TMI Blog1936 (10) TMI 12X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rvivorship to Raghaviah on Muthuswamy Aiyah's death. It is stated that Raghaviah left a will whereby he bequeathed the suit properties to his daughter Subbamma but that will has not been produced. We however find that in about a month after Raghaviah's death, there was an arrangement between Guruvamma and Subbamima (by Exs. D and E) whereby Guruvamma was given 10 1/2 guntas of land and the rest was taken by Subbamma. It is not clear whether this was only a notional division or whether there was a physical separation of the properties taken by them respectively. The evidence however shows that in the village accounts the whole land had been recorded as in the possession of Guruvamma and the lower appellate Court has accepted the suggestion made on behalf of the defendants that the patta for the whole land stood in Guruvamma's name. 3. It is clear from Ex. IT that the proprietor knew that Subbamma was the legal representative of Raghaviah. Whether he knew his alleged will or not, it is not clear. I therefore see no reason to think that in the matter of the registry of the lands in Guruvamma's name the landlord must have acted in ignorance of Subbamma's right; n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ficiently representing the estate for the purpose of the suits. 5. It is true that prior to the Estates Land Act it was the duty of the landholder to find out the person really entitled to the ryoti interest and that under Section 147 of the Estates Land Act of 1908 the landholder was relieved in respect of this duty only in cases of transfers but not in respect of succession. The amendment recently introduced so as to cover cases of succession also has no application to the circumstances of this case. But in determining whether the landlord has properly discharged his duty in finding out the person whom he must treat as a tenant for the purpose of issuing pattas and instituting suits for rent, the principle recognised in Ramaswamy Chettiar v. Oppilamani Chetty (1909) 19 M.L.J. 671 : I.L.R. 33 Mad. 6 and Bachu Soorayya v. Toomuloori Chinna Anjaneyalu (1918) 36 M.L.J. 106, may well be taken into account. The result is that if the landlord finding a person in possession bona fide believed that person to be legally in possession as heir and that person further happens to be entitled to an undivided share in the holding it will be scarcely fair to permit other persons entitled to th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... K and the rest of the holding which belonged to Nageswara Aiyah which also formed the subject-matter of the conveyance under Ex. K. The reference in Ex. K to the decree in S. No. 1163 of 1915 and to the arrears due for the three faslis which presumably formed the subject-matter of the decree in S. No. 1470 of 1917 undoubtedly put the vendees on notice of the liability of the property purchased by them for payment of rent both past and future. If for several years after this purchase these vendees did not take steps under Section 147 to get themselves registered as pattadars, I do not see any justification for punishing the landlord for his ignorance of the transfer. It is obvious that when it came to his knowledge he had no objection to implead these transferees as well in his suit as he did in Ex. II-E. I am accordingly of opinion that the second appeal must be allowed to the extent of declaring that the appellant is entitled to execute not only the decrees, Exs. II, II-A and II-E, but also the decrees, Exs. II-B, II-C and II-D. 7. As the memorandum of objections has not been pressed I need not say more than to point out that the above reasoning will itself suffice to justify ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ld be impleaded as a party. I am of opinion that the decision of Krishnan, J., in Sreekanta Sundararamiah v. Venkatasubbiah (1924)46MLJ380 lays down the correct principle, if I may say so. 10. I understand that during the pendency of this litigation, the mortgagee had brought the properties to sale in execution of his mortgage decree and the landholder has brought the properties to sale in execution of his rent decrees. It does not seem to me desirable to leave this litigation merely with a declaration of the rights of the parties as they stood at the date of the institution of the suit, because it is bound to lead to further litigation. This is just one of the class of cases where the Court will be justified in taking notice of the events that have happened during the pendency of the suit. It therefore seems to me best in the circumstances to modify the lower appellate Court's decree to the extent above indicated but at the same time send the case back to the Court of first instance for the rights of parties to be worked out in accordance with the principle laid down in Sreekanta Sundararamiah v. Venkatasubbiah (1924)46MLJ380 . In the circumstances I am not disposed to make ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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