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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 239 Records
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1986 (11) TMI 396 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is admitted that the alienation was made by Chandrasekharan Nair in favour of the Respondent within a period of 12 years and in contravention of the conditions imposed by Rule 29(1). No other factor is pleaded by the Respondent to justify alienation in his favour and to prevent cancellation of the assignment. Hence no useful purpose would be served having regard to the facts of this case in remitting the case back to the Collector for fresh disposal, as all the factors are before Court and they fully justify the action taken by the Collector. For the reasons already stated, we are of the opinion that this is a fit case in which the Court should decline to interfere. We have therefore no hesitation in taking the view that the learned Single Judge, with respect, was not right in quashing the order Ext. P-1 and allowing the Original Petition. Hence this appeal is allowed, the judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside and the O.P. No. 4433 of 1981 is dismissed. No costs.
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1986 (11) TMI 395 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ion should not be read so literally as to rob the decree holder of his vested rights-permitting Peter to rob for feeding Paul was not social justice, it was urged. Where in a society of accute shortage of accommodation adjustment of rights between the parties is the purpose, we must ask ourselves two questions-does the argument of the appellant on the construction of the section further the purpose of the legislation, and secondly, whether the construction canvassed by the appellant does violence to the language or is contrary to the literal meaning. In our opinion the answers to the first question is in the affirmative and to the second in the negative. If so, in our opinion it must be so read, and the appeal must succeed. 8. In that view of the matter and in view of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that this appeal must be allowed and the judgment of the High Court must be set aside. Accordingly the appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.
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1986 (11) TMI 394 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 24. Once it is held as above, necessarily the writ petition must fail. It is not in serious dispute that on the Anchal Adhikan's direction the Circle Inspector, after holding a full inquiry, held that the petitioner had collected the tolls from the Khizersarai Bazar ever since 1st of April, 1977. The Certificate Officer, after full consideration, rejected the petitioner's objection and came to the firm conclusion that the collection of tolls had in fact been made by the petitioner. The appellate authority, on an independent consideration, came to the identical conclusion. No serious challenge to these concurrent findings could have been laid in the writ jurisdiction and was, in fact, not so laid by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The writ petition has thus no merit and is hereby dismissed. In view of the legal intricacy and the earlier existing precedent, I would leave the parties to bear their own costs. N.P. Singh, J. 25. I agree. S.S. Hasan, J. 26. I agree.
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1986 (11) TMI 393 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... g the issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the State Government to appoint respondents Nos. 1 and 3-6 as District Judges under Art. 233(1) of the Constitution are set aside. We instead direct that a writ in the nature of mandamus shall be issued to the State Government requiring it to communicate its views to the High Court to elicit its opinion within six weeks from today and, if necessary, make a fresh effort to find suitable candidates from the communities or groups of communities passed over before taking a final decision in the matter. In consequence, the State Government's decision not to make appointments from the panel forwarded by the High Court and to renotify the vacancies must stand quashed. The High Court shall also comply with the directions issued by this Court in two cases of Smt. N. Subhadra Arnrna and K. Sadanandan. We make it clear that the choice of candidates lies entirely with the High Court. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeals allowed.
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1986 (11) TMI 392 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... inflow of such special leave petitions. This was the reason why a Bench of this Court consisting of two of us, viz., the Chief Justice and Justice Ranganath Misra, clearly enunciated in an Order made on 30th October 1985 in special leave petition (criminal) No. 2938 of 1985 that this Court should not "interfere with the orders granting or refusing bail or anticipatory bail"and that "these are matters in which the High Court should normally become the final authority. We reiterate this policy principle laid down by the Bench of this Court and hold that this Court should not ordinarily, save in exceptional cases, interfere with orders granting or refusing bail or anticipatory bail, because these are matters in which the High Court should normally be the final arbiter. The writ petition will stand disposed of in these terms. We appreciate the anxiety and concern shown by the petitioner for the poor and the disadvantaged in bringing this public interest litigation.
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1986 (11) TMI 391 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o be terminated on account of the closure of the Corporation shall be continued in service on the same terms and conditions either in the Government departments or in the Government Corporations. 2. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly. There is no order as to costs.
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1986 (11) TMI 390 - ITAT COCHIN
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... ... ..... the case of A.A. Annamalai Nadar (supra). Evidently the Madras High Court is divided on the point at issue. In such a situation, it would be only desirable to follow the view taken by the majority of the High Courts. 13. In view of the above discussion, I conclude that the consensus of opinion on the point at issue is in favour of the assessee. I would, therefore, hold that since Mrs. Surajben K. Mehta contributed a capital of ₹ 10,000 for becoming a partner in the firm and since she agreed to share the losses of the business and to render services to the firm, the consequent reduction of the assessee's share in the firm from 30 per cent to 25 per cent would not tantamount to a gift within the meaning of section 4(1)(a). 14. I, therefore, agree with the view taken by the learned Accountant Member and conclude that the assessment made by the GTO deserves to be cancelled. The case will now go to the Division Bench for disposal in accordance with the majority opinion.
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1986 (11) TMI 389 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... raised concern the future of the petitioners and therefore we heard him at considerable length. We also heard Shri Upadhyaya, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent. In the view that we take, we feel that no grounds exist for granting special leave. We also feel that the grant of such leave would not be in public interest. It would not be fair to keep the selected candidates who have now been recruited by the Commission to wait indefinitely. 8. Although we decline to interfere, we cannot help observing that some of the petitioners who apparently are highly qualified persons would be faced with unemployment. We hope and trust that the State Government would sympathetically consider their case for suitable employment commensurate with their experience and qualifications within three months from today, in case the petitioners make a representation for such employment. 9. Stay granted by this Court's order dated September 9, 1986 shall continue till November 30, 1986.
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1986 (11) TMI 388 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the applicant firm are partners in another firm holding a valid license. Our conclusion is also fortified by the form prescribed for application for a license under the Gold control (Forms, Fee and Miscellaneous Matters) Rules, 1968, where one of the columns requires an applicant to name the partners of the firm. 7. We, are, Therefore, satisfied that the petitioner is not disqualified by the terms of rule 2(dd) from being granted a license. We, Therefore, quash the order of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal dated May, 30,1986 as well as the impugned notice dated July 11, 1986. We are informed that though the Tribunal directed the cancellation of the license, it was cancelled in view of the pendency of the writ petition. There is, Therefore, no necessity to order restoration of the license to the petitioner who, as we have already held, is entitled to the license. 8. The writ petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. 9. Petition allowed.
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1986 (11) TMI 387 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... would have arisen only after they had attained majority. The payment which was directed to be made to them was not referable either to a jagir or to any other customary right. It was merely a direction to pay a particular amount computed on a particular basis referable to a past period commencing from the date of their birth. We are therefore fully convinced, and firmly of the view, that in substance the amount directed to be paid as per Order Ex. 1 was nothing else but a 'gift' by the then Ruler to his sons, unrelated to any legal rights of the appellants. And that it did not create any legal obligation enforceable against the State of Rajasthan inasmuch as the order in question was not a 'law'. There is thus no substance in any of the submissions urged on behalf of the appellants. The view taken by the High Court is unexceptionable and the appeals are devoid of merit. We accordingly dismiss the appeals. There will be no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1986 (11) TMI 386 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... salaries to say that in view of the high reputation enjoyed by the institution for its excellence, it is unnecessary to seek to apply provisions like Section 10 of the Delhi School Education Act to the Frank Anthony Public School. On the other hand, we should think that the very contribution made by the teachers to earn for the institution the high reputation that it enjoys should spur the management to adopt at least the same scales of pay as the other institutions to which Section 10 applies. Regarding the fear expressed by Shri Frank Anthony that the institution may have to close down we can only hope that the management will do nothing to the nose to spite the face, merely to 'put the teachers in their proper place'. The fear expressed by the management here has the same ring as the fear expressed invariably by the management of every industry that disastrous results would follow which may even lead to the closing down of the industry if wage scales are revised.
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1986 (11) TMI 385 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... upon as part of one transaction. Nor can assistance be derived from Clause 71. The benefit of that provision can be claimed only if the amount sought to be retained is an ascertained sum, an amount which can be readily adjusted against the amount payable under the other contract. Here, the amount sought to be adjusted has yet to be determined as a liability against the contractor. It has been disputed by the appellant. Accordingly, Clause 71 cannot be invoked. In the result, the decision of the High Court in respect of the adjustment of ₹ 12,69,532 cannot be sustained. 9. In the circumstances, the appeal is allowed in part, the judgment and order of the High Court is modified in so far that while the adjustment claimed by the State Government on the basis of the final bill relating to the contract covered by the award is maintained, the direction in respect of the adjustment of the claim made under the other contract is set aside. The parties will bear their own costs.
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1986 (11) TMI 384 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ent argued that the imposition of full assessment on lands held by the religious institution in the present case would be hit by Art. 26 of the Constitution which gives to every religious denomination the right to own and acquire movable and immovable property and to administer such property inaccordance with law. We are unable to understand how the mere imposition of assessment on lands held by a religious denominational institution can possibly attract the right guaranteed by the Art. 26 of the Constitution. The burden imposed is a burden to be shared in the same manner by all the owners of the lands in the State and not a special burden imposed on the denominational institution. Burden of that nature are outside the right guaranteed by Art. 26 of the Constitution. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the orders of the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the Madras High Court are set aside. The writ petition filed in the High Court is dismissed. Appeal allowed.
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1986 (11) TMI 383 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ompany (supra) was rendered not only under a different set of facts and circumstances but also under Section 15 (1) (a) (b) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, the basis of which is materially different. Therefore, that case has no relevancy to the controversy involved in the present case, and is distinguishable as such. 8. All the contention raised on behalf of the Commissioner of Sales Tax succeed, and those advanced on behalf of the dealer fail. The orders passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal as well as the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) suffer from manifest errors of law and are not sustainable in the eyes of law. 9. In the result, the revision succeeds and is allowed with costs. The impugned orders passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal as well as the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) are set aside, and the order of the Sales Tax Officer is restored with the finding that under the facts of the case, the dealer is liable to penalty under Section 15-A (1) (o) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act.
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1986 (11) TMI 382 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... own conduct disentitled herself to that property by letting it out for higher income, she would be disentitled to evict her tenant on ground of her need. The philosophy and principle of rent restriction law have nothing to do with the private exploitation of property by the owners of the property in derogation of the tenant's need of protec- tion from eviction in a society of shortage of accommoda- tion. In the premises we are of the opinion that the High Court was wrong in the view and the approach it took and in view of the undisputed facts that the landlady had in her choice to go into the premises in question but she did not, she has become disentitled to the right of eviction. The fact that the tenant was a troublesome tenant inasmuch as that he questioned the liability to the landlord is irrelevant. In the premises the appeal is allowed. The order and judgment of the High Court are set aside. In the facts of this case the parties will pay and bear their own costs.
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1986 (11) TMI 381 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ring with the view taken by the Gujarat High Court. We may also add that the decision of the Gujarat High Court has stood for sixteen years and many thousands of transactions must have taken place on the basis of correctness of this judgment. We see no justification for interference in this case. 2. The decision in Maganlal Chhagganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay2 on which reliance was placed by learned counsel for the appellant has no relevance whatsoever. These appeals are accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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1986 (11) TMI 380 - CEGAT- CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... f confiscation shall not exceed the market price of the goods confiscated, less in the case of imported goods, the duty chargeable thereon. According to Section 112 of the Customs Act the maximum amount of penalty in the case of prohibited goods is five times the value of the goods or ₹ 1,000/- whichever is greater. It cannot, therefore, be said that the redemption fine and penalty imposed are exorbitant. In the circumstances, we do not find any justification for reducing the amount of redemption fine and penalty imposed by the Collector in 7 appeals discussed in paragraphs 68 to 73. The amounts of fine and penalty in these 7 appeals are, therefore, confirmed. 76. Appeals No.C-152/84-Cal, C-36/85-Cal, C-37/85-Cal, C-83/85-Cal, C-84/85-Cal, C-85/85-Cal, C-90/85-Cal and C-91/85-Cal are dismissed. The redemption fine and penalty imposed by the Collector therein are confirmed. Appeals No.C-24/85-Cal and C-129/85-Cal. are allowed with consequential relief to the appellants.
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1986 (11) TMI 379 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e judge who heard the Second Appeal not being available virtually sitting in Judgment over the decision of the learned Judge who decided the Second Appeal construed the document differently and held that it was a will and not a deed of settlement. This the learned single Judge was not entitled to do. If the party was aggrieved by the Judgment of the learned single Judge sitting in Second Appeal the appropriate remedy for the party was to file an appeal against the Judgment of the learned single Judge. A remedy by way of an application for review was entirely misconceived and we are sorry to say that the learned single Judge who entertained the application totally exceeded his jurisdiction in allowing the review and upsetting the Judgment of the learned single Judge, merely because he took a different view on a construction of the document. These appeals are, therefore, allowed with costs. The Judgment of the learned single Judge in Second Appeal No. 1048 of 1966 is restored.
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1986 (11) TMI 378 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... order by the learned Additional District Judge, II, Bhiwani. After the proceedings are received in Delhi, an attempt shall be made for bringing about reconciliation or settlement through the Marriage Counselling Centre in Patiala House and if this effort does not succeed within a period of two months from the receipt of the proceedings by the Court of District Judge, Delhi, the petition shall be tried and disposed of by the judge in Delhi, as far as possible, within a further period of two months.
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1986 (11) TMI 377 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed by the petitioner in respect of the cause of action relied on in the writ petition when he withdraws it without such permission. In the instant case the High Court was fight in holding that a fresh writ petition was not maintainable before it in respect of the same subject-matter since the earlier writ petition had been withdrawn without permission to file a fresh petition. We, however. make it clear that whatever we have stated in this order may not be considered as being applicable to a writ petition involving the personal liberty of an individual in which the petition- er prays for the issue of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus or seeks to enforce the fundamental fight guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution since such a case stands on a different footing altogether. We however leave this question open. Even on merits we do not find any ground to reverse the decision of the High Court. In the result we dismiss the special leave petition. Petition dismissed.
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