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TMI Blog1962 (11) TMI 66X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pilgrimage. By. the east of the lake runs a road approximately north to south. The Ghats for getting into the lake are situated contiguous west of this road. Several Dharmshalas and at least one Gurudwara have been established by the side of this road not far from the lake. A temple of Hanumanji stands east of the road, a short distance from the southern edge of the lake. Another temple close to the road is the temple of Rangji. This is situated very near the Ghats and to the east of the road. There is also a temple of Brahamaji further away towards the north but on this very road a little away from where the road further north cast from the edge of the lake meets, another Road Ganera Deedwana Nagar. Towards the south of the Dharamashalas the road goes on to Ajmer. The police station of Pushkar is situated at some distance from the Pushkar lake. The police station stands on a road which goes on towards Ganera Deedwana Nagar to the north; and on the south joins the road to Ajmer, Thus the road running north to south by the side of the police station and the road running by the east of the Ghats of the lake meet a short distance north of the police station and a greater distance tow ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r, Jai Narain and Madan Mohan moved before the State Transport Authority an application for revision of' the decision of the Regional Transport Authority changing the bus stand. This application purported to be under s. 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act. It was heard by the State Transport Authority on February 18, 1960, and was rejected the same day. On April 13, 1960, five bus operators of the Ajmer Pushkar route moved a fresh application for revision under s. 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act against the Regional Transport Authority's decision to change the stand. This application was decided by an order dated January 6, 1961. The State Transport Authority rejected the preliminary objection raised by the respondent's counsel that no revision lay against the Regional Transport Authority's order and also the objection that the matter in dispute had already been heard and decided on February 18, 1960 and the State Transport Authority had no right to review its own order. It also rejected the contention that the revision petition was barred by limitation. Coming to the merits of the case the State Transport Authority was of opinion that the proposed new bus stand was likely ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the respondents, it was made under s. 68 of the Act. Section 76, it has to be noticed, is in Chapter VI of the Motor Vehicles Act which deals with the control of traffic. Section 68 is in Chapter TV which deals with the, control of transport vehicles. Section 76 gives power to the State Government or any authority authorised in this behalf by the State Government "to determine places at which motor vehicles may stand either indefinitely or for a specified period of time" and also to determine the places at which public service vehicles may stop for a longer time than is necessary for the taking up and setting down of passengers. According to the learned Attorney General it is under this power to determine a place at which motor vehicles may stand indefinitely or for a specified period of time that the location of a bus stand is and can be determined by the State Government or any other authority authorised by it in this behalf. The rival contention on behalf of the respondent is that the determination of places at which motor vehicles may stand either indefinitely or for a specified period of time means the determination of parking place while the determination of place ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... egional Transport Authority, Tanjore declared that bus stand as unsuitable and with effect from April 1, 1950, altered the starting and terminal points by means of two resolutions purporting to have been passed under s. 76 of the Motor Vehicles Act. When the validity of these resolutions was challenged before the Madras High Court by a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution the High Court held that s. 76 did not authorise the respondent to close the previous bus stand and quashed the orders. On November 10, 1950, the Regional Transport Authority of Tanjore, after hearing the appellant Ibrahim and the Municipality passed a resolution that for good and proper reasons, viz., the convenience of the travelling public the Transport Authority had resolved to alter the starting places and termini of all public service vehicles, other than motor cabs, arriving at and proceeding from Tanjore from the existing buts stand to another area of the town. Against this resolution a fresh petition under Art. 226 was filed in the High Court but the petition was dismissed. Against the High Court's order, Ibrahim appealed to this Court by special leave and it is the judgment in that appeal whic ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rom being used for picking Upon setting down passengers. This will inevitably result in the closing of that specified place for the purpose of picking up or setting down of passengers. Similarly a specified area may be excluded for the same purpose. The expression "duty notified stands" is not defined in th` Act, but it is reasonable to presume that a duly notified stand must be one which is notified by the Transport Authority and by none other. There is no warrant for the presumption that it must be notified by the Municipality." The Court then discussed certain provisions of the Madras District Municipalities Act and said that these provisions did not affect the power of the Transport Authority to locate traffic control and that if Rule 268 was within the rule-making authority, it followed that it could riot be challenged as being void because it was riot consistent with some general law. The discussion on this point was con- cluded in these words :- "Section 68, sub-section (2)(r) involves both a general prohibition that the , stand will cease to exist as well as a particular prohibition, namely, that passengers shall riot be picked up or set down at a spe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ority under which the rules were being made, viz., ss. 21, 41, 65, 68, 70, 71, (2), 73, 74, 75, 77, 80, 86, (2), 88, 90 and 91 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. In view of this Court's decision in Ibrahim's Case (1) it will be proper to hold that Rule 13,4 ,was made in exercise of the powers under s. 68. Accordingly, the order of the Regional Transport Authority fixing the new bus stand and discontinuing the old should be held to have been made under a rule made under s. 68 and thus liable to revision under s. 64 A. The learned Attorney-General stressed the fact that in lbrahim's case this Court did not in so many words say that such an order. fixing or altering a bus stand cannot be made under s. 76 of the Act and contended that that case is no authority for holding that the order was not made under s. 76. Assuming for the sake of argument that that was so and that the order could also be made under s. 76 that would not affect or weaken the authority of Ibrahim's Case in so far as it decided that a rule empowering the Transport Authority to fix or alter bus stands can be made under s. 68 (2) (r) of the Act. In that position there will be no escape from the conclus ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f places at which the Motor Vehicles may stand either indefinitely or for a specified period of time means the "determination of parking places" while the determination of places at which public vehicles may stop for a longer time than is necessary for the taking up and setting down of passengers means "halting stations for public service vehicles". It is well worth noticing that while the determination of such places for stoppage, in the latter portion of the section can be in respect of public service vehicles only the determination of places of standing in the first part of the section is in respect of motor vehicles in general. All things considered, it appears to us clear that s. 76 has nothing to do with the provision for bus stands. Section 91 (2) (e) which empowers the State Government to make rules for "the maintenance and management of parking places and stands" does not refer, in our opinion, to bus stands but to "'stands" for motor vehicles which are in the nature of parking places determined under s. 76. It is equally clear to us that the "control of transport vehicles" with which Chapter IV purports to deal shoul ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... annot read it as within 30 days from the date of the knowledge of the order. In this connection the learned Attorney-General has drawn our attention to the decisions of the Privy Council in Nagendranath v. Suresh, (1) and General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corporation Limited v. Jarmohomnad Abdul Rahim (2) where it has been emphasised that in interpreting the provisions of limitation, "'equitable considerations are out of place, and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is the only safe guide." There can be no doubt that this principle has always been acted upon by the courts. This principle has recently been re-affirmed by this Court in Boota Mal.v. The Union of India (3). We agree therefore that the words "-date of the order" should not be read ""as from the date of knowledge of the order" in the absence of clear indication to that effect. In this connection the learned Attorney-General has drawn our attention to several sections of the Motor Vehicles Act to show that where the legislature in prescribing the period of limitation intended that time should run from some other date than the date when the order was made clear indicati ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e fixation of a new bus stand or discontinuance of the old bus stand. The matter may be considered from another aspect. Section 64A provides for an application for revision by a person aggrieved by an order. It is the making of the order which gives rise to the grievance. In this case it is the fixation of the new bus stand and the discontinuance of the old bus stand by which the bus operators claim to have been aggrieved, It is easy to see that there is no real cause for grievance till such fixation and discontinuance of 'bus stands have been made by a notified order. In other words, the order has not been "made" till the notification has been published. Before that it is only an intention to make an order that has been expressed. That this distinction between the making of an order fixing or discontinuing a bus stand and the expression of an intention to make such. an order was present in the mind of the Regional Transport Authority is abundantly clear from the language used by it. The resolution that Was Passed on December 4, 1959-which according to the appellant was the date on which the impugned order was made-says :- "The bus stand for Pushkar will be th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y way of review and an order of the Central Government in effect rejecting the application of the appellant for the grant of a mining lease to him and confirming the rejection of the application of the appellant by the Orissa Government was held not amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court of Orissa under Art. 226 of the Constitution in view of the fact that the Central Government was not located within the territories subject to the jurisdiction of the Orissa High Court on the ground that the Central Government's order rejecting the review petition and in effect rejecting the application of the appellant for grant of a mining lease was the (1) [1963] 3 S.C.R. 338. (2) [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 906, operative order. It has been urged. on the authority of these cases that the principle of merger should be applied to the cases of revision also where the revising authority reverses the order or modifies it or merely dismisses the revision application thereby confirming the order. In our opinion, there is no scope for the application of the principle of merger to the facts of the present case. As we have pointed out above the order fixing a new bus stand and discontinuing the ol ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f law. On a consideration of all the circumstances, we do not think that the appellant can now claim an order for quashing the State Transport Authority's decision on this ground. In our opinion, it would be proper, in the special circumstances of the case, to hold that the State Transport Authority could, immediately after June 28, 1960, when the order was completed by the notification treat the application for revision made on April 13, 1960, pending before it on the date of the notification, as an application for revision of the order as completed by the notification, and that, in substance, the order of January 6, 1961, was an order revising-not the decision of the Regional Transport Authority's order of December 4, 1959, but the Regional Transport Authority's order fixing a new bus stand at Pushkar, as completed by the notification of June 28, 1960. The other point which was brought to our notice during the arguments at the Bar is that the order of the State Transport Authority dated January 6, 1961, was made without compliance with the second proviso to s. 64 A. That proviso is in these words: "Provided further that the State Transport Authority shall not p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... The appellant is the Municipal Board of Pushkar in the State of Rajasthan. It passed a resolution sometime in 1958 that the bus stand near the Pushkar lake should be shifted to what it considered a more suitable place. Now the power to fix bus stands was given to the Regional Transport Authorities by r. 134 of the Rules framed by the Rajasthan Government under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. That rule provides as follows : Rule 134. ""A Regional Transport Authority, by notifications in the Rajasthan Gazette, or by the erection of traffic signs which are permitted for the purpose under sub section (1) of section 75 of the Act, or both, may, in respect of the taking up or setting down of passengers or both, by public service vehicles or by any specified class of public service vehicles (i) conditionally or unconditionally pro- hibit the use of any specified place or of any place of a specified nature or class, or (ii) require that within the limits of any municipality or within such other limits as may be specified in the notification, certain specified stands or halting places only shall be so used: " The appellant Municipality moved the Regional Transport Authorit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 8, 1960, and thereafter the facilities required had been provided by the appellant Municipality. It is after all this that the notification of June 28, 1960, had been issued. The respon- dent's petition under s. 64A was allowed by the State Transport Authority by an order made on January 6, 1961. By that order the State Transport Authority directed that "the decision passed by the R. T. A. dated 3/4 December 1959 and upheld by the STA on 18. 2. 1960 be set aside and cancelled and the old Bus stand shall continue to be recognised as Official Bus stand for the Pushkar Town." On February 10, 1961, the appellant Municipality filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Rajasthan for a writ quashing the order of the State Transport Authority of January 6, 1961. This petition was dismissed by the High Court. The appellant has now appealed to this Court against the decision of the High Court. There were various points taken in support of this appeal, but I think that one of them must succeed and I propose in this judgment to discuss that point only. It was said on behalf of the appellant Municipality that there was an error apparent on the face ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ondents no advantage. They had by their petition under s. 64A asked that the Regional Transport Authority's order of December 3/4, 1959, be quashed. Now, on the respondents own argument, that order was not an order under s. 64 A at all and could not be set aside under that section. Therefore, again the order of the State Transport Authority setting aside the Regional Transport Authority's resolution of December 3/4 1959, was incompetent on the face of it. That resolution was exhypothesi not art order liable to be revised under s. 64A. The State Transport Authority's order of January 6, 1961, was even off this basis patently erroneous and without jurisdiction and so liable to be set aside,. by a writ. Then it was said that it was in the power of ,the State Transport Authority to treat the petition under s. 64A filed on April 13,1960, and pending on June 28, 1960, the date of the notification, as an application to set aside the order contained in that notification. Now I do not think the State Transport Authority suo motu could do so. It is for thepetitioner to decide what relief he would ask in his application under s. 64A. The State Transport Authority could not agains ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... urpose to consider whether the State Transport Authority could treat the respondents petition under s. 64A as having been filed on or after June 28, 1960, to cancel the order contained in the notification of that date. In fact, it did not do so. It was neither for the High Court nor it is for this Court now to amend the application under s. 64A and treat it as one for sett ing aside the Regional Transport Authority's order contained in the notification of June 28, 1960. That application was never before either of these Courts. If the respondents. themselves had made an application for such a amendment, then the application would have been dismissed if on its date, thirty days from the date of the notification had passed. Now on the dates when the State Transport Authority and the High Court passed their orders, the period of thirty days so counted had passed. On those dates the respondents could not successfully ask for an amendment of their application under s. 64A. It, therefore, seems to me that if the order of the Regional Transport Authority is to be taken as having been, made, on June 28, 1960, then the respondents' petition under s. 64A was incompetent because it sou ..... 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