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TMI Blog1953 (5) TMI 35X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... March 1953 is void on the ground of inconsistency with the provisions of part III of the Constitution, (b) to call for the records of the U.P. Legislative Assembly proceedings dated the 30th March 1953, the proceedings of the privileges Committee dated the 7th, 17th, 25th and the 26th March 1953 and quash the resolution dated the 30th March 1953, (c) to issue a suitable order, writ or direction asking the opposite parties to expunge the above-mentioned resolution of the said Assembly dated the 30th March 1953 from the proceedings of the U.P. Legislative Assembly and (d) to order the payment of costs to the petitioner. 2. I should have been disposed to reject this application on the simple ground that it is not competent to this Court, for reasons to be indicated hereafter, to grant the reliefs asked for, had it not been for the fact that the learned Advocate-General has made it clear that the opposite-parties do not wish to take their stand on the technical ground that the reliefs are not properly framed. Repeatedly this Court has emphasised that a party seeking relief under Article 226 of the Constitution should precisely state what writ, order or direction it is that he seeks fo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... h the legislature. It is well known that no writ, direction or order restraining the Speaker from allowing a particular question to be discussed or interfering with the legislative processes of either house of the legislature or interfering with the freedom of discussion or expression of opinion in either house can be entertained. On this part of the case, I may quote Article 285 of Mr. Perris's Extraordinary Legal Remedies. It runs as follows: "Under the common law mandamus Is issued in the King's name to inferior Courts, officers, corporations or persons. Being in the King's name, it did not run to himself; 'nor did it run to Parliament', nor to the judiciary, except to such inferior Courts as the higher Courts had the power to review. Under our system of Government the executive power answers to that of the King, the legislative power takes the place of parliament, and the judicial power is vested in Courts established in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Where the force and effect of the common-law writ of mandamus, and its objects and purposes are unchanged, it follows that the writ never issues to the legislative branch of the Governmen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... bered paragraphs the grounds upon which the Court is asked to issue a direction, order or writ but also to specify in the prayer clearly, so far as circumstances permit, the exact nature of the relief sought. Undoubtedly, the prayer for relief in this case has not been framed with due regard to the considerations to which attention has been drawn above. While inviting our attention to the defects in the prayer for relief, the learned Advocate General, however, stated that he did not want a decision on technical grounds alone as not only a question of the status and the dignity of the Speaker but also that of the legislature was involved. While we would have been justified in dismissing this application on the simple ground that the reliefs asked for were neither precisely nor intelligibly stated, I think that having regard to the importance of the case and the issue that it raises and the further fact that the procedure in regard to writ applications is not very well understood, even after the framing of the new High Court Rules, it is not desirable to rest our decision on technical grounds alone. With these preliminary observations, I shall now proceed with a narration of the fac ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... statement about the matter & to ask for leave of the House to move his adjournment motion. The applicant thereafter rose in his seat and after a short statement asked for the leave of the House. Objection to leave being granted was taken by the Minister for Home Affairs, Shri Sampurnanand. On that being done, the Speaker asked the members who were prepared to support the motion to rise in their places so that he might be able to find out if the requisite number of thirty-six members was there to support the motion for leave. At that stage there was an intervention by another member, Shri Narain Dutt Tiwari. He requested the Speaker to give his consent under Rule 221 to enable him to move the suspension of Rule 71 (3). Rule 71 (3) requires that at least one-twelfth of the total number of the House, i.e., 36 members must rise in support of the motion for leave before such a motion can be considered if objection is taken by any member to its being taken up. The Speaker was not prepared to allow a consideration of the question of suspension of the rule under Rule 221 as it was a day fixed for the voting of the demands. An assurance was, however, given by the Speaker that permission to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Narain Tripathi had been removed from the House, the Speaker drew the attention of the House to the intransigent attitude that they had adopted and observed that, in his opinion, their conduct constituted a breach of the privileges of the House. He did not think that the incident should be ignored. He referred the matter to the Committee of Privileges and suggested that the Committee should examine and Investigate and report on the conduct of the members against whom action had been taken in the interests of order. The privileges Committee met on the 7th, 17th, 24th and 26th March 1953 and submitted its report. On the 17th March the applicant was called upon by it to state whether he was guilty of a breach of privilege of the House. He denied that he had been guilty of any breach. It may be added that according to the applicant it turned down his request to be represented by Counsel. It may also be mentioned that according to the applicant no charges were supplied to him even on his asking for them. The committee was not, however, unanimous in regard to the recommendation for action to be taken against the intransigent members, there being majority and minority reports. On the reco ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in the two great cases which exhaust the learning on the subject -- 'Burdett v. Abbott' (1811) 14 East 1 (C) and -- 'Stockdale v. Hansard' (1839) 9 Ad and E 1 (D) -- are agreed, and are emphatic. The Jurisdiction of the Houses over their own members, their right to Impose discipline within their walls, is absolute and exclusive. To use the words of Lord Ellen-borough, 'They would sink into utter contempt and inefficiency without it. (1811) 14 East 1 at p. 152' (C)." The facts which have been narrated by me are based upon the affidavits and have not been taken from the proceedings, but I have considered it necessary to state them as fully as I could as they are essential for an understanding of the points and issues which have been raised and the arguments which have been advanced in this case. I am well aware of the observations of Sir Maurice Gwyer, C. J. in --'in the matter of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor ispirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938, regarding the relevance for historical purposes, in constitutional cases of parliamentary paper such as, for example, the Proposals for Indian constitutional reform commonly known as the Wh ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... law and the special rights of the House of Lords." Though the Houses have never expressly given up the claim that they and they alone can interpret and determine the extent and limits of their privileges, the position that the Courts have taken consistently is that it is for each House, unless Parliament decrees otherwise by law to determine the limits of the privileges of each House, while allowing each of them within those limits exclusive jurisdiction. The reasons for the importance attaching to privileges of Parliament are not far to seek. In order that a free competition of ideas in regard to the various matters the legislature has to deal with, including a ventilation of grievances through examination of legislative proposals or a reasonable scrutiny of administrative acts, might be effectively possible it is vitally necessary that not only should a member of the legislature not have the fear that he can be penalised for anything that is said or done within the four walls of the legislature, but also that each House should itself have complete control over its proceedings and internal affairs. Thus it is a truism to say that the right to regulate its own procedure and, indee ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ference to or dependence on the other. This enjoyment is due, as May points out, at page ...... not to any separate right peculiar to each but solely by virtue of the law and custom of Parliament. Thus both Houses possess privileges, though they are not exactly similar in nature. They are declared, explained and interpreted by each House; their violations or breaches are adjudged and censured by each; but still it is the law of Parliament that is thus administered. While, to repeat what has been said already, neither House has ever expressly renounced the claim not only to be the judge of the breach of its own privileges but of their very existence or limits, the courts have nevertheless consistently taken the view that neither House of Parliament has power by any vote, resolution or declaration to create for themselves new privileges not justified by the known laws and customs of Parliament. Reference may be made here to Article 9 of the Bill of Rights (1688) which confirmed the long standing claim of each House of Parliament to exclude all outside interference within its four walls. That great document lays down : 'that freedom of speech and debate or proceedings in Parlia ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... use the language or Lord Coleridge, C. J., in (1884) 12 QBD 271 (B)', that: "if the House of Commons is,--as for certain purposes and in relation to certain persons it certainly is, and is on all hands admitted to be,--the absolute judge of its own privileges, it is obvious that it can, at least for those purposes and in relation to those persons, practically change or practically supersede the law." 12. I have considered it desirable to state the law relating to privileges before grappling with the questions which this case raises as I think that much of the argument in this case on behalf of the applicant is based upon the assumption that an erroneous decision by Mr. Speaker or the House in respect of a breach of privilege can be the subject-matter of scrutiny by a Court of law. There is nothing startling in the proposition that finality attaches where under cover of it no new privilege is created by the House to a decision of the House in respect of a matter relating to its privileges. On this part of the case, I may quote the observations of Stephen J. in -- 'Bradlaugh v. Gossett (B)', referred to above. They are to the following effect: "It would, as I have al ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ;Bradlaugh's case (B)' was, as is well-known, of a duly elected member entitled to take the oath by law prescribed to be taken by the members of the House of Commons being refused to do so by the Speaker who directed the serjeant at arms to exclude him by actual force from the House until he should engage not further to disturb its proceedings. These cases forcibly illustrate the complete degree of internal autonomy which the House of Commons enjoys in a matter relating to its internal affairs. On this part of the case, see Holdworth's History of English Law, Vol. 10, pp. 539-550; Anson's Law and Custom of the Constitution. Vol. 4 (Parliament pages 151-178 also Vol. 6, pp. 268-273 of the Constitution; Keir and Lawson's cases on constitutional law, p. 72.) 13. On the question whether it was wise and statesmanlike to pursue the matter after Shri Raj Narain Singh had been ejected from the House it would be improper for me to express any opinion. Obviously, this Court is not, in any sense whatever a Court of appeal or revision against the legislature or against the rulings of the Speaker who, as the holder of an office of the highest distinction, has the sole respo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tate what the present position in regard to the law relating to privileges of the British House of Commons is as Article 194 declares that the Privileges of each House of the State Legislature and the members thereof shall be, save in respect of matters specified in Clauses 1 and 2 of Article 194, the same as those enjoyed by the British House of Commons and its members. The broad facts on which the learned argument advanced to this Court by Shri Iqbal Ahmad is based have been stated by me in an earlier part of this judgment. What he contends is that under the procedure as it obtains in the British House of Commons under Standing Orders 21 to 24, the Speaker has been invested, with the power to direct a member whose conduct is disorderly in the House, to withdraw from the House and such withdrawal has the effect of suspending him for the rest of the day's sitting. Where, however, a member is guilty of a disorderly behaviour for a second time, or where the speaker thinks it desirable that a more severe notice should be taken of the member's conduct, the Speaker names the member, that is to say submits his conduct to the judgment of the House before the member actually leave ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o carry out his order at any stage of the proceedings. Undeniably the Speaker has been invested with the power under Rule 67 to refer any matter he chooses to the Committee of Privileges. The learned Advocate General has sought to justify the departure from British practice on the ground of its suitability to the peculiar requirements of working parliamentary institutions in a Country which is new to them. On the question whether that reason is a good one or not, it would be improper for me to express any opinion for obviously the matter is capable of being looked at from different angles. There is the point of view that Oppositions are weak in our Legislatures, and that the tendency to associate every person in authority in any capacity with the Government of the day is still wrong. It may well be that naming a member, i.e., submitting him to the judgment of the House at the very time the incident occurs has the merit of not bringing the Speaker into the area of controversy. These are considerations, however, with which this Court has no concern and on which I do not think it proper to dogmatise. Rule 67 of the Rules of procedure of the State Assembly makes it abundantly clear th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e goes beyond a matter of procedure and on this point again I would invite attention to the observations of Stephen J. at p. 285: -- '(1884) 12 QBD 271 (B)'. While there is no doubt that the right of a member to continue to represent his constituency in Parliament gets affected by his suspension for whatever period, yet even on that assumption there is no legal remedy open to a member if his rights get affected by something done within the walls of the legislature. Apart from the cases to which reference has been made, Article 212(2) of the Constitution is decisive on this point. Article 212 is in the following terms: "212, (1) The validity of any proceedings in the Legislature of a State shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure. (2) No officer or member of the Legislature of a State in whom powers are vested by or under this Constitution for regulating procedure or the conduct of business, or for maintaining order, in the Legislature shall be subject to the jurisdiction of any Court in respect of the exercise by him of those powers." 17. For the reasons given above, this part of the case fails. But it is so interconnecte ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 20(2) governs it. To appreciate this point, it is desirable to reproduce Article 194. "(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the rules and standing orders regulating the procedure of the Legislature, there shall be freedom of speech in the Legislature of every State. (2) No member of the Legislature of a State shall be liable to any proceedings in any Court in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in the Legislature or any committee thereof, and no person shall be so liable in respect of the publication by or under the authority of a House of such a Legislature of any report, paper, votes or proceedings. "(3) In other respects, the powers, privileges and immunities of a House of the Legislature of a State, and of the members and the Committees of a House of such Legislature, shall be such as may from time to time be defined by the Legislature by law, and until so defined, shall be those of the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and of its members and committees, at the commencement of this Constitution. (4) The provisions of Clauses (1), (2) and (3) shall apply in relation to persons who by virtue of this Constitution h ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , I do not think that we would be justified in going so far as to say on the basis of speculation that words like 'subject to the provisions of the Constitution' have been used. only where a matter dealt with by an article is also the subject-matter of some other article. It strikes me that whenever the founding fathers intended that a provision of the Constitution, whether it be described as Fundamental or not, should govern it they said so. Incidentally it may be pointed out that the Fundamental rights conceded by our Constitution have not been conceived, of as 'natural, sacred and inalienable' rights which may not be changed at all like the Law of the Medes and Persians, but as rights which can be changed in the exercise of the constituent powers conceded to Parliament by a procedure which is less rigid than that reserved for an amendment of certain other parts of the Constitution. In any case, the use of the words 'subject to the provisions' 'only' in connection with the right of freedom of speech and its omission from the other parts of the article cannot be ignored. The way in. which the whole article has been framed clearly indicates, to my m ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y a law enacted by themselves, their privileges, being the same as those of the British Parliament, will not be subject to the operation of either Article 20(2) or to any other provision of the Constitution, while a law passed relating to them shall be subject to the provisions of the Constitution and thus liable to be declared void, under Article 13(2), on the ground of inconsistency with it. Sir Iqbal Ahmad contends that it could hardly have been the intention of the founding fathers that during the interim period when privileges have not been defined by the statute itself, privileges should not be subject to the Constitution. Now, it strikes me that in declaring that the privileges etc. of the State legislature shall be the same as those of the British Parliament, until so otherwise determined by legislation, the founding fathers followed the precedents created for them by the framers of both the British North America Act and the Australian Act. 24. It is interesting to note that while in Canada the houses of legislature cannot enlarge their privileges by any law made by them beyond those enjoyed by the British House of Commons, there is no such limitation under Section 49 of t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n. Freedom of speech is the subject-matter of a separate article viz., Article 19(a) of the Constitution. The right to prohibit publication of its proceedings is dealt with under Sub-article (2) of Article 194. It is further contended that some of the privileges of the House of Commons can have no meaning with reference to the Indian Constitution, our being a republican one. There are others again which have either become obsolete or meaningless in Britain or which Parliament has given up itself. For example, it is pointed out that the right to provide for the due composition of its own body has been modified by Parliamentary enactments in Britain which give authority to Courts of law to adjudicate on disputed questions of law. In our own Constitution Articles 324 and 329 deal with election matters. Now, on this basis it is urged that the only rights which had not been the subject-matter of definition in previous or subsequent articles by the Constitution are the rights to regulate its own proceedings and the right to enforce observance of its privileges by fine, imprisonment or expulsion. On the basis of these facts, it is argued that it is only where specific matters have been d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e will be nullified or defeated if the privileges which have been defined to be those of the House of Commons were made subject to fundamental rights. Fundamental rights cannot govern, except of course where it is specifically or by implication intended that they should, various parts of the Constitution. The frame of Article 194, remembering the rules of grammatical construction, cannot be ignored. The omission of the words "subject to any provision of the Constitution" as governing Clauses (2), (3) and (4) of the Article has a significance which cannot be omitted from consideration. 28. As regards the argument that the law when made relating to privileges would be subject to the fundamental rights and thus subject to Article 13(2) whereas privileges as conferred by the Constitution with reference to the British House of Commons would not be so subject, the answer is that the founding fathers contemplated a clear distinction between the two periods, viz., (1) until so defined and (2) when so determined. In one case the privileges well known to be possessed by the House of Commons were being conferred by the Constitution. In the other case the privileges made were to be laid down ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ontrolled' legislature possessed of all the privileges which the British House of Commons possesses. 30. I am unable, therefore, to hold that the cases cited above govern this case. From what I have said it will be apparent that, in my opinion, Article 194(3) is not governed by Article 20(2) of the Constitution. 31. I shall now proceed to consider what the exact nature of a resolution of a house of legislature is. It was held in the famous case of --'Stockdale v. Hansard (D)', that a resolution of the House of Commons cannot alter the law of the land. For legislation both under the British Constitution and the Constitution as it obtains in the Uttar Pradesh State three parties are necessary. In our State the parties are the two Houses of the Legislature and the Governor. A resolution is an expression of the opinion of the House or at best a recommendation on any particular matter. It has not the status of a law. A declaration or resolution of either House, as Dicey points out on the basis of -- 'Stockdale v. Hansard (D)', is not in any sense a law. For no resolution of the House of Commons ordering or approving of a member's act could be pleaded by a perso ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 'law' has been used in Article 13(3) In the widest sense possible as including any ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law. I am inclined to think that even having regard to that very wide language, the resolution cannot be accurately described as a law for it is a mere expression of opinion which can have a binding effect in cases of privileges. 33. Whatever be the position of a resolution of a House, whether it be looked upon as a law or as a judgment of a Court or the expression of an opinion which may practically have the effect of law, the question still remains whether the resolution complained against awarded a punishment for an offence within the meaning which must be attributed to those words in Article 20(2) of the Constitution. Before dealing with this part of the case, I may quite frankly state that on the facts which have been placed before us, I am unable to hold that the action of the Speaker in ordering the applicant to withdraw from the House was not in the nature of a punishment for the parliamentary offence of disorderly behaviour. The learned Advocate General contended that that th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... committed and has the character of a punishment or a disciplinary order. 'In so large and active an Assembly as the House of Commons', observes May in his Parliamentary Practice "It is absolutely necessary that the Speaker should be invested with authority to repress disorder and to give effect, promptly and decisively, to the rules and orders of the House." "The ultimate authority", Sir J. Erskine May further observes, "upon all points is the House itself, but the Speaker is the executive officer by whom its rules are enforced." May further observes that "the power to punish disorder is regulated partly by practice and partly by standing order." "the change introduced", he continues, "by standing orders may be described briefly as giving the Chair power to deal with minor offences, but as leaving punishment to the House, while making its infliction more certain than immediate." May further observes that "the ancient usage has been so modified by recent standing orders, which cover the majority of cases likely to arise, as to be largely inapplicable." (May's Parliamentary Practice, pp. 445-447). 34. From these quotations it will be observed that the order of wi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e in the words 'among others'. Sir Iqbal Ahmad is, therefore, indisputably right when he says that Shri Raj Narain was punished by Shri Speaker when he was forcibly made to withdraw from the House and very properly he does not question the correctness or justice of that order. Indeed, it would have been grossly improper for us to sit in review in any sense over that order. In order to appreciate, however, the point which has arisen under Article 20(2) of the Constitution, it is necessary to appreciate exactly what was done after the reference to the Committee of Privileges by the House. Sir Iqbal Ahmad's argument is that his client was, contrary to established parliamentary practice in Britain, punished a second time by the House on the same set of facts for the offence or offences for which he had been punished or could have been punished then and there by the House. 36. Now, as far as I can see, there is no doubt that further action was taken against Mr. Raj Narain for the incident for which disciplinary action had been taken against him by Mr. Speaker. On the question whether that further punishment was in the nature of a second punishment or an enhancement of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... regulating its proceedings it can proceed against a person or even a stranger for breaches of privilege. 38. And this brings me to the question of the exact scope of Article 20(2) of the Constitution. That Article reads as follows : "No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once." It is clear that this Article is based upon the principle of the 'double jeopardy' clause and lays down that no person should be put in jeopardy of his life or liberty more than once. This principle is so well established in the system of law that we administer that it is not surprising that it should have been elevated to the level of a fundamental right. In the case of -- 'Rex v. Barron (No. 2) (1914) 2 KB 570 (K), Lord Reading C. J. quotes a statement of the law by Hawkins J. that, "It is against the very first principles of the criminal law that a man should be placed twice in jeopardy upon the same facts." Lord Reading C. J., however, made it plain that the learned Judge did not intend to lay down and did not lay down as a general principle of law that a man cannot be placed twice in jeopardy upon the same facts if the offences are different. Whether the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to be found in Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to the extent of protection against 'double jeopardy' in the criminal law of this country. 40. It strikes me that on a correct reading of the section, having regard to the background of Article 20(2) as discoverable by a reference to Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the word 'and' has been used not in a disjunctive but in a conjunctive sense. To read the word 'and' as 'or' would be to read something into the article which is not there. That being so, it strikes me that Article 20(2) does nothing more than reproduce in effect the provisions of Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is clear that under that Code a discharged person can be put for retrial. Article 20(2) clearly uses the word 'and' in a conjunctive sense and only where the accused has been both prosecuted and punished for the same offence is a second trial barred, according to the judgment of a learned single judge of the Madras High Court in -- 'In Re C. Devanugraham AIR 1952 Mad 725 . 41. In the case of 'Raman Lal v. Commr. of Police, Calcutta AIR1952Cal26 , the observation ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority.' The effect of this Article read with Section 403 of the Criminal Procedure Code is that Section 403 of the Criminal Procedure Code continued to be a law on the date the Constitution came into force. Having regard to these considerations, I am driven to the conclusion that Article 20(2) did nothing more than elevate the principle laid down in Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the status of a fundamental law. Bearing these considerations in mind, I am driven to the conclusion that taking the article as a whole, the context indicates that the word 'offence' as used to the Article contemplates a criminal offence and not all types of offences. In any case, for an 'offence' there has to be an act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force. Significance has, therefore, to be attached to the word 'made'. That word carries with it the implication that some authority empowered to do so has laid down the law. The law contemplated in the Article would appear to be an enacted law by a legislature or by a body of persons authorised by the legislature ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e in which the legislature conducts its internal affairs. In the ultimate analysis, it is as was hinted at by Lord Coleridge C. J, in --Bradlaugh v. Gossett ', (B) (supra), in an assiduous education of the tremendous forces generated by a vast electorate that remedies against real or supposed highhandedness on the part of any particular legislature lies. With all those matters, which are of a political nature, this Court has no concern. 46. Before parting with this case, I would like to record my thanks to learned counsel for the applicant, Sir Iqbal Ahmad, and the learned Advocate General, Mr. Kanhaiya Lal Misra, for the valued assistance which they rendered in this case to us. I am deeply grateful to them for the thoroughness with which the case was placed before us. 47. For the reasons given above, I would dismiss this application. B. Mukerji, J. 48. This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking certain relief by means of requisite orders or directions or writs. The effective, or the main, prayer is that a resolution which was passed by the U.P. Legislative Assembly on the 30th March, 1953, be declared void as being inconsistent with the provisions ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ip of the Assembly. Some parleys appear to have taken place between the petitioner on the one hand and members of Government on the other in order that the petitioner may have facility in moving his contemplated adjournment motion in the House. It also appears that there was no agreement between the majority party and the opposition in regard to this matter. 52. The petitioner, thereafter, sought the permission of the Speaker from the floor of the House to move his adjournment motion. Under the rules of procedure, framed by the U.P. Legislative Assembly, in pursuance of the previsions of Article 208(1), namely, under Rule 68, the consent of the Speaker is necessary to make such it motion. The Speaker is under this rule, made the sole judge as to whether the proposed motion is for the purpose of discussing a definite matter and is of urgent public importance or not. In the event of the Speaker being of the view that the matter to be discussed is definite and is of urgent public importance, he is empowered to accord permission to the mover to seek the leave of the House to move the motion. Under Rule 71 of the aforesaid rules, there is a mode prescribed for asking for leave to move ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n the adjournment motion was before the House. I am fortified in this view of mine by the line of action which was taken by the petitioner and some of his supporters when both these questions were before the House. We are, however, not called upon to pronounce upon the appropriateness or otherwise of the action of the petitioner. 53. The Speaker could not allow the adjournment motion to be placed before the House because the requisite support was not forthcoming for the motion. The Speaker further did not wish to let the motion for the suspension of Rule 71(3) to be discussed because of the fact that the day on which these motions were placed before the House was a day set apart for the voting on demands. Under the rules of procedure, the days set apart for the voting on demands are to be exclusively devoted to such business and other motions, save adjournment motions, could not be permitted to take precedence over it. Nonetheless the Speaker appears to have pointed out that he could accord permission to move the motion for the suspension of Rule 71(3) later in the day, presumably after the time for the budget discussions was over. The petitioner and his supporters did not agree t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t, had spent itself out. It was further argued by the learned Advocate-General that any harm that may have accrued by the resolution cannot now be undone by our intervention. 56. This petition was moved before us, as I have said, on the 2nd April, 1953, and we issued notice to the opposite parties because of the importance of this case and the importance of the issues which it raised and also because we thought it proper under the circumstances to decide the questions which were raised concerning the dignity of the Speaker of the House, its privileges and the protection which the petitioner claimed, after deliberation and after having the full assistance of learned counsel on both sides. 57. On behalf of the petitioner the points that were raised were these. First, that the procedure which had been adopted by the Speaker in referring the matter of the "disorderly conduct" of the petitioner was unwarranted by the rules of procedure prescribed and as such was in effect the creation of a new privilege, or in any event was the extension of a privilege. 58. Second, that the Speaker having ordered the forcible eviction of the petitioner from the House for disorderly conduct, he could ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... se be longer than, the remainder of the session: Provided further that the House may at any time, on a motion being made, resolve that such suspension be terminated. "(3) The Speaker shall have full authority to carry out his order or the decisions of the House and may employ or authorise the employment of necessary force at any stage of the proceedings. "(4) The Speaker may in the case of grave disorder arising in the House suspend any sitting for a time to be determined by him". By virtue of the provisions of Sub-rule (1) quoted above, it was contended by Sir Iqbal Ahmad that the Speaker having directed the petitioner to withdraw from the House and having used force under Sub-rule (3) for the enforcement of the order of withdrawal, the Speaker had exhausted all the power that he had in respect of that disorder. It was contended that the Speaker not having "named" the member and there not having been a motion by the leader of the House forthwith to suspend the member named, the Speaker had no jurisdiction or power to have the suspension of the member brought about through the mediation of the Committee of Privileges. It was strenuously contended by Sir Iqbal Ahmad that the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... contended that apart from the provisions of Rule 189 (2) it was open to the Speaker, under Rule 67, to refer the conduct of the applicant to the Committee of Privileges for examination, investigation and report. I do not consider it necessary, in view of what I shall say presently, to express any opinion as to whether or not the interpretation put by the learned Advocate-General on Rule 189 as also on Rule 67 is correct. 62. The main question which to my mind calls for determination in this application is whether this Court has the power to review the action taken by the Speaker in regard to the conduct of the applicant in the House on the 4th March, 1953. Further, whether it is open to this Court to scrutinise and pronounce upon the decision taken by the Speaker in referring the question to the Committee of Privileges and further to pronounce upon the legality or otherwise of the resolution of the House adopted on the report of the Committee of Privileges. 63. It must be conceded that the House is the sole judge of its own privileges. It must also be conceded, however, that Courts elsewhere have from time to time scrutinised as to whether or not in judging their privileges and i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... walls of either assembly must pass without question in any other place". Littledale J. was then quoted thus: "It .is said the House of Commons is the sole Judge of its own privileges; and so I admit as far as the proceedings in the House and some other things are concerned". Stephen J. also quoted with approval the following passage of Patteson J.: "Beyond all dispute, it is necessary that the proceedings of each House of Parliament should be entirely free and unshackled, that whatever is said or done in either House should not be liable to examination elsewhere." Coleridge J. is reported to have said. "That the House should have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the course of ,its own proceedings and animadvert upon any conduct there in violation of its rules or derogation from its dignity stands upon the clearest grounds of necessity." On these high authorities, which I have quoted above, it is clear to me that the security which the petitioner in this case wants us to make into the proceedings of the House cannot be made by us. 65. Apart from the persuasive authority of great value of English decisions we have definite provisions in our Constitution enjoining us to l ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... xception the constitutional provisions, to my mind, give the proceedings in the Legislative sanctity and make them inscrutable to the same extent as the proceedings of the House of Commons. The provisions which to my mind determine this question are the provisions of Article 194(3) and Article 212 of the Constitution. Article 212 is in these words: "(1) The validity of any proceedings in the Legislature of a State shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity, of procedure. (2) No Officer or member of the Legislature of a State in whom the powers are vested by or under this Constitution for regulating procedure or the conduct of business, or for maintaining order in the legislature shall be subject to the jurisdiction of any Court in respect of the exercise by him of those powers." What was done by the Speaker was in the exercise of powers vested in him for regulating the conduct of business of the House and for maintaining order in the Legislature. This conduct, under Article 212(2) must, in my judgment, remain without scrutiny by the Courts. The petitioner in effect challenges the validity of the proceedings in the Legislature, inasmuch as he says ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cle. The use of the word 'offence' in Clause (1) of Article 20 makes it perfectly clear to me that by the word 'offence' in Article 20 is meant something which is a violation of a law in force and for the violation of which the law prescribes a penalty. The use of the word 'offence' in Clause (3) also indicates, to my mind, that it has reference to an act in respect of which a person can be accused and where in respect of that accusation there is a question of taking evidence and deciding upon the culpability or otherwise of the person charged. The use of the word 'prosecuted' in Article 20 is also indicative of the fact that it has a reference to a prosecution for an offence before a Court. Further by Article 367 the provisions of the General Clauses Act, 1897, subject to any adaptations and modifications that may have been, made therein under Article 372 are made applicable to the interpretation of the Constitution in the same manner as they are made applicable to the interpretation of an Act of the Legislature of the dominion of India. By Section 3(37) of the General Clauses Act 'offence' has been defined to mean any act or omission made ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ot possibly preserve that order which had already been broken and he had not been given any other power save the power to preserve order under Rule 189(1). Anything that is done in order to safeguard against a future recurrence of the same danger is not punitive action but is preventive action, but what was done by the resolution of the House was to suspend the petitioner for the disorderly conduct for which he had not really been punished earlier. In my judgment in this view of the matter also, there was no breach of Article 20(2) of the Constitution. 68. I wish, however, to make it clear that in the event of my being persuaded to hold that there was double punishment of the petitioner for the same offence--offence as contemplated by Article 20(2) of the Constitution -- then I would have felt little difficulty in holding that the petitioner would have been entitled to relief by this Court because in my judgment the privileges, immunities and powers of the House or its Speaker could not override the positive prohibitions contained in the Constitution, nor could they make the provisions of Part III -- the Fundamental Rights--nugatory, even though Article 194(3) has not been made sp ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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