TMI Blog1926 (5) TMI 1X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to go over the same ground. In this connection it was argued by the learned vakil for the appellant that the effect of the passing of the Act was to re-convert into ryoti all lands which had been converted previously by the Zamindar from ryoti into kamatam lands except in the one case provided in the proviso to Section 185; he relied upon Sections 8 and 185 for this contention. Here again I agree generally with my learned brother in the view he has adopted of these sections and do not propose to discuss the question at length. We cannot give retrospective effect to the provisions of an Act, especially when to do so will destroy existing rights, unless it is made clear by express language that such effect was intended. I do not read Section 8, Clause (3) as necessarily retrospective in effect. I am of opinion that the Zamindar was at liberty to convert his ryoti lands into kamatam lands before the passing of the Act and in the present case the lands were kamatam lands both at the time of the passing of the Act and when the 1st defendant was given possession. On this view the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs. 2. The Memorandum of Objections is dismissed with costs. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ryoti. The documentary evidence clearly establishes this point. The estate owned two species of kamatam: (1) Immemorial kamatam; (2) Lands relinquished by ryots and absorbed into Zamindar's kamatam lands. 8. This distinction is kept in view in the records of the Zamindari and document after document refers to this twofold character of the kamatam lands. It is also proved beyond doubt that the suit lands come under the second category, namely, lands originally ryoti but subsequently incorporated with the Zamindar's private lands. The finding of the Subordinate Judge is, that the suit lands were at their inception ryoti but were subsequently converted into kamatam. This finding is correct and although the plaintiffs' learned Vakil said at first that he would attack it, he subsequently gave up the point and had to concede that he could take no exception to the finding. 9. The lands having thus been proved originally to be ryoti lands, two questions arise: (1) Could there be a valid conversion before the Estates Land Act came into force of ryoti land into kamatam land? (2) If it was capable of being so converted has such conversion been in fact effected in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ble to impute any such intention to this section. To accept this construction would be to unduly enlarge the scope of the section, which, as I have said, mereiy lays down a rule of evidence and does not profess to enact any rule of substantive law. Now, turning to the proviso, the effect of it is to create an irre-buttable presumption that a certain kind of land shall be private land. If land had been for 12 years immediately before the commencement of the Act, directly cultivated by the landholder (that is, cultivated by his own servants or by hired labour) that land shall be absolutely presumed to be the landholder's private land. Here, again, it must be noticed that this clause is enacted by way of a proviso and not as an exception; so that, it does not follow that land not answering the description in the proviso shall be treated as other than private land. 13. If there is thus nothing in Section 185 to justify the contention that ryoti land could not before the date of the Act be converted into private land, is there any other section in the Act that forbids such conversion? It has been contended for the defence that. Section 8(1) produces such a result. It enacts that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he words in question in Clause 3 can be given full effect by interpreting merger In that clause as meaning merger resulting from a union by transfer, succession or otherwise as mentioned in Clause 1. I am unwilling to strain the language of this Sub-section with a view to render it retrospective 15. Mr. Venkataramana Rao has next drawn our attention to Clauses 2 and 4 of Section 8 and contended that they indicate a clear intention to place the ryot in a very advantageous position. That may be so, but it does not follow that the particular advantage now contended for has been conferred upon him. The o,bscure wording of this section of the Act, as in the case of many other sections, has led to a great conflict of opinion, but on the whole 1 have come to the conclusion that the Act does not retrospectively forbid conversion of ryoti into private land. My view receives support from the judgments of Sir John Wallis, C.J. in Zamindar of Chellapalli v. Somayya ILR (1924) Mad 341 : 27 MLJ 718, Napier, J., in Zamindar of Nuzvid v. Lakshminarayana and Spencer, J. in Section A. No. 1765 of 1918. A contrary view was taken by Seshagiri Aiyar, J. who differed from the learned Chief Justic ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 27 MLJ 718 citing Budley v. Bukhtoo (1871) NW PHCR 203 observes that the test laid down in that case may be accepted, namely, the private land is that which a Zamindar has cultivated himself and intends to retain as resumable for cultivation by himself even from time to time he demises it for a season. This test has been approved by the Privy Council in Yerlagadda Mallikarjuna Prasad Nayudu v. Somayya ILR (1918) Mad 400 : 36 MLJ 257 (PC). Now applying that test, I shall proceed to deal with the question, whether the lands were actually converted into kamatam lands. Ex. 23 series are the principal documents that must be considered in this connection. They give us a connected history of the lands in question for a period of twenty years, that is, from the year 1878 to 1897. These are statements relating to collection and arrears of revenue maintained by the estate, and for deciding the point at issue it is necessary to very carefully go through the figures appearing in them and understand their full effect. The first of these series is Ex. 23 (1878-1879). The figures relating to kamatam lands are the following: Acres 68.21 Immemorial Kamatam. 54.17/122.38 Relinquished by ry ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 23--F 1889--1890 37.35 Immemorial Kamatam. Entire extent 112.1 Relinquished by ryots under direct cul. 149.36 and absorbed into Kamatam. tivation of Zamindar. 9. 23--H 1890--1891 28.59 Immemorial Kamatam. 112.1 Relinquished by ryotsdo. and absorbed into 140.60 Kamatam. 10. 23--H--2 1891--1892 37.35 Immemorial Kamatam. 112.1 Relinquished by ryotsdo. and absorbed into 149.36 Kamatam. 11. 23-H-3 1892--1893 37.35 Immemorial Kamatam. 59.36 direct cul- 112.1 Relinquished by ryotstivation of and absorbed into Zamindar; 90 .1 Kamatam. leased to ryots. 12. 23-H-4 1893--1894 140.36 Kamatam. 71 43 cultivated by Zamindar directly; 77.93 leased to ryots. 13. 23-H-S 1894--1895 37.35 Immemorial Kamatam. 71 43 under 112.1 Relinquished by ryots Zamindar's per- and absorbed into sonal cultiva- 149.36 Kamatam. tion; 77.93 leased to ryots. 23. This chart shows that during the period between 1878 and 1895 the suit lands were mostly under the direct cultivation of the Zamindar. We find that in 1887-88 there was a break, the Zamindar cultivating over half of the kamatam lands personally and leasing the rest. The entire lands were resumed by the Zamindar in the next three faslis. Again in 1892-93 a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r was in office. The land register prepared in 1896, Ex. NN, treats the Zamindar as the pattadar of the suit lands. The suit resulted in a partition and it is somewhat important to note that in the division these lands were treated as the private lands of the estate. They were divided between the two Zamindars, the lands in dispute having fallen to the share of the plaintiffs' father (see Ex. 25) 26. I have so far confined myself to the evidence relating to dealings with the lands previous to 1898, for the last lease to which I have referred, is the lease given by the Receiver in 1896. Section 185 of the Estates Land Act says that when it becomes necessary to determine whether any land is landholder's private land regard shall be had inter alia to the question whether the land was before the 1st of July, 1898 specifically let as private land. Legislation which culminated in the Estates Land Act was for some time in contemplation and it was believed that to forestall it, landholders were anxious to make pelf-serving statements in documents executed during the years that immediately preceded that Act. Although the section merely says that regard shall be had to the manner ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , that the lease would not confer upon the lessee any rights in the property and the sale was made expressly subject to this condition. Whereas on each of the two previous occasions (in the case or Y. Ramiah and B. Ramiah) the lease was of the entire land, on this occasion different parcels were leased to different individuals and Exs. C to C-4). are some of the lease deeds executed by the highest bidders at the auction. Care was again taken to insert in these deeds recitals that the lands were kamatam, that the lessees could acquire no jeroyiti rights and were bound to deliver up the lands at the end of the term. In 1910 when the terms of these leases expired, a similar process was gone through and fresh leases were executed. This state of things continued till 1912. 28. From this time onward, direct evidence is lacking in regard to the Zamindar's dealing with the land. Thentu Lakshamanna was allowed to cultivate it from 1912 and his connection with it ceased in 1917 when it was given over to the 1st defendant. In the case of these two individuals, there was no document taken or executed which would show the terms on which they were admitted to the land. This circumstance h ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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