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TMI Blog2005 (7) TMI 76X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... other hand the contention of counsel appearing for the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was that the orders are duly communicated or served upon the authorities but sometimes they decline to accept the same and the delay is not attributable to the Registrar of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. Faced with these circumstances, the court had passed the following order on January 11, 2005: "The basic contention raised on behalf of the respondent is that for the financial year 1988-89 the Tribunal had passed the order, which order has not been challenged by the Department and as such all subsequent appeals would be adversely affected in that behalf. Be that as it may, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed on record a copy of the orders dated January 10, 2003, and March 3, 2004. We may also refer to the order of the court dated January 16, 2003 passed in this case. We require the Department of Income-tax's concerned office to file an affidavit in regard to the exact facts and the stand of the Department arising from the above said three documents. We also direct the Registrar, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to submit the report to this court before the next date of hearing as to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... this aspect of the matter, thus we reserved our orders in this regard, however, adjourned the appeals for hearing on the merits. While referring to the present case counsel appearing for the income-tax authorities had placed on record a letter dated March 3, 2004, stating that though the orders in relation to the assessment year 1988-89 onwards had been pronounced quite early, copies had not been given to the Department despite the fact they had demanded certified copies of the orders vide the same letter. In response thereto, peon book was produced before us to show that the orders were received by the Department or that they had even refused to receive the copies of the orders as not belonging to their circle. This controversy to a larger extent was resolved by a meeting held between the President of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and the Commissioner of the Income-tax in furtherance of the observation of the court, and as already noticed an affidavit was filed by the Registrar of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. An incidental but a pertinent question which remained unresolved calls for certain directions by the court in view of the stand taken by the parties particularly th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... onstruction suggested on behalf of the Tribunal would neither be in administration of justice nor would be permissible in conformity with the settled principles of interpretation of procedural law. The fine distinction between the expressions "pass" and "pronounce" should not be stretched to the extent that it offends the basic rule of law. The expression "pass" in common parlance or its usual sense means "to deliver". It has been given wide meaning and connotations, depending on the reference in which the expression is to be construed. The Law Lexicon, 1997 edition explains this term "pass" as to be allowed or approved by a court or by a legislative or deliberative body; to be given or pronounced (in case of verdict, reference or judgment), "pass judgment" as "deliver judgment". Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth edition, explains the word "pass" as follows: "To utter or pronounce, as when the court passes sentence upon a prisoner. Also to proceed; to be rendered or given, as when judgment is said to pass for the plaintiff in a suit. The term also means to examine into anything and then authoritatively determine the disputed questions which it involves. In this sense a jury is said t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... decree. Objective analysis of the above discussion would show that in substance there is really no distinction between the meaning of the expression "pass" or "pronounce" and consequences thereof. "Passing of orders", as a Tribunal may consider it appropriate can hardly be differentiated from the words "pronounce its orders". As already noticed "an order" is in the form of decision which contains reasoning for the conclusions and such an order is to be signed on a date by the concerned authorities. The purpose of "passing an order" within the contemplation of section 254(1) of the Act is to empower the Tribunal to pass such orders which it may think fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. "Order" is a mandate, precept or command but reasoning is its soul and it would obviously be a final order or judgment. To "pass an order" can simply be equated to "pronounce an order", as "pronounce" is to give one's considered or authoritative opinion on a matter or context. To articulate the distinction which is more imaginary than the real distinction, may subserve the basic concept of procedural law. But, there is nothing in this provision which on its plain reading or by necessary ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... onouncement", to include such an act would be necessary by the very nature of things and would impose an obligation upon the Tribunal to pronounce its orders on the occasion when they are dated and signed by the Members of the Bench of the Tribunal. Dating and signing of the judgment and declaration is a procedural matter and this would, if complied with in no way infringe the rules and procedure. (Reference can be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Iqbal Ismail Sodawala v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 1880). Unlike the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure where section 33 and Order 20, rules 1, 2 and 3 provide for pronouncement of judgment in the open court as well as the judgment to be dated and signed by the judge in the open court at the time of pronouncement, there are no provisions under the Income-tax Act which contemplate signing, dating and pronouncing of the orders passed by the Tribunal under section 254(1) of the Act. If the submissions made on behalf of the Appellate Tribunal are taken to their logical ends, there is no requirement for giving a reasoned order, signing the same and its dating etc. This all is being done in compliance with ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ries present in court, if not represented by a counsel, as to which court an appeal would lie and the period of limitation and also place on file information to that effect. This no way diluted the other provisions of Order 20 in relation to pronouncement of judgment but it certainly indicates the protection which a procedural law is required to give to a litigant even at the hands of the court. The practice being complementary to procedural law, and usefully practised even if prevalent in other systems of judicial administration would form a valid precept for its adoption in other systems. "Pronouncement of judgment" is a concept which covers dating, signing and declaration of a judgment and order by the competent court. To unnecessarily dissect this wholesome concept would only result in inordinate delay and prejudice to the litigant as is evident from the above-noticed facts. We may refer to a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Dr. Sudha Suri v. Union of India [2002] 1 SLR 665; 130 PLR 453, wherein the court after discussing the detailed judgment in regard to acceptance of practice in law held as under: "Thus, a good practice of the past alone ca ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... its judgments and orders in open hearing and upon enlisting them for a given date. This practice shall be adopted by the Tribunal in addition to its obligation to communicate the orders as contemplated under section 254(3) of the Act and rule 35 of the Rules. We are also unable to see any prejudice, inconvenience or obstruction being caused to the functioning of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal by pronouncing of its orders after enlisting them for a given date. Rather it would facilitate proper functioning, would help the litigant to lawfully know the result of his appeal as well as avoid unnecessary delay in communication of the orders in accordance with law. Such a practice would further the cause of justice and would also serve larger public interest. We feel that the stand taken by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is not quite fair and the court has been called upon to unnecessarily spend its time on the hearing of the prolonged submissions on this aspect of the case, when the litigant and lawyers are waiting for hearing on decision on their cases pending in this court. Consequently, we would direct the Tribunal to pay costs of Rs. 5,000 to the Delhi Legal Services Authority ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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