TMI Blog1958 (2) TMI 39X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... medical officer of the Dimakuchi tea estate with effect from November 1, 1950. He was appointed subject to a satisfactory medical report and on probation for three months. It was stated in his letter of appointment: While you are on probation or trial, your suitability for permanent employment will be considered. If during the period of probation you are considered unsuitable for employment, you - ,ill receive seven days' notice in writing terminating your appointment. If you are guilty of misconduct, you are liable to instant dismissal. At the end of the period of probation, if you are considered suitable, you will be confirmed in the garden's service. In February 1951 Dr. Banerjee was given an increment of ₹ 5 per mensem, but on April 21, Dr. Banerjee received a letter from one Mr. Booth, manager of the tea estate, in which it was stated : It has been found necessary to terminate your services with effect from the 22nd instant. You will of' course receive one month's salary in lieu of notice. As no reasons were given in the notice of termination, Dr. Banerjee wrote to the manager to find out why his services were being terminated. To this Dr. Banerjee ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sen between the appellants and the respondent herein and whereas it was expedient that the dispute should be referred for adjudication to a Tribunal constituted under s. 7 of the Act, the Governor of Assam was pleased to refer the dispute to Shri U. K. Gohain, Additional District and Sessions Judge, under cl. (c) of sub-s. (1) of s. 10 of the Act. The dispute which was thus referred to the Tribunal was described in these terms: (i) Whether the management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate was justified in dismissing Dr. K. P. Banerjee, A. M. O.? (ii) If not, is he entitled to reinstatement or any other relief in lieu thereof ? Both parties filed written statements before Mr. ohain and the respondent took the plea that Dr. K. P. Banerjee was not a workman within the meaning of the Act; therefore, there was no industrial dispute in the sense in which that expression was defined in the Act and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make an adjudication on merits. Mr. Gohain took up as a preliminary point the question if Dr. Banerjee was a workman within the meaning of the Act and came to a conclusion which may be best expressed in his own words: Dr. Banerjee being not a ' wor ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to the amendments of 1956 and refer to the amendments only when they have a bearing on the question before us. The definition of 'workman' as it stood at the relevant time stated : S. 2 (s): Workman means any person employed (including an apprentice) in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward and includes, for the purposes of any proceedings under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, a workman discharged during that dispute, but does not include any person employed in the naval, military or air service of the Government. Now, the question is whether a dispute in relation to a person who is not a workman within the meaning of the Act still falls within the scope of the definition clause in s. 2 (k). If we analyse the definition clause it falls easily and naturally into three parts: first, there must be a dispute or difference; second, the dispute or difference must be between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen; third, the dispute or difference must be connected with the employment or non- employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hese necessarily import a limitation in the sense that a person in respect of whom the employer-employee relation never existed or can never possibly exist cannot be the subject matter of a dispute between employers and workmen. Secondly, the definition clause must be read in the context of the subject matter and scheme of the Act, and consistently with the objects and other provision's of the Act. It is well settled that the words of a statute, when there is a doubt about their meaning are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature has in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. (Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 9th Edition, p. 55). It is necessary, therefore, to take the Act as a whole and examine its salient provisions. The long title shows that the object of the Act is to make provision for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes, and for certain other purposes. The preamble stat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication under s. 17; it also contains certain other provisions which empower the appropriate Government to modify or reject the award. Section 18 is important for our purpose, and in so far as it relates to awards it states that an award which has become enforceable ,shall be binding on- (a) all parties to the industrial dispute; (b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Tribunal records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause; (c) where a party referred to under clause (a) or clause (b) is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates; and (d) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who are employed in the establishment or part of establishment as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part. Section 19 lays down the period of operation of settlements and awards and states inter alia that an award shall, subje ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... roceedings under the Act or in any proceedings before a court. Sub-section (4) states that in any proceeding before a Tribunal a party to a dispute may be represented by a legal practitioner with the consent of the other parties to the proceeding and with the leave of the Tribunal. The point to note is that there is no particular provision for the representation of a party other than a workman or an employer, presumably because under the second part of the definition clause the parties to an industrial dispute can only be employers and employers, employers and workmen, or workmen and workmen. Thus, an examination of the salient provisions of the Act shows that the principal objects of the Act are- (1) the promotion of measures for securing and preserving amity and good relations between the employer and workmen; (2) an investigation and settlement of industrial disputes, between employers and employers, employers and workmen, or workmen and workmen, with a right of representation by a registered trade union or federation of trade unions or association of employers or a federation of associations of employers; (3) prevention of illegal strikes and lock-outs; (4) relief t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ellate) Tribunal ((1953) 55 Bom. L.R. 125,129, 130): If any person were to be read as an expression without any limitation and qualification whatsoever, then we must not put even any territorial restriction on that expression. In other words, it would be open to the workmen not only to raise a dispute with regard to the terms of employment of persons employed in the same industry as themselves, not only to raise a dispute with regard to the terms of employment in corresponding or similar industries, not only a dispute with regard to the terms of employment of people employed in our country, but the terms of employment of any workman or any labourer anywhere in the world The proposition has only to be stated in order to make one realise how entirely untenable it is. Take, for example, another case where the workmen raise an objection to the salary or remuneration paid to a Manager or Chief Medical Officer by the employer but without claiming any benefit for themselves, and let us assume that a dispute or difference arises between the workmen on one side and the employer on the other over such an objection. If such a dispute comes within the definition clause and is referr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... person, but such person must be an employee discharged or in service or a candidate for employment. According to learned counsel for the appellants, the person about whom the dispute has arisen need not be a workman within the meaning of the Act, but he must answer to the description of an employee, discharged or in service, or a candidate for employment. (4) The workmen raising the dispute must have a nexus with the dispute, either because they are personally interested or because they have taken up the cause of another person in the general interest of labour welfare. The further argument of learned counsel for the appellants is that even imposing the aforesaid four limitations on the width of the expression any person occurring in the definition clause, the dispute in the present case is an industrial dispute within the meaning of s. 2 (k) of the Act, because (1) the employer could give relief in the matter of the termination of service of Dr. K. P. Banerjee, (2) Dr. K. P. Banerjee belonged to the same establishment, namely, the same tea garden, (3) the dispute related to a discharged employee (though not a workman) and (4) the workmen raising the dispute were vitally int ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e the amendments of 1956) included, for the purposes of any proceedings under the Act in relation to an industrial dispute, a. workman discharged during the dispute.. This definition corresponded to s. 2.(j) of the old Trade Disputes Act, 1929 except that the words ,,including an apprentice were inserted and the words industrial dispute were substituted for the words trade dispute . It is worthy of note that in the Trade Disputes Act, 1929, the word 'workman' meant any person employed in any trade or industry to do I49 any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward. It is clear enough that prior to 1956 when the definition of ' workman' in the Act was further widened to include a person dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of the dispute or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment led to the dispute, a workman who had been discharged earlier and not during the dispute was not a workman within the meaning of the Act. If the expression any person in the third part of the definition clause were to be strictly equated with 'any workman', then there could be no industrial dispute, prior to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erest. Can it be said that workmen as a class are directly or substantially interested in the employment, non- employment, terms of employment or conditions of lab our of persons who belong to the supervisory staff and are, under the provisions of the Act, non-workmen on whom the Act has conferred no benefit, who cannot by themselves be parties to an industrial dispute and for whose representation the Act makes no particular provision ? We venture to think that the answer must be in the negative. Limitation (4) formulated by learned counsel for the appellants is also too generally stated. We recognise that solidarity of labour or general interest of tabour welfare may furnish, in some cases, the necessary nexus of direct or substantial interest in a dispute between employers and workmen, but the principle of solidarity of the labour movement or general welfare of labour must be based on or correlated to the principle of community of interest; the workmen can raise a dispute in respect of those persons only in the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or the conditions or labour of whom they have a direct or substantial interest. We think that Chagla C. J., correct ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s substantially affected there. by. It is the community of interest of the class as a whole -class of employers or class of workmen-which furnishes the real nexus between the dispute and the parties to the dispute. We see no insuperable difficulty in the practical application of this test. In a case where the party to the dispute is composed of aggrieved workmen themselves and the subject matter of dispute relates to them or any of them, they clearly have a direct interest in the dispute. Where, however, the party to the dispute also composed of workmen, espouse the cause of another person whose employment, or non-employment, etc., may prejudicially affect their interest, the workmen have a substantial interest in the subject matter of dispute. In both such bases, the dispute is an industrial dispute. Learned counsel for the appellants has also drawn our attention to the definition of a ' trade dispute' in the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926. That definition is also in the same terms, but with this vital difference that the word ' workmen' means there all persons employed in trade or industry whether or not in the employment of the employer with whom the trade ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... al dispute included within its ambit a dispute with regard to reinstatement of certain dismissed workmen. It was held that reinstatement was connected with non-employment and, therefore, fell within the words of the definition. It appears that the finding of the Court from which the appeal was preferred to the Federal Court was that the workmen whose reinstatement was in question were discharged during the dispute and were, therefore, workmen within the meaning of the Act, Therefore, the problem of interpretation with which we are faced in this case was not the problem before their Lordships of the Federal Court. The observations on which learned counsel for the appellants has relied are these: The question for determination is whether the definition of the expression industrial dispute given in the Act includes within its ambit, a dispute in regard to reinstatement of dismissed employees........ The words of the definition may be paraphrased thus: any dispute which has connection with the workmen being in, or out of service or employment . Non-employment is the negative of employment and would mean that disputes of workmen out of service with their employers are ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ngs can be the discharged workmen only. The last words in the definition of industrial dispute, viz., any person are a complete answer to this argument of the appellants. It is true that two of the illustrations-Nos. (2) and (3)-given in the aforesaid observations seem to indicate that there can be an industrial dispute relating to persons who are not strictly speaking workmen ; but whether those persons would answer to such description or what community of interest the workmen had with them is not stated and in any view we do not think that illustrations given to elucidate a different problem can be taken as determinative of a problem which was not before the court in that case. A reference was also made to the decision of this Court in D. N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherjee ([1953] S.C.R. 302.). The question there was whether the expression industrial dispute included disputes between municipalities and their employees in branches of work analogous to the carrying on of a trade or business. More in point is the decision of the Full Bench of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in a number of appeals reported in 1952 Labour Appeal Cases, p. 198, where the question now before us ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Act. They are to be interpreted in a manner that persons, who would come within that expression, can at some stage or other, answer the description of workman as defined in the Act. It is necessary to state here that earlier a contrary view had been taken by the Calcutta High Court in Birla Brothers, Ltd. v. Modak ( I.L.R. (1948) 2 Cal. 209.), by Banerjee J. in The Dalhousie Jute Co. Ltd. v. S. N. Modak ([1951] 1 L.L.J. 145.), and by the Industrial Tribunal, Madras, in East India Industries (Madras) Ltd. v. Their Workmen ([1952] 1 L.L.J. 122.). It is necessary to emphasise here two considerations which have generally weighed with some of the learned Judges in support of the view expressed by them: these two Considerations are that (1) normally workmen will not raise a dispute in which they are not directly or substantially interested and (2) Government will not make a reference unless the dispute is a real or substantial one. We think that these two considerations instead of leading to a strictly grammatical or etymological interpretation of the expression any person occurring in the definition clause should lead, on the contrary, to an interpretation which, to use the wor ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t, terms of employment, or conditions of labour (as the case may be) the parties to the dipute have a direct or substantial interest. In the absence of such interest the dispute cannot be said to be a real dispute between the parties. Where the workmen raise a dispute as against their employer, the person regarding whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour the dispute is raised need not be, strictly speaking, a 'workman' within the meaning of the Act but must be one in whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour the workmen as a class have a direct or substantial interest. In the case before us, Dr. K.P. Banerjee was not a workman'. He belonged to the medical or technical staff-a different category altogether from workmen. The appellants had no direct, nor substantial interest in his employment or non-employment, and even assuming that he was a member of the same Trade Union, it cannot be said, on the tests laid down by us, that the dispute regarding his termination of service was an industrial dispute within the meaning of s. 2(k) of the Act. The result, therefore, is that the appeal fails and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Banerjee was not a workman within the definition of that term in the Act and as the dispute was connected with his employment or non- employment, it was not an industrial dispute, and was therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal. From that decision the present appeal by the workmen of the Tea Estate arises with leave granted by this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution. In granting the leave this Court limited it to the question whether a dispute in relation to a person who is not a workman, falls within the scope of the definition of Industrial Dispute contained in s. 2(k) of the Act. That, therefore, is the only question before us. Section 2(k) is in these terms: Industrial dispute means any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non- employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person. The dispute that was raised was between an employer, the respondent in this appeal and its workmen, the appellants before us and concerned the employment or non-employment of Dr. Banerjee, a person empl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t the reinstatement of the discharged workmen was not an industrial dispute because if the union represented the discharged employees, they were not workmen within the definition of that word in the Industrial Disputes Act. This argument is unsound. We see no difficulty in the respondents (union) taking up the cause of the discharged workmen and the dispute being still an industrial dispute between the employer and the workmen. The non-employment of any person can amount to an industrial dispute between the employer and the workmen, falling under the definition of that word in the Industrial Disputes Act. It was argued that if the respondents represented the undischarged employees, there was no dispute between them and the employer. That again is fallacious, because under the definition of industrial dispute, it is not necessary that the parties to the proceedings can be the discharged workmen only. The last words in the definition of industrial dispute, viz., any person , are a complete answer to this argument of the appellants. The last two of the cases mentioned earlier were not however concerned with any dispute regarding discharged workmen. In The Dalhousie Jute Co. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... oyment as also those, who in future, become workmen . Again I am in difficulty. So understood the words would not include a person who seeks employment as a workman because he has not become a workman till he is employed. That being so, it would have to be said that a dispute raised by workmen in employment when new workmen are to be appointed, that only those of the candidates as agree to join their union should be appointed and others should not be, would not be an industrial dispute. That again seems to me to be against all con- ceptions of industrial dispute laws. Furthermore, I am wholly unable to appreciate what is meant by a dispute concerning a person, who is not at the time the dispute arises, a workman but in future becomes one. When is such a person to become a workman ? I find no answer. Again, is it to be said that whether a dispute is an industrial dispute or not may have to depend on future circumstances for there is no knowing whether the person concerning whom the dispute arises will later become a workman or not ? If he becomes one, there can be no dispute concerning him referable to a point of time before he became one, and, if he does not, he cannot be one who ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... so summoned without proper cause; (c) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b)is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates; (d) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b)is composed of workmen, all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part. 1 entirely fail to see how that section assists at all in finding out who were meant to be included in the words any person . Is it to be said that s. 18(d) by, making the award binding on those who become in future employed in the establishment as workmen, indicates that such persons are treated in the same way as workmen in actual employment and therefore it must have been intended to include them within the words any person along with present and dismissed workmen. I am wholly unable to agree. The object of s. 18(d) is quite clear. The Act is intended to compose a dispute between an employer and his workmen by a settlement or an award brought about ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... holly unable to accept the argument that s. 18(d)shows that future workmen were intended to be included within the words any person . I wish also to say this. Assume that s. 18(d) shows that it was intended to include within the words ,any person one who in future becomes a workman. But where is the reason for saying that the words do not also include others ? Section 18 provides none. I proceed now to discuss the reasons advanced for restricting the generality of the words any person They were put as follows: 1. In certain sections of the Act the words any person have been used but there the reference is to workmen, and therefore in s. 2(k) the words any person should mean persons of the workman class. 2. The scheme and the purpose of the Act generally and the object of the Act specially being to benefit workmen, the words any person should be confined to people of the workman class. 3. The word dispute in s. 2(k) itself indicates that the person raising the dispute must be interested in the dispute and therefore since the dispute must concern the employment, non-employment, terms of employment or the conditions of labour of a person, that person must ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... an class. I have not been able to find any and none has been pointed out. Therefore the fact that in s. 2, sub-ss. (1) and (q) the word persons means workmen is no reason for concluding that the same word must be given the same restricted meaning in s. 2(k). The position with regard to s. 33A, in which the word employee has to be read as meaning a workman because of s. 33, is the same and does not require to be dealt with specially. I may add that if it has to be said that because in certain other sections the word person has to be understood as referring to a workman only, in s. 2(k) also the same word must have the same meaning, then we have to read the words any person in s. 2(k) as meaning only a workman as defined in the Act. This however is not the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent. I may further say that it was not contended that the word person in s. 2, sub-ss. (1) and (q) and the word employee in s. 33A has to be read as including not only a workman in employment but also a discharged workman and a person who in future becomes a workman, and it seems to me that such a contention would not have been possible. I proceed now to deal with the sec ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is said, an industrial dispute cannot be a dispute concerning one who is not a workman. But the benefit resulting to the person in such a case would only be incidental. The workmen themselves would also be benefited by it at the same time. To adopt this argument would be to deprive the workmen of this benefit and there is no justification for doing so. How the workmen would be benefited would appear later when I discuss the question of the workmen's interest in the dispute. I will show later that if the workmen were not interested in the dispute so that they could get no benefit under it, there would be no reference by the Government and there would be no benefit to a person who was not a workman. Further, I am unable to agree that the Act is intended to confer benefit on workmen. Its object is admitted by all to preserve industrial peace. It may confer some benefit on workmen but at the same time it takes away their power and right to strike and puts them under a disadvantage. We were referred to the note of dissent to the award of the majority of the All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes), dated July 31, 1950. This note was by Mr. Chandra Sekhar Aiyer who later became ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... who was not a workman, for example an officer who had been dismissed. He assumed that the Bank and the officer had no dispute as between themselves. In his view, if in such a case the dispute was an industrial dispute and could be made the subject matter of an award by an Industrial Tribunal, the award would not be binding on the officer because he had no concern with the dispute. According to him, it would be absurd to suggest that the Bank was under an obligation to give effect to the award. Therefore, in his view, such a dispute would not be an industrial dispute. Now, whether the award would be binding on the officer or not, would depend on whether he could be made a party to the dispute under s. 18(b). It is not necessary to discuss that question now. But assume that the award was not binding on the officer. Why should not the bank be under an obligation to give effect to the award in so far as it lay in its power to do so ? If the dispute was an industrial dispute, the award would be binding on the Bank and it must give effect to it. Then the argument comes to this that the dispute is not an industrial dispute because the award would not, as assumed, be binding on the officer ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r. Then it is said, suppose, the employer had made a contract with the manager to employ him at the higher salary for a number of years. It is pointed out that in such a case the award being binding on the employer, he would be compelled to commit a breach of his contract and be liable to the manager in damages. It is said that it could not have been the intention of the Act to produce a result whereby an employer would become liable in damages and therefore such a dispute cannot be an industrial dispute. But I do not agree that the employer would be liable in damages. The award being binding on him under the Act, the performance of his contract with the manager would become unlawful after the award and therefore void under s. 56 of the Contract Act. The employer would not, by carrying out the award, be committing any breach of contract nor would he be liable in damages. To hold that the dispute contemplated is an industrial dispute, would not produce the absurd result suggested. The reason suggested for not holding that dispute to be an industrial dispute, therefore, fails. Take another case. Suppose there was a dispute between two employers A and B concerning the wage to be pa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rkman concerning whom a dispute arises may or may not be a party to the dispute. The object of the section is clear. If workmen could be punished during the pendency of the proceedings, then no workman would raise a dispute or want to take part in the proceedings under the Act concerned with its adjudication. Further, such punishment would surely give rise to another dispute. All this would defeat the entire object of the Act which is to compose disputes by settlement or adjudication. Section 33 gives protection to workmen who are parties to the dispute and does not purport to concern itself with the person concerning whom the dispute arises. Such being the position, the section can throw no light on the meaning of the words any person in s. 2(k). Suppose a workman was dismissed and thereupon a dispute arose between the employer and the other workmen in employment concerning such dismissal. Such a dispute would be undoubtedly an industrial dispute. And it is none the less so, though no protection can be given to the dismissed workman under s. 33 for he is already dismissed. Reference was also made to s. 36 which provides for the representation of the parties to a dispute in a pr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n raised a dispute against their employer which included a demand for fixing scales of pay and for bonus not only for themselves but also for the foremen and divisional heads under the same employers who were not work- men and this dispute had been referred by the Government for adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal refused to adjudicate the dispute in so far as it concerned the pay and bonus of persons who were not workmen as, according to it, to this extent it was not an industrial dispute. The workmen then applied to the High Court for a writ directing the Tribunal to decide the dispute relating to the claims made for the pay and bonus of the persons who were not workmen. The High Court held that the dispute was not an industrial dispute and refused the writ. Chagla C. J. expressed himself in these words (p. 130): A controversy which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour is an industrial controversy. But it is not enough that it should be an industrial controversy; it must be a dispute; and in my opinion it is not every controversy or every difference of opinion between workmen and employer ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... orkmen and that therefore the words any person in s. 2(k) must mean only workmen. I also think it right to say now that this argument is not really open to the respondent, for the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is, as I have earlier stated, that the words any person do not mean a workman only but mean all persons of the workman class, or past, present and future workmen. Now I find nothing in the judgment of Chagla, C. J. to show that workmen can be interested in the workman class or in past or future workmen. On the contrary be says that workmen are interested primarily-and by the word primarily I think he means, directly and substantially-only in their own employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour. Reliance on the judgment of the Bombay High Court will therefore land the respondent in contradiction. I find great difficulty in saying that it is a condition of the existence of an industrial, dispute that workmen must be interested in it. The Act does not say so. But it is said that the word dispute in the definition implies it. No doubt, one does not raise a dispute unless he is interested in it, and as the Act must be taken to have in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e or two. Suppose a workman was dismissed by the employer and the other workmen raised a dispute about it. Such a dispute comes completely within the definition even assuming that the words any person only refer to persons of the workman class, as the respondent contends. There is therefore no doubt that such a dispute is an industrial dispute. The question then is what interest have the disputing workmen in the reinstatement of the dismissed work man if they must have an interest ? The reinstatement would not in any way improve their financial condition or otherwise enhance any interest of theirs in any sense of the term, in common use. The only interest that I can think of the workmen having for themselves in such a dispute is the solidarity of labour. It is only this that if the same thing happens to any one of them, the others would rally round and by taking up his cause prevent the dismissal. Apart from the Act how would the workmen have prevented the dismissal from taking effect ? They would have, if they wanted to prevent the dismissal, gone on strike and thereby tried to force the employer's hands not to give effect to the dismissal. That would have destroyed the ind ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... appening in future, which conceivably may never happen at all. Such an interest is plainly nearer to the ordinary kinds of interest than the interest in solidarity of labour or in the prevention of future harm which in the preceding paragraphs have been found to be sufficient to sustain an industrial dispute. The dispute last imagined would undoubtedly be an industrial dispute if the foreman was a workman for then it would be entirely within the definition of an industrial dispute. Now suppose the foreman was not a workman. Can it be said that then the dispute would not be an industrial dispute ? Would the interest of the workmen in the dispute be any the less or in any way different because the foreman whose dismissal was demanded was not a workman ? I conceive it impossible to say so. Therefore if interest is the test, the dispute that I have imagined would have to be held to be an industrial dispute whether or not the foreman concerned was a workman. Now assume that the dispute did not arise out of a demand for the dismissal of a foreman but against his dismissal on the ground that he was a particularly kind and sympathetic man and the workmen were happy to work under him. In ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... #39;s evaluation of the situation. That this is the intention is clear from the object that the Act has in view. I will here read from the judgment of the Federal Courtin Western India Automobile Association case(1) what the object of the Act is. It was said at PP. 331-332. We shall next examine the Act to determine its scope. The Act is stated in the preamble to be one providing for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes. Any industrial dispute as defined by the Act may be reported to Government who may take such steps as seem to it expedient for promoting conciliation or settlement. It may refer it to an Industrial Court for advice or it may refer it to an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. The legislation substitutes for free bargaining between the parties a binding award by an impartial tribunal. Now, in many cases an industrial dispute starts with the making of number of demands by workmen. If the demandsare not acceptable to the employer-and that is what often happens-it results in a dismissal of the leaders and eventually in a strike. No machinery for reconciliation and settlement of such disputes can be considered effective unless it provides within it ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o prevent that. Assume a case in which the workmen raised a dispute without having what the court considers sufficient interest to make it an industrial dispute and therefore, on the matter coming to the court the dispute was held not to be an industrial dispute. Upon that the Government's hands would be tied and it would not be able to have that dispute resolved by the processes contemplated in the Act. Suppose now that, the workmen then go on strike and industrial peace is disturbed and production hamper. ed. The object of the Act would then have been defeated. And why ? Because it was said that it was not a dispute in which the workmen were interested and therefore not a dispute which was capable of being adjusted under the provisions of the Act. It would be no answer to say that the workmen would not go on strike in such a case. If they would not, neither would the Government refer the dispute for adjudication under the Act and it would not be necessary for the court to decide whether the workmen were interested in the dispute or not or whether the dispute was an industrial dispute or not. Therefore, I think that it is not necessary to say that a dispute is an industrial di ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dy against this possibility is provided in the Act, in that it has given complete freedom to the Government not to refer such a dispute. It is not necessary to meet a somewhat remote apprehension that the Act may be used for purposes other than those for which it was meant, to construe its language in a manner different from that which it plainly bears,. Lastly, in doing this many cases like Chose earlier mentioned including the present, which are clearly cases of industrial disputes would have to be excluded in the attempt to prevent by interpretation a remote apprehension of a misuse of the Act. This would do more harm than good. 1 have therefore come to the conclusion that a dispute concerning a person who is not a workman may be an industrial dispute within s. 2 (k). As it has not been said that the dispute with which we are concerned is for any other reason not an industrial dispute, I hold that the Industrial Tribunal had full jurisdiction to adjudicate that dispute and should have done so. I would therefore allow the appeal and send the case back to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication in accordance with law. ORDER OF THE COURT. In view of the opinion of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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