TMI Blog1958 (4) TMI 109X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... for revision under section 33A on January 25, 1957. The period of limitation is one year from the date of the order or within such further period as the Commissioner may think fit to allow on being satisfied that the assessee was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within that period, and the contention of the Department is that limitation begins to run from the date of the order, viz., January 9, 1956, and inasmuch as the application was made on January 25, 1957, the application is out of time. On the other hand, the contention of the assessee is that limitation begins to run from the date when the assessee came to know of the order, which is January 27, 1956, and, therefore, his application is within time. Mr. Jo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ake up his mind whether he should apply for revision or not. If Mr. Joshi's contention were to be accepted, we would be driven to this extraordinary conclusion that the period of limitation provided by the Legislature could be cut down by the action of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner could at his sweet will determine what the period of limitation was. He need not promulgate the order for a month, two months, or six months, and the period of limitation would depend upon when he choose to intimate to the party affected the nature of his order. Surely that could not have been the intention of the Legislature. Mr. Joshi's answer is that the Commissioner has the power to condone delay for suffic ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ctive knowledge. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner may announce that he is going to pass this order on a particular date. The assessee may not choose to turn up on that date. In such a case the assessee cannot contend that he had no knowledge of that order, because he could have had knowledge if he was present on the date announced for publication of the order. But if the assessee has neither actual nor constructive knowledge, it cannot possibly be suggested that there is an order within the meaning of section 33A(2) against which the assessee could possibly have appealed. Turning to the authorities, the Madras High Court has taken the same view of this section in a recent judgment in Muthiah Chettiar v. Commissioner of Incometax [195 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ntend that we should re-write the section and insert words which the Legislature did not think fit to insert. What the assessee contends is that we should give a reasonable interpretation to the word used by the Legislature and that word is order . Therefore, in construing section 33A(2) as we are construing, we are not adding to the words used by the Legislature or altering the words used by the Legislature. We are placing a reasonable interpretation upon the very words used by the Legislature, an interpretation which ensures an effective right of revision to the assessee and also ensures an effective period of limitation provided by the Legislature. In our opinion, therefore, the Commissioner was in error in coming to the conclusion t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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