TMI Blog1947 (7) TMI 10X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... costs. LORD WRIGHT―The issue in this case is whether the appellant society is entitled to exemption from income tax under Section 37 of the Income Tax Act, 1918, on the ground that it is a body established for charitable purposes only. The year of charge is the year ending April 5, 1943, and the subject is the appellants' invested income aggregating ? 2,876 15s. 7d. The Special Commissioners before whom the matter came felt bound to allow the claim on the authority of Re Foveaux, Cross v. London Anti-Vivisection Society , in which Chitty, J., had held that the society was a charity, though they would, apart from authority, have held that on balance the object of the society, so far from being for the public benefit, was gravely injurious thereto and therefore that the society could not be regarded as a charity. They also on the ground of the same authority rejected the argument that the society could not claim to he a charity, because the alteration of the law by means of legislation was a main object of the society. That decision was reversed by the revenue judge, Mac- naghten, J., and his decision was affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeal, by a majority, the Mas ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ecision of the court on all the materials before it. Charitable in this context has reference to charit- able in the legal sense. Charity indeed is here a word of art of precise and technical meanings. From very early times the decision was the function of the court. Thus rules grew around the very sketchy list in the Statute of Elizabeth (43 Eliz. c. 4). Judicial precedents were established. An early attempt to simplify the problem by a classification under main heads was the summary under four heads submitted by Sir Samuel Romilly (then Mr. Romilly) arguing in Morice v. Durham (Bishop) . These heads were, first, relief of the indigent, second, ad- vancement of learning, third, the advancement of religion, fourth, which is the most difficult, the advancement of objects of general public utility. This classification substantially was adopted by Lord Mac- naghten about eight-five years later in his famous list of charitable purposes in Commissioner for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v. Pemsel , which is too familiar to call for quotation here. The noble and learned Lords had emphasised that he was discussing the legal meaning of charity; like Sir Samuel Romilly he remarked on ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... itty, J. The headnote is simply Societies for the suppression and abolition of vivisection are charities within the legal definition of the terms charity. The particular societies in question were either the predecessors of the present appel- lant or were substantially identical for all relevant purposes. The ob- ject as started by Chitty, J., was the total suppression of the practice of vivisection. At the time when the decision was given an Act entitled the Cruelty to Animals Act, 1876, was in force; that Act made it unlawful and an offence to perform on a living animal any experiment calculated to give pain except subject to the restrictions imposed by the Act. One provision was that the particular experiment was to be performed with a view to the advancement by new discovery of phy- siological knowledge or of knowledge which will be useful for saving or prolonging life or alleviating suffering. It was general required by the Act that the animals should be under a sufficient anesthetic save in special circumstance in which case a certificate was necessary un- der stringent conditions and experimenters were to hold a license. This Act has remained in force since then. Its rep ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... opinion of the donor of a gift or the creator of a trust that the gift or trust is for the public benefit does not make it so, the matter is one to be determined by the court on the evidence before it. Russell, J., rejected the contention on the lines of the vies expressed in Re Cranston, Webb v. Oldfield , and by Chitty, J., in Re Foveaux . Russell, J. clearly defined his opinion: If a testator by stating or indicating his view that a trust is beneficial to the public can indicating his view that a trust is trusts might be established in perpetuity for the promotion of all kinds of fantastic (though not unlawful) objects, of which the training of poodles to dance might be a mild example. In my opinion, the question whether a gift is or may be operative for the public bene- fit is a question to be answered by the court by forming an opinion upon the evidence before it . I accept these observations as cor- rectly stating the law. They were in fact adopted by the majority of the Court of Appeal in the next case I shall cite which is an animal case; it is Re Grove-Grady, Plowden v. Lawrence#. It is sufficient here to record that the purpose of the society contemplated by the trus ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o cruelty. Much that was said in that case clear- ly went too far. The emphasis of the actual decision, however, was that the moral benefit to mankind consisted is promoting feelings of kindness towards animals and thus promoting feelings of humanity and morality generally; the limitation of the doctrine took animals use- ful to man which was prominent in the earlier of the animal cases, London University v. Yarrow , was lost sight of or at least had fallen into the background in view of the wider and less specific doctrine of moral improvement, which was held to satisfy the requirement of benefit to the community under the fourth head of Lord Macnaghten's classification. It was held to be present in Re Wedgwood , but absent in Re Grove-Grady , but in neither case was it ignored. I do not intend to make a complete anthology of the animal cases, but I must refer shortly to the most important of the Irish cases on gifts for the benefit of animals, namely, Re Cranston#, a decision of the Irish Court of Appeal. There the bequest was in favour of a vega- tarian society, whose purpose was to stop the killing of animals for food, which was condemned as being inconsistent with the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... onor as a sufficient test that the gift was charitable. That is vital. He was wrong in holding that he could stand neutral and not decide, on the facts before him, the question whether the gift was for the public benefit. If he stood neutral he could not decide in favour of one side and against the other side. He was inconsistent in holding that the gift was charitable while at the same time refusing to decide whether it was for the public benefit: unless he so decided in favour of the gift he could not decide that it was charitable. If he was not satisfied that the propaganda and expenditure for the suppression of vivisection were beneficial to the community, he could not hold that the activities of the society were charitable or that the society was entitled to exemption from income tax under Section 37 of the Income Tax Act, 1918, or to the benefit of a perpetuity. He was also wrong in deciding that he could not weigh against each other the detriment inseparable from suppressing vivisection the one had and on the other hand the benefit to the community of higher moral standards said to be due to enhanced regard for the well being of animals. There is no, so far as I can see, any ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the unfortunate deer. The subject of vivisection is not a consenting party not does it benefit. But I put against that the benefit to humanity. It has been argued that a court cannot weigh moral and material benefits against each other. This is not the place to accept or reject Bentham's pronouncement that measure of measure pushpin is as good as poetry or debate whether utilitarian or intuitionist ethics is the truer theory. But in ordinary life people often have to decide between a moral and a material benefit. However, I do not think that is a fair statement of the issue. The scientist who inflicts pain in the course of vivisection is fulfilling a moral duty to mankind which is higher in degree than the moralist or sentimentalist who thinks only of the animals. Nor do I agree that animals ought not to be sacrificed to man when necessary. A strictly regulated amount of pain to some hundreds of animals may save and avert incalculable suffering to in- numerable millions of mankind. I cannot doubt what the moral choice should be. There is only one single issue. I have great sympathy with much that the Master of the Rolls has said in his powerful dissenting judgment. I hav ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d its funds, exiguous as they are, permit. Apart from the animal cases I cannot find any precedent for such an object being held charitable. On the other hand, the vivisectionists, who are attacked, can fairly claim that their purpose is charitable and would generally be so recognised either under the fourth head of the accepted classification or under the head of advancement of learning. I think that the whole tendency of the concept of charity in a legal sense under the fourth head is towards tangible and objective benefits and at least that the approval by the common understanding of enlightened opinion for the time being is necessary before an intangible benefit can be taken to constitute a sufficient benefit to the community to justify admission of the object into the fourth class. By this test the claim of the appellant society would fail. But there is another and essentially different ground on which in my opinion it must fail; that is because its object is to secure legisla- tion to give legal effect to it. It is, in my opinion, a political purpose within the meaning of Lord Parker's pronouncement in Bowman v. Secular Society, Ltd. Lord Parker was discussing in a d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... issioners held that the alteration of the law by means of legislation is a main purpose of the society, but the repeal of the Act of Parliament, i.e., 39 40 Vict. c.77―[the Cruelty to Ani- mals Act, 1876, which I have referred to above] was undoubtedly part of the society's object in 1895. They accordingly felt bound to follow Chitty, J., on this point as they had done on the first point. Your Lordships are not bound by the judgment of Chitty, J., and I prefer the reasoning on the point of Rowlatt, J., in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Temperance Council of the Christian Churches in England and Wales , Rowlatt, J., held in respect of the respondent in that appeal that the purpose was not charitable, but political within the meaning of the principle stated by Lord Parker. He held that legis- lation occupied the greater part of the filed in the description of the objects of the respondent. He held that any purpose of influencing legislation is a political purpose in this connection on the clear authori- ties: that the respondent's direct purpose was to effect changes in the law and that was not a charitable purpose. He distinguished what he called the anti-vivis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g a specific limitation on the extent of the legal definition of charitable trusts. There are in this case stronger grounds than Lord Parker contemplat- ed in his broader statement of principle for the court declining to say that a gift to secure the change is a charitable gift. I should dismiss the appeal. LORD PORTER.―The question what is or is not a charity is always a difficult problem, partly, I think, owing to the fact that the meaning now attributed to the words is derived from the preamble to the Act of Elizabeth, which though the Act itself has been repealed has been re- enacted and gives a kind of example of the class of matters then held to be charitable. From this beginning legal decisions have extended the meaning of the word to many matters which would not originally have been included. But the difficulty does not lie in the origin of the doctrine alone. It is, I think, inherent in the subject-matter under consideration. Whether any two persons would agree in all cases as to what charity should include is at least doubtful. It is not the law but the diversity of subjects which creates the difficulty. A step towards a closer definition was, however, reach ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... olitical objects are not charitable, and (2) whether the finding that any assumed public benefit in the direction of morals and education is far outweighed by the detriment to medical science and research and consequently to the public health which would result if the society succeeded in achieving its object and that on balance, the object of the society so far from being for the pub- lic benefit is gravely injurious thereto is a finding of fact as a result of which your Lordships ought to hold that the objects of the society are not charitable. Before dealing with the first question I would desire to point out that read strictly the second finding would appear to contract moral and educational advancement with the public health and so to contract and ethical with a material benefit. It was, however, strenuously and, I think, successfully urged by the respondents that this was not an accurate summing up of the position. The object of curing human or even animal illness and suffering itself aims at a moral end and the question is not fairly stated as a conflict between material and moral benefits, but, as counsel on the part of this appellants was prepared to accepts, as counsel ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the enactment of the factory Acts or the abolition of the use of boy labour to sweep chimneys, would be charitable so long as the supporters of these objects had not in mind, or at any rate did not advocate, a change in the laws, but became political and therefore non-charitable if they did so. To take such a view would to me be to neglect substance for form. The object was to stop slavery or the use of boy chimney sweeps, and to ensure that certain minimum requirements were carried out in factories. All this could be done by common consent, though no doubt the only effective method would be to alter the law. But persuasion, not force, was a possible means of effecting the desired purpose. So in the case of members of the Anti-Vivisection Society a con- ceiveable though a very unlikely way of effective its purpose would be to persuaded mankind to cease from experiments on animals, and it is possible that its members would prefer success by that means, though I have no doubt they would frankly admit that they saw no possibility of such an event. They would not, however, be asking anyone to break the law by refraining from vivisection. Their primary object, as I see it, is to prev ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ould only be differed from with great diffidence and it is therefore necessary to con- sider their exact bearing in the cases in which they are found. One thing is certain and was not contested by counsel-the inten- tion of the donor in making the gift cannot affect the result. The question must be judged independently of his idea of what is or is not charitable, but undoubtedly, as has been pointed out more than once, a gift for the protection of animals is prima facie at any rate a good charitable gift. It is enough in this connection to refer to the obser- vations of Swinfen Eady, L.J., in Re Wedgwood . Such a gift then being prima facie charitable must remain charitable unless its charit- able nature is taken away because on the whole it does more harm than good in the eyes of some tribunal authorised to determine that question. Chitty, J., as I understand him said in Re Foveaux , that that question was not one which the tribunal of fact was entitled to decide. The court or the Commissioners, as the case may be, were authorised to determine whether the object was one of a class which was or had been held to be charitable, i.e., whether it was one of a class which prima facie ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... charitable or not and decides that it has no effect and adds: In my opinion the ques- tion whether a gift is or may be for the benefit of the public is a ques- tion to be answered by the court by forming an opinion upon the evidence before it. It will be observed that the opinion which the court has to form is as to whether the gift is or may be for the benefit of the public, not as to whether on the balance of evidence the scale inclines one way or the other. If the latter were the true meaning I do not know why the words or may be were added. The phra- seology is at least capable of the interpretation that the court has to de- termine whether the gift comes within the category of things bene- ficial to the public not whether on balance the tribunal holds that the disadvantages attached to it outweigh its benefits. Re Grove-Grady was concerned with this very point, viz., was the gift in question within that class which could be held to be a charity. The Court of Appeal differing from Romer, J., held by a majority that it could not because there was no benefit to the com- munity in a devise to form a reserve for animals of all kinds wild or tame free from the interference o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e two views whether on balance the gift is beneficial to the community or not? Yet if the argument be that the tribunal is to make up its mind on the evidence called before it, I cannot see where it can stop short of determining the matter on the ordinary principles upon which courts act in deciding upon a conflict of evidence, nor can I see any method of determining what preponderance of weight is to incline the scale sufficiently to one side or the other. This view is, I think, in accordance with the opinion of Sir John Romilly, M.R., in Thornton v. Howe (the Joanna Southcote Case) when he says (inter alia): If the tendency were not immoral and al- though this court might consider the opinions sought to be propagated, foolish or even devoid of foundation, it would not on that account... take it out of the class of legacies which are included in the general terms 'charitable bequests'. Undoubtedly the object must not be a mere fad or contrary to public policy, but no argument against the claim of the society was presented to your Lordships on either of these points, and fads can be dealt with by the method suggested by Ken- nedy, L.J., in Re Wedgwood . In my view t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sed to such experiments as caused pain and suffering to the animals, but we find it difficult to re- concile this evidence with the statements contained in the literature produced by the society, or indeed with the speeches of Dr. Fielding- Ould, as reported in 'The Animals 'Defender', a paper of which he is the editor. We are satisfied that the members of the society are actuated by an intense love of animals, and that the work of the society is to a large extent directed towards the prevention of cruelty to animals. Part of its propaganda literature is directed towards inculcating a love of animals in the young. A number of very distinguished men were called as witnesses by the Crown with the object of proving the great benefits which had ac- crued to the public by reason of the medical and scientific knowledge which had been obtained through experiments on living animals. We think it has been proved conclusively that:- (a) a large amount of present-day medical and scientific know- ledge is due to experiments on living animals; (b) many valuable cures for and preventives of disease have been discovered and perfected by means of experiments on livi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the courts below. It is mentioned only in the judgment of the learned Master of the Rolls. As will appear in the course of this opinion, it is worthy of more serious debate. The second point is fundamental. It is at the very root of the law of charity as administered by the Court of Chancery and its successor, the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice. It is whether the court, for the purpose of determining whether the object of the society is charitable, may disregard the finding of fact that any assumed public benefit in the direction of the advancement of morals and education was far outweighed by the detriment to medical science and research and consequently to the public health which would result if the society succeeded in achieving its object, and that on balance, the object of the society, so far from being for the public benefit, was gravely injurious thereto. The society says that the court must dis- regard this fact, arguing that evidence of disadvantages or evils which would or might result from the stopping of vivisection is irrelevant and inadmissible. Upon the first point the learned Master of the Rolls cites in his judgment a passage from the spe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... an alteration of the law, I ask whether that can be a charitable object, even if its purposes might otherwise be regarded as charitable. I see no reason for supposing that Lord Parker in the cited passage used the expression political objects in any narrow sense or was confining it to objects of acute political controversy. On the contrary he was, I think, propounding familiar doctrine, nowhere better stated than in a textbook, which has long been regarded as of high authority but appears not to have been cited for this purpose to the courts below (as it certainly was not to your Lordships), Thyssen's Charitable Bequests (1st ed.). The passage which is at page 176, is worth repeating at length: It is a common practice for a number of individuals amongst us to form an association for promoting some change in the law, and it is worth our while to consider the effect of a gift to such an association. It is clear that such an association is not of a charitable nature. However desirable the change may really be, the law could not stultify itself by holding that it was for the public benefit that the law itself should be changed. Each court in deciding on the validity of a gift mu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... argument. I do not regard Re Villers-Wilkes, Bower v. Goodman##, as a decision that a legacy which had for its main purpose the passing of such an Act is charitable. The second question raised in this appeal, which I have already tried to formulate, is of wider importance, and I must say at once that I cannot reconcile it with my conception of a Court of Equity that it should take under its care and administer a trust, however well inten- tioned its creator, the consequence of which would be calamitous to the community. I would not weary your Lordships with a historical excursion into the origin of the equitable jurisdiction in matters of charity, one of the heads of Equity as Lord Macnaghten called it in Pemsel's case###. Undoubtedly the favour shown by the civil law to gifts in piosusus had some part in it. So too had the conception, to which I have already referred, that the King as parens patriae took under his special care charitable gifts as he took also infants and lunatics. But, what- ever its origin, from the fact of its existence arose the necessity of definition. And so both before and after the statute of 43 Elizabeth it became the duty of the Court of Chan ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... has been presented to the House. It would be very relevant, if the society, conceding that the campaign against vivisection was not a charitable purpose, argued that there was yet a general charitable intention and that its funds were applicable to some other charitable purpose. That is not the argument. If it were, I should not entertain it, though it might in an earlier age have succeeded. This then being the position, that the court determined one by one whether particular named purposes were charitable, applying always the overriding test whether the purpose was for the public benefit, and that the King as parens patriae intervened pro bono public for the protection of charities, what room is there for the doctrine which has found favour with the learned Master of the Rolls and has been so vigorously supported at the Bar of the House, that the court may dis- regard the evils that will ensue from the achievement by the society of its ends? It is to me a strange and bewildering idea that the court must look so far and no further, must see a charitable purpose in the intention of the society to benefit animals and thus elevate the moral character of men, but must shut its ey ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by the learned judge was whether they were charities in the technical sense in which the term charity is used in law. That is the same question as that which your Lordships have to decide here. Chitty, J., decided that they were charities. His judgment concludes with these words: The purpose of these societies whether they are right or wrong in the opinions they hold is charitable in the legal sense of the term. The intention is to benefit the community: whether if they achieved their object, the community would in fact be benefited is a question on which I think the court is not required to express an opinion. The defendant socie- ties may be near the border line, but I think they are charities. These words, which appear to be in direct opposition to the passage that I have cited from the judgment of Russell, J., in effect repeat what Chitty, J., said earlier in his judgment: In determining this question of charity the court does not enter into or pronounce any opinion on the merits of the controversy which subsists between the supporters and opponents of the practice of vivisection. It stands neutral. In the passages that I have cited from the judgments of Chitty, J., an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the point. I see no reason why they should have done so, unless they held, as I invite your Lordships to hold, that injury to the community must be weighed with the ostensible charitable pur- pose of the society. The learned Master of the Rolls, from whose opinion upon a broad question of principle such as this is I differ with great reluctance, sup- ports his decision by reference to such cases as Att.-Gen. v. Marchant## and Re Campden Charities###. In the former case a testator had in the year 1640 left real estate upon trust to pay 50 per annum to four charitable objects, namely, 20 for the salary of a schoolmaster, 20 to a college for the purchase of books, and 5 each to the poor of two parishes with a direction that any deficiency should be borne rateably. It appears to have been assumed that any excess of the rents and pro- fits of the real estate over 50 was applicable for charitable purposes. There was in fact a substantial surplus and the question submitted to the court was whether it should be divided rateably between the charities named in the will or should be appropriated for the benefit of one or more of them to the exclusion of the others. Kindersley, V ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n. v. Marchant . There, too, a bequest had been made for the purchase of lands of the annual value of 10, half of which was to be applied towards the better relief of the most poor and needy people of good life and conversation in the parish of Kensington. The value of the lands so purchased had great- ly increased; so had the parish of Kensington. It became necessary to establish a scheme for the administration of the charity, and the Charity Commissioners did so. Taking the view expressed by Kinder- sley, V.―C., that doles to the poor were detrimental to the parish they in substance diverted to educational purposes a gift which was in part eleemosynary. The Court of Appeal held that they were entitled to do so. The habits of society , said Jessel, M.R. (50 L.J. Ch. at pp. 648, 649; 18 Ch. D. at pp. 324 and 327) have changed and not only men's ideas have changed but men's practices have changed, and in consequence of the change of ideas there has been a change of legislation: laws have become obsolete or have been absolutely repealed, and habits have become obsolete and have fallen into disuse, which were prevalent at the times when those wills were made , and, l ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... not depend on the view entertained by any individual 'either the judge who is to decide the question or by the person who makes the gift': In Re Cranston . The test is to be applied from evidence of the benefit to be derived by the public or a considerable section, though a wide divergence of opinion may exist as to the expediency or utility of what is accepted generally as beneficial. The Court must decide whether benefit to the community is established. The learned Master of the Rolls then expressly approved the passage that I have cited from the judgment of Russell, J., in Re Hummeltenberg . The same view is reiterated by that learned judge (Lord Justice Russell as he then was), In my opinion the court must determine in each case whether the trusts are such that benefit to the community must neces- sarily result from their execution. Counsel for the society sought to distinguish this case on the ground that the initial step was not there taken; there was not found to be any benefit to the community, so that no question arose of weighing advantage against disadvantage. In this view, presumably, however slight the benefit, the court must disregard injury however gre ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to the general law of the land, or to the principles of morality. Your Lordships see how inevitably some qualification slips in. Here we have the test of rationality, of conformity with the general law, of the principles of morality. These are tests which the court must examine and, so far as they depend on facts, come to a conclusion upon relevant evidence. I do not under- stand Fitzgibbon, L.J., to support the view of the appellant that, given a measure of public advantage, the public disadvantage can be ignored. Walker, L.J., appears more strongly to favour the appellant. The idea, he says, may be erroneous and may be visionary, but it was entertained honestly by the giver and her gift was designed for the benefit of mankind and I think it was charitable. I can hardly think that the learned Lord Justice intended to say that the honest opinion of a donor is conclusive. At least an exception must be made in the case of an illegal purpose or a purpose contrary to public policy. The question here, with which he did not purport to deal, is whether it is as fatal to the charitable nature of a gift that it is shown specifically to be to the public detriment as that it is regarded ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dealt at some length with the case of Re Cranston partly because it was relied on by the appellant, partly because it is, I think, one of the most important cases in this branch of the law of charity. I do not express any opinion whether it was rightly decided. Still less do I express an opinion whether upon such evidence as might to-day be available a similar conclusion would be reached. I use it for the purpose of emphasising a view, too often, I fear, reiterated, that the court must still in every case determine by reference to its special cir- cumstances whether or not a gift is charitable. What I have said is enough to conclude this case. But there is an important passage in the judgment of the Master of the Rolls which I ought not to ignore. I do not see , he says, how at this time of day it can be asserted that a particular exemplification of those objects is not beneficial merely because in that particular case the achievement of those objects would deprive mankind of certain consequential bene- fits however important those benefits may be. If this were not so, it would always be possible by adducing evidence which was not before the court on the original occasion to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... endeavoured to state it has reached this House. If your Lordships are satisfied that the law as laid down by Russell, J., (as he then was), in Re Hummeltenberg is correct, and the decision of this House confirms it, I believe that it will be a useful landmark in the history of the law of charity. LORD NORMAND.―The appellant society claims exemption from income tax on its investment income on the ground that it is a body of trustees established for charitable purposes only within the meaning of Section 37 of the Income Tax Act, 1918. The trust purposes are to be found in resolutions passed by a general meeting of the society held on July 31, 1897, and by the council on February 9, 1898. Of these resolutions the first declares that the object of the society is to awaken the conscience of mankind to the iniquity of torturing animals for any purpose whatever; to draw public attention to the impossibility of any adequate protection from torture being afforded to animals under the present law; and so to lead the people of this country to call upon Parliament totally to sup- press the practice of vivisection. By the second resolution, which is described as an explanatory reso ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tly avow an intention of inducing Parliament to pass new legislation if a favourable opportunity should arise of furthering their purpose by that means. A society for the prevention of cruelty to animals, for example, may include among its professed purposes amendments of the law dealing with field sports or with the taking of eggs or the like. Yet it would not in my view necessarily lose its right to be considered a charity, and if that right were questioned, it would become the duty of the court to decide whether the general purpose of the society was the improvement of morals by various lawful means including new legislation, all such means being subsidiary to the general charitable purpose. If the court answered this question in favour of the society, it would retain its privileges as a charity. But if the decision was that the leading pur- pose of the society was to promote legislation in order to bring about a change of policy towards field sports or the protection of wild birds, it would follow that the society should be classified as an association with political objects and that it would lose its privileges as a charity. The problem is, therefore, to discover the general p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ood, Public Trustee v. Hood , where it was held that, the main object of the gift being charitable, the gift was none the less valid because the testator had pointed out one of the means by which, in his opinion, the main object could best be attained and which in itself might not have been charitable if it had stood alone. But I regret that I cannot agree with the Master of the Rolls in limiting the scope of Lord Parker's words to matters of acute political controversy. Whether a project for new legislation excites acute political controversy may depend on the prudence and good management of the promoters. If they have patiently prepared the way by a gradual education of the public they may succeed in eliminating much of the opposition. But I cannot imagine that it is probable that a measure for the suppression of the kind of research which is impugned by the society would pass without acute controversy. It excites little or no controversy at pre- sent because the immediate prospects of its success are negligible, but, if the efforts of the society were to bring success near, acute and bitter controversy would, it is almost certain, become inevitable. But in my opinion it is n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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