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2025 (3) TMI 1404
Setting aside of the cancellation of sale of landed properties in pursuance of e-auction initiated by SEBI upon acceptance of the remaining consideration money and/or appropriate writ for refund of earnest money was dismissed
HELD THAT:- Proceeding whereby e-auction of the properties, confirmation and cancellation of the auction sale was taken in accordance with relevant provisions of the Rules contained in the Second Schedule of Income Tax Act with necessary modifications.
Rule 58 of the Second Schedule of Income Tax Act and the provision contained in Order XXI Rule 86 of the Civil Procedure Code has extended a discretion upon the tax recovery officer/authorities to decide whether to forfeit the EMD or not and if so to what extent.
The facts and circumstances obtaining in the case at hand, no such discretion was exercised by the respondent and the respondent proceeded to forfeit the entire deposit amount in a manner as if it was automatic. Needless to say, no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the appellants. The entire EMD was directed to be forfeited without taking into consideration the loss and damage suffered by the respondent owing to the default on the part of the appellants in making the payment of balance consideration money.
In course of hearing of the instant appeal, the appellants never endeavored to challenge the finding of learned Single Judge whereby learned Single Judge disbelieved the case of the appellant to the effect that he was prevented by the intervention of COVID-19 in making payment of the balance consideration money within time specified in the contract. We, therefore, have no justification to interfere with such finding of learned Single Judge. Accordingly, we uphold the same.
Set aside the impugned judgment and order so far as it relates to the rejection of the prayer of the appellant for return of EMD. The respondent shall proceed to determine the nature and extent of forfeiture of the EMD amount afresh. In doing so, the respondent shall provide sufficient opportunity of being heard to the appellant. The respondent is at liberty to hear any other parties and consult any document as it deems necessary. The respondent shall take a decision in this regard within 8 weeks from date and communicate its decision to the party it heard forthwith thereafter.
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2025 (3) TMI 1403
Wilful disobedience - binding nature of Resolution Plan, on any creditor including the Central Government, State Government or any local authority, once it is approved by an adjudicating authority under sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - amendment to Section 31 by Section 7 of Act 26 of 2019 is clarificatory/declaratory or substantive in nature? - initiation of any proceedings for recovery of any of the dues from the Corporate Debtor, hich are not a part of the Resolution Plan approved by the adjudicating authority, after approval of resolution plan by the Adjudicating Authority a creditor including the Central Government, State Government or any local authority.
HELD THAT:- All the dues of any of the stakeholders including the statutory dues owed to the Central Government, any State Government or any local authority, which were not part of the Resolution Plan, stood extinguished from the date on which the Resolution Plan stood approved.
This Court has held that a successful resolution applicant cannot suddenly be faced with “undecided” claims after the resolution plan submitted by him has been accepted as this would amount to a hydra head popping up which would throw into uncertainty amounts payable by a prospective resolution applicant who would successfully take over the business of the corporate debtor. It has also been held that all claims must be submitted to and decided by the RP so that a prospective resolution applicant knows exactly what has to be paid in order that it may then take over and run the business of the corporate debtor.
There are no hesitation in holding that the demands raised by the respondents/authorities for a period prior to the date on which the learned NCLT has approved the Resolution Plan were totally contemptuous in nature. The respondents could not have raised the said demands inasmuch as they are not part of the Resolution Plan.
Undoubtedly, in the present case, in spite of public notice, neither the State of Chhattisgarh nor its authorities raised any claim before the CoC. In that view of the matter, the case of the present Petitioner is specifically covered by the judgment of this Court in the case of Ghanshyam Mishra, which judgment was brought to the notice of the respondents/authorities, the respondents/authorities could not have proceeded with the recovery proceedings - When the law laid down by this Court in the case of Ghanshyam Mishra is clear and unambiguous and specifically when the Petitioner’s own case was part of the batch which is specifically dealt with by this Court, the respondents/alleged contemnors ought not to have proceeded further with the recovery proceedings and ought to have dropped them forthwith. The continuation of such proceedings despite the judgment and order of this Court being pointed out to their notice is nothing but contemptuous in nature.
There are no hesitation in holding that the continuation of the proceedings by the respondents/authorities even after the judgment of this Court in Ghanshyam Mishra was specifically brought to their notice is contemptuous in nature. However, we do not propose to proceed against the respondents/contemnors inasmuch as they are entitled to benefit of doubt.
Conclusion - The act of the alleged contemnors is contemptuous in nature, it is not proposed to take any action against them. The demand notices issued by the contemnors on the Petitioner Company and all proceedings pursuant thereto are held to be illegal and the same are quashed and set aside.
The contempt petition accepting unconditional apology of the contemnors disposed off.
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2025 (3) TMI 1402
Seeking grant of regular bail - prolonged detention - right to speedy trial - Money Laundering - proceeds of crime - alleged AgustaWestland VVIP helicopter scam - routing illicit funds through shell companies - alleged bribe payments through middlemen - HELD THAT:- This Court notes that the learned counsel for the applicant primarily argued the present bail application on the ground of delay in concluding investigation and consequently the trial, and placed reliance on the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court whereby the applicant herein has been granted bail in the predicate offence – on the ground of delay in trial itself - this Court has given consideration to the material placed on record as well as the stage of the investigation and the fact that in the present case, though the applicant has been in judicial custody for more than six years, investigation in the case has yet not been concluded, charges have not been framed and the trial has not begun.
This Court while deciding the present bail application, in the backdrop of the fact that applicant has been granted bail by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the predicate offence, has considered the issue of grant of bail to the applicant viz-a-viz the delay in conclusion of investigation and initiation of trial, especially the fact that the applicant has almost completed the period of judicial custody equivalent to the maximum punishment attracted in the present case i.e. under Section 4 of PMLA. Considering these circumstances, the merits of the allegations against the applicant were not considered at this stage.
In cases under PMLA, while the legislature has incorporated stringent provisions such as Section 45 to regulate the grant of bail, by prescribing the twin test, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held that such provisions must be harmoniously interpreted with Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It has also been held that the statutory bar under such bail provisions cannot be permitted to override an accused’s right to speedy trial, nor can statutory restrictions be construed as a tool for indefinite incarceration.
In Prem Prakash v. Union of India [2024 (8) TMI 1412 - SUPREME COURT], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated the fundamental right to speedy trial enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and held that keeping persons behind bars for unlimited periods of time, in the hope of speedy completion of trial, would deprive the fundamental right of persons under Article 21.
This Court is of the view that while Section 45 of PMLA imposes stringent conditions for the grant of bail, constitutional courts, including the Hon’ble Supreme Court, have also emphasized time and again that this provision cannot be interpreted in a manner, to confine the accused in judicial custody for an indefinite period of time. As noted above, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in multiple decisions, has held that the right to bail must be read into such provisions where there is an inordinate delay in the completion of trial which effectively converts pre-trial custody into a punitive sentence.
The present case presents an exceptional situation where the applicant has already been in custody for over six years and two months, yet the trial has not even commenced due to the incomplete investigation. Such prolonged incarceration, without any foreseeable conclusion of trial, would infringe upon the applicant’s fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution.
Section 436A of the Cr.P.C. is a statutory safeguard designed to prevent excessive and disproportionate pre-trial detention. It provides that an accused, who has undergone detention for a period equivalent to one-half of the maximum sentence prescribed for the offence, shall ordinarily be released on bail unless the court, for reasons recorded in writing, directs otherwise. In the context of offences under PMLA, where the maximum sentence is ordinarily seven years, the one-half threshold would be three and a half years. Although the proviso to Section 436A of Cr.P.C. allows the court to extend the period of detention beyond the one-half threshold based on the facts of the case, yet such extended detention cannot be indefinite and the Courts must assess the necessity of continued incarceration in light of the specific facts, the stage of the trial, and the overall interests of justice.
While the proviso to Section 436A allows courts to extend detention beyond this period in exceptional circumstances, the present case is not one where the applicant’s custody is only marginally beyond the halfway mark. Instead, the applicant has been in custody for over six years and two months – which is alarmingly close to the maximum punishment – without even being adjudicated guilty. It was pointed out that more than 100 witnesses are to be examined in the present case and there are more than 1000 documents relied upon by the prosecution. Given that the trial is unlikely to conclude before the applicant completes even seven years in jail, further incarceration would render the entire purpose of a trial meaningless.
In this Court’s opinion, the prolonged incarceration of the accused, of about six years and two months, and the fact that investigation is not yet complete and trial has not yet begun, and there are more than 100 witness to be examined in this case, would entitle him to grant of regular bail, thereby overriding the statutory bar under Section 45 of PMLA and proviso to Section 436A of Cr.P.C.
Considering the period of incarceration of about six years and two months undergone by the applicant, and in view of the fact that he has also been granted bail in the case pertaining to predicate offence by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the ground that the investigation has not been completed and the trial has not even begun, and considering that there seems to be no possibility of trial in this case concluding too within the remaining duration of the maximum prescribed sentence under Section 4 of PMLA, inasmuch as the same has not even begun as of now, this Court is inclined to grant regular bail to the present applicant, on furnishing a personal bond and surety in the sum of ₹5,00,000/- each and on surrendering the passport before the learned Trial Court, which be not released without permission of this Court, considering that investigation qua the present applicant is still pending.
Conclusion - The applicant's prolonged detention without trial violates his right to a speedy trial under Article 21.
Application allowed.
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2025 (3) TMI 1401
Process amounting to manufacture - process of drawing wire from wire rod - liability of appellant to pay Service Tax under the 'transportation of goods by road' (GTA) service category when the vehicles were hired from local transporters who did not issue consignment notes - business auxiliary services.
Business auxiliary service - HELD THAT:- From the definition of ‘business auxiliary service’, it is seen that if the activity undertaken by the appellant amounts to manufacture of excisable goods, then the said activity shall be excluded from the said definition. As the activity of drawing of wire from wire rod supplied by the customer amounts to ‘manufacture’, the services undertaken by the appellant do not fall within the ambit of the taxable service of 'business auxiliary service' as defined under Section 65(19) of the Act. Thus, the job work undertaken by the appellant does not amount to 'business auxiliary services', as held in the impugned order. Consequently, the demand of Service Tax confirmed under this category is not sustainable and hence, the same is set aside.
Demand confirmed under the category of GTA service - HELD THAT:- The appellant has hired vehicles from local vehicle providers who have not issued any consignment notes. Hence, they cannot be considered as ‘goods transport agencies’ within the meaning of Section 65(50b) of the Finance Act, 1994. The liability of the appellant to pay Service Tax under the category of ‘transportation of goods by road’ (GTA) service arises only when the appellant receives services from a goods transport agency who issues a consignment note, by whatever name it may be called. In these circumstances, the appellant is not liable to pay Service Tax under the category of GTA service in respect of the expenditure incurred by them for transportation of goods during the impugned period as the services were not received from a GTA who issues consignment notes - as the suppliers were not goods transport agencies within the meaning of Section 65(50b) of the Act as they have not issued any consignment notes, the services received by the appellant cannot be held liable to Service Tax under reverse charge mechanism at the hands of the appellant under the category of GTA service. Accordingly, the demand of Service Tax confirmed under this category is not sustainable and therefore, the same is set aside.
Interest and penalty - HELD THAT:- As the demands confirmed against the appellant do not survive, the question of demanding interest thereon or imposing penalties does not arise.
Conclusion - i) As the activity of drawing of wire from wire rod supplied by the customer amounts to 'manufacture', the services undertaken by the appellant do not fall within the ambit of the taxable service of 'business auxiliary service' as defined under Section 65(19) of the Act. ii) Service tax under the GTA category requires issuance of consignment notes by a 'goods transport agency.
The impugned order is set aside - appeal allowed.
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2025 (3) TMI 1400
Validity of demand notice under proviso to Section 73 when tax liabilities have already been accepted by the Appellant by filing ST-3 Returns - demand of Service Tax on the basis of figures of turnover in Balance Sheets - demand of Service Tax on services covered under RCM, when the same is claimed as Cenvat credit by the Appellant - demand of inadmissible credit in respect of services, said not to be input services - penalty u/s 78 - personal penalty on Asstt. Vice President - Demand of late fee for filing ST-3 Returns late, beyond the due date, under Section 70 of the Finance Act, 1994.
Whether demand notice is justified under proviso to Section 73 when tax liabilities have already been accepted by the Appellant by filing ST-3 Returns? - HELD THAT:- An in-depth reading of tprovisions of Section 73(1B) of the Finance Act, 1994 reveals that where tax was self- assessed and returns were furnished, no notice of demand was required to be issued under Section 73(1). It is further found that in the present case, tax was self- assessed and service tax liability was declared in returns as already admitted in the SCN as well as impugned order. So, issuance of SCN for recovery of self- assessed tax is patently unwarranted and legally incorrect. There should also be no demand of interest under Section 75. It is also found that the service tax liability declared in the ST-3 returns was deposited before issuance of SCN. As per provisions Section 73(3), if short levied or non-paid service tax deposited before issuance of the SCN, no notice under sub Section (1) of 73 in respect of the amount so paid was required to be issued.
Whether demand of Service Tax on the basis of figures of turnover in Balance Sheets is legally correct? - HELD THAT:- It indicates that no service tax was chargeable on sale of flats by the Appellant in its own account. Service tax was payable only on the commission amount earned by the Appellant for sale of flats of other builders. The demand of service tax on the turnover shown in Balance Sheets is incorrect. Thus, demand of service tax on differential value, i.e., difference between figure of turnover shown in Balance Sheets and value of service declared in ST-3 is unjustified and is not sustainable. It is a settled legal position that demand raised on the basis of Balance Sheet or Form 26AS is not sustainable as held in M/s Lord Krishna Real Infra P. Ltd., [2019 (2) TMI 1563 - CESTAT ALLAHABAD]. It has been held that by raising demand on the value shown in the Balance Sheets without any investigation, the Department had not discharged the onus on them. Following the ratio of the above decision, the demand raised on the figure of Balance Sheet is not sustainable.
Whether demand of Service Tax on services covered under RCM is justified when the same is claimed as Cenvat credit by the Appellant? - HELD THAT:- It is a case of revenue neutrality with no loss of revenue to the Exchequer. It is a settled law that in case of revenue neutrality, demand of any differential duty would not be sustainable. In this context, reliance is placed on the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of V.E. Commercial Vehicles Ltd., [2019 (9) TMI 887 - SC ORDER]. In the above case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the demand of differential duty would not be sustainable as the same is available as rebate to the assessee. So, it is revenue neutrality case. Decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd., [2019 (11) TMI 783 - SC ORDER] is also referred to. In this case the Court has enunciated that demand of differential duty is not sustainable on the ground of revenue neutrality in as much as differential duty would be available as credit to the assessee. In view of the above judgments, it is clear that demand in the present case is not sustainable.
Whether demand of inadmissible credit in respect of services, said not to be input services, is justified or not? - HELD THAT:- The business of the Appellant to provide real estate agent services whereunder, as commonly known, they arranged customer’s meeting, arranged their visits to location, provide free catering to customers and also used to visit abroad for promotional activities of its business. Therefore, any service for undertaking above said activities were covered in the definition of input services - In view of utilisation of the services, it is held that they were covered under the definition of input services and credit availed thereon would be admissible.
Whether penalty under Section 78 is imposable? - HELD THAT:- As there was no requirement to issue notice u/s 73, the imposition of penalty u/s 78 is not warranted. In this regard, the Tribunal in the case of Ms Mass Marketing and Advertisement Services Pvt. Ltd., [2006 (2) TMI 20 - CESTAT BANGALORE] where it has been held that no penalty is imposable if service tax deposited before issuance of show cause notice. The same view has also been taken in the case of [2004 (8) TMI 3 - CESTAT, BANGALORE] where it was held that no penalty is imposable if service tax is deposited before issuance of SCN.
Whether personal penalty on Asstt. Vice President is justified? - HELD THAT:- In the present case, evasion of service tax has not been established. There is no case of issuance of fake invoice or challan and also no case of wrong availment of credit. Nothing has been discussed that taxes were collected but not paid. Hence, no penalty is imposable.
Demand of late fee for filing ST-3 Returns late, beyond the due date, under Section 70 of the Finance Act, 1994 - HELD THAT:- There are no provisions to raise any demand notice for late fees. It is provided that a Return can be filed with late fees of maximum amount of Rs.20,000/-. It does not prescribe that incase of non- payment of late fees any demand notice is required to be issued. Lack of any provision for issuing SCN for demand of late fee, it is refrained to confirm any such demand.
Conclusion - i) Self-assessed tax liabilities declared in returns do not warrant an SCN under Section 73. ii) Service tax demands based on Balance Sheet figures require thorough investigation to establish liability. iii) Revenue neutrality precludes sustainable demands for differential duty. iv) Services related to business promotion and operations qualify as input services for CENVAT credit purposes. v) No penalties imposed.
Appeal allowed.
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2025 (3) TMI 1399
Condonation of delay in filing appeal - whether the appeal filed by the appellant was within the permissible time limit as prescribed under Section 85 of the Finance Act, 1994? - HELD THAT:- The fact of the receipt of the order is not in dispute. It is not even the case of the Appellant that the Order of the Adjudicating Authority was not received by the Appellant on 29.07.2022 and Appeal was to be filed within 60 days i.e. up to 29.09.2022. The Commissioner (Appeals) chould have condoned the delay further by one month i.e. upto 29.10.2022. However, the Appeal was filed before the Commissioner (Appeals) on or after that date. That being so Commissioner (Appeals) has rightly held that in view of the Hon’ble Supreme Court decision in the case of Singh Enterprises [2007 (12) TMI 11 - SUPREME COURT] he could not have condoned the delay and dismissed the Appeal.
The Appellant had filed the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) beyond the period which could have been condoned by the Commissioner (Appeals) as per Section 35 of the Central Excise Act. Judgment relied upon by Commissioner (Appeals) has clearly laid down that Commissioner (Appeals) has no Authority to condone the delay beyond 30 days.
Conclusion - The appeal is filed beyond the permissible period and could not be entertained.
Appeal is dismissed.
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2025 (3) TMI 1398
Levy of penalty for shortages of raw materials and finished goods - appellant paid the duty before the issuance of the SCN - HELD THAT:- Appellant were unable to fully explain the shortage of raw materials and finished goods at the time of stock verification and, in order to put an end to the litigation, they paid the duty and hence, penalty should not have been imposed in respect of these demands. The submission of the appellant agreed that since the appellant had paid the central excise duty along with interest before issuance of the SCN, as per Section 11A(2B) of the Act, there was no necessity to issue the Show Cause Notice for these demands. as the duty involved has already been paid. Accordingly, the SCN for these issues need not have been issued. In these facts and circumstances, the penalties imposed on the appellant on these issues are not warranted and hence, the penalties imposed on the appellant on these demands are set aside.
Regarding the liability to central excise duty amounting to Rs.1,21,936/- on transport insurance, the appellant has collected transport insurance charges @ 1% on the value from the customers and deducted the same from the assessable value. However, the actual premium paid by them was found to be less than the 1% collected. In this regard, it is observed that the profit earned by the appellant on the transport insurance is not liable to be included in the assessable value, as has been held by the Tribunal in the case of TCP Ltd. v. Commissioner of C.Ex., Madurai [2007 (10) TMI 512 - CESTAT, CHENNAI].
Conclusion - i) The demands of Rs.40,445/- and Rs.18,031/- (inclusive of cesses), along with interest, confirmed on account of shortage of inputs and shortage of finished goods respectively, already paid by the appellant, are upheld. No penalty is imposable in respect of these demands. ii) The demand of Rs.1,21,936/- confirmed on account of inclusion of transit insurance in the assessable value is set aside. No penalty is imposable on the appellant in respect of this issue.
Appeal disposed off.
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2025 (3) TMI 1397
Refund upon finalisation of provisional assessments - requirement to prove conclusively that the incidence of duty burden has not been passed on to the ultimate buyer - compliance to the principle of the doctrine of unjust enrichment - HELD THAT:- It is evident from the records that the Original Authority in the denova Order-in-Original No. 08/2016 dated 05.08.2016 has arrived at the decision that the appellant has borne the excise duty burden and not passed on to the dealers after scrutinizing the credit notes, Chartered Accountant’s certificate, extract of ledger for discounts, etc., and ordered for sanction of the refunds. Whereas in the impugned orders dated 14.09.2017, the Commissioner of GST and Central Excise (Appeals), Coimbatore has held that refund claims were hit by the bar of unjust enrichment as the appellant has not conclusively established that the burden of excise duty in relation to which such refunds are claimed has not been passed on by him to any other person (ultimate consumer) and the verification process done by the Original Adjudicating Authority was only confined to the first buyers i.e., Dealers. Whether the incidence of duty was passed on to any other downstream buyer was not verified by the Original Adjudicating Authority and also from the records, it was ascertained that the assessee has not submitted any such evidence.
An in-depth examination of the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of Addison & Co. Ltd. [1997 (3) TMI 98 - SUPREME COURT] makes it clear that there is a presumption that the full incidence of duty burden has been passed on to the buyer of the goods. The refund of any duty can be made only to the person who bears the incidence of duty and it is necessary to conduct verification as to ascertain who actually have borne the burden of duty. It has been categorically laid down that refund can be granted only to the person who has paid the duty and borne the duty and not to anyone else. If the ultimate customer cannot be identified the amount should be credited to the Consumer Welfare Fund established under Section 12 C of the Central Excise Act, 1944 to be utilised for the benefit of consumers in general.
The appellant would be eligible for refunds sanctioned only when it is proved that incidence of duty has not only been passed on to the dealers but also by the dealers to the ultimate customers. Herein, the appellant has proved that the excise duty burden has been borne by him and not passed on to the dealers. But whether there is any evidence as to their dealers having not passed on the duty incidence to the ultimate customers of Motor Cycles is not forth coming as a second stage verification has not been carried out. As such, the appellant is required to prove conclusively that the incidence of duty burden has not been passed on to the ultimate buyers so as to be eligible for the refund claims arising on account of finalisation of provisional assessment after allowing abatements.
The sanction of the refund claims by the Original Adjudicating Authority without conducting verification as to whether the dealers of the Motor Cycles have not passed on the incidence of duty to the ultimate customer is not legal and proper. Refund of excess excise duty paid at the time of provisional assessments, could be legally sanctionable only to those persons which include ultimate customers who must have borne the burden of excise duty paid.
Conclusion - The appellant failed to conclusively prove that the duty burden was not passed on to the ultimate consumers, thus affecting their eligibility for refunds.
The appeals are allowed by way of remand.
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2025 (3) TMI 1396
Modification of National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission's (NCDRC) order by awarding an increased interest rate of 15% per annum on the refund amount - delay on the part of the respondent in not completing the construction within the agreed period - HELD THAT:- The NCDRC having taken note of the relevant aspects including the factum of delay and the fact that petitioner had opted for refund of money deposited, rightly held that as a home buyer, petitioner cannot be compelled to take possession of the flat after such long time, and as such ordered for refund of entire amount deposited with interest of 9% p.a.
Placing reliance on the law laid down by this Court in Bangalore Development Authority v. Syndicate Bank, [2007 (5) TMI 565 - SUPREME COURT] wherein a coordinate Bench of this Court dealing with the question of grant of relief to a consumer in cases of delay of delivery of possession held that when possession of the allotted plot/flat/house is not delivered within the specified time, the allottee is entitled to a refund of the amount paid with reasonable interest thereon from the date of payment till the date of refund.
In the present case, the High Court by the impugned order modified the finding of NCDRC and awarded interest @ 15% p.a. primarily relying upon the judgment of this Court in ‘Rohit Chaudhary and another v. Vipul Ltd. [2023 (9) TMI 1569 - SUPREME COURT], wherein this Court in order to balance the equities and to compensate the loss caused to the purchaser/complainant who had booked an office premise for his use, directed the refund of the amount paid along with interest @ 12% p.a. from the date of complaint till the date of payment. However, the issue in the instant case relates to allotment of a 3 BHK flat after payment of sale consideration and delay in delivery of same. As such, the NCDRC considering the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case, had awarded interest @ 9% p.a., which in our view was fair and reasonable. The interest @ 15% p.a. awarded by High Court is excessive. Therefore, the impugned order hereby is setaside and the order dated 27.07.2022 passed by NCDRC in so far as it relates to award of interest @ 9% on the respective deposit till the date of actual payment is restored.
Conclusion - i) The NCDRC's award of 9% interest per annum is deemed fair and reasonable, considering the complainant's choice for a refund and the delay in possession. ii) The High Court's enhancement of interest to 15% per annum is excessive and not justified under the circumstances. iii) The compensation amount is reduced from Rs. 10,00,000 to Rs. 7,50,000 to balance the interests of justice, considering the appellant's status as a state instrumentality.
The appeal stands partly allowed.
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2025 (3) TMI 1395
Denial of Input tax credit - expiry of the period prescribed under Sections 37(3) and 39(9) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 - HELD THAT:- It is accepted by the Revenue that there is a clerical/arithmetical mistake which is not being permitted to be corrected. Invariably, such mistakes come to the notice of the seller, who has to fill up the online form(s), etc., after the input tax credit is denied to the purchaser(s).
Re-list in the week commencing 28.04.2025.
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2025 (3) TMI 1394
Seeking cancellation of the bail granted to the appellant - respondent/Union of India submitted that the case of the Gautam Garg cannot be equated with the present case as the present appellant is the main accused and proprietor of the two firms and an operator in another firm - HELD THAT:- The case for bail is made out.
Appeal allowed.
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2025 (3) TMI 1393
Challenge to order of provisional attachment of bank account of the petitioner - HELD THAT:- The final order passed under Section 74 of the CGST Act, if ultimately challenged shall be looked into on its own merits in accordance with law without being influenced in any manner by any of the observations made by the High Court in its impugned order.
This Court in M/s Radha Krishan Industries versus State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors., [2021 (4) TMI 837 - SUPREME COURT], has categorically said that once the final order is passed under Section 74 of the CGST Act, the provisional attachment comes to an end.
SLP disposed off.
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2025 (3) TMI 1392
Challenge to ex-parte demand order and SCN - Time limitation - HELD THAT:- This subject matter is covered by the judgment and order in M/s Anita Traders Lko. U.P. Thru Proprietor Aneeta Sharma vs. State of U.P. and another [2025 (2) TMI 466 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] where it was held that 'As would be apparent from a reading of the said order, the due date for filing annual return in the case of financial year 2017-18 was 31.12.2018, however, this due date was extended by the Central Board of Direct Taxes and Customs vide notification dated 03.02.2018, to 05.02.2020 and this notification was adopted by the State of U.P. vide notification dated 05.02.2020. Based on this notification, the period of three years mentioned in Sub Section 10 of Section 73 would end on 05.02.2023 meaning thereby, an order under Sub Section 9 of Section 73 for the financial year 2017-18 could have been passed by 05.02.2023 but not after it.'
It has been held in the said judgment that an order under sub-Section 9 of Section 73 pertaining to financial year 2017-18 could have been passed by 05.02.2023 but not thereafter. The notification dated 24.04.2023 has been considered and the contention that such an order could have been passed til 31.03.2023 has been repelled for the reasons given therein. Now, in the case at hand the order under sub-Section 9 of Section 73 has been passed on 14.12.2023, therefore, it is clearly time barred.
Conclusion - The impugned orders are beyond the time limit prescribed under sub Section 10 of Section 73 as applicable for the financial year 2017-18 and therefore the impugned orders are beyond jurisdiction being barred by the time provided in the said provision.
Petition allowed.
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2025 (3) TMI 1391
Violation of principles of natural justice - Challenge to assessment order and the consequent rectification order passed by the respondent - petitioner's consultant failed to file an appeal, within the limitation period - HELD THAT:- In the present case, initially ASMT 10 notice dated 04.01.2022 was issued to the petitioner for which the petitioner submitted its reply on 07.04.2022. Thereafter, for the very same issue and assessment year another ASMT 10 notice was issued on 09.10.2023. Thereafter pre show cause notice dated 11.12.2023 followed by show cause notice dated 16.12.2023 was issued to the petitioner, for which the petitioner vide reply dated 16.01.2024 and 28.02.2024 sought for adjournment for filing detailed reply along with supporting documents and also personal hearing. But, the respondent herein without considering the same has passed the impugned assessment order.
As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner when the respondent intend to drop the proceedings, based on the reply filed by the petitioner to the show cause notice, they can very well do so. But, when they intend to pass orders confirming the demand for the other issue, they ought to have provided an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.
In the case on hand, the impugned order came to be passed without sufficient opportunities to the petitioner. Hence, this Court is of the view that the impugned order passed is in violation of principles of natural justice and it is just and necessary to provide an opportunity to the petitioner to establish their case on merits. In such view of the matter, this Court is inclined to set aside the impugned assessment order as well as the rectification order passed by the respondent.
The orders impugned herein are set aside and the matter is remitted back to the assessing authority for fresh consideration - Petition allowed by way of remand.
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2025 (3) TMI 1390
Seeking grant of anticipatory bail - involvement in financial misconduct and the subsequent impact on the State Exchequer - HELD THAT:- Considering the fact that the petitioner has not caused any loss to the State Exchequer as he has been filing GST returns on time, with the purchases made by him and his firm accurately reflected in the vendor's GST R-1 Return, as well as in the GST 2-A and 3-B returns and all due taxes have been paid promptly and the fact that the petitioner is ready and willing to join the investigation and cooperate with the investigating officer concerned, as has been averred in para No.16 of the present petition, this Court is of the considered view that the petitioner deserves the concession of anticipatory bail at this stage.
The petitioner is directed to be released on anticipatory bail subject to fulfilment of conditions imposed - bail application allowed.
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2025 (3) TMI 1389
Cancellation of registration of petitioner - petitioner Municipal Board did not file returns for a continuous period of six months - HELD THAT:- In view of the fact that the petitioner Municipal Board after 13.05.2022 has cleared all its dues under the GST Act and since then, has been depositing its dues under the GST Act regularly/monthly, the impugned order dated 17.10.2019 is set aside by making the interim order dated 13.05.2022, as suggested by Mr. Keyal, learned Standing Counsel, CGST, absolute.
Petition allowed.
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2025 (3) TMI 1388
Dismissal of appeal on the ground of delay of 285 days in filing appeal - sufficient cause for delay or not - HELD THAT:- Considering the fact that the notices were uploaded in the portal, but no hard copy was served on the petitioner, this Court feels that reasonable cause has been shown by the petitioner for the delay. Therefore, this Court is inclined to condone the delay of 285 days in filing the appeal.
The delay of 285 days in filing the appeal before the first respondent is condoned and the order of the appellate authority/first respondent is set aside - Petition allowed.
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2025 (3) TMI 1387
ITR u/s 139 to be treated as “non-est” or not - Review of order [2014 (5) TMI 596 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] - HELD THAT:- In the facts of the case, it has to be seen as to when the due date for filing return i.e. 31.10.2002 had lapsed but, prior thereto, account books and other material of the assessee were seized on 01.09.2002 and when the block assessment was being done, whether it was at all necessary for the assessee to file a belated return after the seized material was released in favour of the assessee or if at all it was filed, whether such filing could be fatal to his case or whether the assessee was precluded from filing return though inspection was facilitated to him. The interse connection between regular proceedings vis-a-vis block assessment proceedings in the peculiar facts of the case, is a question that has relevance so as to adjudge the issue of double jeopardy allegedly faced by the assessee, as argued on his behalf.
Review petition - non answering the substantial question - whether a ground for review? - HELD THAT:- Applicability of correct clause/sub-clause of any Section/sub-Section of Section 158-BB of the IT Act was not answered by this Court while deciding the appeal, the same, in itself, cannot be a ground to review the order, inasmuch as, the point was left open by the Court to be decided in appeal after remand, i.e. to say that the ingredients of the substantial question of law were to be re-determined by the Appellate Tribunal pursuant to the order of remand. Therefore, when Shri Goyal submits that the Appellate Tribunal, after remand, has accepted the finding of this Court as regards the ITR under Section 139 being “non-est” and, therefore, the order passed by the Tribunal be also set aside on this ground alone, we are of the view that the present review application and the connected appeal are to be decided in the light of scope of two different and independent proceedings, i.e. one being an application for review and the other being a statutory appeal and, hence, we would do accordingly.
Conclusion - We find that not only the block assessment order dated 30.09.2004 but also the assessment order 29.03.2006 and orders passed subsequently i.e. on 16.08.2005 and 26.06.2006 contained discussion of material that was available before the Authorities/Tribunal.
Merely because this Court interpreted the record of proceedings in one way or the other, we do not find that there is any error apparent on the face of the record so as to justify exercise of our review jurisdiction.
At the same time, the effect of order on the proceedings culminating into passing of the subsequent order after remand, has to be seen while deciding the connected Income Tax Appeal [2025 (3) TMI 1287 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] but, in any case, we are of the considered view that the order [2014 (5) TMI 596 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] does not suffer from an error apparent on the face of the record so as to persuade this Court to review the order and take another view of the matter different from the one taken by this Court in its order dated 16.05.2014. Application for review stands rejected.
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2025 (3) TMI 1386
Interim Application seeks restoration of Writ Petition which was dismissed for non- prosecution - This application has been filed after delay of 16 months and 9 days, so condonation is applied for.
Respondent/Revenue states that the delay is, in fact, 19 months, not just 16 months and 9 days.
HELD THAT:- In such matters, the length of the delay is one consideration, but the cost shown is crucial. If the cost shown is satisfactory, then, subject no doubt to payment of sufficient cost, the delay can be condoned.
In Paragraphs 6 and 7, the Applicant has explained the circumstances in which the matter was missed and no sufficient steps were taken. An apology is also being tendered. There is nothing on record to suggest any lack of bonafide. Therefore, considering the cost shown, the delay can be condoned, and the Petition can be restored.
By a separate order, we have restored this Petition which was earlier dismissed for non-prosecution - This Petition challenges the assessment order dated 25 March 2022 - Applicant seeks leave to withdraw this Petition with the liberty to file an Appeal against the impugned order - HELD THAT:- This Petition was instituted on 26 April 2022, i.e. within the limitation period prescribed for instituting an Appeal. This Court had also granted interim protection to the Petitioner. The Petition was being pursued bona fide.
Therefore, if, as stated Petitioner that the Appeal is instituted within four weeks from today, then the Appellate Authority should give due consideration to the fact that this Petition was instituted on 26 April 2022 and has been pending in this Court until today. The Petitioner was bona fide in pursuing this Petition because it alleged certain breaches of principles of natural justice.
Accordingly, leave is granted, and this Petition is disposed of as withdrawn with liberty to the Petitioner to pursue the Appeal remedy.
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2025 (3) TMI 1385
Assessment of trust - Petitioner’s application for condonation of delay in filing Form-10 rejected - HELD THAT:- The record shows that the Petitioner is a small charitable trust engaged inter-alia in awarding scholarships for educational purposes. The returns were filed for AY 2021-2022 during the extended period due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This means that the COVID-19 pandemic had just ended, and during this pandemic, it must have been challenging for Petitioner-Trust to have its documentation in order.
The record also shows that the Petitioner has been diligent and punctual in filing the necessary Form-10 along with its returns for the previous years. Petitioner, in its application for condonation of delay, has relied upon a precedent, thereby suggesting that the circumstances referred to in the precedent were not qualitatively different from those in the Petitioner's case.
There are no mala fides involved, and it is not as if the Petitioner has gained any undue advantage on account of the delay in submitting Form-10.
In this case, the return was filed within the prescribed period, but Form-10 did not accompany it. After this lacuna was pointed out, the same was rectified, but with some delay. From the Application for condonation of delay, it appears that the Petitioner did not have any professional assistance. This position was affirmed by Mr. Jain, learned counsel for the Petitioner.
Thus, we think sufficient cause has been shown for the condonation of delay.
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