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TMI Blog1958 (2) TMI 39X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... inted assistant medical officer of the Dimakuchi tea estate with effect from November 1, 1950. He was appointed subject to a satisfactory medical report and on probation for three months. It was stated in his letter of appointment: " While you are on probation or trial, your suitability for permanent employment will be considered. If during the period of probation you are considered unsuitable for employment, you -",ill receive seven days' notice in writing terminating your appointment. If you are guilty of misconduct, you are liable to instant dismissal. At the end of the period of probation, if you are considered suitable, you will be confirmed in the garden's service." In February 1951 Dr. Banerjee was given an increment of ₹ 5 per mensem, but on April 21, Dr. Banerjee received a letter from one Mr. Booth, manager of the tea estate, in which it was stated : " It has been found necessary to terminate your services with effect from the 22nd instant. You will of' course receive one month's salary in lieu of notice." As no reasons were given in the notice of termination, Dr. Banerjee wrote to the manager to find out why his services wer ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s stated that whereas an industrial dispute had arisen between the appellants and the respondent herein and whereas it was expedient that the dispute should be referred for adjudication to a Tribunal constituted under s. 7 of the Act, the Governor of Assam was pleased to refer the dispute to Shri U. K. Gohain, Additional District and Sessions Judge, under cl. (c) of sub-s. (1) of s. 10 of the Act. The dispute which was thus referred to the Tribunal was described in these terms: " (i) Whether the management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate was justified in dismissing Dr. K. P. Banerjee, A. M. O.? (ii) If not, is he entitled to reinstatement or any other relief in lieu thereof ?" Both parties filed written statements before Mr. ohain and the respondent took the plea that Dr. K. P. Banerjee was not a "workman" within the meaning of the Act; therefore, there was no industrial dispute in the sense in which that expression was defined in the Act and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make an adjudication on merits. Mr. Gohain took up as a preliminary point the question if Dr. Banerjee was a " workman " within the meaning of the Act and came to a conclusion which ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the one previous to the amendments of 1956; therefore, in reading the various sections of the Act, we shall read them as they stood prior to the amendments of 1956 and refer to the amendments only when they have a bearing on the question before us. The definition of 'workman' as it stood at the relevant time stated : " S. 2 (s): " Workman " means any person employed (including an apprentice) in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward and includes, for the purposes of any proceedings under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, a workman discharged during that dispute, but does not include any person employed in the naval, military or air service of the Government. " Now, the question is whether a dispute in relation to a person who is not a workman within the meaning of the Act still falls within the scope of the definition clause in s. 2 (k). If we analyse the definition clause it falls easily and naturally into three parts: first, there must be a dispute or difference; second, the dispute or difference must be between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen or between workmen an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t mean anybody and everybody in this wide world. First of all, the subject matter of dispute must relate to (i) employment or non-employment or (ii) terms of employment or conditions of labour of any person; these necessarily import a limitation in the sense that a person in respect of whom the employer-employee relation never existed or can never possibly exist cannot be the subject matter of a dispute between employers and workmen. Secondly, the definition clause must be read in the context of the subject matter and scheme of the Act, and consistently with the objects and other provision's of the Act. It is well settled that " the words of a statute, when there is a doubt about their meaning are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature has in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained." (Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 9th Edition, p. 55). It is necessary, therefore, to take the Act as a whole ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the award of a Tribunal shall within a period of one month from the date of its receipt by the appropriate Government be published in such manner as it thinks fit. Section 17-A lays down that the award of a Tribunal shall become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication under s. 17; it also contains certain other provisions which empower the appropriate Government to modify or reject the award. Section 18 is important for our purpose, and in so far as it relates to awards it states that an award which has become enforceable ,shall be binding on- (a) all parties to the industrial dispute; (b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Tribunal records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause; (c) where a party referred to under clause (a) or clause (b) is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates; and (d) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who are employed in the establishment or part of establishment as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the da ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d in, the industry in which the employer is engaged and authorised in such manner as may be prescribed. Sub-section (3) of s. 36 states that no party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner in any conciliation proceedings under the Act or in any proceedings before a court. Sub-section (4) states that in any proceeding before a Tribunal a party to a dispute may be represented by a legal practitioner with the consent of the other parties to the proceeding and with the leave of the Tribunal. The point to note is that there is no particular provision for the representation of a party other than a workman or an employer, presumably because under the second part of the definition clause the parties to an industrial dispute can only be employers and employers, employers and workmen, or workmen and workmen. Thus, an examination of the salient provisions of the Act shows that the principal objects of the Act are- (1) the promotion of measures for securing and preserving amity and good relations between the employer and workmen; (2) an investigation and settlement of industrial disputes, between employers and employers, employers and workmen, or workmen an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rate or District Judge on the one hand and the disputants, employer and workmen, on the other. The absurd results that will follow such an interpretation have been forcefully expressed by Chagla C. J., in his decision in Narendra Kumar Sen v. All India Industrial Disputes (Labour Appellate) Tribunal ((1953) 55 Bom. L.R. 125,129, 130): " If "any person " were to be read as an expression without any limitation and qualification whatsoever, then we must not put even any territorial restriction on that expression. In other words, it would be open to the workmen not only to raise a dispute with regard to the terms of employment of persons employed in the same industry as themselves, not only to raise a dispute with regard to the terms of employment in corresponding or similar industries, not only a dispute with regard to the terms of employment of people employed in our country, but the terms of employment of any workman or any labourer anywhere in the world The proposition has only to be stated in order to make one realise how entirely untenable it is. Take, for example, another case where the workmen raise an objection to the salary or remuneration paid to a Manager o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... relate to the particular establishment or part of establishment in which the workmen are employed so that the definition clause may be consistent with s. 18 of the Act. (3) The dispute must relate to the employment, non- employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person, but such person must be an employee discharged or in service or a candidate for employment. According to learned counsel for the appellants, the person about whom the dispute has arisen need not be a workman within the meaning of the Act, but he must answer to the description of an employee, discharged or in service, or a candidate for employment. (4) The workmen raising the dispute must have a nexus with the dispute, either because they are personally interested or because they have taken up the cause of another person in the general interest of labour welfare. The further argument of learned counsel for the appellants is that even imposing the aforesaid four limitations on the width of the expression " any person " occurring in the definition clause, the dispute in the present case is an industrial dispute within the meaning of s. 2 (k) of the Act, because (1) the e ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in the third part the expression used is "any person" indicates that the expression "any person cannot be completely equated with'any workman'. The reason for the use of the expression " any person" in the definition clause is, however, not far to seek. The word 'workman' as defined in the Act (before the amendments of 1956) included, for the purposes of any proceedings under the Act in relation to an industrial dispute, a. workman discharged during the dispute.. This definition corresponded to s. 2.(j) of the old Trade Disputes Act, 1929 except that the words ,,including an apprentice " were inserted and the words " industrial dispute " were substituted for the words " trade dispute ". It is worthy of note that in the Trade Disputes Act, 1929, the word 'workman' meant any person employed in any trade or industry to do I49 any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward. It is clear enough that prior to 1956 when the definition of ' workman' in the Act was further widened to include a person dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of the dispute ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s of labour the workmen as a class have a direct or substantial interest-with whom they have, under the scheme of the Act, a community of interest. Our reason for so holding is not merely that the Act makes a distinction between workmen and non-workmen, but because a dispute to be a real dispute must be one in which the parties to the dispute have a direct or substantial interest. Can it be said that workmen as a class are directly or substantially interested in the employment, non- employment, terms of employment or conditions of lab our of persons who belong to the supervisory staff and are, under the provisions of the Act, non-workmen on whom the Act has conferred no benefit, who cannot by themselves be parties to an industrial dispute and for whose representation the Act makes no particular provision ? We venture to think that the answer must be in the negative. Limitation (4) formulated by learned counsel for the appellants is also too generally stated. We recognise that solidarity of labour or general interest of tabour welfare may furnish, in some cases, the necessary nexus of direct or substantial interest in a dispute between employers and workmen, but the principle of sol ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e the party is composed of workmen, on all persons employed in the establishment and all persons who subsequently become employed therein. If, therefore, the dispute is a collective dispute, the party raising the dispute must have either a direct interest in the subject matter of dispute or a substantial interest therein in the sense that the class to which the aggrieved party belongs is substantially affected there. by. It is the community of interest of the class as a whole -class of employers or class of workmen-which furnishes the real nexus between the dispute and the parties to the dispute. We see no insuperable difficulty in the practical application of this test. In a case where the party to the dispute is composed of aggrieved workmen themselves and the subject matter of dispute relates to them or any of them, they clearly have a direct interest in the dispute. Where, however, the party to the dispute also composed of workmen, espouse the cause of another person whose employment, or non-employment, etc., may prejudicially affect their interest, the workmen have a substantial interest in the subject matter of dispute. In both such bases, the dispute is an industrial disput ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ent problem. The definition clause in s. 2 (k) was considered at some length by the Federal Court in Western India Automobile Association v. The Industrial Tribunal, Bombay ( [1949] F. C. R- 321, 329-330 346-347.), and learned counsel for the appellants has placed great reliance on some of the obervations made therein. The question which fell for decision in that case was whether " industrial dispute" included within its ambit a dispute with regard to reinstatement of certain dismissed workmen. It was held that reinstatement was connected with non-employment and, therefore, fell within the words of the definition. It appears that the finding of the Court from which the appeal was preferred to the Federal Court was that the workmen whose reinstatement was in question were discharged during the dispute and were, therefore, workmen within the meaning of the Act, Therefore, the problem of interpretation with which we are faced in this case was not the problem before their Lordships of the Federal Court. The observations on which learned counsel for the appellants has relied are these: " The question for determination is whether the definition of the expression "ind ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... spute between the employer and the workmen. The non-employment " of any person " can amount to an industrial dispute between the employer and the workmen, falling under the definition of that word in the Industrial Disputes Act. It was argued that if' the respondents represented the undischarged employees, there was no dispute between them and the employer. That again is fallacious, because under the definition of industrial dispute, it is not necessary that the parties to the proceedings can be the discharged workmen only. The last words in the definition of industrial dispute, viz., " any person " are a complete answer to this argument of the appellants." It is true that two of the illustrations-Nos. (2) and (3)-given in the aforesaid observations seem to indicate that there can be an industrial dispute relating to persons who are not strictly speaking "workmen"; but whether those persons would answer to such description or what community of interest the workmen had with them is not stated and in any view we do not think that illustrations given to elucidate a different problem can be taken as determinative of a problem which was not before ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... were considered by the Full Bench of the Labour Appellate Tribunal and the Chairman of the Tribunal (Mr. J. N. Majamdar) acknowledged that his earlier view was not correct and expressed his opinion, concurred in by all the other members of the Tribunal, at p. 210- " I am, therefore, of opinion that the expression 'any person' has to be interpreted in terms of 'workmen.' The words 'any person' cannot have, in my opinion, their widest amplitude, as that would create incongruity and repugnancy in the provisions of the Act. They are to be interpreted in a manner that persons, who would come within that expression, can at some stage or other, answer the description of workman as defined in the Act." It is necessary to state here that earlier a contrary view had been taken by the Calcutta High Court in Birla Brothers, Ltd. v. Modak ( I.L.R. (1948) 2 Cal. 209.), by Banerjee J. in The Dalhousie Jute Co. Ltd. v. S. N. Modak ([1951] 1 L.L.J. 145.), and by the Industrial Tribunal, Madras, in East India Industries (Madras) Ltd. v. Their Workmen ([1952] 1 L.L.J. 122.). It is necessary to emphasise here two considerations which have generally weighed with some ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ther provisions, the expression 'any person ' in s. 2 (k) of the Act must be read-subject to such limitations and qualifications as arise from the context; the two crucial limitations are (1) the dispute must be a real dispute between the parties to the dispute (as indicated in the first two parts of the definition clause) so as to be capable of settlement or adjudication by one party to the dispute giving necessary relief to the other, and ((1953) 55 Bo-. L.R. 125.) the person regarding whom the dispute is raised must be One in whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment, or conditions of labour (as the case may be) the parties to the dipute have a direct or substantial interest. In the absence of such interest the dispute cannot be said to be a real dispute between the parties. Where the workmen raise a dispute as against their employer, the person regarding whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour the dispute is raised need not be, strictly speaking, a 'workman' within the meaning of the Act but must be one in whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour the workmen as a class have a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... said Act. SCHEDULE. (i) Whether the management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate was justified in dismissing Dr. K. P. Banerjee, A. M. 0. ? (ii)If not, is he entitled to reinstatement or any other relief in lieu thereof ? The Tribunal held that Dr. Banerjee was not a workman as defined in the Act and, therefore, the dispute referred was not an industrial dispute and consequently it had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon such a dispute. The workmen preferred an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal. That Tribunal dismissed the appeal holding that Dr. Banerjee was not a workman within the definition of that term in the Act and as the dispute was connected with his employment or non- employment, it was not an industrial dispute, and was therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal. From that decision the present appeal by the workmen of the Tea Estate arises with leave granted by this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution. In granting the leave this Court limited it to the question whether a dispute in relation to a person who is not a workman, falls within the scope of the definition of " Industrial Dispute " contained in s. 2(k) of the Act. That, therefore, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tioned above were concerned with a dispute regarding discharged workmen and did not therefore decide that the words (I any person' included all. It is no doubt true that these cases were concerned with a dispute regarding discharged workmen but I do not understand the decision to have proceeded on that basis. Sen J. said in Birla Brothers case (I.L.R. (1948) 2 Cal. 209.) (p. 213) that, " It cannot be argued that workmen dismissed prior to the Act are not 'persons"'. And in the Western India Automobile Association case ([1949] F.C.R. 321.), it was said (p. 346-7), " It was contended that the reinstatement of the discharged workmen was not an industrial dispute because if the union represented the discharged employees, they were not workmen within the definition of that word in the Industrial Disputes Act. This argument is unsound. We see no difficulty in the respondents (union) taking up the cause of the discharged workmen and the dispute being still an industrial dispute between the employer and the workmen. The non-employment " of any person " can amount to an industrial dispute between the employer and the workmen, falling under the definition ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ssed workman was not a workman within the definition of that word in the Act as it stood in 1953, that being the Act with which we are concerned. Such a result is against all conceptions of industrial disputes laws. It is indeed not contended that a dispute concerning the dismissal of a workman would not be an industrial dispute. It therefore seems to me that the words " any personal cannot be said to refer only to persons of the workman class. If they cannot be restricted as being understood to refer only to a person of the workman class, it is not suggested that they can be restricted in any other manner. It is then said that the words refer to "workmen dismissed as well as in employment as also those, who in future, become "workmen". Again I am in difficulty. So understood the words would not include a person who seeks employment as a workman because he has not become a workman till he is employed. That being so, it would have to be said that a dispute raised by workmen in employment when new workmen are to be appointed, that only those of the candidates as agree to join their union should be appointed and others should not be, would not be an industrial dis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is argued that the words " any person " were used so that persons who in future become workmen may be included in them,; it cannot be argued that those words were used instead of the word "workman" because it was intended to include within them certain dismissed workmen who were not workmen within the definition of that term in the Act as it stood in 1953. Coming now to s. 18 it is in these terms: A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act or an award which has become enforceable shall be binding on- (a) all parties to the industrial dispute; (b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Board or Tribunal, as the case may be, records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause; (c) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b)is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates; (d) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b)is composed of workmen, all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rkman and admittedly within the words "any person ". Is it to be said that before such employment also he is within the meaning of those words. But it is difficult to follow this. It is conceivable that any person whatsoever may in future be employed as a workman for there is nothing in the quality of a human being that marks him out as a workman. In this way the words " any person " would include all. That, however, is not meant, for it will defeat the very argument based on s. 18(d). Is it to be said then, only such future workmen are meant as apply for jobs as such ? But the section makes no reference to such people at all and cannot therefore be of any assistance in showing that it was intended that such applicants would be included within the words " any person ". I am therefore wholly unable to accept the argument that s. 18(d)shows that future workmen were intended to be included within the words "any person". I wish also to say this. Assume that s. 18(d) shows that it was intended to include within the words ,any person " one who in future becomes a workman. But where is the reason for saying that the words do not also include ot ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e other sections in which lock- outs and strikes are mentioned but they make no difference for our present purpose. The lock-outs and strikes dealt with in ss. 22(2), 23 and 24 are lock-outs of and strikes by, workmen. It may hence be said that in s. 2(1) and (q) by the word person a workman is meant. Therefore, it is these sections, viz., 22(2), 23 and 24, which show what the meaning of the word 'person' in the definitions is. I would like to point out in passing that s. 22(1) says that no person employed in a public utility service shall go on strike except on certain conditions and there is nothing in the Act to show that the word "person" in s. 22(1) means only a workman. Proceeding however with the point we are concerned with, the question is, is there any provision in the Act which would show that the words " any person" in s. 2(k) were meant only to refer to persons of the workman class. I have not been able to find any and none has been pointed out. Therefore the fact that in s. 2, sub-ss. (1) and (q) the word " persons " means workmen is no reason for concluding that the same word must be given the same restricted meaning in s. 2(k). T ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the three reasons earlier stated, ,namely, that in order that there may be an industrial dispute the workmen must be interested in that dispute. This contention I will consider later. It is also said in the United Commercial Bank Case ([1952] 1 L. L. J . 782) that the main purpose of the Act is to adjust the relations between employers and workmen by securing for the latter the benefit provided by the Act. It is really another way of saying that the workmen must be interested in the dispute, for if they are not interested no benefit can accrue to them from an adjustment of it. This, as I have said, I will discuss later. It is also said that the Act is for the benefit of workmen and therefore if a dispute concerning a person who is not a workman, is an industrial dispute capable of being resolved by adjudication under the Act, then, if the award goes in favour of the workmen raising it, a benefit would result to a person whom the Act did not intend to benefit. So it is said, an industrial dispute cannot be a dispute concerning one who is not a workman. But the benefit resulting to the person in such a case would only be incidental. The workmen themselves would also be benefited ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g a person of the workman class alone, for, a person having something to do with an establishment need not necessarily belong to the workman class. An officer in an establishment where the dispute crops up would be as much a person having something to do with that establishment as a workman there and, therefore, even assuming that the limitation suggested by Mr. Aiyar applies, there would be nothing in it to prevent an industrial dispute concerning him arising. The question is not whether the person concerning whom an industrial dispute may arise, has to be employed in the establishment where the dispute arises, but whether he must belong to what has been called the workman class. The decision of the former question which has not arisen in this case, -is of no help in deciding the question that has arisen and I do not therefore feel called upon to express any opinion with regard to it. Mr. Aiyar next referred to a case where workmen of a Bank raise a dispute with that Bank, about an employee of the Bank who was not a workman, for example an officer who had been dismissed. He assumed that the Bank and the officer had no dispute as between themselves. In his view, if in such a case ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n industrial dispute, the question whether the award would be binding on the person concerning whose employment the dispute was raised, is no test. I therefore find nothing in the minute of dissent of Mr. Aiyar to justify the putting of any restriction on the plain meaning of the words "any person" in s. 2(k). As I shall show later, if certain disputes concerning foremen who are not workmen and who I will assume would not be bound by the award, are not to be industrial disputes, the object of the Act would clearly be defeated. I cannot therefore agree that the fact that an award is not binding on one affords a reason for holding that there cannot be an industrial dispute concerning him. The matter was put from another point of view. It is said that if workmen could raise an industrial dispute with their employer concerning the salary of a manager, who was not a workman, and an award was made directing the employer to pay a smaller salary to the manager, the employer would be bound by the award but not the manager. Then it is said, suppose, the employer had made a contract with the manager to employ him at the higher salary for a number of years. It is pointed out that in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n whom the award would be binding would disappear, for on being made a party the award would be binding on that person. It would on the contrary show that it was intended that the words " any person " should include one who is not a party to the dispute, and therefore not in the workman class. An argument based on s. 33 was also advanced. That is this. The section provides that during the pendency of conciliation proceedings or proceedings before a Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute the conditions of service of workmen concerned in the dispute cannot be changed by the employer, nor such workmen dismissed or otherwise punished by him except with the permission of the Board or Tribunal. It is said that this section shows that it was intended to protect only workmen and therefore the words " any person " in s. 2(k) should be understood as meaning workmen only. I do not follow this argument at all. Section 33 gives protection to workmen concerned in the dispute which can only mean workmen who are parties to the dispute. A workman concerning whom a dispute arises may or may not be a party to the dispute. The object of the section is clear. If workmen could ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e Act makes provision for the representation in the proceedings arising out of an industrial dispute of workmen alone does not show that an industrial dispute can only arise concerning a workman. In my view, therefore s. 36 is of no assistance in finding out the meaning of the words " any person ". I come now to the last of the reasons advanced for restricting the natural meaning of the words " any person ". It is said that the word dispute in the definition shows that the person raising it must have an interest in it and therefore since the dispute must concern the employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour of a person that person must be a workman. I confess I do not follow the reasoning. It is said that this is the view expressed by a Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of Chagla C. J. and Shah J. in Narendra Kumar Sen v. The All India Industrial Disputes (Labour Appellate) Tribunal ((1953) 55 Bom. L.R. 125.). I have some difficulty in seeing that this is the view expressed in that case. What happened there was that certain workmen raised a dispute against their employer which included a demand for fixing scales of pay and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ief Justice said. But assume he is right. How does it follow that because an industrial dispute is one in which workmen must be interested it must be concerning themselves ? I do not see that it does. Neither do I find Chagla C. J. saying so. In the case before him the dispute concerned persons who were not workmen and he found on the facts before him that the workmen were not interested in that dispute and thereupon held that the dispute was not an industrial dispute. But that is not saying that an industrial dispute can only be a dispute concerning workmen. Even the observations that I have read from p. 131 of the report would not support this view. It is not difficult to conceive of a dispute concerning the employment of a person who is not a workman which at the same time is one which affects the conditions of labour or terms of employment of the workmen themselves. I shall give examples of such disputes later.. What I wish now to point out is that even if an industrial dispute has to be one in which workmen are interested, that would be no reason for saying that it can only be a dispute concerning workmen and that therefore the words " any person " in s. 2(k) must me ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... at large.and well nigh impossible of definition. To say that the interest that the workmen must have is one of the well- known kinds of interest mentioned above is, to my mind, to make the Act largely infructuous. We cannot lose sight of the fact that the Act is not dealing with interest as ordinarily understood. It cannot be kept in mind too well that the Act is dealing with a new concept, namely, that of the relation between employer and employed or to put it more significantly, between capital and labour, a concept which is undergoing a, fast and elemental change from day to day. The numerous and radical amendments made in the Act since it came on the Statute book not so long ago, testify to the fast changing nature of the concept. Bearing all these things in mind, I find it almost impossible to define adequately or with any usefulness an interest which will serve the purposes of the Act. I feel that an attempt to do so will introduce a rigidity which will work harm and no good. Nor does it, to my mind, in any manner help to define such interest by calling it direct and substantial. I will illustrate the difficulty that I feel by an example or two. Suppose a workman was dismiss ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... strial dispute. What then is the interest of the workmen in this dispute ? The increase in the wages claimed would not in any manner improve the financial condition of the disputing workmen, nor serve any of their interests as ordinarily understood. It would however help the workmen in seeing that their own wages were not reduced by preventing the employer from being able to engage any low paid workman at all. Apart from this I can think of no other interest that the disputing workmen may have in the dispute. If therefore it is essential that the disputing workmen must have an interest in the dispute, this must be that interest, for, as already stated, the dispute is undoubtedly an industrial dispute. If this is sufficient interest to constitute an industrial dispute I fail to see why the workmen have no sufficient interest in a dispute in which they claim that a foreman who is particularly rude and brutal in his behaviour should be removed and they should have a more human foreman. This is surely a matter in which the workmen raising the dispute have a personal and immediate interest and not, as in the last case, an interest in the prevention of something happening in future, whi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... think that the appellant had no interest in the dispute concerning the dismissal of Dr. Banerjee. Therefore, I would hold that even if it is necessary to constitute an industrial dispute that workmen must have an interest in it, the dispute before us is one in which the appellants' have a direct and substantial interest and it is an industrial dispute. For myself however I would not make the interest of the workmen in the dispute a condition of the existence of an industrial dispute. The Act does not do so. I repeat that it would be impossible to de no such interest. In my view, such a condition would defeat the object of the Act. It is said that otherwise the workmen would be able to raise disputes in which they were not interested. Supposing they did, the Government is not bound to refer such disputes for adjudication. Take a concrete case. Suppose the workmen raise a dispute that the manager of the concern should have a higher pay. It would be for the Government to decide whether, the dispute should be referred for adjudication or not. The Government is not bound to refer. Now, how is the Government to decide ? That must depend on the Government's evaluation of the sit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... disturbed or production being hampered by the dispute raised by the work- men demanding a higher salary for the manager, for being normal men the workmen were not likely to suffer the privations of a strike to enforce their demand for a cause of this nature. The Government must be left to decide this primary question for itself, and therefore the Government must be left to decide in each case whether the workmen had sufficient interest in the dispute. If Government thought that the workmen had no such interest as would lead them to disturb industrial peace by strike or otherwise if the dispute was not ended, the Government might not in its discretion refer the dispute for adjudication by a tribunal. It must be left free to decide as it thinks best in the interest of the country. It is not for the Court to lay down rigid principles of interest which interfere with the Government's discretion, for that might defeat the object of the Act. If the Government feels that the dispute is such that it might lead to the disruption of industrial peace, it is the policy of the Act that it should exercise its powers under it (1) (1953) 55 Bom. L.R. I25 (2) [1952] L.L.J. 782. to prevent tha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r adjudication or not. Then it is said that if workmen were allowed to raise a dispute concerning a person who was not a workman, then it would be possible for such a person to have his dispute with the employer adjudicated through the workmen. This case was put. Suppose the manager wanted his salary to be increased but could not make the employer agree to his demand, he could then instigate the workmen and make them raise a dispute that his salary should be increased and if such a dispute is an industrial dispute and the award goes in favour of the workmen then the result would be that the Act could be used for settling disputes between the manager and his employer, a dispute which the Act did not intend to concern itself with. So it is said that the words " any person" in s. :2 (k) cannot include an employee who is not a work. man. I am unable to agree. First, in interpreting an Act, the Court is not entitled to assume that persons would use its provisions dishonestly. The words in the Act cannot have a different meaning than their natural meaning because otherwise there would be a possibility of the Act being used for a purpose for which it was not meant. The remedy ag ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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