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TMI Blog2024 (10) TMI 1328X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , Adv., Mr. Sahil Tagotra, AOR, Mr. N. Venkataraman, ASG, Mr. Prashanto Chandra, Sr. Adv., Mr. Kartikay Agarwal, Adv., Ms. Darshita Sethia, Adv., Mr. Rashi Goswami, Adv., Ms. Yashodhara Burmon Roy, Adv., Mr. Kunal Tandon, Adv., Ms. Shweta Bharti, Adv., Mr. Kr. Shashank Shekhar, Adv., Mr. Sachin Sharma, AOR, Mr. Anil Kr Gulati, Adv., Mr. Naman Sharma, Adv., Mr. Abhishek Kumar, Adv., Ms. Nur Tandon, Adv., Mr. Kunal Jindia, Adv. and Mr. Nishant Anand, Adv. For the Respondent: Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Sr. Adv., Mr. Sajan Poovayya, Sr. Adv., Ms. Amrita Narayan, Adv., Mr. Mohit D. Ram, AOR, Mr. Ashwin Rakesh, Adv., Mr. Saurobroto Dutta, Adv., Mr. Madhav Sharma, Adv., Ms. Raksha, Adv., Mr. Abhishek Kakkar, Adv., Mr. Palash Maheshwari, Adv., Mr. Amit Pawan, AOR, Mr. Buddy Ranganadhan, Adv., Ms. Nishtha Kumar, Adv., Mr. Prantar Basu Choudhury, Adv., Mr. Shrom Sethi, Adv., Mr. Sujay Jain, Adv., Mr. Sahil Tagotra, AOR, Dr. A.M. Singhvi, Sr. Adv., Mr. Arvind Datar, Sr. Adv., Mr. Sajan Poovayya, Sr. Adv., Mr. Maninder Singh, Sr. Adv., Mr. Mahesh Agarwal, Adv., Mr. Hemant Sahai, Adv., Mr. Ankur Saigal, Adv., Mr. Rishi Agrawala, Adv., Mr. Manu Kulkarni, Adv., Mr. Milanka Chaudhary, Adv., Ms. A ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t the Central Government must, by a notification, establish AERA within three months from the date of commencement of the Act. By a notification dated 12 May 2009, the Central Government established AERA. Section 13 of the AERA Act prescribes the functions of AERA. AERA must perform the following functions in respect of major airports: a. Determine tariff for aeronautical services [Section 13(1)(a)]; b. Determine the amount of development fees [Section 13(1)(b)]; c. Determine the passengers service fee levied under Rule 88 of the Aircraft Rules 1937 notified under the Aircraft Act 1934 [Section 13(1)(c)]; d. Monitor the performance standards relating to quality, continuity and reliability of service as specified by the Central Government or any other authority authorised by it [Section 13(1)(d)]; e. Call for information necessary to determine the tariff [Section 13(1)(e)]; and f. Perform such other functions relating to tariff which may be entrusted to it by the Central Government or which may be necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act [Section 13(1)(f)]. 4. Section 13(1)(a) also prescribes the factors which AERA must take into consideration to "determine" tar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... irport; d. For ground handling services relating to aircraft, passengers and cargo at an airport; e. For the cargo facility at an airport; f. For supplying fuel to the aircraft at an airport; and g. For stake holder at an airport. 7. Section 14 confers AERA with the power to call for an information and conduct investigation regarding the activities of a service provider. The provision confers it with the power to do the following by an order in writing: a. Call upon the service provider to furnish in writing such information or explanation relating to its functions to access the performance of the service provider; b. Appoint persons to inquire into the affairs of a service provider; c. Direct the inspection of book of accounts or other documents of any service provider; and d. Issue directions to monitor the performance of service providers. 8. The service provider is bound to produce all books of account and documents relating to the subject matter of the inquiry and furnish such statement or information. Section 15 confers AERA with the power to issue directions to service providers to discharge its functions under the Act.13 9. Section 17 provides that TDSAT ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ty, cannot be an "aggrieved party" at any stage of the proceedings. Since it cannot file an appeal before TDSAT, it also cannot file an appeal before this Court under Section 31 of the Act assailing the order of TDSAT. Section 18(2) provides that "any person" aggrieved by any direction, decision or order made by the Authority may prefer an appeal to TDSAT. AERA will not be covered by the expression "any person" since that would amount to AERA challenging its own order; b. AERA cannot defend its own actions in the appeal against its order since tariff determination is a quasi-judicial function: i. Numerous judgments of this Court have held that tariff determination is a quasi-judicial exercise (see PTC India v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission18, BSES Rajdhani Power Limited v. Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission19, Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd v. Union of India20 and GRIDCO v. Western Electricity Supply Company of Orissa Limited21); ii. The procedure followed by AERA while fixing tariff elucidates that it is a quasi-judicial exercise. Section 13(4) requires AERA to follow principles of natural justice before determining the tariff of aeronautical services; c. The AERA ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... al authority. It is a regulator which performs multiple functions other than determination of tariff; d. Even assuming that AERA is a quasi-judicial authority, the embargo that applies to judicial authorities, that they cannot contest an appeal against their own orders, need not always apply to quasi-judicial authorities; e. A comparison cannot be made with Section 53T of the Competition Act. Section 53T identifies the parties that can file an appeal, as opposed to Section 31 of the AERA Act which only mandates that "an appeal shall lie against any order, not being an interlocutory order of the Appellate Tribunal to the Supreme Court"; and f. Institutional bias is not recognised in Indian jurisprudence. An institution or authority is independent of its officers who act under it. C. Issues 15. The following issues arise for the consideration of this Court: a. Whether AERA has a right to contest an appeal against its order determining tariff for aeronautical services before TDSAT, and then consequently prefer an appeal against the order of TDSAT before this Court under Section 31 of the AERA Act; and b. Even if AERA does not have a right to contest an appeal against its ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s high time that the practice of impleading judicial officers disposing of civil proceedings as parties to writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or special leave petitions under Article 136 of the Constitution of India was stopped. We are strongly deprecating such a practice." 19. In Md. Omer v. S Noorudin24, an appeal was preferred against an order of the Registrar of Trade Marks before the High Court of Bombay. The Solicitor General of India put an appearance for the Registrar. The Solicitor General submitted that "he appeared to help the Court by pointing out certain errors in the judgment of the lower Court." The Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay held that though there are certain cases in which the Registrar should appear, this was not one such case. Chief Justice Chagla, writing for the Division Bench observed that the Solicitor General made a startling proposition by which the Judge of the Court of first instance appears before the Court of second appeal to argue that his judgment was correct and the judgment of the Court of the first appeal was wrong. The Bench observed that: (a) there may be cases in which the Registrar could ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ct that the Tribunal had become functus officio did not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to quash the order because the presence of the Election Tribunal, though proper, was not necessary.30 22. However, in Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Additional Member Board of Revenue31, a four-Judge Bench of this Court drew a fine line of distinction between an appeal against a decree and a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Tribunal. Justice K Subba Rao (as the learned Chief justice then was), writing for the Bench observed that the Tribunal is a necessary party if a writ of certiorari is filed to quash its order because: (a) otherwise the order of quashing could be ignored; and (b) a writ of certiorari is filed to quash orders of the Tribunal which are outside their jurisdiction as opposed to a regular appeal where the Court decides if the order is erroneous.32 23. In Jogendrasinhji Vijaysinghji v. State of Gujarat33, a two-Judge Bench of this Court culled out the following principles on the impleadment of Tribunals and Courts as parties in appeals against their orders after analysing the above three judgments. Justice Dipak Misra (as the learned Chief Justice then was) writ ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d STAT had overlooked material considerations while issuing transport permits. The counsel who appeared for STA and STAT before this Court asked for costs. Rejecting the argument, Justice PB Gajendragadkar writing for the majority of the Constitution Bench, observed that though STA and STAT were proper and necessary parties in the proceedings, it is unusual for them to be represented by counsel unless allegations are made against them for which they need to respond because "they are not interested in the merits of the dispute": "19. [...] It may be that in such proceedings, the Authority and the Appellate Tribunal are proper and necessary parties, but unless allegations are made against them which need a reply from them, it is not usual for the authorities to be represented by lawyers in Court. In ordinary cases, their position is like that of court or other Tribunals against whose decisions writ proceedings are filed; they are not interested in the merits of the dispute in any sense, and so, their representation by lawyers in such proceedings is wholly unnecessary and even inappropriate." (emphasis supplied) 27. In State Transport Authority Tribunal and Regional Transport Auth ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... with Section 26(1) of the Competition Act by providing information to allege that SAIL had abused its dominant position by entering into an exclusive supply agreement with Indian Railways. The Competition Commission of India rejected the application for extension of time by SAIL. It held that a prima facie case was made out against SAIL and directed the Director General to make an investigation. SAIL challenged the above order before the Competition Appellate Tribunal. The Commission filed an application for impleadment before the Competition Appellate Tribunal on the ground that it was a necessary and proper party. Emphasis was placed on Section 18 of the Competition Act to contend that the powers, functions and duties of the Commission required it to be impleaded as a party in the appeals filed before the Tribunal. The Tribunal dismissed the application for impleadment. An appeal was preferred against this order. This issue framed by this Court was: "whether the Commission would be a necessary or at least a proper party in the proceedings before the Tribunal in an appeal preferred by a party".46 A three-Judge Bench of this Court held that the Commission was a necessary party in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ssary in public interest.53 This principle must be extended to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Tribunal. The Competition Commission has a substantial interest in the outcome of the proceedings in most cases as the judgments of the Tribunal: (i) will be binding on it; (ii) provide guidelines for determining various matters of larger public interest; and (iii) affect the economic policy of the country. 31. The Competition Act, unlike the AERA Act, expressly provides the statutory authority with the right to present its case before the Appellate Tribunal.54 Section 52T of the Competition Act also expressly grants the Competition Commission the right to file an appeal before this Court against an order of the Appellate Tribunal.55 The judgment of this Court in Competition Commission of India (supra), however, does not hinge only on the express stipulations in the Competition Act. This Court drew a functional analysis of the role of the Competition Commission. This Court by creating a distinction between proceedings initiated by the Competition Commission suo moto and others, in effect made a classification between matters in which the Commission is an "interested party" and the on ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ry authority would have a legal interest in appeals against orders made by it in discharge of its regulatory duty. 33. In view of the above discussion, the following principles emerge: a. An authority (either a judicial or quasi-judicial authority) must not be impleaded in an appeal against its order if the order was issued solely in exercise of its "adjudicatory function"; b. An authority must be impleaded as a respondent in the appeal against its order if it was issued in exercise of its regulatory role since the authority would have a vital interest in ensuring the protection of public interest; and c. An authority may be impleaded as a respondent in the appeal against its order where its presence is necessary for the effective adjudication of the appeal in view of its domain expertise. iii. The test of quasi-judicial functions: A misnomer 34. The next issue is whether AERA is undertaking an adjudicatory function in determining tariff under Section 13(1)(a) of the AERA Act. We have already in the preceding section clarified that the test to be adopted is whether the authority was undertaking an adjudicatory exercise. However, before we proceed with this analysis, we de ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 'judicially' meant to comply with the principles of natural justice. Courts began diluting the distinction between quasi-judicial and administrative actions to ensure that administrative actions or proceedings by authorities which are not Courts in a strict sense also comply with the principles of natural justice. The term "quasi-judicial" came into vogue to describe the exercise of power which though administrative in some respects was required to be exercised judicially, that is, in accordance with the principles of natural justice because of its impact on the rights of persons affected.65 38. In R v. ex p London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920) Ltd.66, Lord Atkin laid down the following three components of a "quasi-judicial order": (a) there must be a legal authority; (b) the authority must determine questions affecting rights of subjects; and (c) the authority must have a duty to act judicially. This test has been applied by this Court in Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S Advani67, Shivji Nathubhai v. Union of India68 and Indian National Congress (I)69 to determine if a function is quasi-judicial. 39. In Khushaldas S Advani (supra), the issue before a four-Judge Bench ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Baldwin75, Lord Reid observed that the judicial character of the duty must be inferred from the nature of the duty itself. Since the decision in Ridge (supra), Courts have inferred the duty to act judicially, that is, in compliance with the principles of natural justice based on whether the decision adversely affects legal rights. Over time, Courts have abandoned the classification between quasi-judicial and administrative functions because the duty to act fairly, in compliance with the principles of natural justice has been read into administrative actions as well. 76 MP Jain and SN Jain in their treatise on Administrative law elucidate the reasons for the blurring of this distinction 77: "Differentiation between quasi-judicial and administrative seems to be merely an artificial formality, as many a time such a distinction is elusive and mostly a manner of judicial policy. Also, since the functions of the Administration have been expanding adversely affecting the rights and interests of individuals, the courts are convinced that it is essential to concede the right of hearing on a broader scale, but, at the same time, it may be artificial to call a function as quasi-judicial as ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... are the tests to identify them because the functions of an authority no more need to have any semblance to 'judicial functions' for it to act judicially (that is, comply with the principles of natural justice). 44. The observations in judgments of this Court that a quasi-judicial authority must not be impleaded as a party in an appeal against its order must be interpreted in view of the doctrinal expansion of the principle of fairness. The substitution of the standard of whether the Authority undertakes a quasi- judicial function with the test of adjudication is thus, not an aberration. It is a standard which is true to the purpose of the principle and which accounts for the subsequent constitutional developments. iv. The test for determining an 'adjudicatory function': Exploring Sitaram Sugar 45. Before we proceed to determine if tariff-determination by AERA is an adjudicatory function, we must answer a more preliminary question: what are the tests to identify if a function is an adjudicatory one? 46. In Sitaram Sugar (supra), the constitutional validity of notifications issued under Section 3(3C) of the Essential Commodities Act 1995 was before a Constitution Bench of this C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the amount determined based on the price is adjudicatory because the former applies generally to a class of commodities while the latter is decided after taking individual aspects into consideration. This Court also held that price fixation can be of a legislative character even if it is based on an objective criteria87. 88 48. Two principles are deducible from the judgment of this Court in Sitaram Sugar (supra). The first is that one of the factors to determine if an order was issued in exercise of an adjudicatory function, is whether it was specific to an individual or of general application. The second is that it is not necessary that a legislative action must always be 'subjective' and an adjudicatory function 'objective'. The Constitution Bench repudiated this distinction by observing that a legislative action can also be based on an objective set of factors. v. Whether tariff determination is an adjudicatory function: PTC and GRIDCO 49. In PTC (supra), a Constitution Bench of this Court made certain observations on the fixation of tariff by the Electricity Commission under the provisions of the Electricity Act 2003 89. Section 61 of the Electricity Act provides that the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rule or regulation, emanates from the exercise of delegated legislative power which is a part of administrative process resembling enactment of law by the legislature whereas a quasi-judicial order comes from adjudication which is also a part of administrative process resembling a judicial decision by a court of law. (See Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India [(1990) 3 SCC 223] .) 50. Applying the above test, price fixation exercise is really legislative in character, unless by the terms of a particular statute it is made quasi-judicial as in the case of tariff fixation under Section 62 made appealable under Section 111 of the 2003 Act, though Section 61 is an enabling provision for the framing of regulations by CERC. If one takes "tariff" as a subject-matter, one finds that under Part VII of the 2003 Act actual determination/fixation of tariff is done by the appropriate Commission under Section 62 whereas Section 61 is the enabling provision for framing of regulations containing generic propositions in accordance with which the appropriate Commission has to fix the tariff. This basic scheme equally applies to the subject-matter "trading margin" in a different statutory ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... red an appeal against the order of the Appellate Tribunal.90 The judgment of the two- Judge Bench in GRIDCO (supra) also dealt with the nature of function of the Appropriate Commission under Section 62 of the Electricity Act which was already settled by the judgment of the Constitution Bench in PTC (supra) that it was adjudicatory. vi. Tariff determination for aeronautical services by AERA is a regulatory function 53. The question that falls for our consideration is whether AERA in exercise of its power under Section 13(1)(a) of the AERA Act is discharging an adjudicatory function. The issue of whether AERA is a necessary or a proper party must be determined based on whether the AERA is an aggrieved/interested party or merely an expert body whose views would be necessary for the effective adjudication of the appeal. 54. A simplistic conclusion that AERA regulates tariff and does not adjudicate it cannot be arrived at merely because the long title to the AERA Act states that AERA is established to, inter alia, "regulate tariff". An analysis of the statutory provisions must indicate the regulatory character of tariff determination by AERA. 55. Before we proceed to analyse the st ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sistently applied by this Court in drawing the distinction is to determine if the function is discharged in the capacity of a regulator or an adjudicator. Now, it may be possible that certain statutes create a clear distinction between the regulatory and adjudicatory roles with respect to the same function. When such a distinction is created, the Authority does not put on the hat of a regulator while undertaking the adjudicatory function. On the other hand, certain other statutes may require the Authority to 'determine' something in its capacity as a regulator. In such cases, a clear distinction between the adjudication and regulatory functions cannot be drawn. 58. On an analysis of the statutory provisions, it can be reasonably concluded that AERA is performing a regulatory function while determining tariff under Section 13(1)(a) of the AERA Act. The reasons for this conclusion are summarised below: a. It cannot be concluded that AERA is performing an adjudicatory function merely because Section 13(1)(a) uses the phrase "determine" with respect to tariff. This would amount to a formalistic interpretation. The Court ought to make an assessment by undertaking a holistic analysis; ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erent airports. This, it is argued, is a specific/individualistic component which is an indicator of the adjudicatory function. It is true that this Court in Sitaram Sugar (supra) held that one of the factors to assess if a function is adjudicatory is by determining if it has a specific or a general application. However, the observations cannot be interpreted to mean that it is an overarching consideration in the determination of whether the function is adjudicatory. Neither can it be interpreted to mean that the factor must be considered de hors the context. The consideration of the factors while exercising the function is equally and if not more important as a factor. As the judgment in Sitaram Sugar (supra) notes, "judicial decisions are made according to law while administrative decisions emanate from administrative policy." 95 As held above, the factors to be considered by AERA in terms of Section 13(1)(a) are purely 'policy' factors. Further, the function of AERA to determine tariff must be read in the context of the role of the Authority as a 'regulator' as has been highlighted above. Modern constitutional governance requires that legislation is not general but context speci ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the precedent, concluded that the Authority can be impleaded as a respondent in an appeal against its order even if the provisions of the statute do not provide for it. This power can be read by necessary implication based on the role conferred on the Authority by the statute. To recall, Section 17(1)(a) grants TDSAT the jurisdiction to adjudicate any dispute between two parties, either between two service providers or a service provider or a consumer. There is clearly a lis before TDSAT in such cases. However, the proviso to the section recognises the expertise of AERA in the economic regulation of airports by providing TDSAT with the discretion to "obtain the opinion of the Authority on any matter relating to the dispute". This is referable to the role of AERA as a proper party in the proceedings, where its expertise may be required for the effective adjudication of the dispute. 63. However, when it comes to appeals against the tariff orders issued by AERA, it is not just acting as an 'expert body' but as a regulator interested in the outcome of the proceedings. AERA has a statutory duty to regulate tariff upon a consideration of multiple factors to ensure that airports are run ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ng with statutory appeal are drafted. First, the provision may not prescribe who can file an appeal such as Section 31 of the AERA Act. Second, the provision may provide that an appeal may be preferred by a 'person aggrieved' such as under the Electricity Act 96, the Major Port Authorities Act 202197, the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act 199298 and the Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority Act 201299. The third category is where the statute confers 'any party' with the right to file an appeal as under the Companies Act 2013.100 With respect to the first of the three categories, at a minimum the parties to the appeal before first appellate body (in this case TDSAT) will have a right to file an appeal before this Court. AERA can file an appeal under Section 31 in view of our conclusion that it is a necessary party in the appeals against the tariff orders issued by it. E. Conclusion 67. In view of the discussion above, the appeals filed by AERA against orders of TDSAT under Section 31 of the AERA Act are maintainable. The Registry shall list the matters before the Regular Bench for adjudication of the appeals on merits. Footnotes 1 "AERA" 2 "AERA Act" 3 "TD ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... re within the purview of the Competition Act, 2002 (12 of 2003); (iv) relating to an order of eviction which is appealable under section 28K of the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994 (55 of 1994). (b) hear and dispose of appeal against any direction, decision or order of the Authority under this Act. 15 "18. Application for settlement of disputes and appeals to Appellate Tribunal.-(1) The Central Government or a State Government or a local authority or any person may make an application to the Appellate Tribunal for adjudication of any dispute as referred to in clause (a) of section 17. (2) The Central Government or a State Government or a local authority or any person aggrieved by any direction, decision or order made by the Authority may prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. (3) Every appeal under sub-section (2) shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date on which a copy of the direction or order or decision made by the Authority is received by the Central Government or the State Government or the local authority or the aggrieved person and it shall be in such form, verified in such manner and be accompanied by such fee as may be prescribed: Pr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ded by the Judge of the trial Court appearing by counsel and telling us what the mistakes in the judgment of the lower Court are. We take it that this Court is sufficiently competent to find out for itself, with the guidance of the counsel of parties, as to what errors, if any, have been committed by the lower Court. We, therefore, think that it was entirely wrong on the part of the Registrar in this case to have appeared merely for the purpose of elucidating his own judgment and pointing out the errors in the judgment of the Court below. That is not the proper function of the Court of first instance, and in this case the Registrar is nothing else except the Court of first instance. [...] But, as I said before, this Court neither needs illumination nor guidance from the Judge of the first instance as to what are the errors in the judgment of the lower appellate Court." [emphasis supplied]; Also see the judgments of the Delhi High Court in Union Public Service Commission v. Shiv Shambhu25 and SBI v. Mohd. Shahjahan25 in which the impleadment of the Competition Commission of India as a respondent in writ petitions filed challenging its orders was reprimanded. 26 2004 SCC OnLine Kar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... SCC 702 [40] 45 (2010) 10 SCC 744 46 (2010) 10 SCC 744 [30.3] 47 The Competition Act 2002; Section 53S; Also see the Competition Commission of India (General) Regulations 2009; Regulation 51 48 (2010) 10 SCC 744 [104] 49 (2010) 10 SCC 744 [105,112] 50 See Brahm Dutt v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 730 51 (2010) 10 SCC 744 [106] 52 "2009 Regulation" 53 The Competition Commission of India (General) Regulations 2009; Regulation 25(1) 54 Competition Commission of India Act 2002; Section 53S(2) 55 "53T. Appeal to Supreme Court.- The Central Government or any State Government or the Commission or any statutory authority or any local authority or any enterprise or any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the Supreme Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal to them: Provided that the Supreme Court may, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed after the expiry of the said period of sixty days." [emphasis supplied] 56 The Competition Act, 2002; Section 19(1) 57 Orde ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... remedy is available even though the decision is merely a step as a result of which legally enforceable rights may be affected." 80 (1969) 2 SCC 262 [13] 81 "20. [...] If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquires. [...] Arriving at a just decision I the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries." [emphasis supplied] 82 AIR 1978 SC 597 83 "The law must, therefore, now be taken to be well settled that even in an administrative proceeding, which involved civil consequences, the doctrine of natural justice must be held to be applicable." Also see SL Kapoor v. Jagmohan, AIR 1981 SC 136 84 (a) the minimum price, if any, fixed for sugarcane by the Central Government under this section; (b) the manufacturing cost of sugar; (c) the duty or tax, if any, paid or payable thereon; (d) the securing of a reasonable return on the capital employed in the business of manufacturing sugar, 85 (1990) 3 SCC 223 [34] 86 (1987 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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