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Showing 441 to 460 of 534 Records
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2002 (9) TMI 94
Capital Or Revenue Expenditure - "Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that payment of Rs. 45 lakhs for purchase of the unit was a capital expenditure and if it was a capital expenditure as held by the Tribunal then whether the Tribunal was justified in directing apportionment of the said amount as advance rent over a period of 71 years at the rate of Rs. 63,380 per annum as rent relatable to each year?" - we hold as follows: (a) That payment of Rs. 45 lakhs by the assessee was a capital expenditure and, therefore, the Tribunal erred in directing the Department to apportion/spread over the said amount for 71 years on proportionate basis, relatable to each year at the rate of Rs. 63,380 per annum, for 71 years. Consequently, the direction to that extent in para. 16 of the impugned order is set aside. Therefore, the appeal stands allowed. (b) Consequently, the cross-objections filed by the assessee stand dismissed.
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2002 (9) TMI 93
"1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the aggregate sum of Rs. 92,40,329 being interest received on IDBI bonds for a period of three years, was chargeable to tax in the assessment year 1989-90 instead of bringing to tax in the year to which it relates? - 2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the compensation for termination of the selling agreement was taxable as revenue receipts?" – Both questions also is, therefore, answered against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue.
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2002 (9) TMI 92
The petitioner is a charitable society - The petitioner is contesting order whereunder section 80G benefit was denied to the petitioner by the Commissioner on the ground that an amount of Rs. 25,000 received as donation was invested in a private company which disentitles the petitioner for exemption under section 13(1)(d) read with section 11(5) of the Income-tax Act. - It is to be confined to the facts of that case because it was found in that case that the trustees through whom the deposits had been made had paid up deposits in those institutions to the petitioner and so far as the petitioner was concerned, the technical breach ought not to have weighed with the Commissioner is the finding of the court. In any case going by the wording of section 80G, it makes it clear that unless a charitable trust or society qualifies for exemption under section 11 during the relevant year, it is not entitled to renewal of registration under section 80G. - In the circumstances, there is no ground to interfere. The original petition is dismissed.
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2002 (9) TMI 91
The petitioner has filed the present writ application challenging the order dated June 28, 2002 (annexure 1 to the writ application), by which appointment of an auditor to audit its books of account for the block assessment period from April 1, 1990 to June 6, 2000, has been made. - The petitioner has challenged the appointment of the auditor on the ground of non-fulfilment of the requirements as contained under section 142(2A) - The satisfaction is of the authority concerned to order for appointment of auditor. This court in writ jurisdiction cannot judge the satisfaction of the authority when it has ordered for appointment of an auditor after taking note of the nature of the controversy in the matter. - In our view, the appointment of auditor does not suffer from any legal infirmity justifying interference in writ jurisdiction. Accordingly, the writ application is dismissed.
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2002 (9) TMI 90
"Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that the rental for the mere letting of godowns received by the assessee should be assessed under the head 'Income from business' and not 'property'?" - The case of Karanpura Development Co. Ltd. v. CIT relied upon by the Tribunal, dealt with the case of sub-lease given by a company which had acquired coal mining leases over large areas and the object of the company was to acquire such leases, develop them as coalfields and then sub-lease them to collieries and other companies. In the context of the facts of that case, the court held that the amounts paid to the lessors by the sub-lessees constituted business income. - The Tribunal was in error in holding that the rental income derived by the assessee was required to be treated as business income and not as income from property. The question referred to us is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
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2002 (9) TMI 89
Penalty, Non-payment Of Advance Tax - levy of penalty of Rs. 70,000 under section 273 - admittedly, on account of the set off of unabsorbed depreciation of earlier years against the total income computed for the relevant assessment year, the taxable income would work out to nil and the assessee will not be liable to pay any tax in respect of this year. It is axiomatic that if there is no liability to pay income-tax, there is no obligation to pay advance tax and consequently no occasion for levy of penalty for non-payment of advance tax. In that view of the matter, we feel that it is unnecessary to go into the question as to whether the assessee had failed to furnish a statement of advance tax without any reasonable cause, particularly when the Tribunal has not gone into this aspect of the matter. - the levy of penalty cannot be sustained
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2002 (9) TMI 88
"1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that unabsorbed depreciation of an earlier year could not be allowed to be set off against the income taxed under section 56 (sic) of the Income-tax Act, 1961? - 2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in upholding the allowance of only 10 per cent. of the total expenditure incurred by the assessee as expenditure for earning the income that was the subject-matter of tax?" we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was not right in holding that the unabsorbed depreciation carried forward from earlier years could not be allowed against the income assessed under section 56 of the Act under the head "Income from other sources". Consequently, the first question is answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. - As regards the second question, Mr. Aggarwal, learned counsel for the assessee, submits that the assessee, at whose instance, the reference has been made, is not interested in getting an answer from this court on the question. Accordingly, the second question is returned unanswered.
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2002 (9) TMI 87
"Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the development rebate reserve written back should not be reduced from the capital base under rule 1(iii) of the Second Schedule to the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964?" - The amount credited into the general reserve from the development rebate reserve therefore is not to be regarded as an amount which had been allowed as a deduction in the computation of the income of the previous year under the Income-tax Act. - The question referred to us is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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2002 (9) TMI 86
Powers Of Commissioner, Export, Special Deduction - By this writ petition, the petitioner/assessee seeks to challenge the order passed by the revisional authority under section 264 - The main issue which arose for consideration by the Commissioner was whether the export incentives received in subsequent assessment years can be allowed under section 80HHC even though such incentive has not been shown as income for the relevant year. - Commissioner has correctly framed an issue. However, he has rejected the revision application on extraneous grounds. We are of the view that the revision application is maintainable under section 264 of the Act. We direct the Commissioner to decide the issue of law which he has framed in impugned order viz., "Whether export incentives received in subsequent assessment years can be allowed under section 80HHC even though not shown as income for the relevant year in view of the rectification application subsequently filed supported by the auditors report". This issue needs to be decided by the Commissioner under section 264 of the Act. - we set aside the orders of the Commissioner and we remit the matter back
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2002 (9) TMI 85
The only question that was raised before the Tribunal and in fact throughout the proceedings by the assessee was that the notice under section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, had not been validly served - In view of these findings, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the notice under section 143(2) of the Act had not been validly served and, there fore, the assessments were cancelled. The question whether notice was validly served or not is a pure question of fact and, in our opinion, no question of law much less a substantial question of law arises from the order of the Tribunal. Consequently, these appeals are dismissed.
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2002 (9) TMI 84
The petitioner has challenged the order dated March 27, 2002, by which the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Circle 2, Patna, has amended the earlier assessment order in exercise of power under sections 154 and 155(4A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and investment allowance allowed to the petitioner has been withdrawn for non-utilisation of the same within the statutory time limit. - It is an admitted position that the assessment was made and that order of assessment was subject to appeal and the appellate court has finally decided the matter. Thereafter, the respondent-Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax in exercise of power under sections 154 and 155(4A) of the Income-tax Act issued notice to the petitioner to show cause as to why the aforesaid investment allowance be not withdrawn for its non-utilisation within the statutory time limit and granted only one day's time to the petitioner to state its version. - we are inclined to quash the impugned order
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2002 (9) TMI 83
Interest On Borrowed Capital - We find that both the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and the Tribunal have noticed that by mutual consent, the parties had carried out certain changes in the original agreement and the interest was paid by the assessee in terms of the changed terms. The Assessing Officer had not doubted the genuineness of the subsequent arrangement but had rejected the assessee's claim only on the short ground that in view of the aforenoted restriction against change in terms, the original agreement could not be ignored. The Tribunal has come to the conclusion that there was no element of collusiveness in the parties agreeing to vary the terms of the initial agreement. We are of the view that this conclusion is essentially factual. The issue raised by the Revenue cannot be said to involve any question of law, much less a substantial question of law. It cannot be said that the finding of the Tribunal is without any evidence or material or is perverse
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2002 (9) TMI 82
"1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is right in holding that the question as to whether a loss can be set off can arise only in the assessment of the succeeding year or years when there is a positive income against which such set off is claimed? - 2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is right in law in vacating the directions of the Assessing Officer recorded in the assessment order to the effect that the loss shall not be carried forward?" - We, answer the question referred to us against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue.
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2002 (9) TMI 81
Settlement Of Cases - Scope Of Powers – Penalty - Concealment Of Income - In this petition the petitioner has challenged notices issued to it under section 156 of the Act pursuant to the orders passed by the Settlement Commission under section 245D(1) of the Act by serving upon the petitioner notices of demand claiming the tax, penalty, etc., payable by virtue of the order of the Settlement Commission. Since we have set aside the order of the Settlement Commission relating to penalty, the demand in these notices cannot be enforced till the decision by the Settlement Commission is taken afresh. This writ petition is, therefore, also disposed of with the direction to the Income-tax Officer to keep the matter in abeyance till the decision of the Settlement Commission
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2002 (9) TMI 80
Expenditure On Acquiring Know-How - "whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that the assessee is entitled to deduction under section 35AB?" - Section 35AB is designed to provide relief to the assessee who paid a lumpsum consideration for acquisition of know-how. The time with reference to which the assessee's entitlement is to be judged is the previous year in which the payment was made and not the subsequent year in which the assessee's project was either abandoned or the know-how became useless by reason of the non-availability of other inputs required to make the project success. The return of the know-how in the subsequent year would not affect the factum of payment having been made in the relevant previous year for the purpose of acquisition of the know-how. - The Tribunal, therefore, was right in the view it took
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2002 (9) TMI 79
"Whether the Tribunal was right in law and had valid materials in holding that the advance (rental) received by the assessee from the company in which he is a shareholder cannot be termed as a deemed dividend for the purpose of section 2(22)(e)?" - It is clear that the company had agreed to pay an advance of Rs. 10 lakhs when it had taken the first floor on lease for the purpose of meeting the cost of construction of the other three floors and that the lease deed provided explicitly that the advance so paid was to be adjusted against the rent payable for the other three floors. The amount of rent payable for those floors was also set out in the further lease. The advance therefore was required to be set off against the rents payable in future years and thus adjusted. The amount of Rs. 10 lakhs paid was clearly as advance, though it was an advance which was to be set off against the rents payable in future. - The question referred to us is therefore required to be and is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee
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2002 (9) TMI 78
"Whether, there was jurisdiction to assess the company in liquidation for wealth-tax for the assessment years 1984-85 to 1986-87 unless and until the assessing authority established from the books that the assets exceed the liabilities in value?" - The fact that the Wealth-tax Act does not contain a provision similar to section 178 of the Income-tax Act would not make any difference to the taxability of the net wealth of a closely held private company which has been subjected to a winding up order. - The Assessing Officer therefore was competent to make the assessment of the net wealth of a closely held private company, the assessee herein, even though that company had been subjected to a winding up order made by the company court. - The Assessing Officer having ascertained all the liabilities set out in the statement filed along with the return, there was no further need for the Assessing Officer to verify the books of account of the company. - The question referred to us is therefore answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
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2002 (9) TMI 77
"Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the value of stock-in-trade leased out by the assessee with Dharangdhara Chemical Works Ltd. and leased out dated November 26, 1979, should be treated as part of the capital employed for the purpose of computing relief under section 80J of the Act?" - When the assessee receives rent by leasing out the manufacturing facility, it cannot also be said that the income is derived from the industrial undertaking. The value of the leased assets, therefore, had been rightly excluded by the Commissioner. The Tribunal was in error in reversing that decision of the Commissioner. The question referred is, therefore, answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
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2002 (9) TMI 76
Royalty Income - Publication Of Book - "1. Whether, the Tribunal was correct on the facts and in law in its interpretation of the declarations of the assessee's karta dated January 3, 1967, and December 22, 1970? - 2. Whether, the Tribunal, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, was justified in disallowing the expenditure claimed by the assessee in respect of the publication of the revised edition of the book Design and Construction of Concrete Shell Roofs?" - "Whether the Tribunal was justified on the facts and in law in disallowing the expenditure claimed by the assessee on account of the foreign trip of the karta during the accounting year?"
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2002 (9) TMI 75
"whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal is right in law in holding that the interest income derived by the assessee from funds in connection with letter of credit is income derived from the profits of the business of the industrial undertaking so as to be entitled to get the benefit of section 10A of the Income-tax Act, 1961?". - In this case the interest received by the assessee was on deposits made by it in the banks. It is that deposit which is the source of income. The mere fact that the deposit made was for the purpose of obtaining letters of credit which letters of credit were in turn used for the purpose of the business of the industrial undertaking does not establish a direct nexus between the interest and the industrial undertaking. - The Tribunal, therefore, was in error in holding that there was direct nexus between the two. The question referred to us is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
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