TMI Blog1957 (4) TMI 68X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e prosecuted by the State, but they have been eventually acquitted by the High Court of Allahabad. In the meantime, in its issue for the month of Kartik Samvat 2009, corresponding to November, 1952, an article was published in the petitioner's magazine 'Gaurakshak.' On December 12, 1952, the State Government ordered the prosecution of the petitioner on the basis of the said article. Accordingly on June 8, 1953,acomplaint was filed in the court of the District Magistrate, Kanpur, by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Kanpur, against the petitioner for offences under ss. 153A and 295A of the Indian Penal Code. The Magistrate by his order dated August 5, 1953, charged the petitioner under ss. 153A and 295A and committed the petitioner to the Sessions Court of Kanpur for trial. The petitioner pleaded not guilty. The learned Sessions Judge, by his judgment dated November 16, 1953, acquitted the petitioner of the charge under s. 153 Abut convicted him under s. 295A and sentenced him to 18 months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹ 2,000 and, in default of payment of the fine, to further rigorous imprisonment of 4 months. The petitioner filed an appeal to the High Co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y do so in some case. Therefore, where a law purports, as the impugned section does, to authorise the imposition of restriction on the exercise of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression in language wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limitation of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting such right, the court should not uphold it even in so far as it may be applied within the constitutionally permissible limits as it is not severable. So long as the possibility of its being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out it must, according to learned counsel, be held to be wholly unconstitutional and void. Reference has been made to the cases of Romesh Thappar v. The St-ate of Madras((1950) S.C.R. 594) and Brij Bushan v. The State of Delhi ((1950) S.C.R. 605.). In Romesh Thappar's case, in exercise of powers conferred on him by s. 9(1 -A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949, the Governor of Madras, being satisfied that for the purpose of securing public safety and the maintenance of public order it war,. necessary so to do, prohibited the entry into or the circulation, s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... intenance of public order, it was not a law solely relating to a matter which undermined the security of or tended to overthrow the State within the meaning Of Cl. (2) of Art. 19 as it then stood. The principles laid down in Romesh Thappar's case were applied to this case and the law was held to be void. The case of Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh ((1950) S.C.R. 759) has also been relied upon in support of the contention that where the language employed in the Statute is wide enough to cover restrictions on a fundamental right both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting the right and the possibility of its being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out, the law must be held to be wholly void. After this Court decided the cases of Romesh Thappar (supra) and Brij Bushan (supra), cl. (2) of Art. 19 of the Constitution was amended. Clause (2), as amended, protects a law in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by sub-cl. (a) of cl. (1) of Art. 19 in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign S ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... freedom of speech and expression by simply making insult to religion an offence will cover both varieties of insults, i.e., those which may lead to public disorders as well as.those which may not. The law in so far as it covers the first variety may be said to have been enacted in the interests of public order within the meaning of el. (2) of Art. 19, but in so far as it covers the remaining variety will not fall within that clause. The argument then concludes that so long as the possibility of the law being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out, the entire law should be held to be unconstitutional and void. We are unable, in view of the language used in the impugned section, to accede to this argument. In the first place el. (2) of Art. 19 protects a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to freedom of speech and expression in the interests of public order, which is much wider than for maintenance of public order. If, therefore, certain activities have a tendency to cause public disorder, a law penalising such activities as an offence cannot but be held to be a law imposing reasonable restriction in the interest ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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