TMI Blog1956 (8) TMI 72X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he Purnea-Kishunganj route. On 26-9-1950, Abdul Majid Khan, opposite party No. 2 also applied for a similar permit for the same route. On 29-5-1951, the East Bihar Regional Transport Authority hereinafter mentioned as R.T.A. granted stage carriage permits to both the petitioner and opposite party No. 2 for the Purnea-Kishunganj route. One Suraj Narain Mitra, who was also one of the applicants for a similar permit for the same route, being aggrieved by the above order of the R.T.A. preferred an appeal, under Section 64(a) of the Act. to the Appeal Board of the State Transport Authority hereinafter mentioned as the Appeal Board . On 7-1-1953, the Appeal Board directed one of the two permits to be granted to the appellants Suraj Narain Mitra, and remanded the matter to the R.T.A. for deciding which of the two persons, namely the petitioner arid opposite party No. 2 should get the second permit. The petitioner on notice by the R.T.A. appeared but opposite party no. 2 did not appear before the R.T.A. The R. T. A. therefore on 26-2-1953, allowed the permit of the petitioner to stand and cancelled the permit of the opposite party No. 2 and directed him to surrender his permit. 3. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... titution, for a writ to call up and quash the order, of the Appeal Board dated 5-12-1953. This application was registered in this Court as Misc. Judicial Case No. 265 of 1954 (Pat) (A). This was heard by Das C. J. and Imam J. who on 29-3-1955, allowed the application, and quashed the order of the Appeal Board dated 5-12-1953, with the observation that it is open to. the State Transport Appellate Authority to hear the appeal again on merits (including the question of its maintainability) after complying with the statutory rule regarding the issue of a notice to the parties concerned, as laid down in Rule 71 of the Rules made under the Indian Motor Vehicles Act. 5. In pursuance of the above order, the Appeal Board heard the parties on 30-5-1955, and 2-7-1955. The Appeal Board finally passed the impugned order on 3-3-1956, reversing the order of the R.T.A. dated 26-2-1953, and allowing the appeal of opposite party No. 2, the effect of which was that the petitioner's permit was refused and opposite party No. 2 was granted the permit. Against this order the petitioner has again moved this Court under Articles 226 and 227of the Constitution of India asking for a writ qua ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . It cannot be assumed that there is a right of appeal in every matter which comes under the consideration of a Judge, such right must be given by statute. The first question which arises in approaching the consideration of this question is, whether any right of appeal is given by the Act itself. There is nothing in the Act which would suggest it. The only section which gives a right of appeal is Section 64 of the Act. It provides in Clauses (a) to (g) the matters on which an appeal can lie by any person aggrieved. None of these clauses deals with an order rejecting an application for review, obviously because there is no provision for a review of its order by the R.T.A. in the Act. My concluded opinion, therefore, is that the R.T.A. has no power either to entertain an application for review of its own order, or to review its own order and, that there is no appeal to the Appeal Board against an order pass-by the R.T.A. rejecting an application for review. The contention of Mr. Ghose on this point, therefore, is well founded, and must prevail. 7. The learned Advocate-General, in reply, admitted that there was no provision for a review of its order by a R.T.A., but he contended ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... elayed giving effect to its order an the review petition, the finality of the R.T.A.'s order can be deemed to take effect only from the day when it disposed of the review petition and time will count from this date and not the date of the original order. 10. The Appeal Board therefore considered, in the light of its earlier order passed on the 6th July, 1954, at the time of the admission of the appeal, that the petition of appeal was not time-barred and that such delay as took place from the date of the original resolution of the R.T.A. was therefore, condoned. The Appeal Board thought that it was an administrative tribunal, and, therefore, it did not like to go into the technicality, and it found no reason to differ from the earlier order of the Appeal Board condoning the delay and admitting the petition of appeal especially when it was satisfied that opposite party No. 2, who was the appellant before it, had received no notice from the R.T.A. for the meeting when the original resolution was passed on the 26th February, 1953. In that view of the matter, the Appeal Board heard the appeal on merits, and disposed of the matter accordingly. 11. The order of R.T.A. dated th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hat the provisions contained in Sections 4, 9 to 18, and Section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law, for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law. But Section 29(2) (b) provides that the remaining provisions of the Limitation Act shall not apply. Therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply usually to a special law, like the Motor Vehicles Act, unless it is specifically made applicable by such Act itself to its provisions. Section 5 of the Limitation Act is the only section which empowers a Court to admit an appeal after the period of limitation prescribed therefor, when the appellant satisfied the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period. But, Section 5 of the Limitation Act itself provides that any appeal, or application for a review of judgment, or for leave to appeal or any other application, to which this section may be made applicable by or under any enactment for the time being in force, may be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... provides the filing of an appeal against any order of the R.T.A. in respect of any of the matters mentioned in Clauses (a) to (g) of Section 64 of the Act within thirty days of the date of the 'order', and, therefore, he contended the words the order mean the date of the final order passed in the case. To continue his argument he submitted that as the operation of the order dated the 26th February, 1953, was stayed on the 29th March, 1953, by the R.T.A. and, it was vacated on the 25th of April, 1953, therefore, the final order would be deemed to have been passed on the 25th April, 1953, when the operation of the order dated the 26th February, 1956, was revived, and when it became effective, and, as such the appeal having been filed within thirty days from the 25th of April, 1953, on the 25th May, 1953, was within time and, therefore, there was no question of any limitation. I am unable to accept this line of reasoning put forward by the learned Advocate General. The limitation for filing the appeal against the order dated the 26th February, 1953, began to run from that very date, and the right to file an appeal against that order was extinguished the moment thirty days ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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