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TMI Blog1962 (5) TMI 29X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... poration (P) Ltd., is a private limited concern and holds a licence from the Government of India for starting a factory for the manufacture of various ranges of refrigeration compressors and ancillary equipment. We may mention here that initially this project was allotted to the State of West Bengal but at the request of State of Punjab its location was shifted to the State of Punjab. Respondent No. 6 requested the State of Punjab for the allotment of an appropriate site for the location of the factory. The petitioners contend that respondent No. 6 being interested in acquiring land in the village Meola Maharajpur approached the State of Punjab in or about the month of March, 1961, for the purpose of acquiring land for their factory under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). One of the petitioners having learnt of this made an application on March 23, 1961, to the Deputy Commissioner, Gurgaon, requesting him that none of the lands purchased by the petitioners should be acquired for the benefit, of respondent No. 6. Owners of adjacent lands Mr. Om Prakash, Mr, Ram Raghbir, Mr. Atmaram Chaddha and Mr. Hari Kishen who are petitioners in W. P. 247 and 2 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... heir fundamental rights under Art. 19 (1) (f) and (g) to possess the said land and carry on their occupation, trade or business and that, therefore, they must be quashed. It is their contention that they have purchased this land bona fide for industrial purposes as land in the vicinity of this land is being acquired by industrialists for establishing various industries. The purpose is said to be the establishment of a paper manufacturing plant. According to them they have entered into an arrangement with Messrs. R. S. Madho Ram & Sons who hold industrial licence No. L/2-1/2 (1)/N-60/62. The proposed industry, according to them, would employ about 200 people. The industry they wish to start is a new one so far as they are concerned, whereas according to them, the respondent No. 6 is already engaged in refrigeration industry and as far as they know, it has established a factory for manufacturing refrigeration equipment at Hyderabad in the State of Andhra Pradesh. It may be mentioned that some time after the notification was published, that is, on September 29, 1961, the Government of Punjab sanctioned the expense of ₹ 100 for the purpose of acquisition of this land. According ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d by the respondent No. 6 through private negotiation has no access to the main road' and as the land is inadequate to meet the minimum essential requirements the acquisition of the, lands in question became necessary. On behalf of the respondent No. 6 it is stated that the need for a factory like the one in its con. temptation is acutely felt in India inasmuch a manufacture of compressors and the composes nts of big and small air-conditioners, refrigerators, water coolers and cold storage cabinets is not being carried out anywhere in the country so far. The import of these goods naturally drains away a considerable amount of foreign exchange. It was, therefore, felt that by starting manufacture of these articles in our country not only Will foreign exchange be saved, but some foreign exchange will eventually be earned by the export of manufactured goods. They further contend that the purpose for which the factory is being set up must be regarded as a public purpose because inter alia it is intended by manufacturing the aforesaid goods, to cater to the needs of the public at large. It is in view of these circumstances that the Government of India, accepting the recommendation mad ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... greement between York India Ltd., and Messrs. York Corporation, U.S.A. a subsidiary of Borg Warner of the U.S.A. whereunder the latter have undertaken to give all technical assistance and technical training to the Indian personnel as also to contribute 50% of the initial investment in the undertaking. The respondent No. 6 expects to manufacture 70% of the equipment in the very first year and cent. per cent, by the end of 1966. It further stated that the foreign collaborators also have agreed to sell the products of the firm outside India at prices and on terms and conditions most favourable to the Indian firm, thereby enabling it to obtain access to the foreign market. The foreign collaborator would make available to the Indian personnel the technical ,know-how' and other information necessary for the manufacture of refrigeration materials and that such assistance will itself be very valuable. It denied that the respondent No. 6 has established a factory similar to the one now intended to be established in Hyderabad as alleged by the petitioners. It is admitted that licences have been granted to two other concerns in India for the manufacture of similar equipment. Neither of those ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the third point raised by Mr. Pathak first, that is, regarding non-compliance of provisions of Part VII. It is common ground that those provisions were not complied with. The reason for that is, that according to the respondents the acquisition is not for a company but for a public purpose, partly at public expense. Indeed, the respondents at no stage have relied on the provisions of Part VII of the Act and therefore, the main question to be considered is whether the acquisition is for a public purpose partly at public expense or not. If it is so, then, of course, the petitions must succeed. Therefore, it is the first two contentions raised by Mr. Pathak which primarily need our consideration. According to learned counsel for the petitioners the statements made in the affidavits on behalf of the; State as; well as, on behalf of the respondent No. 6 make it perfectly clear that the land is being acquired for the respondents No. 6. Reliance, is placed particularly upon that portion of the affidavit of the State, where it is stated that the land is acquired for enabling the respondent No. 6, to have access to the main road and for meeting their minimum requirements for establishing t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... itannica, p. 745 wherein facilities for providing refrigeration have been grouped under the heading Public utility'. Reference was also made to be next page where it is stated "Every public utility must be in possession of natural resources upon which that industry is based. Their sites must have strategic locations. Limitation in the choice of this agent of production tends to make the cost of acquiring or leasing these facilities greater than it would be if the industry had a wider range of choice. Furthermore, utilities must make allowances in advance for probable increase in the required capacity. For these reasons utilities are provided with the governmental power of eminent domain which makes possible the 'compulsory sale of private property." Relying upon the affidavit of Mr. Bhagat, to which we have referred earlier, the learned Advocate-General of Punjab said that the object of the Government in acquiring these lands is to enable a new industry to be established not only for saving foreign exchange and earning foreign exchange bat also for securing the industrial advancement of the country, enabling the citizens to obtain technical education in a new field, relie ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... aws may provide. There are a number of laws which make certain fact& conclusive evidence of other facts: (see Companies Act, 1956, s. 132 ; the Indian Succession Act, 1925, s. 381 ; Christian Marriages Act, 1872, s. 61 ; Madras Revenue Act, 1869, s. 38 ; Oaths Act, 1873, s. (11). The question is whether such provision also bars other evidence after that which is conclusive evidence is produced. The object of adducing evidence is to prove a fact. The Indian Evidence Act, deals with the, question as to what kind of evidence is permissible to be adduced for that, purpose and states in s. 3 when a fact is said to be proved. That section reads thus 'Evidence' means and includes- (1) all statements which the court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in, relation to matters of fact under, inquiry ; such statements are called oral evidence ; (2) all documents produced for the inspection of the court ; such documents are called documentary evidence. A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ). (See pp. 957, 958). Das. J. (as he then was), was also of the same view. (See pp. 986 988). Similarly Patanjali Sastri, C.J., has also taken the view that the existence of public purpose is an express condition of cl. 2 of Art. 31. The Constitution permits acquisition by the State of private property only if it is required for a, public purpose. But can it; therefore, be said that the provisions of a statute must be so construed that the declaration by the Government as to the existence of public purpose is necessarily justiciable ? We are not concerned here with a post Constitution law but with a pre- Constitution law. The Act has been in operation since 1894. The validity of the law was challenged before this Court in Babu Barkya Thakur v. The State of Bombay (1961) 1 S.C.R. 128) on the ground that it infringes the provisions of Arts. 31(2) and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. But this Court held that the law being a pre-Constitution law is protected from the operation of Art. 31(2) by the provisions of Art. 31(5) (a). It also held, following the decision in the State of ,Bombay v. Bhanji Munji (0935) 1 S.C.R. 777) and that in Lilavati Bai v. The State of Bombay ((1957) S.C.R. M ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... idental matters connected therewith. Section 2(f) defines public purpose as follows : "the expression 'public purpose' includes the provision of village sites in districts in which the appropriate Government shall have declared by notification in the Official Gazette that it is customary for the Government to make such provision:" This is an inclusive definition and not a compendious one and therefore, does not assist us very much in Ascertaining the ambit of the expression 'public purpose'. Broadly speaking the expression public purpose' would, however, include a purpose in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals, is directly and vitallv concerned. Then there is s. 4 which enables the State to publish a preliminary notification whenever it appears to it that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be ,needed for a public purpose. The other aspects of the section have no bearing upon the point before us and we need not refer to them. Then there its s. 5A which gives to the person interested in the land which has been notified as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose or for a company, the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... any ground as for instance that the land is not in fact needed at all for any purpose or that it is not suitable for the purpose for which it is, sought to be acquired or that the purpose is not a public purpose or what is said to be a company is not a company and so on. Finality is attached to the decision of the Government which ultimately has to decide such objections. Then follows s.6 which enables the Government to make a declaration provided that it is satisfied that a particular land is needed for a, public purpose or for a company. No doubt, it is open to the State Government in an emergency by exercisingits powers under sub. s. (4) of s. 17, to say that the provisions of s. 5A would not apply. But for construing the provisions of s. 6 it would be relevant to bear in mind that section. The scheme of the Act is that normally the provisions of s. 5A have to be complied with. Where, in pursuance of the provisions, objections are lodged, these objections will have to be decided by the Government. For deciding them the Government will have before it the Collector's proceedings. It would, therefore, be clear that the declaration that a particular land is needed for a public purp ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uired under the Act unless the need is for one or the other purpose and, therefore it will be futile to give conclusiveness merely to the question of need dissociated from the question of public purpose or the purpose of a company. Upon the plain language of the relevant provisions it is riot possible to accept the contention put forward by learned counsel. Learned counsel put the matter in a slightly different way and said that s. 6 (3) presupposes that the jurisdictional fact exists, namely, that there is a public purpose or the purpose of a company behind the acquisition and, therefore, the question whether it exists or not is justiciable. The Act has empowered the Government to determine the question of the need of land for a public purpose or for a company and the jurisdiction conferred upon it to do so is not made conditional upon the existence of a collateral or extraneous fact. It is the existence of the need for a public purpose which gives jurisdiction to the Government to make a declaration under s. 6 (1) and makes it the sole judge whether there is in fact a need and whether the purpose for which there is that need is a public purpose. The provisions of sub-s. (3) precl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hole of the learned judges, who are thoroughly conversant with the conditions of Indian life, say that they are satisfied that the scheme is one which will redound to public benefit by helping the Government to maintain the efficiency of its servants. From such a conclusion their Lordships would be slow to differ, and upon its own statement it commends itself to their judgment". Mr. Pathak strongly relied on these observations and said that the Privy Council have held that the matter is justiciable. It is enough to say that that was not a case under the Land Acquisition Act and, therefore, conclusiveness did not attach itself to the satisfaction of the Government that a particular purpose fell within the concept of public purpose. Mr. Pathak then contended that the question as to the meaning to be given to the phrase 'public purpose' is not given conclusiveness by sub-s. (3) of s. 6. According to him all that sub-s. (3) of s. 6 says is that the Government's declaration that particular land is needed for a public purpose or a company shall be conclusive and that it does not say that the Government is empowered to define what is a public purpose and then say that the particula ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he Government are satisfied as a result of giving some other meaning to the words, the satisfaction of the Government is of no use, for then they are not satisfied about what they should be satisfied. In the present case the Government seems to have taken a wrong view that so long as the product of the works is useful to the public and so long as the public is entitled to go upon the works in the way of Body text Uf tQ34pe4-˜ business, that is all that is required by the relevant words in as. 40 and 41' required It was no doubt argued before the Court that the declaration made by the Government under s. 6 (1) that the land was needed for a company is conclusive and, therefore, the question as to the actual purpose of the acquisition is not justiciable. This Court pointed out that s. 6 (3) makes the declaration under s. 6 (1) conclusive evidence of the fact that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a company and that as the declaration stated that the land was needed for a company and that fact was not disputed by the parties, the provisions of s. 6 (3) were of no assistance. We may point out that even according to that decision conclusiveness attaches itself to the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... purpose' means. But in neither case the question arose for consideration as to whether the meaning to be given to the expression 'public purpose' is justiciable. Now whether in a particular case the purpose for which land is needed is a public purpose or not is for the. State Government to be satisfied about. If the purpose for which the land is being acquired by the State is within the legislative competence of the State the declaration of the Government will be final subject, however, to one exception. That exception is that if there is a colourable exercise of power the declaration will be open to challenge at the instance of the aggrieved party. The power committed to the Government by the Act is a limited power in the sense that it can be exercised only where there is a public purpose, leaving aside for a moment the purpose of a company. If it appears that what the Government is satisfied about is not a public purpose but a private purpose or no purpose act all the action of the Government would be colourable as not being relatable to the power conferred upon it by the Act and its declaration will be a nullity. Subject to this exception the declaration of the Government will ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... into by the Courts even in the absence of colourable exercise of power, because s. 6(3) has become void under Art. 13(2) of the Constitution. It was next contended that sub-s. (3) of s. 6 cannot stand in the way in a proceeding under Art. 226 or under Art. 32 of the Constitution and in support of this argument reliance was placed upon the decision in Chudalmuthu Pillai v. State (I.L. R. [1932] Tra. Cochin. 488) ; Maharaja Luchmeshwar Singh v. Chairman of the Darbhanga Municipality ((1890) L.R. 17 nI.A. 90); Rajindra Kumar Ruia v. Government of West Bengal (A.I.R. 1952. Cal. 573.) ; Major S. Arjan Singh v. State of Punjab (I.L.R.[1958] Punjab 1451) ;. In the first mentioned case it was contended that the order was actuated by mala fides and also that there were various irregularities in the proceedings. As we have already indicated, if the declaration is vitiated by fraud, then the declaration is itself bad and what is bad cannot be protected by sub-s. (3) of s. 6. In the next case the act of the Court of Wards in handing over the ward's lands for a nominal consideration for a public- purpose was challenged in a suit. The challenge was upheld by the Privy Council on the ground that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ot extend. For, the question whether a particular action was the result of a fraud or not is always justiciable, provisions such as s. 6(3) notwithstanding. We were referred by the learned Advocate General to a recent decision of the House of Lords in Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council ([1956] A.C. 736) to which reference was made by a learned Advocate General. In that case their Lordships were considering the Acquisition of Land (Authorisation of Procedure) Act, 1946, (9 and 10 Geo. 6, c. 49), Sch. 1, Pt. IV, paras 15 and 16. Paragraph 15 (1) of Part IV, Sch. 1 to the Act provides as follows : "If any person aggrieved by a compulsory purchase older desires to question the validity thereof..... on the ground that the authorisation of compulsory purchase thereby granted is not empowered to be granted under this Act.......... he may, within six weeks from the date on which notice of the confirmation or making of the order.... is first published...... make an application to the High Court........" Paragraph 16 provides as follows : "Subject to the provisions of the last foregoing paragraph, a compulsory purchase order.... shall not.... be questioned in any le ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... therefore, the declaration was a colourable exercise of the power conferred by law. Then it is said that not only does the declaration omit to state that the contribution of the State towards the cost of acquisition was to be ₹ 100 only but also omits to mention that what was decided was that the Government was to bear only a part, of the cost of acquisition and not the whole of it. The notification is said to be thus misleading and to create the impression that the entire cost of the acquisition is to come out of the public exchequer. Finally it is contended that the establishment of an industry by a private party for manufacturing refrigeration equipment cannot fall within the meaning of the expression 'Public purpose'. It is no doubt true that the financial sanction for the contribution of Re. 100 as part of the expenses for acquisition was accorded by the Finance Department on September 29, 1961. No doubt also that a day prior to the according of sanction this petition had been admitted by this Court and a stay order issued. But from these two circumstances it would not be reasonable to draw the inference that the declaration made by the Government was a colourable exerc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ercise of the power to make an acquisition would be open to challenge as being colourable. Then it is contended that the contribution by the State towards the cost of acquisition must be substantial and not merely nominal or token as in this case. The argument is that though the law permits acquisition for a public purpose to be made by the State by contributing only a part of the cost of acquisition that part cannot be a particle and in this connection reliance was placed on the decision in Chatterton v. Cave ((1878) 3 App. Cas. 483, 491, 492) which was followed in Ponnaia v. Secretary of State () A. I. R. 1926 Mad. 1099). In the latter case the High Court of Madras observed that ,,the Legislature, when they provided that a part of the compensation should be paid from public revenues, did not mean that this condition would be satisfied-by payment of a particle, e. g. one anna in ₹ 5, 985". In that case land was being acquired for making a road between two villages in Ramnad District. A sum of ₹ 5, 985 was required for the acquisition. Out of this amount only one anna was agreed to be contributed by the Government and it was contended on its behalf that this contr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t less than 40 shillings. It was suggested that these differences indicated an intention to prevent the invasion of the dramatic copyright independently of the quantity or materiality of the portion of dialogue or dramatic incident proved to have been copied by another. Dealing with this argument Lord Hatherley observed: "Now it appears to me, my Lords, that this argument goes much too far. As was said by the counsel for the respondent, the appellant would wish to read the word 'part' in the Dramatic Copyright Act as 'particle', so that the crowing of the cook in Hamlet', or the introduction of a line in the dialogue, might be held to be an invasion of the copyright entitling plaintiff to 40s. damages and consequently, as the law stood I believe at the time of the passing of the statute of 3 & 4 Will. 4, to the costs of his action," (pp. 491-2) Then after pointing out that while in the case of an ordinary copyright of published works a fair use made by others would not amount to a wrong justifying an action at law, the position of dramatic performance is not the same he observed "They are not intended to be repeated by others or to be used in such a way as a book ma ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uit was dismissed by the courts below and he preferred an appeal before the Judical Committee of the Privy Council. Allowing the appeal, their Lordships observed : "The offer and acceptance of the rupee was a colourable attempt to obtain a title under the Land Acquisition Act without paying for the land........" How this case could at all have any bearing upon the point which arose for consideration in Ponnaia's case we fail to see. This case is also relied on before us on behalf of the petitioners and we have referred to it earlier in this Judgment. It has nothing whatsoever to do with the question of contribution by the State to-wards the cost of acquisition. We would like to add that the view taken in Senja Naicken's case (1) has been followed by the various High Courts in India. On the basis of the correctness of that view the State Governments have been acquiring private properties all over the country by contributing only token amounts towards the cost of acquisition. Titles to many such properties would be unsettled if we were now to take the view that 'partly at public expense' means substantially at public expense. Therefore, on the principle of state decision ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... purpose, namely, for setting up a factory for manufacturing various ranges of refrigeration compressors and ancillary equipment. It was vehemently argued before us that manufacture of refrigeration equipment cannot be regarded as beneficial to the community in the real sense of the word and that such equipment will at the most enable articles of luxury to be produced. But the State Government has taken the view that the manufacture of these articles is for the benefit of the community. No materials have been placed before us from which we could infer that the view of the Government, is perverse or that its action based on it constitutes a fraud on its power to acquire land or is a colourable exercise by it of such power. Further, the notification itself sets out the purpose, for which the land is being acquired. That purpose, if we may recall, is to set up a factory for the manufacture of refrigeration compressors and ancillary equipment. The importance of the under'taking to a State such as the punjab which has a ,surplus of fruit, dairy products etc. the general effect of the establishment of this factory on foreign exchange resources, spread of education, relieving the pressure ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... collaboration with them they propose to establish a factory on the lands which are now being acquired. It is true that a licence for erecting a paper factory was granted to Messrs. R. S. Madhoram and Sons but the location of that factory is to be in Uttar Pradesh and not in the State of Punjab. Without therefore, obtaining the approval of the appropriate authority the location of the factory could not be shifted to the land in question which, as already stated, is situate in the State of Punjab. Moreover this licence has since been cancelled on the ground that Messrs. R. S. Madhoram and Sons have taken no steps so far for establishing a paper factory. It is necessary to mention that the petitioners allege that this cancellation was procured by the respondents with the object of impeding the present petitioners. With that, however, we, need not concern ourselves because that licence as it stood on the date of the petitions did riot entitle Messrs. R. S. Madhoram and Sons to establish a factory in the State of Punjab. Apart from that it is always open to the State to fix priorities amongst public utilities of different kinds, bearing in mind the needs of the State the existing faci ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cts and then come to a decision or arrived at its satisfaction even in a case where the provisions of s. 5A need not be complied with. Undoubtedly the law requires that notification under sub-s. (1) of s. 6 must be made .only after the Government is satisfied that a particular land is required for a public purpose. Undoubtedly also where the Government has not directed under sub-s. (4) of s. 17 that the provisions of s. 5A Deed not be complied with the two notifications, that is, under sub-s. (1) of s. 4 and sub-s. (1) of s. 6 cannot be made simultaneously. But it seems to us that where there is an emergency by reason of which the State Government directs under sub-s. (4) of s. 17 of the Act that the provisions of s. 5A need not be complied with, the whole matter, that is, the actual requirement of the land for a public purpose must necessarily have been considered at the earliest stage itself that is when it was decided that compliance with the provisions of s. 5A be dispensed with. It is, therefore, difficult to see why the two notifications cannot, in such a case, be made simultaneously. A notification under subs.( 1) one of s. 4 is a condition precedent to the making of notific ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1961, the Governor of Punjab published a notification dated August 18, 1961, in the Official Gazette under s.4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, hereinafter called the Act, to the effect that the said land was likely to be needed by the Government at public expense for a purpose, namely, for setting up a factory for manufacturing various ranges of refrigeration compressors and ancillary equipment. Under s.17 of the Act the appropriate Government directed that the provisions of s.5A will not apply to the said acquisition; On the same day, another notification under s.6 of the Act dated August 19, 1961, was published to the effect that the Governor of, Punjab was satisfied that the land specified therein was required by the Government at public expense for the said purpose. On Septemher 29, 1961, the Government of Punjab sanctioned an expense of ₹ 100 for the purpose of acquisition of the said land. The validity of the said notification is questioned on various grounds. But as I am in favour of petitioners on the question of interpretation of the proviso to s.6 of the Act, I do not propose to express my opinion on any other question raised in the case. The material part of s. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r, wholly or partly, out of public revenues. A contrast between these two modes of payment suggests the idea that in one case the compensation must come out of the company's coffers and in the other case the whole or some reasonable part of it should come from public revenues. This idea excludes the assumption that practically no compensation need come out of public revenues. The juxtaposition of the words "wholly or partly" and the disjunctive between them emphasize the same idea. It will be incongruous to say that public revenue shall contribute rupees one lakh or one pie. The payment of a part of a compensation must have some rational relation to the compensation payable in respect of the acquisition for a public purpose. So construed "part" can only mean a substantial part of the estimated compensation. There cannot be an exhaustive definition of the words "substantial part of the compensation". What is substantial part of a compensation depends upon the facts of each cue, the estimate of the compensation and other relevant circumstances. While a court will not go meticulously into the question to strike a balance between a part and a whole, it wil ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion of private spite. or malice." These are weighty observations of a judge of great experience, who was also the Government Pleader before he became a judge of the, Madras High Court. The observations also indicate the statutory object in insisting on a substantial contribution from public revenues, for a strict insistence thereon would prevent to a large extent the abuse of power under the Act. But unfortunately the correctness of this decision was not accepted by another division Bench of the same High Court, consisting of Odgers and Madhavan Nair, JJ., in Senja Naicken v. Secretary State for India (1926) I.L.R. 50 Mad. 308). I have carefully gone %rough the judgment in that case, and, with great respect to the learned Judges, I cannot see any acceptable reasons for departing from the earlier view of the same court. Odgers, J., concentrated his criticism of the earlier judgment more on the reliance by the earlier Bench on the decision of the House of Lords than on the intrinsic merits of the decision itself. It is true that the learned Judges in the earlier decision relied upon the observations of the House of Lords, but that was only. in support of their conclusion why th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... There Sir Lionel Leach, C.J., delivering the judgment of the Full Bench, noticed the judgment of the division Bench in Ponnaia v. Secretary of State (A.I.R. 1926. Mad. 1099. and the criticism offered on the judgment by the later division Bench in Senja Naicken v. Secretary of State (1) and observed : "We are in entire agreement with this criticism." Then the learned Chief Justice proceeded to observe: "In interpreting the proviso we can only have regard to the words used and, in our judgment, it is sufficient compliance with the proviso if any part of. compensation is paid out of public funds. One anna is a part of the compensation. It is true it is a small part, but it is nevertheless a part." This literal interpretation of the word "part" de hors the setting in which that word appears in the section, in MY view, makes the condition imposed on the exercise of the jurisdiction by the Government meaningless and also attributed to the Legislature an intention to impose a purposeless and ineffective formality. For the reasons already given, I cannot accept the correctness of this judgment. I, therefore, hold that unless the Government agrees to contri ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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