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1922 (10) TMI 4

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..... osing taxation, any real ambiguity must be decided in favour of the subject and against the Crown. I consider that the hour of the day at which the Gazette was actually published is a wholly irrelevant consideration, because on neither view does it make any difference. If the Gazette had been published early in the morning, according to the view of Kumaraswami Sastri, J., the tax will come into operation only the next day. If it had been published late in the night, according to the view of Coutts-Trotter, J., the tax would still be operative from the time the office opened for the receipt of plaints on that day. I agree that we have nothing to do with the English Common Law except in so far as it may afford some guide as to the proper meaning to be attached to words in the English language. I think this may be deduced from a study of all the English authorities, namely, that in every case the word from preceding a date may have one of two meanings, namely, on and after, that is, including the named date, or merely after, that is excluding the named date, and that it is necessary to look at the context and the circumstances of each case to arrive at the true construction. But I t .....

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..... each case must depend on its own circumstances and subject-matter, and giving the best consideration that I can to this case and the circumstances and the subject-matter of this notification, in my judgment, the plaints filed on May 5th are subject to the amended rules, and it must be declared accordingly. V.M. Coutts Trotter, J. 5. The short point for our decision is whether the new scale of fees applies to the plaint filed in this Court on the 5th May, the date of its publication in the Fort St. George Gazette. The High Courts of India are enabled to make rules for regulating the practice and proceedings of such Courts and to settle a table of fees to be allowed to officers of Court under Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 5 and 6 Geo. V, c. 61, and 6 and 7 Geo. V, c. 37 and 9 and 10 Geo. V, c. 101, all of course being statutes passed by the Imperial Parliament. The Advocate-General therefore contends that it follows that Section 36 of the Interpretation Act of 1889, 52 and 53 Vict. c. 63 alone applies and that we are not concerned with the Indian Statutes. Section 36, Sub-section 2 of the Interpretation Act is as follows: Where an Act passed after the comm .....

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..... is clearly provided in two other rules. If you are fixing the point of time at which a certain state of things is to be called into existence, that state of things comes into existence at midnight of the day preceding the day at which or on which or from which or from and after which the new state of things begins. In such cases the statute or rule is only concerned in fixing the terminus a quo of a new state of law which is enacted to continue indefinitely, in other words, until repealed by a new enactment of the legislature where, in short, you have a terminus a quo but no terminus ad quem. This principle is well illustrated by the case of Tomlinson v. Bullock (1879) 4 Q.B.D. 230. It is one of obvious convenience for it would be an intolerable burden upon the litigant public to require it to ascertain at which precise hour of the day a particular statute is passed or a particular rule or regulation is promulgated. The other rule is this. When you have a period delimited by statute or rule which has both a beginning and an end, the word from excludes the opening day and any words fixing the closing day include that day. As was pointed out by Day, J., any other canon of construc .....

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..... her more or less arbitrarily and it does not seem to me that considerations of supposed hardship can possibly affect the determination. In my opinion the Crown succeeds, whether this matter is regulated directly by the Common Law of England and the English Interpretation Act of 1889 or by the Indian General Clauses Act which, in my opinion, should be construed in the light of the numerous decisions of the English Courts. I do not think too much importance should be attached to the terminological significance of the words period and series which are the expressions used in the Indian Act. But it is clear that such considerations, if invoked, tend to support the contention of the Crown. In the case of the word period it is incontestably so, for the word obviously imports from its Greek origin the completion of a circuit, that is to say, something which has both a terminus a quo and a terminus ad quem to begin and end the circuit. C.V. Kumaraswami Sastri, J. 9. By a notification in the Fort St. George Gazette Extraordinary, published on Friday the 5th of May, 1922, the Table of Fees which under Appendix II of the old rules on the Original Side, were levied in respect o .....

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..... applies to the construction of the Acts of Governor General in Council and the Regulations made pursuant to those Acts and is not made applicable to any rules that may be framed. The legislature has refrained from making the provision of this Act applicable to rules framed under statutory power. The Madras General Clauses Act I of 1891 similarly has no application to the question involved in this case. Section 36 of the Interpretation Act of 1889 (52 and 53 Vic. C. 63) is also of no help even assuming that the Act applies to rules made under the powers conferred by Section 107 of the Government of India Act (a point on which I express no opinion) as the section refers to rules being expressed to come into operation on a particular day and not from a particular day. We have therefore to fall back on the general principles which govern cases like the present. 11. There has been a great diversity of opinion as regards the legal effect of the use of the word from with reference to the computation of time and as to whether it must be treated as inclusive or exclusive of a terminus a quo. Hard and fast rules were attempted to be laid clown in the earlier English cases. For examp .....

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..... as he has unquestionably the benefit of some portion of the day, there is the less hardship in constructively reckoning the whole of it as a part of the time allowed him; whereas in the case under consideration the event-was one totally foreign to the party whose time for deliberation was to begin to run from that event. Maxwell in the Interpretation of Statutes (Sixth Edition, P. 605) observes as follows. In the computation of time, distinctions have been made by the Courts which were founded, chiefly on considerations of convenience and justice. The general rule, anciently, seems to have been that both terms or endings of the period given for. doing or suffering something were included; but when a penalty or forfeiture was involved in non-compliance with a condition within the given time, the time was reckoned by including one and excluding the other of the terminal days. A distinction was afterwards made depending on whether the point from which the computation was to be made was an act to which the person against whom the time ran, was privy or not. Thus, if the time ran from when he was arrested or received a notice of action, it might justly be computed as including th .....

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..... cisions in which technical rules have been formulated which were not true - that is, were not in accordance with the facts of the case. To say that by the common law a part of a day is the whole of a day is to say something which is contrary to the truth; it is a technical rule which was imposed upon the law with the result of bringing the law into disrepute. It is immaterial whether those older decisions were right in the particular cases; if they, or any of them, laid down any general rule as to the mode of computing time, that rule has been departed from in recent times and no longer exists. 17. A.L. Smith L.J., observed: It is contended that the old authorities show that formerly when time had to be computed from the doing of an act, the first day, that is, the day on which the act was done was included and that the rule is applicable to the present case. But it has been shown from subsequent cases that there is no such universal rule and that in the reckoning of time each case must depend on its own circumstances and subject matter and for this 1 need only refer to the judgment of Sir William Grant in Lester v. Garland 33 E.R. 748 to that of Kelly, C.B. in Isacs v. Royal .....

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..... ' are equivocal since they do not make it clear whether the inclusion or exclusion of the named day be intended. As a general rule however the effect of defining a period in such a manner is to exclude the first day and include the last day. 20. I may also refer to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary where it is stated from is much akin to after and when used with reference to computation to time, for example, from a stated day, prima facie excludes the day of the date. In Wharton's. Law Lexicon it is stated that the word from ordinarily excludes the day from which the time is to be reckoned but is construed inclusive of that day if the context requires it. Sidebotham v. Holland (1763) 3 Burr. 1424, was referred to by the Advocate General as showing that the words at, on, from and on and from have the same meaning. That case turned upon the date of commencement of a tenancy and all that Lindley, L.J., held in that case was that the words at, on from and on and from were, for the purpose of considering the validity of a notice, equivalent expressions and the learned Judge observed that any distinction between them for such, a purpose as that was far to .....

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..... case. I do not think that the rules of English Common Law based as many of them are on a system of jurisprudence and on considerations so different should be applied to this Court unless necessary for the ends of justice. It has not been held in any case that the English Common Law applies to this country. The rules of equity and good conscience are by the Civil Courts Act to govern cases not covered by Hindu and Muhammadan Laws. The rule that the law will not take notice of fractions of a day has been used for the purpose of excluding the first day in cases where the inclusion would work hardship and I do not think there is any reason for including the day where an act is said to be done from a day and excluding the day where an act is said to be done from a day to another day. A number of days beginning with a fixed date is still a series of days and they do not cease to be a series simply because they are to go on indefinitely. It is argued that the exclusion is necessary when there are two termini because if one day is given for the doing of an act the law would be reduced to an absurdity. But it has always been recognized even in the older decisions that the word from would .....

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..... resentation is entitled to have his plaint admitted on presentation though as a matter of convenience the office receives the plaints and admits that at the end of the day or later on. There seems to me to be very little justice or equity in directing that persons who have done what was perfectly a legal and valid act at the time should pay a Court-fee which is much higher simply because a notification was received at the close of the day making the higher fees chargeable from the date of the notification. It may well be that if those persons had notice that instead of ₹ 30 they had to pay at least ₹ 150 and a maximum that would range according to the value of their claim, they might rather have compromised with the other side or might have had resort to other proceedings like arbitration for settling their claims. I can find nothing to justify charging people, who filed their plaints on that day without knowledge of the notification which only reached the High Court at 5 p.m. with the higher fees in respect of plaints filed during the course of the day. 23. Having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the present case, I think that, if the law is that there i .....

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