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TMI Blog1957 (5) TMI 51X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... company, having been taken into service on the 29th October 1948 and 26th February 1951, respectively. They were retrenched on the 5th April 1954 and 8th April 1954, respectively. It is alleged that, at the time of this retrenchment, none of them made any protest nor was any demand made by them against the Company. Further, it is alleged that even the opposite party No. 1, The Textile Mill Mazdoor Union, Mirzapur, at that stage made no protest and made no demand in respect of that retrenchment; on the other hand, on their applications dated 6th April 1954 and 10th April 1954, respectively, these two person's were given temporary jobs by the petitioner-Company for the period of. three months as ice clerks in a subsidiary business. This temporary employment of these two persons was terminated on the -13th July 1954 and 17th July 1954, respectively. It is stated that even at this stage there was no protest or demand on their behalf. In the same month of July 1954, the petitioner-Company received a notice from the Regional Conciliation Officer, Allahabad, stating that the latter had received an application from opposite party No. 1, The Textile Mill Mazdoor Union. Mirzapur. with ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tte. The matters referred for adjudication were: "(1) Whether the employers have wrongfully or unjustifiably terminated the services of Aditya Prasad and Tasadduq Husain. If so to what relief; are they entitled? and (2) Whether the employers should be required to pay bonus to their workmen for the year 1952-53. If so, at what rate, and with details?" The Regional Conciliation Officer, who was appointed as the Adjudicator, gave his award on the 19th June 1955. By this award the claim for restoration in service of Aditya Prasad and Tasadduq Husain was rejected, but they were allowed retrenchment compensation. The award also directed payment of bonus to the workmen for the year 1952-53. This award dated 19th June 1955, is the second order impugned in this writ petition. Two appeals were filed against this award before the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Lucknow Bench. The two appeals were decided together, The result of; the two decisions of the Labour Appellate Tribunal was that, in place of retrenchment compensation, a direction was issued for reinstatement of Aditya Prasad and Tasadduq Husain. In addition, the payment of bonus to the workmen for the year 1952-53 wa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal itself. The second point urged by learned counsel was that in any case a part of the record of. the Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lucknow Bench, was still within the jurisdiction of this Court and consequently this Court had not lost jurisdiction to quash the decision of that Tribunal or thereafter to quash the award given by the Adjudicator. 4. The first point was urged by learned counsel on the basis of Section 16 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, which is to the following effect:-- "16. Effect of decision of the Appellate Tribunal -- Where on appeal from any award or decision of an Industrial Tribunal, the Appellate Tribunal modifies in any manner whatsoever that award or decision, the decision of the Appellate Tribunal shall, when it becomes enforceable under Section 15, be deemed to be substituted for that award or decision of the Industrial Tribunal and shall have effect for all purposes in the same manner and in accordance with the same law under which the award or decision of the Industrial Tribunal was made as if the Industrial Tribunal made the award or decision as modified by the decision of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ity remains in existence incorporating in it the unmodified portion of the award or decision of the subordinate Tribunal or authority. How the further action on that decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal has to be taken is also indicated by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act itself. Under Section 9 (9) of that Act, the Appellate Tribunal is required to send a copy of the decision to the Industrial Tribunal concerned and another copy to the appropriate Government, as soon as practicable, within one week from the date of the decision. The decision of the Tribunal has therefore to be communicated to the State Government under Section 9 (9) of that Act. It is not to be communicated in the manner in which an award has to be submitted by the Adjudicator under Section 6(1) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. After a copy of the decision o£ the Appellate Tribunal has reached the State Government, of course, the State Government has to enforce that decision in exactly the Same manner and in accordance with the same law under which the award of the Adjudicator had been made -- viz., the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The provisions o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... at the procedure that has to be followed for enforcement of a decision "of the Labour Appellate Tribunal does not involve compliance with Section 6(1) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. That provision is confined to the submission of the award by an Adjudicator to the State Government. In the case of a decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, there is a separate and specific provision in Section 9 (9) of; the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, which indicates how the decision of the Tribunal is to be communicated so that subsequently it can be enforced. The method of communication that has been prescribed is that a copy of the decision is to be sent to the Adjudicator and another copy to the State Government. The State Government has to take proceedings for enforcement of the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal on the basis of the copy received by it under Section 9(9) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. The law does not thus require that the original decision must be sent to the State Government. It would form part of the record of the case in which that decision is given by the Appellate Tribunal and we have before us a de ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... award had been given by an Adjudicator and that award had been substituted by a decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lucknow Bench, could not stand in the way of this Court exercising the powers of restraining further action being taken in pursuance of that notification, because if that notification was void and against law, the Adjudicator and the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India in fact got no jurisdiction ab initio to adjudicate upon or give any decision on the disputes referred by the State Government by this notification so that the award and the decision of the Tribunal could be ignored as altogether void. Briefly put, the contention was that, if any judicial or quasi-judicial Tribunal exercises jurisdiction and the conferment of that jurisdiction is ab initio void, there is no necessity for issue of any writ of certiorari to quash the decision of the Tribunal and the Court would be competent to issue appropriate directions and orders completely ignoring the effect of that decision. This proposition was contested on behalf of the opposite parties but it is supported by a Division Bench decision of this Court in Moinuddin v. Deputy Director of Military Lands and Cant ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ) of the Central Industrial Disputes Act as amended by the Industrial (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 1953 reads as follows : "In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, (a) "appropriate Government" means (i) in relation to any industrial dispute concerning any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government or by a railway company or concerning any such controlled industry as may be specified in this behalf, by the Central Government or in relation to an industrial dispute concerning a banking or an insurance company, a mine, oil field or a major port, the Central Government, and (ii) in relation to any other industrial dispute, the Provincial Government." The contention on behalf of the petitioner Company is that the industry carried on by the petitioner Company is a controlled industry which has been specified in this behalf by the Central Government within the meaning of this expression as used in Section 2(a)(i) of the Central Industrial Disputes Act. That the industry carried on by the petitioner Company is a controlled industry cannot be doubted. In Section 2 of the Industries De ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he petitioner company as has been held above. The main argument has centred round the other requirement that the industry must be specified in this behalf by the Central Government. On behalf of the petitioner company, no notification or Government order of the Central Government has been brought to our notice in which there might have been a specification of this particular industry as an industry Specified for the purposes of Section 2(a)(i) of the Central Industrial Disputes Act. On the other hand, on behalf of the opposite parties, our attention has been drawn to a notification issued by the Central Government, Ministry of Labour on 27th April, 1955 under which the controlled industries engaged in the production or use of certain minerals mentioned in the schedule annexed to that notification were specified by the Central Government for the purposes of Sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of Section 2 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act. The controlled industries mentioned in that notification are not covered by the first Schedule to the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 as amended in 1953. The controlled industries mentioned in that notification came within the pu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f Section 2 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act. This contention cannot be accepted. Section 10 and 11 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1950 as amended in 1953 deal with "industrial undertakings" and not with an "industry" as such. In Clause (d) of Section 3 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 the word 'Industrial undertaking' was defined to mean any undertaking pertaining to a scheduled industry carried on in one or more factories by any person or authority including Government. In Clause (i) of the same Section a 'scheduled industry' was defined to mean any of the industries specified in the first schedule. The words 'industrial undertaking' were therefore given by the Act a meaning which was separate and distinct from the word 'industry'. The word 'industry' was envisaged as covering all kinds of undertakings engaged in working on materials mentioned in the first schedule. If the manufacture or production of iron and steel was carried on anywhere under any circumstance, that would be an industry engaged in the manufacture and production of iron and steel. It would not however ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or the purposes of Sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of Section 2 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act in the same manner. Such specification must, therefore, be a separate specification designed particularly to satisfy the requirements of Sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of Section 2 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act and so far as the industry of the petitioner-Company is concerned there has been no such separate specification. 9. In support of his argument that the registration or licensing under Ss. 10 and 11 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, should be held to be the specification envisaged in Sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of Section 2 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act, learned counsel drew our attention to the fact that the Central Industrial Disputes Act itself contains no provision prescribing the manner in which the specification was to be made and published. It is true, that, in a number of statutes, a direction is laid down as to the manner in which a particular order, direction, declaration, or specification must be notified by the authority making it and in the majority of the cases the manner prescribed is by publication in the official Gaze ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d on behalf of the petitioner-Company was that in fact it was not necessary to refer the industrial dispute for adjudication for one or more of the purposes mentioned in Section 3 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, so that the reference as a whole was void. The necessity of issuing the notification and making the reference were matters which under the law are to be determined by the subjective satisfaction of the Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh and it is not within the competence of this Court to see whether the satisfaction of the Government was or was not fully justified. The fact of the actual existence of the industrial dispute had also to be determined to the satisfaction of the State of Uttar Pradesh and the correctness of this satisfaction is also not open to question in Courts. These principles have been laid down in several decisions of this Court, but it is sufficient for us in this case to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court which covers the point. That case is State of Madras v. C. P. Sarathy. The principle was further reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Newspapers Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal, U. P. which was decided by that Cou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ant considerations for arriving at the view whether a dispute did or did not exist. The fact that a reference had been made to the Regional Conciliation Officer in the matter of their retrenchment in the month of June 1954 was another relevant consideration. These were the materials on the basis of which the Government of Uttar Pradesh had to form its. opinion about the factual existence of the dispute. It cannot be said that the opinion formed by the Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh was in these circumstances a perverse or impossible opinion which had no relation to the existing facts. The factual existence of the dispute having been found by the State Government, it was again for the Government of State of Uttar Pradesh to judge the expediency of making the reference. The existence of that expediency had been mentioned by the State Government in the notification itself and again we cannot sit in judgment over the opinion formed by the Government. All that we are competent to see is whether the dispute that was referred did or did not constitute an industrial dispute and satisfied the requirements of an industrial dispute as given in the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act un ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... greater detail and it was held that these words could not include a labourer working in a concern situate in a different country or situate in a completely different type of industry. The word's have to be given a restricted meaning according to the context and the objects for which the Industrial Disputes Act had been enacted. The decision of the Bombay High Court in Narendra Kumar v. All India Industrial Disputes Tribunal, was referred to and the views expressed by the learned Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court on this point were followed. It had been held by the learned Chief Judge of the Bombay High Court that the words 'any person' could only mean those persons in whom the workmen themselves were directly and substantially interested. If the workmen have no direct or substantial interest in the employment or non-employment of a person then an industrial dispute could not arise with regard to such person. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 213 of 1956, D/- 20-3-1957., also supports this view. In that case, the dispute in the reference related to the wrongful termination of the service of one individual Tajarnmul HuSain, Lino Operator. In the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nly an indication in the counter-affidavit filed by Sri J.N. Srivastava, Regional Conciliation Officer, Allahabad, that very likely Aditya PraSad and Tasadduq Husain were members of this Union when he swore in respect of these-persons that 'the aforesaid employees and their Union has a right to raise their disputes even after their retrenchment.' The description of opposite party No. 1, The Textile Mill Mazdoor Union, Mirzapur, as the union of employees, Aditya Prasad and Tasadduq Husain points to the fact that they were member's of this Union. The burden in this case where a petitioner-Company came to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court of, law was on that petitioner-Company to show that the Union was not competent to take up this dispute and that their taking up the dispute did not amount to raising a dispute between an employer and workmen. They failed to do so whereas whatever material has been provided before us indicates that the Union was interested directly in the dispute which arose as a result of the retrenchment of Aditya Prasad and Tasadduq Husain. Both the contentions raised by learned counsel for the petitioner-Company to challenge the validity of the n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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