TMI Blog1963 (4) TMI 104X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eposited into Court on December 19, 1951. The appeal by the plaintiffs was allowed by the Subordinate Judge. The unsuccessful defendants preferred a second appeal to the High Court, but meanwhile the plaintiffs made an application for withdrawing the amount deposited in the Court. By virtue of interim orders passed by the Court they were granted liberty to withdraw the sum pending disposal of the second appeal in the High Court filed by the defendants on furnishing security of immovable property. This security was furnished and the withdrawal was ordered. A cheque petition E.A. 250 of 1952 was accordingly filed which was allowed and thereafter a cheque was issued in favour of the Advocate - the appellant before us - for ₹ 1,452/4/-, this being the sum remaining to the credit of the plaintiffs after deduction of poundage etc. It was admitted that this cheque was cashed by the appellant on April 23, 1953. The appellant did not dispute that he cashed this cheque on behalf of his clients or that the latter was entitled to be paid this sum and the charge of professional misconduct against the appellant was that the Advocate had not made this payment in spite of demands but that on ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hment of suspension from practice, as stated earlier. The appellant then applied and obtained leave of this court - special leave under Art. 136 to challenge the correctness of these findings and that is how the matter is before us. 5. Before proceeding further we desire to indicate the nature of the jurisdiction of this Court in such matters and in broad outline the principles which it would observe in dealing with them. The jurisdiction exercised by the High Court in cases of professional misconduct is neither civil nor criminal as these expressions are used in Arts. 133 and 134 of the Constitution. In one aspect it is a jurisdiction over an officer of the Court and the Advocate owes a duty to the Court apart from his duty to his clients. In another aspect it is a statutory power and we would add a duty vested in the Court under s. 10 of the Bar Councils Act to ensure that the highest standards of professional rectitude are maintained, so that the Bar can render its expert service to the public in general and the litigants in particular and thus discharge its main function of co-operating with the judiciary in the administration of justice according to law. This task which is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ther there has or has not been a consultation is one of fact and if this point had been raised in the High Court we would have information as to whether there had been such consultation or not, and if not why there was none. Even when the appellant applied to the High Court for a certificate of fitness under Art. 133(1)(c) this objection was not suggested as a ground upon which the validity of the proceedings would be impugned. In these circumstances we are not disposed to entertain this objection which rests wholly upon a question of fact. The fact that in the order of reference of the proceedings under s. 10(2) to the District Judge there is no explicit statement that the Bar Council had previously been consulted is not decisive on the point. There would be a presumption of regularity in respect of official and judicial acts and it would be for the party who challenges such regularity to plead and prove his case. 7. It was next contended that the complaint filed by the respondents on the basis of which action was taken against the appellant was not shown to have been signed by them, nor properly verified by them as required by the rules of the High Court. We consider this obje ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ies who appeared before him and affixed the signatures in three places in the complaint before him. It is because of these circumstances that we have stated that this objection was most frivolous. It is only necessary to add that seeing that the High Court is competent to initiate these proceedings suo motu under s. 10(2) the point raised is wholly without substance. 10. The next submission of learned Counsel was that as in substance the charge against the appellant was misappropriation of money belonging to the clients, the learned Judges of the High Court should have left the complainants to their remedy of prosecuting the appellant and should not have proceeded to deal with him under s. 10 of the Bar Councils Act. In support of this submission learned Counsel referred to us in particular to two decisions of the Calcutta High Court reported in Chandi Charan Mitter, a Pleader, In re (1920) I.L.R. 47 Cal. 1115, and Emperor v. Satish Chandra Singha I.L.R. (1927) 54 Cal. 721. 11. We do not consider that the case before us furnishes an occasion for any exhaustive review of the decisions upon the subject or formulating finally the principles which govern the exercise of the discr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the present case. It is sufficient to extract the head-note to the report of the decision in Chandi Charan Mitter (1920) I.L.R. 47 Cal. 1115, indicate that it bears no analogy to the case now on hand. The relevant portion of the head-note reads : Where the misconduct alleged has no direct connection with the conduct of the pleader in his practical and immediate relation to the court, ordinarily, there should be a trial and conviction for criminal misconduct before disbarment will be ordered. 13. The charge against the practitioner in that case related to a matter which had nothing to do with his relationship to his clients, or the court, and in the circumstances it was held that the direction would be properly exercised if the initiation of professional misconduct proceedings awaited the result of the prosecution. It is obvious that the case before us is far different. Emperor v. Satish Chandra Singha I.L.R. (1927) 54 Cal. 721, was also a similar case. The charge against the practitioner was of forging court records by interpolating some words in an original plaint. 14. In the case now before us, however, the misconduct charged is intimately connected with and arises ou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Judge who conducted the inquiry or before the High Court when the report of the District Judge was considered. We have ourselves examined the record and find that there is no basis for any suggestion that any prejudice had occurred by reason of the order in which the witnesses were examined. 17. It was then suggested that one of the plaintiffs - Kagga Veeraiah - had himself admitted in his evidence before the District Judge that he and others had received the proceeds of the cheque which the appellant had cashed and that in the face of this admission the learned Judges of the High Court were clearly wrong in finding that the appellant had failed to pay over the money to his clients. A few facts have to be mentioned to appreciate this contention as well as the answer to it. As stated earlier, there were four plaintiffs in the suit - O.S. 432 of 1951 and plaintiffs 1 to 3 are the complainants - now respondents 1 to 3 before us. The fourth plaintiff was one Kagga Veeraiah. It was the case of the appellant that this money was paid to all the four plaintiffs i.e., was paid to the plaintiffs when all the four of them were present. It was the case of the complainants that Kagga Veerai ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... raiah was dead and if he was not, whether C.W. 7 was Kagga Veeraiah. The admissions that this witness made and the ignorance that he displayed about the proceedings in the suit stamped him as a witness of untruth and the learned Judges correctly characterised his evidence as devoid of even a modicum of truth. The appellant cannot therefore rely on any admission on the part of this witness as evidence of the plaintiffs having received the sum which was admittedly in his hands. 18. Lastly, it was urged that the order directing the suspension of the appellant for a period of five years was too severe and that we should reduce the period of suspension even on the basis that the charge against the appellant be held to be established. We can only express surprise that Counsel should have made bold to make this submission. The appellant had got into his hands a considerable sum of money belonging to his clients and, on the finding of the High Court, had failed to pay it back when demanded. Not content with this he had put forward a false defence of payment and had even sought to sustain his defence by suborning witnesses. In the circumstances, even if the learned Judges of the High C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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