TMI Blog1960 (11) TMI 131X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fly stated. The plaintiffs case is that, at the time of the general assessment of 1950, the house standing in the holding was unoccupied, and one Mr. Iftakhar Ahmad, a Deputy Magistrate, assessed it to a quarterly municipal tax of ₹ 48/12/-. The plaintiff, thereafter, made improvements in the house by providing water and electric connections. He then let it out on rent to Shri Pratapdhari Sinha, an Advocate, on a-monthly rental of ₹ 75/-. On the 8th January, 1951, he received a notice from the municipality under Section 7(2) read with, section I07(1)(c) of the Act, stating that it was proposed to enhance the valuation of the holding, and that the plaintiff could file an objection. The plain-tiff, accordingly, filed an objection which was heard by the Special Officer of the municipality, who by his order dated the 28th September, 1951, rejected his objection and assessed the holding on the basis of a monthly rental of ₹ 155/- to a tax oi ₹ 151/4/- per quarter. The plaintiff paid under protest a sum of ₹ 151/4/- as quarterly tax for October to December, 1951, which amounted to a payment of ₹ 102/8/- in excess of the tax legally payable as having ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to decide all the facts which required determination for exercise of the power to enhance the valuation or assessment of any holding under Section 107(1)(c), and that his decision on those facts is final. The Civil Court has no jurisdiction to investigate, those facts or to interfere with the decision. 2. That an objection filed in pursuance of a notice issued under Sub-section (2) of Section 107 has, under Sub-section (3), to be disposed of by a committee constituted as provided in Section 117; but the Special Officer appointed under Section 386 alone takes the place of the committee referred to in that section when the municipality is superseded under Section 385 of the Act. 8. As to the first point, the learned Advocate General has contended that the provisions of the Act make it quite clear that the decision of the municipality on the facts arising for consideration is final. He has referred to Sub-section (4) of Section 117 of the Act which runs : (4) The decision of the Committee, or of a majority of the members thereof, in such cases shall be final. He has also drawn our attention to Section 119 which is as under : No objection shall be taken to any assessm ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ction in any case in which, on a correct decision on the jurisdictional facts, it cannot possibly have any jurisdiction. There is a long line of decisions of English Courts which may be relied upon in support of this view. 11. In Bunbury v. Fuller (1853) 9 Ex 111 at p. 140, Coleridge, J. has, while delivering the judgment of the Court, of Exchequer Chamber, observed: It is a general rule that no Court of limited jurisdiction can give itself jurisdiction by a wrong decision on a point collateral to the merits of the case upon which the limit to its jurisdiction depends; and however its decision may be final on all particulars, making up together that subject matter which, if true, is within its jurisdiction, and however necessary in many cases it may be for it to make a preliminary inquiry, whether some collateral matter be or be not within the limits, yet upon this preliminary question its decision must always be open to inquiry in the superior Court. Then, to take the simplest case -- suppose a Judge with jurisdiction limited to a particular hundred, and a matter is brought before him as having arisen within it, but the party charged contends that it arose in another hundre ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t possess, whether at all or to the extent claimed, or to refuse to exercise a jurisdiction which it has and ought to exercise. Subjection in this respect to the High Court is a necessary and inseparable incident to all tribunals of limited jurisdiction; for the existence of the limit necessitates an authority to determine and enforce it; it is a contradiction in terms to create a tribunal with limited jurisdiction and unlimited power to determine such limit at its own will and pleasure --such a tribunal would be autocratic, not limited--and it is immaterial whether the decision of the inferior tribunal on the question of the existence or non-existence of its own jurisdiction is founded on law or fact; a Court with jurisdiction confined to the city of London cannot extend such jurisdiction by finding as a fact that Piccadilly Circus is in the ward of Chepe. With the greatest respect, his Lordship has, in these observations, very clearly and succinctly laid down the true principle as well as the reasons therefor. 13. In another decision of the Court of Appeal, Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd. v. Wednesbury, Corporation (1947) 2 All ER 680. Lord Greene, M. R. has sta ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e whether that state of facts exists, and, it they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned, and it will be held that they have acted without jurisdiction. But there is another state of things which may exist. The legislature may instruct the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or do something more, When the legislature are establishing such a tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider, whatever jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision for otherwise there will be none. In the second of the two cases I have mentioned it is an erroneous application of the formula to say that the tribunal cannot give themselves jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist, because the legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine all the facts, including the existence of the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends; and if they were given jurisdiction so to decide, without any ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y person or any property which ought to have been entered, or any property which has become liable to taxation after the publication of the assessment list under Section 116; (b) by substituting therein for the name of the owner or occupier of any holding the name of any other person who has succeeded by transfer or otherwise to the ownership or occupation of the holding; (c) by enhancing the valuation of, or assessment on, any holding which has been incorrectly valued or assessed by reason of fraud, misrepresentation or mistake; (d) by revaluing or re-assessing any holding the value of which has been increased by additions or alterations to buildings; If the provisions of Clause (c) are analysed, it becomes apparent that the jurisdiction vested in the municipality is that of altering or amending the assessment list by enhancing the valuation of, or assessment on, any holding . This is conditioned upon the existence of two preliminary facts, viz., (1) that the holding has been incorrectly valued or assessed; and (2) that the incorrect valuation or assessment has been made by reason of fraud, misrepresentation or mistake. 18. The learned Advocate General has argued ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to them as examples. In order to enable the municipality to act under Clause (a) and to enter in the assessment list the name of any person or property, the existence of one of two facts is absolutely necessary. Those facts are that (1) the name or property ought to have been entered or (2) the property has become liable to taxation after the publication of the assessment list under Section 115. If neither of these facts exists, the municipality cannot exercise its jurisdiction to enter the name of any person or property in the assessment list under Clause (a). If the municipality imposes a tax upon any person or property on an incorrect decision on these facts it is obvious that the aggrieved person will be entitled to seek redress from the Civil Court against an illegal taxation. 21. The position relating to the exercise of power under Clause (b) is the same. The jurisdiction under that clause is to substitute a person's name in place of that of the owner or occupier. This is dependant upon the fact of succession of the substitute by transfer or otherwise to the ownership or occupation of the holding. That is a jurisdictional fact. Supposing that A is the rightful owner ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... was illegal and for restraining the municipality from realising it. Manohar Lall, J. held that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to enquire whether the plaintiffs were occupiers of a holding, as the jurisdiction of the municipality to assess them depended upon the decision on that fact. His Lordship further stated that the Commissioners could not give themselves jurisdiction to assess a person who is not an occupier by a wrong decision on facts. Beevor, J. said that it was only in view of the cursus curiae that he agreed that the Civil Court had jurisdiction in that case to decide the question of validity of the assessment. 25. In ILR 24 Pat 668 : (AIR 1946 Pat 167), it was argued that Section 119 of the Act barred a suit in which an assessment by the municipality was questioned. Fazl Ali, C.J., with whom Ray, J. agreed, however, repelled this argument and said; Where the whole assessment is ultra vires the assessee can always bring a suit for a declaration that the assessment is not binding upon him . In ILR 28 Pat 276 : AIR 1951 Pat 536 the question was whether an increase in the valuation and assessment of a holding by the municipality, acting under Clause (d) of Se ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e in which the Houso Controller, acting under Section 9 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947, directed the tenant to make necessary repairs to the house in question and to deduct the cost of repairs from the rent. The question was whether the Civil Court could entertain a suit for declaration that the Controller's order was ultra vires and for an injunction restraining the tenant from making repairs in pursuance of the order. Rai Brij Raj Krishna's case was relied upon by the lower Courts in support of the proposition that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction. My Lord the Chief Justice and Raj Kishore Prasad, J. distinguished Brij Raj Krishna's case, AIR 1951 SC 115, and said that the Controller's jurisdiction to pass the order depended upon the preliminary condition that the landlord had failed to make the repairs which he was bound to make to the building . Their Lordships held that the Civil Court could enquire into the correctness of the Controller's finding on the preliminary condition in order to decide whether there was a lack of jurisdiction in him. 28. The Supreme Court distinguished Brij Raj Krishna's case, AIR ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... which it would not otherwise possess...... 31. A Bench of this Court dealt with an application for a writ of certiorari in Chandreshwari Prasad Narain Deo v. State of Bihar, MANU/BH/0026/1956MANU/BH/0026/1956 : AIR 1956 Pat 104. Acting under Section 4(h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, a Sub-divisional Officer had, in that case, cancelled the khorposh grants which stood in favour of the petitioners. Under the provisions of that section, the Collector could annul a transfer, if he was satisfied that such transfer was made at any time after the first day of January, 194(3 with the object of defeating any provisions of this Act or causing loss to the State or obtaining higher compensation thereunder . The Sub-divisional Officer concerned held, after hearing the parties, that the khorposh grants to the petitioners had been made with the object of defeating the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act and also for obtaining higher compensation. It is to be noticed that the words used in the section gave power to the Officer to act if he was satisfied about the preliminary facts. Ramaswami, J. (as my Lord the Chief Justice then was) delivered the judgment of the Bench, an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... above three cases when a tribunal with limited jurisdiction has acted beyond its powers or has given itself jurisdiction on the basis of a wrong decision on collateral or jurisdictional facts, 34. On a review of the decisions referred to above, I hold that the point under consideration has been rightly decided in the cases of ILR 23 Pat 862: (AIR 1945 Pat 153 : ILR 28 Pat 276: (AIR 1951 Pat 536) and that the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1951 SC 115 (supra) does not, in any way, affect their authority. The observations of Fazl Ali C J in ILR 24 Pat 668 : (AIR 1946 Pat 167), which I have quoted, are also, if I may say so with great respect, perfectly correct. The Courts below acted within their jurisdiction in investigating the correctness of the Special Officer's decision on jurisdictional facts upon which his power to enhance the valuation or assessment of the holding in question under Section 107(1)(c) depended. They have found that there was no fraud or misrepresentation, and that there was no incorrect valuation at the time of the general assessment. Hence, the Special Officer had no jurisdiction to enhance the valuation or assessment. In view of this finding, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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