TMI Blog1996 (11) TMI 456X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it came to the conclusion that the punishment imposed was justified as the misconduct. was duly proved. The Labour Court's order is dated December 11, 1985. Appellant then filed a writ petition before the High Court which was dismissed by a Single Bench. The writ appeal filed by the appellant was also dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court. Hence this appeal by special leave. The leave granted in this appeal is confined only to the question: whether the dismissal will take effect from the date of the order of the Labour Courts namely, December 11, 1985 or it would relate to the date of the order of dismissal passed by the employer, namely, November 18,1981. The only point involved for decision is apparently concluded by the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ade .......In the present case an inquiry has been held which is said to be defective in one respect and dismissal however to justify the order of dismissal before the Labour Court in view of the defect in the in the inquiry. It has succeeded the Labour will relate back to the date on which the respondent passed the order of dismissal. The contention of the appellant therefore that dismissal in this case should take effect from the date from which the labour courts award came into operation must fail. In our opinion the authoritative pronouncement by the Constitution Bench in Kalyani puts the matter beyond doubt. We may now refer to the decision by a three-Judge Bench in Gujarat Steel. Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for the three- Judge B ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ide, the problem does not present itself directly... Apparently these observations appear to strike a discordant note, even though Kalyani is referred there-in. The basis of the observations is that A void dismissal is just dismissal and does not exist . In other words, the reason for making these observations is that a void order does no come into existence until by a subsequent judicial resuscitation it comes into being inasmuch as a void order is still born. Is this assumption jurisprudentially correct? It is significant that the Constitution Bench decision in Kalyani, by which the three-Judge Bench was bound, is referred in Gujarat Steel and attempt made to indicate that there is no difference in the view taken therein. It is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Unless set aside by a component authority, the order of punishment made by the employer- continues to be effective Obviously this is the ratio of the decision in Kalyani. The decision in D.C. Roy is by a two-judge Bench to which Krishna Iyer, J. is a party. Therein also it was held that the award of the Labour Court relates back to the date when the order of dismissal was passed by the employer when it found the inquiry to be defective but reaches the conclusion on the evidence adduced before it that the dismissal was justified. After referring to Kalyani it was held in D.C. Roy as under: These observations directly cover the case before us because though the Labour Court in the instant case, found that the inquiry was defective as i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 341 342) `Void' is therefore meaningless in any absolute sense. Its meaning is relative, upon the court`s willingness to grant relief in any particular situation. If this principle of legal relativity is borne in mind, confusion over `void' of voidable' can be avoided. With great respect, we must say that the above quoted observations in Gujarat Steel at page 215 are not in line with the decision in Kalyani which was binding or with D.C. Roy to which the learned Judge, Krishna Iyer, J. was a party. It also does not match with the underlying juristic principle discussed in Wade. For these reasons, we are bound to follow the Constitution Bench decision in Kalyani which is the binding authority on the point. We may now re ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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