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Indian Laws - Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 174 Records
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1963 (5) TMI 69 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... lication. The contention that the Government could not get the benefit of this law in connection with its business activities was neither repelled nor considered. It was held to have no foundation as there was nothing on the record that the Food Department of the Government of West Bengal by undertaking rationing and distribution of food on a rational basis had embarked upon any trade or business and, in the absence of any such indication, it appeared that the department was discharging the elementary duty of a sovereign to ensure proper and equitable distribution of available foodstuffs with a view to maintaining peace and good government. 19. In view of what we have said above, we hold that the Union of India (UOI) carries on the business of running railways and can be sued in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Gauhati within whose territorial jurisdiction the headquarters of one of the railways run by the Union is situated. We accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs.
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1963 (5) TMI 68 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rial before us to come definitely to a conclusion in this respect. Even if we take notice of the subsequent legal proceeding and decision in this regard, as a Court of appeal can do, that will not be helpful to the plaintiffs until they amend their plaint suitably and change their averments in accordance with the changed position. Whether the suit on the plaint, as it stands, can be maintained against the defendant No. 1 or what amendment, if applied for by the plaintiffs, will be allowed to the plaint, are matters for the trial Court to decide. 19. The result is that the appeal is allowed in part and the judgment and decree of the trial Court are modified to the extent that the defendant No. 2 is expunged from the suit and the case against the defendant No. 1 is remanded for disposal according to law. The defendant No. 2 will be entitled to costs from the plaintiffs in this Court. The costs of other parties will abide the result of the suit. Tarkeshwar Nath, J. 20. I agree.
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1963 (5) TMI 66 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
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... ... ..... required to pay fluty it will be illegal. For; the reasons stated by us earlier, we are of opinion that there having been an imposition of fine ins lieu of confiscation, there has been no actual confiscation of the goods so as to vest title in the government in respect thereof and the goods are' in the position of being liable to be redeemed by the importer on payment of fine. To such goods there will be a liability to pay customs duty, inasmuch as the goods had admittedly been imported into this country by sea. Secondly the imposition of fine only validates the import and it will have no further effect of absolving the importer from payment of customs duty. That liability is independent of the liability to pay fine in lieu of confiscation and will therefore subsist. The Collector of Customs in our opinion was justified in declining to deliver the goods unless the duty was paid. ( 21. ) The appeal is therefore allowed. The respondent will pay the costs of the appellant.
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1963 (5) TMI 63 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... atutory provision. In such a case,, it would, no doubt, be open to industrial adjudication to have regard to all the relevant considerations before awarding the claim and in doing so, if it appears that a claim for bonus was made after long lapse of time, industrial adjudication may refuse to entertain the claim, or Government -nay refuse to make reference in that behalf. But these considerations would , be irrelevant when claims are made under s. 33C (2), where these claims are, as in the present case, based on an award and are intended 'merely to execute the award. In such a case, limitation cannot be introduced by industrial adjudication on academic ground of social justice. It can be introduced, if at all, by the legislature. Therefore, we think, that the Labour Court was right in rejecting the appellant's contention that since the present claim was belated, it should not be awarded. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1963 (5) TMI 62 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... trong parties are opposed to the petitioner in various ways. Whether they would exercise any influence upon the magistracy and whether magistracy would be able to withstand such a pressure, if made, is not germane to the present petition. We are of opinion that the petitioner has, by his affidavit, made out sufficient circumstances from which it can be inferred that he does entertain, and entertain reasonably, an apprehension that he would not get justice in these cases. In similar circumstances, this Court has not hesitated on an earlier occasion to transfer certain cases outside the State of Punjab. In our opinion, the present case is also one in which the interests of justice demand that the cases should be transferred outside the State of Punjab. We direct that the two cases shall be transferred to Sharanpur District and shall be tried there by a Magistrate who shall be chosen by the District Magistrate of Saharanpur for their disposal according to law. Petition allowed.
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1963 (5) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on with the provisions of s. 5 of the Limitation Act which applied to such applications but on the Court's deciding the question of limitation in connection with which sub-s. (2) of s. 10 followed practically the language of s. 3 of the Limitation Act as it said that no such application would be entertained unless it was made within a certain time. We arc therefore of opinion that the High Court fell in error in interfering with the finding of fact arrived at by the Subordinate judge with respect to the appellants having sufficient cause for not making an application for bringing the respondents on record within time and for not applying for the setting aside of the abatement within time. We allow the appeal with costs throughout, set aside the order of the Court below and restore that of the Trial Court. It will 'now proceed according to law with the further execution of the decree on the second application presented by the appellant for the purpose. Appeal allowed.
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1963 (5) TMI 60 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... eposit lying in court but who cannot, on the record of the case, be shown to have withdrawn the amount. If the petition had mentioned that the decision of the appeal court had proceeded on the ground that' the amount was taken out, it is difficult to imagine that this Court would have given special leave to decide a question of discretion. I have considered the matter carefully. This is not a case of a mere error in the narration of facts or of a bona fide error of judgment which in certain circumstances may be considered to be venial faults. This is a case of being disingenuous with the Court by making out a point of law on a suppositions state of facts, which facts, if told candidly, leave no room for the discussion of law. The appellant has by dissembling in this Court induced it to grant special leave in a case which did not merit it. I agree, therefore, that this leave should be recalled and the appellant, made to pay the costs of this appeal. Special Leave revoked.
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1963 (5) TMI 59 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... l of the respondents on the other charge;, viz , ss. 343, 348 and s. 201 read with s. 109 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Session judge awarded a sentence of five years' rigorous imprisonment for the offence under s. 331 of the Indian Penal Code. Though we have altered the conviction to one under s. 330 of the Indian Penal Code, we do not think we shall be justified in reducing the sentence. A serious view cannot but be taken of such a barbarous method of dealing with persons suspected of a crime as was committed by these respondents in this case. It is necessary that deterrent sentences should be inflicted for such an offence when established. Accordingly, we convict the respondents under s. 330 of the Indian Penal Code and we sentence each of them to five years' rigorous imprisonment. The appeal is thus allowed in part and is dismissed as regards the acquittal of the respondents on other charges. The accused to surrender to their bail. Appeal allowed in part.
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1963 (5) TMI 58 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 50 had been enacted by the State Legislature of Bombay. But by the repeal of the Act of 1948 by the Central Act of 1950 the foundation for the continuance and existence of the Bombay Act of 1950 disappeared. Moreover, since s. 41 of the Central Act provided that a Corporation shall be deemed to be a local authority within the meaning Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and not within the meaning of any other law, the provisions of s. 29 of the Bombay Act could in no circumstances be said to survive. In view of all this the learned Attorney-General did not press his argument on the point further. In our view the acquisition impugned in this case having been made for the benefit of a Corporation, though for a public purpose, is bad because no part of the compensation is to come out of public revenues and the provisions of Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act have not been complied with. We, therefore, allow the appeals and decree the suits of the appellants with costs in all the courts.
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1963 (5) TMI 45 - SUPREME COURT
The respondent company, which was incorporated in New York and carried on business in spices, brought a suit in the original side of the Bombay High Court against the appellant for recovery of a sum of Rs. 92,884-4-10 on the basis of a judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of New York affirming two awards obtained by it and also on the awards in the alternative. - The appellant failed to supply turmeric in terms of the two contracts it entered into with the respondent. The respondent put the matter into arbitration in pursuance of the arbitration clause. The appellant took no part in it. The arbitrators gave the two awards in favour of the respondent for damages. The appellant did not pay. The respondent then took appropriate proceedings and got the awards confirmed by the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of New York. The single judge of the Bombay High Court who tried the suit held that it was not maintainable either on the foreign judgment or on the awards and (dismissed the suit. The Division Bench on appeal held that the suit was maintainable on the awards, though not on the judgment, as part of the cause of action had arisen in Bombay and the relevant facts had been proved by the Public documents produced by the respondent and the admissions made by the appellant and decreed the suit. Held, (per Dayal and Mudholkar JJ.) The decision of the Single judge of the High Court that the suit was not maintainable on the foreign judgment must be affirmed but on other grounds.
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1963 (4) TMI 109 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... re be allowed and the notification under s. 6 and that part of the notification under s. 4, which says that the Governor was pleased to direct that under sub-s. (4) of s. 17, the provisions of s. 5-A shall not apply, are bad and are hereby set aside. Rest of the notification under s. 4 will stand and it will be open to the Government if it so chooses to proceed with the acquisition after action is taken under s. 5-A and thereafter to issue a notification under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. In the circumstances we feel that the appellants should be given an opportunity under s. 5-A now, though the period for making objections provided in that section expire long ago in view of the misunderstanding of the law on the part of the Government by treating the objections made before the Collector after the issue of the notices under s. 9 as objections under s. 5-A. The appellants will get their costs of this Court from the respondents; one set of hearing fee. 18. Appeals allowed.
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1963 (4) TMI 108 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rom taking any evidence outside the facts mentioned in the case stated, is erroneous. In terms, Rule 5 provides that after due compliance with the requirements of Rules 1 to 3, the case shall be set down for hearing as a suit in the ordinary manner and the Court has to try and determine the case in accordance with the rule contained in Order XVIII of the Code of Civil Procedure. 30. Thus, in our opinion, the learned Judge was wrong in dismissing the case without following the procedure prescribed by Order XVIII of the Code of Civil Procedure and in holding that it is not permissible for the parties to lead any evidence in proof of the facts stated in the case. 31. For the reasons stated above, we set aside the Judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge and remand the case to the District Court for disposal according to law. 32. The costs of this appeal will abide the result of the case. The institution fees shall be refunded to the appellants. 33. Case remanded.
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1963 (4) TMI 106 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nt for consideration. The High Court should bear this in mind for deciding whether the evidence of the approver should be acted upon or not. Then again it would not be sufficient for the High Court to deal with the evidence in a general way. It would be necessary for it to consider for itself the evidence adduced by the prosecution on the specific charges and then to conclude whether those charges have been established or not. The prosecution would be well, advised if, instead of placing the evidence on each and every one of those large number of charges against the respondents, it chooses to select a few charges under each head other than the head of conspiracy and concentrates on establishing those charges, this would save public time and also serve the purpose of the prosecution. With these observations we set aside the acquittal of the respondents and remit the appeal to the High Court for decision on merits in the light of our observations. Appeal allowed. Case remanded.
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1963 (4) TMI 105 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ention of Kamani that the suit could not be stayed, the arbitration agreement being inffective and invalid. For reasons already set out by us, that assumption cannot be supported Whether having regard to the terms of s. 3 of the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act 6 of 1937 stay may be granted of the suit commenced by Kamani is a question on which no decision has been recorded by the Trial Judge nor by the High Court, and we will not be justified in this appeal in entering upon questions of fact for the first time without having the (1) Appeal No. 63 of 1959 decided on September 22, 1960. benefit of the view of the High Court on those questions. The appeal will therefore be allowed, and the proceeding remanded to the Court of First Instance to be heard and disposed of according to law. Costs in this Court and before the Division Bench of the High Court will abide the result of the proceeding taken pursuant to this order in the Trial Court. Appeal allowed. Case remanded.
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1963 (4) TMI 104 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... a period of five years was too severe and that we should reduce the period of suspension even on the basis that the charge against the appellant be held to be established. We can only express surprise that Counsel should have made bold to make this submission. The appellant had got into his hands a considerable sum of money belonging to his clients and, on the finding of the High Court, had failed to pay it back when demanded. Not content with this he had put forward a false defence of payment and had even sought to sustain his defence by suborning witnesses. In the circumstances, even if the learned Judges of the High Court had struck off the name of the appellant from the roll of advocates we would have considered it a proper punishment having regard to the gravity of the offence. The order now under appeal therefore errs, if at all, on the side of leniency and there is no justification for the request made on behalf of the appellant. 19. The appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1963 (4) TMI 102 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ctly clear that the particular nomenclature was not decisive and that what mattered in these cases was the nature of the duties and responsibilities of a post. If the nature of the duties and responsibilities of the posts held by the respondents legitimately Justify the conclusion that they are comptists, then the special allowance can be claimed by them. It is in the light of these observations that the Labour Court should proceed to deal with these cases after remand. If the parties want to amend their pleadings, they should move the Labour Court in that behalf within a fortnight after the receipt of the record in that Court. Then the Labour Court should fix an early date for taking evidence and should deal with these matters as expeditiously as possible. The result is, the appeals are allowed, the orders passed by the Labour Court are set aside and the matters sent back to that Court for disposal in accordance with law. There would be no order as to costs. Appeals allowed.
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1963 (4) TMI 101 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is employees. Under these circumstances, if the intimation card in question was taken away by some fraudulent person, it would be difficult to hold that the appellant can be charged with negligence which, in turn, can be held to be the proximate cause of the loss caused to the respondent. In our opinion, therefore, Mukarji.J. was in error in holding that the respondent could successfully plead estoppel by negligence against the appellant. As we have already observed, the question as to whether the claim made by the appellant against the respondent under S. 70 is concluded by the decision of this Court in the case of M/s. B. K. Mondal & Sons ( 1962 Supp. I. S. R. 876), in favour of the appellant, and so, it must be held that the Division Bench of the High Court erred in dismissing the appellant's claim. The result is, the appeal is allowed., the decree passed by the appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial Court restored with costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1963 (4) TMI 99 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hese provisions of cl. (K) and would have thought fit to make an order as was made by this Court in similar circumstances in Mahalakshmi Sugar Mills Company Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1961 (II) L. L. J. 623), making it clear that there 21 workmen should be re-employed in the crushing season of 1962-63 only in so for as it was possible to do so without breach of the provisions of cl. (K) of the Standing Orders. There are no materials on the record however to show how many of the workmen already employed by the Company in the crushing season of 1962-63 had actually worked in the latter half of 1961-62 season. In the written statement of the Company no such point about the difficulty of reinstatement of any of these 21 workmen because of the provisions of cl. (K) was raised. In these circumstances, we have not allowed Mr. Pathak to raise this new plea for the first time in this Court. As all the points raised in the appeal fail, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1963 (4) TMI 98 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... way by which the appellant could get at the money will be to enforce his decree through the process of civil Court by attachment, etc. This contention, however, ignores the express provisions contained in Section nfba 50(2) /nfba of the Act. It makes no difference whether the interim payment is regarded either as compensation or as income or of any other variety of payment. The statute creates an obligation on the part of the Government to make interim payment in certain circumstances and it provides that it shall be paid over to persons specified in Section nfba 50(2) /nfba . We have already referred to the fact that Section nfba 50(2) /nfba will comprehend the case of the mortgagee. The appellant in the present case as mortgage will be entitled to take what is due to him out of the interim payment of compensation amount by reason of that provision. The appeals have, therefore, to be allowed and are accordingly allowed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. o p /o p
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1963 (4) TMI 95 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... fer an intention to create a trust or equitable interest, by means of an irrevocable mutual testament, upon the facts, merely because two persons happen to make a single document of their testamentary dispositions. 51. As far as this country is concerned, the emphasis, in the Supreme Court decision in AIR1959SC71 is, as my learned brother has shown, upon the benefit taken by the surviving testator. Their Lordships would appear to have laid emphasis upon that form of a mutual Will, in which each party is in a relationship of both testator and legatee, as regards the other party. Such terms would, by themselves, constitute powerful evidence of a mutual agreement not to revoke, except by both together. Hence, I do not think that this decision implies that the element of irrevocability may be dispensed with, as a test. AIR1960All126 has been cited by us, as regards the exposition of legal principles; upon the facts, it is distinguishable from the present case, in vital respects.
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