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TMI Blog1934 (2) TMI 23X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... duct of investigation of an offence against the Excise, exercises the powers conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure upon an officer in charge of a Police Station for the investigation of a cognizable offence, a Police Officer within the meaning of Section 25, Evidence Act. 3. So far as this Court is concerned, the following is the state of authority bearing upon the question. In Rokun Ali v. Emperor AIE 1918 Cal 138, which was a case Under Section 9, Opium Act (l of 1878), a confession made by the accused to a Superintendent of Excise was admitted against him in evidence, it being held that there was no inducement, threat or promise to shut it out Under Section 24, Evidence Act; but the question whether Section 25 of the said Act applied to the case or not was neither raised nor decided. In Ah Foong Chinaman v. Emperor AIE 1919 Cal 696, which also was a case Under Section 9, Opium Act (l of 1878), a confession made by the accused to an Inspector of Excise was sought to be ruled out on the ground that Excise Officers were in reality Police Officers, though not called as such ; but the contention was overruled, it being only observed that it was not possible to say that Excise ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rs and they are Police Officers within the meaning of Section 25, Evidence Act." Later on however in the case of Matilal Kalwar v. Emperor AIR1932Cal122 , the view taken in the earlier Calcutta decisions has again been taken and it has been again held that an Excise Officer is not a Police Officer within the meaning of Section 25, Evidence Act. 5. It is apparent therefore that there is a conflict of judicial authority on the question whether an Excise Officer is a Police Officer within the meaning of Section 25, Evidence Act. The question formulated and referred as above stated however does not cover the entire ground of the conflict and, following as it closely does the wording of the question which was referred in the Bombay case above-mentioned, is some what inapposite, because it is clear from a comparison of, the relevant provisions of the Opium Act (1 of 1878), which is the Act to be considered in this connexion, and of the Bengal Excise Act (5 of 1909), the powers of an Excise Officer while investigating into offences under the said two Acts respectively are not quite the same; the Opium (Bengal) Amendment Act (5 B. C. of 1933) which has been recently enacted to amend ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... stances which show that words in a statute must have been used by the legislature in a larger sense than their ordinary meaning the Court is bound to read them in that sense: (Beale on Cardinal Rules of Legal Interpretation, Edn. 2, p. 333). 7. The Evidence Act is now more than half a century old, and though it may not rank with "ancient statutes" in the sense in which that expression is used in forensic language, the principle will hold good that great regard ought to be paid, in construing a statute, to the construction which was put upon it by those who lived about the time or soon after it was made, because the meaning which a particular word or expression bore in those days may have got mixed up or blurred during the interval that has elapsed. From this point of view, I regard the decision of this Court in the case of Queen v. Hurrybole Chunder Ghose (1876) 1 Cal 207, as a decision of very great importance. It is true that the facts of that case were very different from those of the cases which have given rise to the present question. And this fact has been very forcibly pointed out in the decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Radha Kishun Marwari v. Emp ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 235 and has never been dissented from anywhere else. 10. A history of the provision contained in Section 25, Evidence Act, is to be found in the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the celebrated case of Queen-Empress v. Babu Lal (1884) 6 All 509. In that case it has been shown how for the first time a new rule came into existence in the shape of Section 148, Criminal P. C. (Act 25 of 1861), which in the most imperative terms laid down that: No confession or admission made to a police officer, shall be used as evidence against an accused person. 11. And it is this rule which thus came into existence strictly speaking not as a rule of evidence, but rather as a rule governing the action of Police Officers and as a matter of criminal procedure, that was subsequently removed into the Evidence Act in 1872, in Section 25 as a rule of evidence. Act 25 of 1861 received the assent of the Governor-General in Council on 5th September 1861. In it the powers and duties of Police Officers of different grades acting under the Code were defined, but the term "Police Officer" itself was not defined. But a few months before, another Act, namely the General Police Act (5 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... en used, as it is very generally used in interpretation clauses, in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute ; and when so used the words or phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include: see Per Lord Watson in Dilworth v. Commissioners of Stamps (1899) AC 99 at pp. 105 to 106. The natural import of the word "police" as understood in 1861, therefore was something more than the Police Force enrolled Under Act 5 of 1861. The preamble to the Act says: Whereas it is expedient to re-organize the Police and to make it a more efficient instrument for the prevention and detection of crime. 15. And Section 6 of the Act, which conferred Magisterial powers upon certain supe rior officers of the police says: They shall be so invested only so far as may be necessary for the preservation of the peace, the prevention of crime, and the detection, apprehension and detention of offenders in order to their being brought before a Magistrate. 16. The police therefore were instruments for the pre ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... so far as confessions made to them are concerned. Of this only one instance need be given here. There is, as is well-known, a preponderance of judicial authority in favour of the view that a chowkidar is a "Police Officer" within the meaning of Section 25, Evidence Act, Queen.Empress v. Salemuddin (1899) 26 Cal 569, Queen-Empress v. Indra Chandra Pal 2 CWN 637. Queen. Empress v. Keta Baisnavi 2 CWN (180). Also Nazir Jharu dar v. King.Emperor 9 CWN 474, in which the admissibility of a confession before a chowkidar was doubted. In one of these cases, namely lndra Chandra Pal's case 2 CWN 637 it was pointed out that a chowkidar, although he is not a Police Officer under Act 5 of 1861 is a Police Officer under Regn. 20 of 1817 and Act 1 of 1892. The contrary view which was taken in the case of Queen-Empress v. Bepin Bihari Dey 2 CWN 71 and which is no longer tenable in view of the express enactments relied upon in lndra Chandra Pal's case 2 CWN 637, was based upon the distinction that a chowkidar had no power of holding an investigation for the purpose of detecting offenders. The learned Judges said in that case: The reason why the law in Sections 25 and 26; Eviden ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and greater efficiency, the powers of respective grades of Police Officers being more and more accurately defined, outside agencies being from time to time absorbed into the regular establishment under different denominations, and the whole department working for a common end, namely the prevention and detection of crime, and crimes which were previously unprovided for, being gradually brought in within their cognizance. 19. From the year 1773 the monopoly of opium was first assumed in behalf of the company and by 1797-98 the system of providing opium by agencies in the Provinces of Bengal, Bihar, Orissa and Benares was completely established. The intermediate Regulations by which opium monopoly was gradually systematized need not be referred to because all of them were superseded by Regn. 13 of 1816: see Harrington's Analysis, Part 6, Section 3. 20. It will be seen from this Regulation that while opium was made into a separate department for the purpose of revenue, Police and Abkari Darogas were to act simultaneously for the prevention and detection of offences committed in breach of the Regulation (e.g., see Sections 32, 33, 35, 36 etc). In the Opium Act (13 of 1857) there ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by such Subordinate Officers in the fixed establishment of the Collector as the Nazir, the Abkari Daroga or some such officer ; and Magistrates and police officers were enjoined to support these officers of the Collector in the discharge of their duties (vide Section 23 of the Regulation). There were no other enactments on this subject prior to 1872 which are worth mentioning in this connexion. From what has been stated above, I think it is clear that before 1872 when the Evidence Act was enacted, except as regards the illegal cultivation of poppy in respect of which an officer concerned had received intelligence, a matter which was dealt with by Section 24, Opium Act 13 of 1857, no police powers were exercisable by officers of the Opium or the Excise Department. And it is also clear that the aforesaid provision namely Section 24 of Act 13 of 1857, gave only a very limited power to hold a summary inquiry and to grant bail or to send the offender in custody. On the other hand in the matter of prevention and detection of such offences as related to these branches of revenue, Abkari and Excise Officers as well as policemen worked hand in hand. And this, I understand, is why even to-da ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r" used in Section 25, Evidence Act was meant. 25. As militating against the view which I am inclined to take as stated above, two points have been raised. One is that in Section 125, Evidence Act, there is a distinction observed between "police officers" and "revenue officers." And the other is that in Section 25 of the Act in respect of an officer of the police there is a personal disability implied irrespective of the question whether he is holding an investigation or not, while no such disability can be said to have been intended in the case of an Excise Officer. So far as the first of these points is concerned I entirely agree in what was said by Marten, C.J., in the case of Nanoo v. Emperor (5) (at p. 95 of 51 Bom) to meet it. And as regards the second point I need only observe that whereas police officers by reason of Section 22 of Act 5 of 1861 are to be always considered on duty for the purposes of the Act, all revenue officers on the other hand, are not police officers and it is only such of them as may be exercising the powers of police officers and only when exercising such powers they may be regarded as police officers. In the conclusion that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cently at any rate an officer acting under the powers contained in that Act was in no sense whatever a Police Officer and so it was laid down in the case of Ah Foong v. Emperor AIR 1919 Cal 696. The position however has now been altered to some extent by reason of the provisions of the Opium (Bengal Amendment) Act, 1933-Bengal Act 5 of 1933, and I think we may take it that by virtue of those provisions an officer acting under the Opium Act is now very much in the same position as an ordinary Excise Officer. The question which we have to decide may be simply stated in this form. Is an Excise Officer a Police Officer for the purpose of Section 25, Evidence Act? At first glance one would be disposed without any hesitation to reply that, of course, an Excise Officer is not a police officer. I concede however that the matter cannot be disposed of quite so summarily or so succinctly as that because the problem is complicated by the provisions of Section 74, Excise Act. No doubt in order to come to a decision on the point it is desirable if not indeed necessary to delve into the history of the relevant legislation, but it is of even greater importance in my opinion to remember at the outs ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ate the existence of Excise Officer then it obviously follows that the legislature could never have intended to include them within the meaning of the expression 'police officer.' The Advocate-General referred us to the well-known dictum of Lord Macnaughten in the case of Vacher and Sons., Ltd. v. London Society of Compositors (1913) AC 107 as an authority for the proposition that for the purpose of construing words used in a statutory enactment the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to. Lord Macnaughten quoted the warning given by Tindal, C.J., in the Sussex Peerage case (1844) 11 Cl and F 85 (at p. 143), which is to this effect: If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expand these words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in each case best declare the intention of the legislature. 28. In this connexion I would also refer to the case of Satish Chandra Chakravarli v. Ram Doyal De AIR 1921 Cal 1, where a Full Bench of this Court emphasized the proposition that the Court must administer the law as prescribed by the legislature and neither enlarge n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... curing their own professional advancement as a reward for convictions obtained. Be that as it may, however it is obvious that the provisions of Sections 25, 26 and 27 did in a sense confer on a limited class of persons, that is to say, presumed wrong-doers, a very valuable privilege as against the community at large. 30. The provisions of Section 24 are themselves extremely wide and it is difficult to see why it should have been thought necessary wholly to exclude for example the incriminating statement of an individual who entirely of his own volition has walked into a police station or addressed a police officer and announced that he has done something which is a contravention of the criminal law. The provisions of Section 24 are of course sufficient to exclude any confessions which are not made entirely voluntarily. To my mind it is clear that in effect the provisions of Section 25 cast a very serious stigma upon the integrity of the police as such and one ought to hesitate a long time and be absolutely sure of the necessity for so doing before extending the scope of Section 25 in such a way as to cast an equal stigma upon officers engaged in the excise service. Moreover one ou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 25, Evidence Act. 32. The case of Ah Foong v. Emperor AIR 1919 Cal 696 was followed two years later in the case of Budhu v. Emperor AIR 1927 Sind 112. That also was a case arising out of the Bombay Abkari Act (5 of 1878). In that case Kincaid, J.C, and Barlee, A.J.C, held: It is now settled law that an excise officer is not a police officer within the meaning of the Evidence Act. 33. They in fact followed the case of Ah Foong v. Emperor AIR 1919 Cal 696. In the same year there was a decision on similar lines in the Bombay High Court in Raphael Pereira v. Emperor AIR1926Bom517 . In the following year again there was the decision of this Court in the case of Har bhanjan Sao v. Emperor AIR1927Cal527 , where again Suhrawardy. J., and Mitter, J., held that a confession made to an Excise Officer is admissible in evidence as an Excise Officer is not a Police Officer and Section 25, Evidence Act, does not apply to such a confession. Two years later there was a case in the Rangoon High Court, Maung San Myin v. Emperor AIR 1930 Rang 49, where it was held that although the Excise Officer concerned in the case had powers of arrest, search, granting bail and so on, under the Burma Excise Ac ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... provisions of Section 74, Excise Act. 35. Although this point was raised it was not necessary to decide it for the purpose of the case then before us. We said in the course of our judgment: Mr. Pal argues that an Excise Officer is a Police Officer within the meaning of Section 25, Evidence Act. The point may be arguable but so far as this Court is concerned it is not now resintegra. It has been held in several cases that he is not, in Harbhanjan Sao v. Emperor AIR 1930 Rang 49, Bohumali v. Emperor AIR 1918 Cal 138 and Ah Foong v. Emperor AIR 1919 Cal 696. Reference has been made to a Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Nanoo Sheikh Ahmed v. Emperor AIR1927Bom4 . 36. The learned Chief Justice giving the judgment of the Full Bench at p. 93 of the report distinguished the Calcutta case on the ground that Abkari law in Calcutta was different from that in Bombay and that the latter was more stringent than the former. This point is settled by authorities of this Court and as the law now stands an Excise Officer is not a Police Officer within the meaning of Section 25, Evidence Act. As a branch of this ground Mr. Pal has also argued that Under Section 74, Bengal Excise Act ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 38. If however the legislature had ever intended to make excise officers even when functioning under the powers conferred upon them by Section 74, Excise Act-police officers for all purposes- the legislature could have said so in plain and unmistakable terms. Mr. Huq in the course of his argument admitted to all intents and purposes that what he was contending for, was that the Court should in effect arrogate to it the functions of the legislature and insert into Section 25, Evidence Act, after the words "police officer" some such expression "or such other persons as may from time to time and for certain purposes be acting as police officers under some statutory authority." I can only repeat that had the legislature in the year 1861 or in the year 1872 or at any subsequent time intended any such thing, in my opinion they would have said so in clear and unmistakable terms and it is not for this Court or any other Court to vary or add to the plain language of Section 25, particularly having regard to the fact which I have already emphasized- that any addition upon the lines indicated would have the effect of conferring the extraordinary privilege given by Section ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pplied. If domination were an important test for the determination of the question now before us, then with almost equal logic and with parity of reasoning it might equally well be said that parents, senior relations and even spiritual advisers ought to be deemed in certain circumstances to be in the position of police officers for the purpose of Section 25, Evidence Act. It cannot in my opinion be too often emphasized that as Section 25 contains an absolute prohibition and an unqualified exclusion of statements which under English criminal jurisprudence would generally speaking be regarded not only as admissible but valuable evidence, the provisions must be strictly construed and not extended by inductive reasoning or by the presumed effect of other statutes not directly concerned with the law of evidence. The transferring of the provisions now contained in Section 25, from Criminal P. C, to the Evidence Act indicates that the legislature intended that they should be treated solely under the law of evidence and nothing else. It is noteworthy that despite the decision of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court and the judgment of S.K.Ghose, J., to which I have just referred, Sir C. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... careful consideration of the matter I take the view that an Excise Officer should not be put in the same category as a police officer for the purpose of Section 25 and I use that now to a large extent on those very observations of Sir Richard Garth, C.J., in the case of Queen v. Hurribole Chunder Ghose (1876) 1 Cal 207 which Mukerji, J., has cited in his judgment as supporting a contrary view. That case as Mukerji, J., observed was decided within a few years of the passing of the Evidence Act. The learned Chief Justice said: The term Police officer should be read not in any strict technical sense, but according to its more comprehensive and popular meaning. 45. In my opinion although the observations to that effect are relied on in support of the view that Excise Officers are Police Officers, they may equally well and indeed with greater justification be taken to operate in the reverse sense, for one would imagine that no ordinary member of the public would have it in mind to identify an Excise Officer with a Police Officer for all purposes. I am supported in this view by the observations of Sir Courtney Terrel in the recent Patna case to which I shall refer in detail presently ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... only certain Revenue Officers, such as Officers of the Excise and Salt departments, who are sometimes invested with the powers of a Police Officer in charge of a Police station, but a private individual may also under certain circumstances be invested with such powers. 50. For instance: Under Section 202, Criminal P. C, if an enquiry or investigation under that section is delegated to a private person, such person is to exercise all the powers conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure on an officer in charge of the police station except that he is not to have the powers to arrest without warrant. 51. Are we then to suppose that such a private individual should also be regarded as a Police Officer within the meaning of Section 25, Evidence Act? Another of the learned Judges discussing the same point said: It may be observed however that there are officers who have no powers of investigation under Criminal Procedure Code, e.g., police constables, and yet such officers are nevertheless "Police Officers" within the meaning of Section 25, Evidence Act. The mere possession of certain of the powers of a Police Officer even though those powers include the power of invest ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ruing a section such as the 25th, which was intended as a wholesome protection to the accused to construe it in its widest and most popular signification ." Then Sir Courtney-Terrell says: "This very sound decision, that the term "Police Officer" in Section 25, Evidence Act, includes all kinds of Police Officers, has been misunderstood as a decision that the term includes not only Police Officers but any on whom is conferred the powers of a Police Officer, although it has nowhere been decided what minimum aggregation of functions will constitute any person a Police Officer within the meaning of the section. 56. I would most emphatically agree with Sir Courtney-Terrell where he says the fact is that the term 'Police Officer' is sufficiently well understood to allow of its use without any precise definition. It is well recognized that different countries and states confer upon their respective Police Officers different powers. Nevertheless it is not difficult to decide whether any particular individual is or is not a Police Officer in any particular country and it has been held that: "A confession made to a Police Officer of a foreign force in the co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lice Officer in the sense in which that expression is generally understood by the populace at large and in no other sense at all. I would therefore hold that not only was the confession in the present case rightly admitted but any confession made to an officer acting under the Opium Act or the Excise Act would be equally well admissible in evidence unless it could be ruled out, under the provisions of Section 24, Evidence Act. Having regard to the importance of this matter to the public and the State and in view of the confusion set up by conflicting decisions it would seem desirable that the legislature should deal with the matter again and give a clear definition of what it is intended the section should cover and possibly whether the time has not now come when the slur on the police implied in Section 25 should not be removed by the repeal of the section altogether seeing that the provisions of Section 24 afford ample safeguards against any real oppression or coercion. Mallik, J. 60. I agree with my learned brother Mukerji, J. Jack, J. 61. The question referred to us is whether an Excise Officer who in the conduct of the investigation of an offence against the Excise, exerci ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ession, which would have greatly simplified the right decision of the case. In these circumstances the Courts should, I think, be very careful not to stretch the words used by the legislature to cover cases which do not come strictly within the terms of the section. Had the legislature intended to include confessions made to persons other than Police Officers surely it would have introduced words to that effect in the section, at least after Excise Officers were given police powers. I would suggest that there was no need to do so because Section 74, Excise Act, gives Excise Officers while engaged in the investigation of an excise case the status of a Police Officer for purposes of the investigation of the case, and the recording of a confession would be part of the investigation: Where the words of a statute are themselves precise and unambiguous those words are to be taken in their ordinary meaning. 66. There is, I think, no ambiguity in the term Police Officer, and therefore it was not considered necessary to give any definition of the term in the Evidence Act or in any other statute; we have simply to take the words in their ordinary meaning. Sir Richard Garth in the case of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... minal Procedure upon an officer in charge of police station for the investigation of a cognizable offence, a police officer within the meaning of Section 25, Evidence Act? 69. The learned Advocate General has pointed out that the question as formulated in this form does not, strictly speaking, arise out of the appeal which is against a conviction Under Section 9, Opium Act, and not one under the Bengal Excise Act 5 of 1909. He has however said that in view of the importance of the matter he would not press this technical objection and he has invited us to give our opinion on the question as stated above. The decision of this question turns upon a construction of Section 25, Evidence Act; in particular, upon a construction of the words "police officer" occurring therein. Sections 25, 26 and 27 were embodied in the Evidence Act from the Criminal Procedure Code, Act 25 of 1861. This is how Stephen puts the matter: I may observe upon the provisions relating to them that Sections 25, 26 and 27 were transferred to the Evidence verbatim from the Code of Criminal Procedure, Act 25 of 1661. They differ widely from the law of England, and were inserted in the Act of 1861 in orde ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... peration take effect in any place (Section 46). The Criminal Procedure Code of 1861, Act 25, does not define police officer, but it contains provisions regarding the duties and powers of a police officer in the matter of prevention, detection, and investigation of crime. 72. The later Code merely defines "officer in charge of a police station." The Calcutta Police Act (Act 4 of 1866) does contain a definition of police officer, but it is merely that it shall mean "any member of the Calcutta Police Force. 73. It also prescribes the duties (Section 10-A) which arising out of the exigencies of city, are not identical with the duties prescribed by Section 23 of Act 5 of 1861. No doubt the legislature of 1872 was cognisant of the duties and powers of a police officer of that period. But it is noteworthy that it used the words " police officer " in Section 25, Evidence Act, without any qualifying expression. By a later provision in Section 125 which was passed in 1887 a reference was made to "revenue officer" as distinct from " police officer." But in Section 25 the expression police officer " remained without any differentiation or ame ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rson should not be deemed to be a police officer within the meaning of the section. This is quite in keeping with the plain words of the section. The Golden Rule of legal interpretation has been stated thus: The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the statute, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity, repugnance and inconsistency, but no further. (Beal's Cardinal Rules of Legal Interpretation, 3rd Edn., p. 343, et seq.) 76. Where the authorities are collected, it does not seem to me that the interpretation which I have sought to put upon Section 25 goes contrary to this maxim. With great respect the opposite contention results in a stilted, narrow, and superficial view of law, by the application as it were of a copy book maxim. The words "police officer" may be plain, but they are not defined in the Evidence Act. The contention that the term applies only to members of the police force is not borne out by authority. On the other hand it is quite consistent with the scheme of the Act ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... his confession properly recorded. It is desirable that that should be so. Experience shows that even a confession which is recorded by a Magistrate with all the formalities and safeguards that the law provides has sometimes to be thrown out as being not a voluntary confession and great is the risk in the case of an extra judicial confession before an officer exercising police powers, since such confession is more often than not recorded in a slipshod and negligent manner. 79. In the Calcutta High Court there is a number of cases in which the view has been taken that a excise officer is not a police officer for the purpose of Section 25, Evidence Act. These cases are Rukumali v. Emperor AIR 1918 Cal 138; Ah Foong Chinaman v. Emperor AIR 1919 Cal 696; Harbhanjan Sao v. King-Emperor AIR1927Cal527 ; Tura Sardar v. Emperor AIR 1980 Cal 710 and Matilal Kalwar v. Emperor AIR1932Cal122 . In none of these cases however the question of an excise officer exercising powers of a police officer was discussed and it does not seem that in any of these cases except the last mentioned the attention of the learned Judges was directed to the material provisions of the Excise Act. In the case of Tura ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in its popular meaning, but as to this there may be some controversy. 81. The term 'popular' is elastic and large discretion is implied in its interpretation. Even in its popular meaning an excise officer may not be distinguishable from the police, for it is a common thing for people to refer to excise officer as 'excise police' or 'excise daroga' or 'abkari daroga' and so forth, and from the point of view of an accused person one certainly would not make a distinction as between an excise officer and a police officer. All this cannot be dismissed as a popular misconception, for it is no misconception at all. On the other hand it is in keeping with the Oxford Dictionary definition of the Word 'police' which is quoted in the judgment just delivered by my learned brother Mu-kerji, J. It may be that the power to investigate is not a complete test, because a police constable has no power to investigate ; one is landed in this sort of difficulty in trying to get at an exhaustive definition of the term 'police officer.' Nor should the case of a person who has been directed to inquire into a case Under Section 202, Criminal P. C, create an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... arently left to some extent to his discretion according to the circumstances and by Section 21 he is required to make a report within 48 hours. 83. Practically therefore in so far as the investigation is concerned an officer under the Opium Act exercises the powers of a police officer. In this respect he is in no way inferior to village chowkidar or patel who has been held to be police officers Under Section 25, Evidence Act. So far with regard to Act 1 of 1878. But the effect of the amendment by the Bengal Act 5 of 1933 is to bring the position in Bengal more completely into line with that under the Excise Act. By Section 12, Amendment Act the Local Government may authorize any class of officers of the Excise, Police or Customs Department to investigate offences and to grant bail to persons as arrested. They become the investigating police, with the necessary police powers. It is also enacted that the provisions of Section 162, Criminal P. C. shall apply to statements of witnesses as recorded, and also that the provisions of Section 172 of the Code shall apply to the diary of proceedings in investigation which is required to be kept. No doubt excise, police and customs officers a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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