TMI Blog1974 (1) TMI 112X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uld also govern the other appeal. There is a distillery installation owned by the State at Daman. The Government has been leasing out the said distillery for specified period to members of the public for manufacture of country liquor. At the expiry of each lease, the Government used to invite fresh tenders from the public or the next lease and granted lease of the distillery to the person whose tender was accepted. For a number of years before 1973 the appellant's tender in respect of the above distillery was accepted by the Government as the amount offered by him was the highest. The last lease in favour of the appellant expired on January 31, 1973. Before that by notice dated September 25, 1972 the Finance Secretary for the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu invited tenders on behalf of the President of India from the public for the lease of the said distillery for a period of three years commencing from February 1, 1973 for the manufacture of country liquor. The terms and conditions of tender as framed by the Government were appended to the said notice. Clause 7 of those terms and conditions was as under The highest tender shall ordinarily be accepted but the Governme ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... be granted by the court under its writ jurisdiction for alleged breach of contract. According further to the affidavit, the acceptance of the tender was solely within the discretion of the Government, uncontrolled by any statutory obligation or limitation and the rejection of the tender of respondent No. 1 created no statutory rights in him. Clause 7 of the terms and conditions was stated to be valid and not violative of article 14. The tender of respondent No. 1 was stated to have been rejected after the appellant had been informed that his tender could be accepted provided he raised his offer so as to pay an amount higher than that offered by the person with the highest tender. The appellant accordingly raised his and thereupon his tender was accepted. The grounds for the rejection of the tender of respondent No. 1 were stated to have been recorded in the Me. It was, according to the affidavit, for the Government to choose the person to whom it would grant the lease and the party aggrieved could not claim the protection of article 14. The learned Judicial Commissioner in the course of his judgment observed that the act of the Government in giving a lease of the distillery to the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ial Commissioner, it is stated, does not suffer from any infirmity. It has also been argued by the learned counsel that the grant of lease of the distillery in question is governed by the provisions of article 9 of Legislative Diploma No. 1761 framed by the Portugese Government. There is, in our opinion, force in the contention advanced on behalf of the appellant that the Judicial Commissioner should not have without giving some cogent reason set aside the lease of the distillery in favour of the appellant. Perusal of the judgment shows that the main reason which weighed with the learned Judicial Commissioner in setting aside the lease in favour of the appellant was the submission made on behalf of the State that it was prepared without accepting the correctness of the contentions of respondent No. 1 to set aside the lease if the court so desired. This circumstance, in our opinion, was hardly sufficient to warrant the setting aside of the lease in favour of the appellant. The person who was primarily affected by the setting aside of the lease was the appellant to whom the lease had been granted. In the absence of any concurrence of the appellant, the fact that the Government was ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... propriate cases, even specific performance but he cannot complain that there has been a deprivation of the right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business, such as is contemplated by Art. 19(1)(g). Nor has it been shown how Art. 31 of the Constitution may be invoked to prevent cancellation of a contract in exercise of powers conferred by one of the terms of the contract itself. In Trilochan Mishra, etc. v. State of Orissa Ors. [1971] 3 S.C.R. 153 this court dealt with the validity of section 3(2)(a) and section 8 (1) of the Orissa Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Act, 1961 as amended by the 'Orissa Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Amendment Act, 1969 as well as the validity of the rules framed under that Act. The petitioner in that case also sought a declaration that the revised policy in the matter of the sale of Kendu leaves was arbitrary, discriminatory and mala fide. One of the grievances of the petitioner in that case was that the bid of person making the highest tenders were not accepted. Repelling the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner, Mitter J. who gave the judgment of the Court on behalf of the Consti- tution Bench obser ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... at the power retained by the Government to accept or to reject the highest bid without assigning any reason is an unguided power and hence it is violative- of article 14. These contentions were accepted by the High Court. To us, none of these contentions appear to be well founded. As seen earlier section 22 of the Act confers power on the Government to grant to any person on such conditions and for such period as it may think fit the exclusive privilege of selling in retail any country liquor. Section 29 empowers the Government to accept payment of a sum in consideration for the grant of any exclusive privilege under section 22 either by calling tenders or by auction or otherwise as it may by general or special order direct. The powers conferred on the State Government by section 22 and section 29 are absolute powers. As seen earlier, the validity of those provisions has not been challenged before us. Under section 29(2) the Government had power to dispose of any of the exclusive privileges mentioned in section 22 either by auction or otherwise as it may by general or special order direct. That being the amplitude of the power of the Government, we fail to see how the Government ca ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nment was the seller does not change the legal position once its exclusive right to deal with those privileges is conceded. If the Government is the exclusive owner of those privileges, reliance on article 19(1)(g) or article 14 becomes irrelevant. It would appear from the above that the view taken by this Court is that a condition like that contained in clause 7 reproduced above is not violative of article 14 of the Constitution and that in matters relating to contracts with the Government, the latter is not bound to accept the tender of the person who offers the highest amount. Mr. lyengar has tried to distinguish the above mentioned cases on the ground that they were decided in the context of certain statutory provisions. This circumstance, in our opinion, would not detract from the binding effect of the general principle enunciated in those cases. We may now deal with the contention of Mr. lyengar that the lease of distilleries is governed by para 2 of article 9 of Legislative Diploma No. 1761. In this connection we find that the judgment of the learned Judicial Commissioner does not show that any such ground was urged before him. Mr. Parekh on behalf of the appellant submi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ies upon that representation alters his position to his prejudice. No such question arises in the present case because it is not shown that respondent No. 1 has altered his position to his prejudice by relying upon any representation made by the authorities. In Rashbihar Panda etc. v. State of Orissa [1969] 3 S.C.R. 374 this Court dealt with a Government scheme for sale and disposal of Kendu leaves. It was found that the right to make tenders for the purchase of Kendu leaves was restricted to those persons who had obtained contracts in the previous year. The scheme was held to be violative of articles 14 and 19(1)(g) because it gave rise to monopoly in Kendu leaves to certain traders. The dictum laid down in the above case cannot be of much assistance because there was no such restriction in the present, case with regard to the making of the tenders. Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. The State of Uttar Pradesh Two Ors. [1954] S.C.R. 803 related to the validity of clause 4(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Coal Control Order, 1953 according to which the licensing authority was given absolute power-in the matter of grant revocation, cancellation or modification of the licences issued under ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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