observation that the merits had not been considered by the High Court in dismissing it and so no order is to costs was passed. This order the writ petition withdrawn which was passed on February 3, 1955, cannot therefore support the plea of res judicata against the present petition. It appears that a co-lessee of the petitioner had also filed a similar Writ Petition, No. 299 of 1958. On this writ petition the High Court no doubt made certain observations and findings but in the end it came to the conclusion that a writ petition was not the proper proceeding for deciding such old disputes about title and so it left the petitioner to obtain a declaration about title from a competent civil or revenue court in a regular suit. Thus it would be clear that the dismissal of this writ petition (on 17-3-1958) also cannot constitute a bar against the compet ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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