2011 (4) TMI 1305 - SC - Indian Laws

Whether the Cabinet decision dated 18.07.2009 which is a subsequent event and quashing the same when the writ petitioner has not pleaded or amended the original prayer in the writ petition? Whether without appreciating the stand of the State in modifying the policy the High Court not only quashed the Cabinet decision but also issued various directions which are all unacceptable? Whether on the principle of legitimate expectation the State is not justified in altering the policy to promote private institutions for vocational training on various subjects?

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Legitimacy of the High Court's interference with the Cabinet decision dated 18.07.2009.
2. Application of the principle of 'legitimate expectation' in the context of policy changes in vocational training courses.
3. Procedural propriety in quashing the Cabinet decision without it being specifically challenged in the writ petition.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Legitimacy of the High Court's interference with the Cabinet decision dated 18.07.2009:
The Supreme Court noted that the High Court erred in considering and quashing the Cabinet decision dated 18.07.2009, which was a subsequent event, without it being specifically challenged or pleaded in the writ petition. The High Court's decision to quash the Cabinet decision was deemed unacceptable and contrary to well-established principles. The Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court should have reopened the case, allowed the petitioner to amend the relief portion, and provided an opportunity for the State to present its stand on modifying the policy. The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court's actions restricted the State's constitutional authority and powers to frame policy, especially in vital areas like imparting technical education.

2. Application of the principle of 'legitimate expectation' in the context of policy changes in vocational training courses:
The respondent-association argued that the State's actions violated the principle of 'legitimate expectation,' as the members had invested significantly in setting up vocational training centers with the expectation of continuing the permitted courses. The Supreme Court, however, held that education is a dynamic system, and courses must evolve based on market demand, employability potential, and other factors. The Court stated that no institution has a legitimate right or expectation to run a particular course indefinitely. The State's decision to discontinue only three courses while allowing others to continue did not disregard the doctrine of legitimate expectation. The Court reiterated that policy decisions are within the purview of the State, and courts should not interfere unless such decisions contravene constitutional mandates.

3. Procedural propriety in quashing the Cabinet decision without it being specifically challenged in the writ petition:
The Supreme Court found that the High Court committed a procedural error by quashing the Cabinet decision dated 18.07.2009, which was not specifically challenged in the writ petition. The High Court did not afford both parties the opportunity to present their stand on the subsequent development. The Supreme Court highlighted that the High Court's decision was procedurally flawed as it failed to allow the State to explain the reasons for discontinuing the three courses. The Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court should have reopened the case and provided an opportunity for both parties to address the subsequent Cabinet decision.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order quashing the Cabinet decision dated 18.07.2009 and issuing various directions, including awarding costs to the respondent-association. The Supreme Court permitted the respondent-association or its members to challenge the Government's decision/order through fresh proceedings if they so desired. The State Government, in such events, would be entitled to present its policy, the need for change, and the demand of society regarding the courses prescribed under SCVTs. The civil appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.