TMI Blog1952 (12) TMI 36X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y and in a civil litigation which ensued the title of the Municipality was negatived. Thereupon the appellant obtained the lease-hold right of the site from the true owner and constructed a bus- stand conforming to the design approved by the Municipality. Besides sheds for passengers and vehicles it provided other amenities. It was situate near the Railway Station and most of the buses leaving Tanjore for out-station journeys used this bus-stand both as the starting point and as the terminus. It appears that the site was approved as convenient and suitable for the bus- stand both by the Municipality and the District authorities for buses plying from and into Tanjore. The appellant held the licence for running the bus-stand year after year. In 1939 the Municipality granted him a licence for four months only instead of one year as required by section 270 (c) of the Madras Municipalities Act (V of 1920), and the appellant succeeded in vindicating his right for a whole year's licence in the Civil Court by obtaining the relief for injunction and an order directing the issue of a licence against the Municipality for 1940-41. The appellant carried on the business without let or hindra ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... motor- buses. Reference was made, in the course of the arguments, to rule 268, Madras Vehicles Rules, 1940, and the learned Judges observed that though the rule does empower the Transport Authority to fix starting places and termini between which public service vehicles other than motor cars shall be permitted to be used, but that this could be done only if starting places and termini had not already been fixed in accordance with the provisions of any statute. In the present case as these had already been fixed in accordance with rule 27-D, Motor Vehicles Rules, 1923, the Transport Authority could not fix new starting places and termini under rule 268 of the Rules passed in 1940. The Bench pointed out that the rule was defective and would lead to an impasse if the starting places and termini already fixed become unsuitable and have to be shifted. Accordingly they suggested-that the rule should be amended and a provision introduced conferring on the appropriate authority the requisite power to alter from time to time the starting places and termini. See T. E. Ebrahim Saheb v. The Regional Transport Authority Tanjore (A.I.R. 951 Mad. 419). It appears that within two months of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 9; the point of convenience of the travelling public . After hearing the appellant and the Municipality, the Board passed a resolution on November to, 1950, that for good and proper reasons, namely, the convenience of the travelling public, the Transport Authority had resolved to alter the starting places and termini of all public service vehicles (other than motor cabs) arriving, at and proceeding from Tanjore from the existing bus-stand owned by the appellant to the Municipal bus-stand in another area of the town. This order led to another petition being filed in the High Court at Madras, praying for a writ of certiorari under article 226. The appellant questioned the jurisdiction of the Transport Authority to pass the order in question. It was contended before the High Court that rule 268 as amended was itself ultra vires, firstly, because it was beyond the rulemaking power conferred by section 68, sub-section (r), of the Motor Vehicles Act, and secondly because it was repugnant to article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Both these contentions were rejected by the High Court and the petition was dismissed. The contentions raised before the High Court have been repeated before u ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Chapter. The purpose of Chapter IV is described by the compendious expression control of transport vehicles and the Provincial Government is invested with plenary powers to make rules for carrying out that purpose. Keeping in view the purpose underlying the Chapter we are not prepared to hold that the fixing or alteration of bus-stands is foreign to, that purpose. It was contended that section 68, sub-section 2(r), does not confer the power upon the transport authority to direct the fixing or the alteration of a bus-stand and that rule 268 of the rules framed under that section was, therefore, ultra vires. We are not prepared to accede to this contention. Sub-section 2(r) clearly contemplates three definite situations. It prohibits the picking up or setting down of passengers (i) at specified places (ii) in specified areas, and (iii) at places other than duly notified stands or halting places. If the power to make rules in regard to these, matters is given to the Government, then it follows that a specified place may be prohibited from being used for picking up or setting down passengers. This will inevitably result in the closing of that specified place for the pu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sed is rule framed under the plenary rule-making power referred to in section 68, sub-section (1). Sub- section (2) (za) says that a rule may be made with respect to any other matter which is to be or may be prescribed. This shows the existence of residuary power vested in the rule-making authority. It follows therefore that rule 268 is within the scope of the powers conferred under section 68 of the Act. The next contention was that the order is repugnant to article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution, according to which all citizens must have the right to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. It cannot be denied that the appellant has not been prohibited from carrying on the business of running a bus-stand. What has been prohibited is that the bus-stand existing on the particular site being unsuitable from the point of view of public convenience, it cannot be used for picking up or setting down passengers from that stand for outstations journeys. But there is certainly no prohibition for the bus-stand being used otherwise for carrying passengers from the stand into the town, and vice versa. The restriction placed upon the use of the bus-stand for ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ing to the language employed the consultation is not obligatory but only discretionary. It was suggested that the act of the Municipality was mala fide and reference was made to paragraphs 18 and 19 of the appellant's affidavit dated November 20, 1950. They refer merely to the vagueness of the ground of public convenience and to he amendment of the rule not being bona fide. There is, however, no material to support this suggestion. The mere fact that in the first notice certain grounds were mentioned which were not adhered to in the second notice and convenience of the travelling public was alone mentioned as the ground cannot lead to the inference that the order was mala fide. The rule was amended in pursuance of the suggestion of the High Court in order to overcome the difficulty which arose in the absence of requisite power to-alter the bus stands. It is significant that no allegation about mala fides was made before the High Court and the question was never discussed there. In the petition for special leave to appeal though there is reference to the ground of inconvenience being vague, yet there is no suggestion of mala fides. The question about mala fides appears to hav ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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