TMI Blog1952 (8) TMI 25X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ler dismissed the application. An appeal filed against that order to the Court of Small Causes, Madras, was dismissed. The landlords filed C. M. P. No. 4139 of 1948 for issuing a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Small Cause Judge, but that was dismissed by a Divisional Bench of this court on 6-10-1948. Rangarajulu Naidu filed another application, H. R. C. No. 4788 of 1949, for evicting the petitioner, alleging that he required the upstairs for his own occupation. The House Rent Controller ordered that application. The petitioner preferred an appeal against that order to the Court of Small Causes at Madras, which held that the building was a non-residential one and that a second petition on the same facts was barred under Section 10 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949 (hereafter called the Act). That order was made on 10-4-1950. Thereafter the landlords approached the Government with a request to exempt their building from the operation of the provisions of the Act. The Government by their order dated 9-9-1950 exempted the building under Section 13 of the Act. The aforesaid petition was filed for getting the said order quashed. The Government filed ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Government was bad and was, therefore, liable to be quashed. But what he stated was that he was asked not to support the order but leave it to the landlords to do so. For the aforesaid reasons I hold that the landlords are entitled to be made parties. I allow C. M. No. 11818 of 1951 and make them party respondents. (3.) Learned Counsel for the landlords contended that the order of the Government in question was not a judicial act and therefore not liable to be quashed in a writ of certiorari. Arguments therefore were addressed on the question whether the order of the Government exempting the building under Section 13 of the Act is a judicial act or an administrative act Section 13 says: Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act; the provincial Government may, by notification in the Port St. George Gazette, exempt any building or class of buildings from all or any of the provisions of this Act. The power conferred on the Government under this section is very wide and does not depend upon any prescribed objective consideration They are not bound to give reasons. Neither the section nor the rules framed under the Act prescribe a judicial procedure for exercising th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lowed. In my opinion the conditions laid down by Slesser L. J. in his judgment correctly bring out the distinction between a judicial or quasi-judicial decision on the one hand and a ministerial decision on the other. (6.) Can it therefore be said that in the instant case the Act or the rules made thereunder indicate that the Government should follow the wellrecognised principles of judicial approach in exercising the power under Section 13 of the Act? I do not find any indications to that effect. Indeed, as I have already stated, an unqualified power of remption was conferred on the Government, to be exercised by them in their discretion. I therefore hold that the order of the Government exempting the house in question is not a judicial Act. (7.) Even so, it was argued that the order in question affected the fundamental right of the petitioner under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. But this question was covered by authority of a Bench decision which is binding on me. Rajamannar C. J. and Venkatarama Aiyar J. held in 'W. P. NO. 132 of 1951 (Mad)', that the Government in exempting a house have not violated any of the fundamental rights of the petitioner therei ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rt by which it is given but also on the court in which it is cited. Its authority may be absolute in one court, and merely conditional in another. A decision of the Court of appeal is absolutely binding on a court of first instance, but is only conditionally binding upon the House of Lords . (10.) This passage, if I may say so, accurately represents the procedure followed in British Courts. I do not see how the rules stated above help the petitioner's case. The first principle laid down directly applies to the present case. The Divisional Bench decided the case as an appellate tribunal. Bitting as a court of first instance I am bound by that judgment. Nor does the decision in -- 'Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd', (1944) 2-A11. E. R. 293 lays down any new principle. Lord Greene M. R. after considering the case law on the subject summarised the law as follows: On a careful examination of the whole matter we have come to the clear conclusion that this court is bound to follow previous decisions of its own as well as those of courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction. The only exceptions to this rule (two of them apparent only) are those already mentioned which for conve ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nal factors of the loss of money and the waste of judicial time . This judgment, If I may say so with respect, lays down the salutary rules of practice to be followed. In -- 'Manilal v. Venkatachalapathi', I. L. R. (1944) Mad. 95, Leach C. J. again made the following observations at page 97: A Judge has, of course, always the right of expressing his own opinion and indicating that he is not in agreement with an authority binding on him, but he is nevertheless in duty bound to follow it, as the Pull Bench of this court which decided -- 'Seshamma v. Narasimharao', I. L. R. (1940) Mad. 454 had occasion to point. The fact that a Judge thinks that some argument has been overlooked in a judgment binding on him is no reason for refusing to follow it . I am not therefore prepared on the English authorities cited and on the arguments advanced, to depart from the well-recognised practice and the salutary conventions established in this court. If I did, I would be introducing only confusion and uncertainty and put the subordinate judiciary in a very unenviable position. I would therefore unreservedly follow the procedure obtaining in our court which is supported by princip ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ublic. The relevant provisions of the Constitution read: Article 19(1): All citizens shall have the right (f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property; (5) Nothing in Sub-clauses (d), (e) and (f) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said Sub-clauses either in the interest of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any scheduled tribe . In -- 'Dr. N.B. Khare v. State of Delhi', , the provisions of Clause (5) have been construed by the Supreme Court. Kania C. J, observed at page 213 as follows: In my opinion, clause (5) must be given its full meaning. The question which the court has to consider is whether the restrictions put by the Impugned legislation on the exercise of the right are reasonable or not. The question whether the provisions of the Act provide reasonable safeguards against the abuse of the power given, to the executive authority to administer the law is not relevant for the true interpretation of the clause ...... The law providing reasonable r ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erned by the contract and the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. If it was a monthly tenancy, the tenant could be asked to quit after notice for the prescribed period was given. But the Act evolved a scheme imposing restrictions on the landlord. While the main object of the Act was to prevent the arbitrary eviction of the tenants, it took good care to see that interests of the landlords were protected within reasonable limits. A statutory tenant, the creation of the Act, with certain rights and restrictions cannot accept the rights and complain of the restrictions. No question of unreasonable restriction on his part would arise as the statute itself created that right subject to restrictions. He acquired the right not to be evicted except under certain circumstances and one of those circumstances is when the Government exempts a particular building from all or particular provisions of the Act. His right to the user of the properties therefore is not an absolute one, but is circumscribed by the provisions of the Act itself. In this view I cannot hold that Section 13 imposes any unreasonable restriction on the petitioner's right to use the property leased to him. (14. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
