9911796707
TMI Blog1947 (7) TMI 10X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... re move that this appeal be dismissed with costs. LORD WRIGHT―The issue in this case is whether the appellant society is entitled to exemption from income tax under Section 37 of the Income Tax Act, 1918, on the ground that it is a body established for charitable purposes only. The year of charge is the year ending April 5, 1943, and the subject is the appellants' invested income aggregating ? 2,876 15s. 7d. The Special Commissioners before whom the matter came felt bound to allow the claim on the authority of Re Foveaux, Cross v. London Anti-Vivisection Society , in which Chitty, J., had held that the society was a charity, though they would, apart from authority, have held that on balance the object of the society, so far from being for the public benefit, was gravely injurious thereto and therefore that the society could not be regarded as a charity. They also on the ground of the same authority rejected the argument that the society could not claim to he a charity, because the alteration of the law by means of legislation was a main object of the society. That decision was reversed by the revenue judge, Mac- naghten, J., and his decision was affirmed on appeal by the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or fund in charitable is a matter for the decision of the court on all the materials before it. "Charitable" in this context has reference to charit- able in the legal sense. Charity indeed is here a word of art of precise and technical meanings. From very early times the decision was the function of the court. Thus rules grew around the very sketchy list in the Statute of Elizabeth (43 Eliz. c. 4). Judicial precedents were established. An early attempt to simplify the problem by a classification under main heads was the summary under four heads submitted by Sir Samuel Romilly (then Mr. Romilly) arguing in Morice v. Durham (Bishop) . These heads were, first, relief of the indigent, second, ad- vancement of learning, third, the advancement of religion, fourth, which is the most difficult, the advancement of objects of general public utility. This classification substantially was adopted by Lord Mac- naghten about eight-five years later in his famous list of charitable purposes in Commissioner for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v. Pemsel , which is too familiar to call for quotation here. The noble and learned Lords had emphasised that he was discussing the legal meani ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y appears. Re Foveaux## was decided in 1895 by Chitty, J. The headnote is simply "Societies for the suppression and abolition of vivisection are charities within the legal definition of the terms charity." The particular societies in question were either the predecessors of the present appel- lant or were substantially identical for all relevant purposes. The ob- ject as started by Chitty, J., was the total suppression of the practice of vivisection. At the time when the decision was given an Act entitled "the Cruelty to Animals Act, 1876," was in force; that Act made it unlawful and an offence to perform on a living animal any experiment calculated to give pain except subject to the restrictions imposed by the Act. One provision was that the particular experiment was to be performed with a view to the advancement by new discovery of phy- siological knowledge or of knowledge which will be useful for saving or prolonging life or alleviating suffering. It was general required by the Act that the animals should be under a sufficient anesthetic save in special circumstance in which case a certificate was necessary un- der stringent conditions and experimenters were ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sion of Chitty, J.'s judgment is shortly expressed in the headnote, "The opinion of the donor of a gift or the creator of a trust that the gift or trust is for the public benefit does not make it so, the matter is one to be determined by the court on the evidence before it." Russell, J., rejected the contention on the lines of the vies expressed in Re Cranston, Webb v. Oldfield , and by Chitty, J., in Re Foveaux . Russell, J. clearly defined his opinion: "If a testator by stating or indicating his view that a trust is beneficial to the public can indicating his view that a trust is trusts might be established in perpetuity for the promotion of all kinds of fantastic (though not unlawful) objects, of which the training of poodles to dance might be a mild example. In my opinion, the question whether a gift is or may be operative for the public bene- fit is a question to be answered by the court by forming an opinion upon the evidence before it". I accept these observations as cor- rectly stating the law. They were in fact adopted by the majority of the Court of Appeal in the next case I shall cite which is an "animal" case; it is Re Grove-Grady, Plow ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ection and benefit and animals. It was hold to be valid on the ground that its was calculated to promote public morality by checking the innate tendency to cruelty. Much that was said in that case clear- ly went too far. The emphasis of the actual decision, however, was that the moral benefit to mankind consisted is promoting feelings of kindness towards animals and thus promoting feelings of humanity and morality generally; the limitation of the doctrine took animals use- ful to man which was prominent in the earlier of the animal cases, London University v. Yarrow , was lost sight of or at least had fallen into the background in view of the wider and less specific doctrine of moral improvement, which was held to satisfy the requirement of benefit to the community under the fourth head of Lord Macnaghten's classification. It was held to be present in Re Wedgwood , but absent in Re Grove-Grady , but in neither case was it ignored. I do not intend to make a complete anthology of the "animal" cases, but I must refer shortly to the most important of the Irish cases on gifts for the benefit of animals, namely, Re Cranston#, a decision of the Irish Court of Appeal. There ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... which have been treated as binding for generations." In my opinion Re Foveaux , was wrongly decided and should now be reversed. Chitty. J., was wrong in taking the intention of the donor as a sufficient test that the gift was charitable. That is vital. He was wrong in holding that he could stand neutral and not decide, on the facts before him, the question whether the gift was for the public benefit. If he stood neutral he could not decide in favour of one side and against the other side. He was inconsistent in holding that the gift was charitable while at the same time refusing to decide whether it was for the public benefit: unless he so decided in favour of the gift he could not decide that it was charitable. If he was not satisfied that the propaganda and expenditure for the suppression of vivisection were beneficial to the community, he could not hold that the activities of the society were charitable or that the society was entitled to exemption from income tax under Section 37 of the Income Tax Act, 1918, or to the benefit of a perpetuity. He was also wrong in deciding that he could not weigh against each other the detriment inseparable from suppressing vivisection the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... k, De motu cordis, because he has been given deer from the Royal park for purposes of vivisection. Countless millions have benefited from that discovery. I do not minimise the sufferings of the unfortunate deer. The subject of vivisection is not a consenting party not does it benefit. But I put against that the benefit to humanity. It has been argued that a court cannot weigh moral and material benefits against each other. This is not the place to accept or reject Bentham's pronouncement that "measure of measure pushpin is as good as poetry" or debate whether utilitarian or intuitionist ethics is the truer theory. But in ordinary life people often have to decide between a moral and a material benefit. However, I do not think that is a fair statement of the issue. The scientist who inflicts pain in the course of vivisection is fulfilling a moral duty to mankind which is higher in degree than the moralist or sentimentalist who thinks only of the animals. Nor do I agree that animals ought not to be sacrificed to man when necessary. A strictly regulated amount of pain to some hundreds of animals may save and avert incalculable suffering to in- numerable millions of mankin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the appellant cannot get in- to the class of charities at all unless it can establish that benefit. It if fails, it can still continue to carry on such lawful purposes as the members desire and its funds, exiguous as they are, permit. Apart from the "animal" cases I cannot find any precedent for such an object being held charitable. On the other hand, the vivisectionists, who are attacked, can fairly claim that their purpose is charitable and would generally be so recognised either under the fourth head of the accepted classification or under the head of advancement of learning. I think that the whole tendency of the concept of charity in a legal sense under the fourth head is towards tangible and objective benefits and at least that the approval by the common understanding of enlightened opinion for the time being is necessary before an intangible benefit can be taken to constitute a sufficient benefit to the community to justify admission of the object into the fourth class. By this test the claim of the appellant society would fail. But there is another and essentially different ground on which in my opinion it must fail; that is because its object is to secure legisl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... usurping the functions of the Legislature. I do not regard the statements of Lord Parker and Thyssen as inconsistent but as complimentary. In my opinion, the respondent's objection under this head is well founded. The Commissioners held that "the alteration of the law by means of legislation is a main purpose of the society, but the repeal of the Act of Parliament, i.e., 39 & 40 Vict. c.77―[the Cruelty to Ani- mals Act, 1876, which I have referred to above] was undoubtedly part of the society's object in 1895." They accordingly felt bound to follow Chitty, J., on this point as they had done on the first point. Your Lordships are not bound by the judgment of Chitty, J., and I prefer the reasoning on the point of Rowlatt, J., in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Temperance Council of the Christian Churches in England and Wales , Rowlatt, J., held in respect of the respondent in that appeal that the purpose was not charitable, but political within the meaning of the principle stated by Lord Parker. He held that legis- lation occupied the greater part of the filed in the description of the objects of the respondent. He held that any purpose of influencing legis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is lawful enough, by any legitimate or proper means. But it does prevent them from claiming the benefit of being immune from income tax, which would amount to receiving a subsidy from the State to that extent. Lord Parker was, I think, merely enunciating a specific limitation on the extent of the legal definition of charitable trusts. There are in this case stronger grounds than Lord Parker contemplat- ed in his broader statement of principle for the court declining to say that a gift to secure the change is a charitable gift. I should dismiss the appeal. LORD PORTER.―The question what is or is not a charity is always a difficult problem, partly, I think, owing to the fact that the meaning now attributed to the words is derived from the preamble to the Act of Elizabeth, which though the Act itself has been repealed has been re- enacted and gives a kind of example of the class of matters then held to be charitable. From this beginning legal decisions have extended the meaning of the word to many matters which would not originally have been included. But the difficulty does not lie in the origin of the doctrine alone. It is, I think, inherent in the subject-matter under cons ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on and (for that purpose) the repeal of the Cruelty to Animals Act, 1876, and the substitution of a new enactment prohibiting vivisection altogether" amounts took a finding that the society's object is political in the sense in which that words is used when it is said that political objects are not charitable, and (2) whether the finding that any assumed public benefit in the direction of morals and education is far outweighed by the detriment to medical science and research and consequently to the public health which would result if the society succeeded in achieving its object and that on balance, the object of the society so far from being for the pub- lic benefit is gravely injurious thereto is a finding of fact as a result of which your Lordships ought to hold that the objects of the society are not charitable. Before dealing with the first question I would desire to point out that read strictly the second finding would appear to contract moral and educational advancement with the public health and so to contract and ethical with a material benefit. It was, however, strenuously and, I think, successfully urged by the respondents that this was not an accurate summing ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d be induced to desist from these practices. It is in the narrower sense in which I think the phrase "purely political objects" is rightly used, i. e., as appli- cable to objects whose only means of attainment is a change in the law. I cannot accept the view that the anti-slavery campaign or the enactment of the factory Acts or the abolition of the use of boy labour to sweep chimneys, would be charitable so long as the supporters of these objects had not in mind, or at any rate did not advocate, a change in the laws, but became political and therefore non-charitable if they did so. To take such a view would to me be to neglect substance for form. The object was to stop slavery or the use of boy chimney sweeps, and to ensure that certain minimum requirements were carried out in factories. All this could be done by common consent, though no doubt the only effective method would be to alter the law. But persuasion, not force, was a possible means of effecting the desired purpose. So in the case of members of the Anti-Vivisection Society a con- ceiveable though a very unlikely way of effective its purpose would be to persuaded mankind to cease from experiments on animals, a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he then was, in Re Hummeltenberg# and the Court of Appeal of whom Russell, L.J., formed one in Re Grove- Grady##. Any observations of that learned judge whether in the court of first instance or the Court of Appeal or in your Lordships' House, even though not strictly an essential part of his decision, could only be differed from with great diffidence and it is therefore necessary to con- sider their exact bearing in the cases in which they are found. One thing is certain and was not contested by counsel-the inten- tion of the donor in making the gift cannot affect the result. The question must be judged independently of his idea of what is or is not charitable, but undoubtedly, as has been pointed out more than once, a gift for the protection of animals is prima facie at any rate a good charitable gift. It is enough in this connection to refer to the obser- vations of Swinfen Eady, L.J., in Re Wedgwood . Such a gift then being prima facie charitable must remain charitable unless its charit- able nature is taken away because on the whole it does more harm than good in the eyes of some tribunal authorised to determine that question. Chitty, J., as I understand him said in Re Fo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d a discretion as to the object to be included in the scheme and was under no obligation to perpetuate doles. There remains for consideration Lord Russell's two warnings. In Re Hummeltenberg he was discussing the question whether the inten- tion of the giver plays any part in making the object charitable or not and decides that it has no effect and adds: "In my opinion the ques- tion whether a gift is or may be for the benefit of the public is a ques- tion to be answered by the court by forming an opinion upon the evidence before it." It will be observed that the opinion which the court has to form is as to whether the gift is or may be for the benefit of the public, not as to whether on the balance of evidence the scale inclines one way or the other. If the latter were the true meaning I do not know why the words "or may be" were added. The phra- seology is at least capable of the interpretation that the court has to de- termine whether the gift comes within the category of things bene- ficial to the public not whether on balance the tribunal holds that the disadvantages attached to it outweigh its benefits. Re Grove-Grady was concerned with this very poi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nesses on the one side and on the other as to whether it is in fact beneficial. I can imagine the severest contest between two sets of witnesses in the case of a gift for a religious pur- pose, the one saying that it is most beneficial and the other that it is very harmful. Is the tribunal to make up its mind between these two views whether on balance the gift is beneficial to the community or not? Yet if the argument be that the tribunal is to make up its mind on the evidence called before it, I cannot see where it can stop short of determining the matter on the ordinary principles upon which courts act in deciding upon a conflict of evidence, nor can I see any method of determining what preponderance of weight is to incline the scale sufficiently to one side or the other. This view is, I think, in accordance with the opinion of Sir John Romilly, M.R., in Thornton v. Howe (the Joanna Southcote Case) when he says (inter alia): "If the tendency were not immoral and al- though this court might consider the opinions sought to be propagated, foolish or even devoid of foundation, it would not on that account... take it out of the class of legacies which are included in the general ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ain or not, and (for that purpose) the repeal of the Cruelty to Animals Act, 1876, and the sub- stitution of a new enactment prohibiting vivisection altogether. "Dr. Fielding-Ould in his evidence before us suggested that there were some experiments on living animals to which the society did not object, and that the society was only opposed to such experiments as caused pain and suffering to the animals, but we find it difficult to re- concile this evidence with the statements contained in the literature produced by the society, or indeed with the speeches of Dr. Fielding- Ould, as reported in 'The Animals 'Defender', a paper of which he is the editor. "We are satisfied that the members of the society are actuated by an intense love of animals, and that the work of the society is to a large extent directed towards the prevention of cruelty to animals. Part of its propaganda literature is directed towards inculcating a love of animals in the young. "A number of very distinguished men were called as witnesses by the Crown with the object of proving the great benefits which had ac- crued to the public by reason of the medical and scientific knowledge whic ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e already stated. Before I refer to the cases and to the judgments in the courts below I will state the two questions which appear to me to be raised in this appeal. The first and shorter point is whether a main purpose of the society is of such a political character that the court cannot regard it as charitable. To this point little attention was directed in the courts below. It is mentioned only in the judgment of the learned Master of the Rolls. As will appear in the course of this opinion, it is worthy of more serious debate. The second point is fundamental. It is at the very root of the law of charity as administered by the Court of Chancery and its successor, the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice. It is whether the court, for the purpose of determining whether the object of the society is charitable, may disregard the finding of fact that "any assumed public benefit in the direction of the advancement of morals and education was far outweighed by the detriment to medical science and research and consequently to the public health which would result if the society succeeded in achieving its object, and that on balance, the object of the society, so far from ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that vivisection is to be abolished? Abolition and suppression are words that connote some form of compulsion. It can only be by Act of Parliament that that element can be supplied. Upon this point I must with respect differ both from the learned Master of the Rolls and from Chitty, J., whose decision in Re Foveaux I shall later consider. Coming to the conclusion that it is a main object, if not the main object, of the society, to obtain an alteration of the law, I ask whether that can be a charitable object, even if its purposes might otherwise be regarded as charitable. I see no reason for supposing that Lord Parker in the cited passage used the expression "political objects" in any narrow sense or was confining it to objects of acute political controversy. On the contrary he was, I think, propounding familiar doctrine, nowhere better stated than in a textbook, which has long been regarded as of high authority but appears not to have been cited for this purpose to the courts below (as it certainly was not to your Lordships), Thyssen's Charitable Bequests (1st ed.). The passage which is at page 176, is worth repeating at length: "It is a common practice for a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... owlatt, J., as it was in Re Hood#. But in truth the reason of the thing appears to me so clear that I neither expect nor require much authority. I conclude upon this part of the case that a main object of the society is political and for that reason the society is not established for charitable purposes only. I would only add that I would reserve my opinion upon the hypothetical example of a private enabling Act, which was suggested in the course of the argument. I do not regard Re Villers-Wilkes, Bower v. Goodman##, as a decision that a legacy which had for its main purpose the passing of such an Act is charitable. The second question raised in this appeal, which I have already tried to formulate, is of wider importance, and I must say at once that I cannot reconcile it with my conception of a Court of Equity that it should take under its care and administer a trust, however well inten- tioned its creator, the consequence of which would be calamitous to the community. I would not weary your Lordships with a historical excursion into the origin of the equitable jurisdiction in matters of charity, one of the "heads of Equity" as Lord Macnaghten called it in Pemsel's ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... religion (then regarded as an illegal purpose) for the benefit of the Foundling Hospital, and in Cary v. Abbot Sir W. Grant, M.R., directed that the residue of an estate, which had been bequeathed for the instruction of children in the Roman Catholic faith, should be applied as the King by Sign Mannual should direct. I refer to this doctrine in a brief re- view of the equitable jurisdiction only because, as I think, it has been the cause of some confusion in the argument which has been presented to the House. It would be very relevant, if the society, conceding that the campaign against vivisection was not a charitable purpose, argued that there was yet a general charitable intention and that its funds were applicable to some other charitable purpose. That is not the argument. If it were, I should not entertain it, though it might in an earlier age have succeeded. This then being the position, that the court determined "one by one" whether particular named purposes were charitable, applying always the overriding test whether the purpose was for the public benefit, and that the King as parens patriae intervened pro bono public for the protection of charities, what room i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o be answered by the court by forming an opinion upon the evidence before it." This statement of that very learned judge follows immediately upon some observations on the cases of Re Foveaux and Re Cranston , which were the mainstay of the appellant's argu- ment. In Re Foveaux a testatrix had bequeathed legacies to two socie- ties, described briefly by Chitty, J., as the two defendant anti-vivisec- tion societies, one of them being the appellant society under the name which it then bore. The question as stated by the learned judge was whether they were charities in the technical sense in which the term "charity" is used in law. That is the same question as that which your Lordships have to decide here. Chitty, J., decided that they were charities. His judgment concludes with these words: "The purpose of these societies whether they are right or wrong in the opinions they hold is charitable in the legal sense of the term. The intention is to benefit the community: whether if they achieved their object, the community would in fact be benefited is a question on which I think the court is not required to express an opinion. The defendant socie- ties may be near ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t, the defend- ant societies could fairly claim to be in the heart of the province of charity. If the learned judge had a doubt, it could only have been due to the passing thought that perhaps result as well as intention was material. It is worthy of notice that the same doubt, so strong indeed that final opinion was reserved, was entertained by Cotton, Lindley and Bowen, L.JJ., in Re Douglas#. In that case it was unnecessary to determine whether the same anti-vivisection society in its then form was a charity. But the learned Lord Justices expressly reserved their opinion upon the point. I see no reason why they should have done so, unless they held, as I invite your Lordships to hold, that injury to the community must be weighed with the ostensible charitable pur- pose of the society. The learned Master of the Rolls, from whose opinion upon a broad question of principle such as this is I differ with great reluctance, sup- ports his decision by reference to such cases as Att.-Gen. v. Marchant## and Re Campden Charities###. In the former case a testator had in the year 1640 left real estate upon trust to pay £ 50 per annum to four charitable objects, namely, £ 20 for t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... charitable in 1866; therefore the court declined to give effect to it in regard to surplus revenues. It does not follow from this that, if in 1640 the court had thought that nothing could be more detrimental to a parish than such doles, it would nevertheless have supported the gift as a good charitable gift. The case of Re Campden Charities is an authority of some im- portance in a difficult branch of the law of charity relating to the cy- pres application of charitable funds and the jurisdiction of the Charity Commissioners and it is often cited in that connection. Substantially the same question had arisen an in Att.-Gen. v. Marchant . There, too, a bequest had been made for the purchase of lands of the annual value of £ 10, half of which was to be applied towards the better relief of the most poor and needy people of good life and conversation in the parish of Kensington. The value of the lands so purchased had great- ly increased; so had the parish of Kensington. It became necessary to establish a scheme for the administration of the charity, and the Charity Commissioners did so. Taking the view expressed by Kinder- sley, V.―C., that doles to the poor were detrimen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ich should have as one of its objects the acquisition of land for the provision of refuges for the preservation of "all animals birds or other creatures not human." The Court of Appeal by a majority held that the trust not having been shown to be for purposes beneficial to the community was not a good and valid charitable trust. It is instructive to see why not. Hanworth, M.R., thus states the law. Having formulated the test in the two familiar questions is the trust for a purpose beneficial to the community, if it satisfies that first test, is it charitable, he then asks, "Who is to decide these questions? I agree with Holmes, L.J., that the answer does not depend on the view entertained by any individual 'either the judge who is to decide the question or by the person who makes the gift': In Re Cranston . The test is to be applied from evidence of the benefit to be derived by the public or a considerable section, though a wide divergence of opinion may exist as to the expediency or utility of what is accepted generally as beneficial. The Court must decide whether benefit to the community is established." The learned Master of the Rolls then expressly a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the test of charitable purpose was satisfied. Fitzgibbon, L.J., uses words ([1898] 1 Ir.R. at p. 446) which I think it worth citing at length. "What," he says, "is the tri- bunal which is to decide whether the object is a beneficent one? It cannot be the individual mind of a judge, for he may disagree, toto coelo, from the testator as to what is or is not beneficial. On the other hand it cannot be the vox populi, for charities have been upheld for the benefit of insignificant sects and of peculiar people. It seems to me that the answer must be that the benefit must be one which the founder believes to be of public advantage and his belief must be at least rational, and not contrary either to the general law of the land, or to the principles of morality." Your Lordships see how inevitably some qualification slips in. Here we have the test of rationality, of conformity with the general law, of the principles of morality. These are tests which the court must examine and, so far as they depend on facts, come to a conclusion upon relevant evidence. I do not under- stand Fitzgibbon, L.J., to support the view of the appellant that, given a measure of public advantage, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r. I think there is no analogy between a practice such as this, pursued by only a few individuals attended with the severest suffering and productive of very doubtful benefit, and the universal habit of kil- ling animals for human food in a manner that causes at the most but momentary pain." It may well be that if the finding of the Special Commissioners in this case had been in similar terms, I should accede to the society's claim. But the value of the observations of the Lord Justice is that he looks first and last to the true interests of mankind. That is the test. Be the intention of the donor what it will, let him label his gift by what name he likes, he cannot draw a line and say to the court that it shall go thus far and no farther. I have dealt at some length with the case of Re Cranston partly because it was relied on by the appellant, partly because it is, I think, one of the most important cases in this branch of the law of charity. I do not express any opinion whether it was rightly decided. Still less do I express an opinion whether upon such evidence as might to-day be available a similar conclusion would be reached. I use it for the purpose of emphasising a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... purpose, to which in an earlier age that quality would have been ascribed, with the result that (unless a general charitable intention could be found) a gift for that purpose would fail. I cannot share the apprehension of the Master of the Rolls that great confusion will be caused if the court declines to be bound by the beliefs and knowledge of a past age in considering whether a particular purpose is to-day for the benefit of the community. But if it is so, then I say that it is the lesser of two evils. In a speech, which I recently delivered in this House, I had occa- sion to say that the cases decided on this branch of the law were legion in number and were not easy to reconcile. This is the first time, so far as I am aware, that the issue in the form in which I have endeavoured to state it has reached this House. If your Lordships are satisfied that the law as laid down by Russell, J., (as he then was), in Re Hummeltenberg is correct, and the decision of this House confirms it, I believe that it will be a useful landmark in the history of the law of charity. LORD NORMAND.―The appellant society claims exemption from income tax on its investment income on the ground that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... te and encourage kindness towards them, to discourage cruelty, and to ameliorate the condition of the brute creation, and thus to stimulate humane and generous sentiments in man towards the lower animals, and by these means promote feelings of humanity and morality generally, repress brutality, and thus elevate the human race." Socie- ties for the amelioration of the condition of animals like other societies for the improvement of human morals do not as a rule limit their activities to one particular method of advancing their cause. Com- monly they hope to make voluntary converts, and they also hope to educate public opinion and so to bring its influence to bear on those who offend against a humane code of conduct towards animals. But they seldom disclaim and frequently avow an intention of inducing Parliament to pass new legislation if a favourable opportunity should arise of furthering their purpose by that means. A society for the prevention of cruelty to animals, for example, may include among its professed purposes amendments of the law dealing with field sports or with the taking of eggs or the like. Yet it would not in my view necessarily lose its right to be considered ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Ltd. , Lord Parker said that a trust for the attainment of political objects has always been held in- valid, not because it is illegal.....but because the court has no means of judging whether a proposed change in the law will or will not be for the public benefit. That was said in a case in which the society was advocating a very important change in the relations of the State and the community towards religion. I respectfully agree with the comment of the Master of the Rolls that Lord Parker's words do not apply when the legislation is merely ancillary to the attainment of what is ex hypothesis a good charitable object. For the charitable purpose, being dominant, would prevail as it did in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Falkirk Temperance Cafe Trust and in Re Hood, Public Trustee v. Hood , where it was held that, the main object of the gift being charitable, the gift was none the less valid because the testator had pointed out one of the means by which, in his opinion, the main object could best be attained and which in itself might not have been charitable if it had stood alone. But I regret that I cannot agree with the Master of the Rolls in limiting the scope of Lord Park ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
