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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 3047 Records
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1949 (12) TMI 43 - PRIVY COUNCIL
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... ... ..... ed, the system of land tenure at and before its date, the nature and terms of the grant under which the land in question was held and other matters which it is unnecessary to elaborate. 16. In the circumstances their Lordships, without expressing any views upon the construction of S. 5 of the Ordinance, are of opinion that the decree of 19th September 1946, so far as it contains a declaration must be set aside, but they do not think fit to disturb the order made as to costs. It is possible that the parties may after this long time come to some arrangement, but, in case they should not do so, it appears to their Lordships that the proper course is to remit the case to the Supreme Court in order that the issues already raised in the pleadings, so far as the parties now wish to have them determined, and such further issues as that Court may allow to be raised by proper amendment of the pleadings, may be beard and determined. There will be no order as to the costs of this appeal.
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1949 (12) TMI 42 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o evidence of any agreement by Tara Chand to pay ₹ 12/- per month and the rent has not been fixed by any notice in writing. Even if the rent at the rate of ₹ 12/- per month does not exceed the reasonable annual rent the applicant had no right to charge ₹ 12/- per month without a notice in writing, Since he is admittedly charging ₹ 12/- per month, he is guilty of contravening the provisions of Section 5. 8. The applicant was rightly convicted Under Section 8 of the Act. There is nothing wrong with the sentence. 9. I wish the learned City Magistrate had written a proper judgment. This was a case in which no appeal lay and he was required only to give a brief statement of the reasons for the judgment, but I do not know how he could give even a brief statement of the reasons without referring to the evidence. The reasons must be based on the evidence. The learned Magistrate has made absolutely no reference to any evidence. 10. The application is dismissed.
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1949 (12) TMI 41 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n that there was a partnership which was resident in British India and that its income was liable to assessment in British India, still the Income Tax Officer having taken action within the period of four years of the end of that year, the assessment on the firm was justified under Section 34, Income Tax Act. We do not think there is any room whatever for the argument advanced on behalf of the assessee that there has been no honest exercise of the Income Tax Officer's judgment in the present case, that he must be fixed with knowledge of the existence of the firm as a resident in British India even in 1941-42 and that therefore the present proceedings are illegal. His action was perfectly justified under the terms of Section 34, and the answer to the second question that has been referred to us must be in the affirmative and against the assessee. The assessee is directed to pay the costs of the Commissioner in R. C. No. 55 of 1946 which we fix at ₹ 250/-. C.R.K./D.B.
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1949 (12) TMI 40 - FEDERAL COURT
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... ... ..... rule which has been laid down in a long line of cases that in each circumstances the majority of the shareholders can sue in the name of the company mast apply. In MacDougall v. Gardner, (1876) 1 Ch. D. 13 (45 L.J. Ch. 27) and Pender v. Lushington, (1877) 6 Ch. D. 70 (46 L.J. Ch. 317), specific reference was made to the fact that the directors, being the custodians of the seal of the company, were the persons who should normally sue in the name of the company, but nevertheless it was held that the majority of the share-holders were entitled to sue in the name of the company when relief was sought against the directors themselves. Even in Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. Ltd. v. Cunninghame (1906) 2 Ch. 34 (75 L.J. Ch. 437), it was recognized that "misconduct" on the part of the director provided an exception to the rule laid down in that case. 18. In the result, we uphold the view taken in the appellate Court judgment and dismiss the appeal with costs.
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1949 (12) TMI 39 - FEDERAL COURT
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... ... ..... of an appeal to the Privy Council or to this Court. Whether the error occurred by reason of the counsel's mistake or it crept in by reason of an oversight on the part of the Court was not a circumstance which could affect the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court to review its decision. We have no doubt that the error was apparent on the face of the record and in our opinion the question as to how the error occurred is not relevant to this enquiry. A mere look at the trial Court's decision indicates the error apart from anything else. 9. The result is that the appeal is allowed and the appellant is declared entitled to all the properties mentioned in the gazette notification of 15th May 1937 including Nos. 3 to 37. She has already been given 18 items out of this and she is hereby declared owner of the remaining 19 items. Her claim is fully specified in para 13 of the statement of the appellant's case to this Court. The appellant will have her costs of this appeal.
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1949 (12) TMI 38 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the licensee holds his licence for the partnership or by an act of volition shares his licence with his partner, then there is a transfer which offends Rule 27. If it be found that the licensee does not hold the licence for the partnership, because it is illegal for him to do so, or because for any other reason the non-licensed partner does not purport to sell, by himself or through his partner, under his partner's licence, then there is no transfer; but the non-licensed partner would then commit a breach of Section 15 of the Act. In either case, a punishable offence would be committed; and a partnership formed that would lead to a breach of these provisions would be illegal, either because an offence would necessarily be committed or because it would be against the general public policy underlying the enactment that only approved persons, specifically licensed, should be allowed to sell liquor. 11. The civil revision petition is therefore allowed with costs throughout.
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1949 (12) TMI 37 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t Judge offended against this principle and their Lordships consider that he was rightly overruled. 11. In asking the Board to allow the plaint to be amended at this stage attention has been drawn to the provisions of Section 153 and 6. VI, Rule 17, of the Code of Civil Procedure. The powers of amendment conferred by the Code are very wide, but they must be exercised hi accordance with legal principles, and their Lordships cannot allow an amendment which would involve the setting up of a new case. The judgment of Lord Buckmaster in Ma Shwe My a v. Maung Mo Hnaung (1922) L.R. 48 I.A. 217, s.c. 24 Bom. L.R. 682 is directly in point. It was there held that it was not open to a Court under Section 153 and Order VI. Rule 17, to allow an amendment which altered the real matter in controversy between the parties. The application for leave to amend is rejected. 12. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed. The appellants will bear the costs.
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1949 (12) TMI 36 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d Judges of the Nagpur High Court state that the widow would be the manager of the joint Hindu family if her sons happened to be minors at the time of the death of her husband. She would be the guardian of her minor sons till the eldest of them attains majority but she would not be the manager of the joint family for she is not a coparcener. If she were the manager then she should continue to be the manager for her life notwithstanding her sons' attainment of majority. It is ages since Hindu society, excepting certain communities, ceased to be matriarchal. I therefore think that the decision in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Lakshminarayan Raghunath Das, 1948-16 I.T.R 313 (A.I.R. (36) 1949 Nag. 128), is, with all deference to the learned Judges, an unwarranted extension of well settled principles of Hindu law and I am unable to follow it. I, therefore, agree with my learned brother in the answer which he has given to this reference and in the direction for costs. o p /o p
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1949 (12) TMI 35 - PRIVY COUNCIL
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... ... ..... him to other parsons not parties to the suit." ( 32. ) Their Lordships have humbly advised His Majesty that the appeal of the plaintiff in Suit no. 1086 be allowed to the extent and subject as aforesaid, that the other appeals be dismissed and that the decree of the Appellate Court be modified accordingly and affirmed subject to such modification. Anything done by any party in pursuance of the order of 9 October 1947, shall be regarded as having been done in execution pro tanto of the said decree as so modified with the proviso that any overpayment made by plaintiff 1 to the defendants other than defendants 1, 2 and 77 over and above what he is liable to pay under the said decree as so modified as aforesaid shall be refunded to him by the said defendants with interest thereon at the rate aforesaid as from 27 October 1947, until payment. ( 33. ) The plaintiffs have succeeded on the major issues and the other appellants must pay their costs of these consolidated appeals.
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1949 (12) TMI 34 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he extent the family assets have been actually partitioned or taken away from the family and allotted exclusively to the individual members, those assets cannot be considered to be the assets of the artificial joint family created by Section 25A (3). Nor could that joint family be assessed to income-tax under Section 25A(2) on the income derived from such assets. Authority in support of the above conclusions will be found in the decisions of the Privy Council in Sundar Singh Majithia's case (supra) and of the High Courts in Bansidhar Dhandhania's case (supra) and Waman Satwappa's case (supra). Though there has been a division of the business there has not been a partition of movables nor a partition of immovable properties into definite portion in the present case. Therefore, my answer to the question referred to us that there has been no partition within the meaning of Section 25A of the Income-tax Act. I agree with my learned brother in the direction for costs.
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1949 (12) TMI 33 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... thin Section 42 of the Act but not by Section 4 or 4A(c)(b) of the Act. Income-tax is not like an excise duty levied upon a manufacturer or producer in respect of the commodity produced or manufactured. It is not a tax on goods or even on the sale proceeds of goods like a sales tax Governor-General in Council v. Province of Madras 1945 1 M.L.J. 225, 228 (P.C.). It is a tax upon profits which arise only on sales. Profits on coming into existence attract tax at that point Pondicherry Railway Co.'s case 1932 I.L.R. 54 Mad. 691 (P.C.). For these reasons I would answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and hold that the profits made by the assessee on sales which took place in British India constituted "income arising in British India" within the meaning of Section 4A(c)(b) of the Income-tax Act. I agree in the direction for costs given by my learned brother both in Referred Case 57 and in Referred Case 59 of 1946. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1949 (12) TMI 32 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... see in fact received nothing at all. The mills were sold at a price a long way below the sum owed to the debenture-holders. The Court considered it equitable to relieve the debenture-holders of the payment of auctioneer's commission, the auctioneer being one of the debenture-holders. In the circumstances it would be unreasonable to regard the relief to the debenture-holders as income........... In any event it did not arise out of any business or exercise of vocation or occupation and it was of a casual or non-recurring nature." (p. 696). This is clearly distinguishable from the present case on our finding in paragraph 11 above. In conclusion, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative. The assessee shall bear all costs of this reference. Counsel's fee ₹ 100 for the Commissioner and ₹ 500 for the assessee. A copy of this judgment be sent to the Appellate Tribunal under Section 66(5) of the Income-tax Act. Reference answered accordingly.
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1949 (12) TMI 31 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ) are assessable to Indian Income-tax is erroneous. I answer the second question referred to us in the affirmative. The answer to the third question is also in the affirmative. Prices fluctuate in the cotton, woollen and silk markets. The raw produce also differs considerably in quality and in its adaptability to different types of goods. Considerable experience and skilful judgment are necessary if suitable raw materials at favourable market rates are to be selected and purchased, and this is what the agents are doing from Madras. Having regard to the volume and regularity of the purchases made by the agents from Madras it is reasonable to attribute a portion of the profits to the purchase of raw materials by the agents in British India. Such selection and large scale purchase would be an "operation" within the meaning of Section 42(3) of the Act. I agree with my learned brother's direction regarding the costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1949 (12) TMI 30 - HIGH COURT OF EAST PUNJAB
Winding up – Delivery of property to liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... ction 171. In that case the Income-tax Officer had to move the Collector to take proceedings for recovery of Income-tax as arrears of land revenue which certainly would be a legal proceeding, but it cannot be said by any stretch of language that any order passed by the Custodian under the Bombay Act in ordering the vesting of evacuee property in him or in taking possession of the evacuee property can be considered to be a legal proceeding. In my opinion, the wording of the section shows clearly that they are an exercise of executive authority and, therefore, no leave was necessary. As the dispute is a bona fide one with regard to the property which is claimed by the Custodian, if leave is necessary I would hereby give him leave to proceed as was suggested by the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court in Shiromani Sugar Mills case 1946 16 Comp. Cas. 71. In the result the application fails and is dismissed with costs. I assess the costs at Rs. 150. Khosla, J. mdash I agree.
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1949 (12) TMI 29 - IN THE FEDERAL COURT
Oppression and mismanagement ... ... ... ... ..... s no provision in the articles of association to meet the contingency, and therefore the rule which has been laid down in a long line of cases that in such circumstances the majority of the shareholder can sue in the name of the company must apply. In MacDougall v. Gardiner 1875 1 Ch. D 13, and Pender s case (supra ) specific reference was made to the fact that the directors, being the custodians of the seal of the company, were the persons who should normally sue in the name of the company, but nevertheless it was held that the majority of the shareholders were entitled to sue in the name of the company when relief was sought against the directors themselves. Even in Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Company Ltd. v. Cunninghame 1877 6 Ch. D 70, it was recognized that misconduct on the part of the director provided an exception to the rule laid down in that case. In the result, we uphold the view taken in the appellate court judgment and dismiss the appeal with costs.
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1949 (12) TMI 28 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
Winding up – Appointment and powers of provisional liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... ck, sugar cannot be manufactured immediately, or almost immediately mdash and as I have already said the evidence is rather the other way. mdash the deadlock is or ought to be resolved when the Calcutta High Court gives judgment, which it may be expected to do very early in the coming year. If it is not so resolved, then it is open to the shareholders to convene an extraordinary general meeting and appoint additional directors vide Barron v. Potter 1914 1 Ch. 895. As to the other ground put forward by the petitioners, namely, that, as the Warisaliganj project has been abandoned or indefinitely postponed, and in consequence the substratum of the company has gone or largely gone, that may, perhaps, be a ground for making a winding up order, but it cannot possibly be a ground for appointing a provisional liquidator. In my opinion this application, as far us the matter of the appointment of a provisional liquidator is concerned, fails and must accordingly be dismissed with costs.
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1949 (12) TMI 27 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Transfer to shares – Power to refuse registration and appeal against refusal ... ... ... ... ..... y the articles given to the directors, the court will not control the exercise of such discretion, unless it is proved that the directors are not exercising it bona fide or are acting, in other words, oppressively, capriciously or corruptly or in some way mala fide. There is no need to quarrel with this proposition and we can also add that the presumption would be that the directors had acted bona fide and the onus would be on the person challenging their action to establish the lack of bona fide and the impropriety on their part. In this case the onus has been discharged. We do not think any useful purpose would be served by dealing with cases like Re Smith and Fawcelt Limited 1942 1 All E.R. 542, in which the material article was in the following wide terms, namely mdash The directors may at any time in their absolute and uncontrolled discretion refuse to register any transfer of shares. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs of the plaintiff-respondent.
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1949 (12) TMI 26 - IN THE PRIVY COUNCIL
Director number of and Oppression and mismanagement ... ... ... ... ..... s consider that it should be added as a defendant. The appellants as the majority of the board formally by their counsel consent to that course. Accordingly their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should succeed as to resolution No. 1 but should fail as regards resolution No. 2 that there should be a declaration of the validity of resolution No. 1 and the declaration as to the original four being the only proper directors should be sruck out that all the injunctions should be discharged and that the record should be amended by striking out the name of the company as plaintiff and adding it as defendant. The respondents having succeeded in both Courts in India on all issues were given their costs throughout. As a result of this appeal they ought to have failed on resolution No. 1 and succeeded only on resolution No. 2. In view of this, their Lordships consider that there should be no costs of the proceedings either in the Indian Courts or on this appeal.
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1949 (12) TMI 25 - HIGH COURT OF EAST PUNJAB
Winding up – Definition of contributory and Application for ... ... ... ... ..... t of the case. He has mainly relied on the observations of some of the cases where it has been held that a fully paid-up shareholder is a contributory and can bring a petition for winding up but the conditions under which he can bring such a petition seem to have been overlooked by the learned Judge and that perhaps led him into the error in which he has fallen. As I am of the opinion that Lajpat Rai Sawhney had no locus standi to bring this petition for winding up, this appeal must be allowed and the order of winding up of the company passed by the learned District Judge set aside and so also the order of appointment of Official Liquidator. The appellants will have their costs in this Court as well as in the Court below. I assess the costs in this Court at Rs. 500. Of course my judgment will affect only the appeal in the petition for winding up which was presented in the Court of the District Judge by Lajpat Rai Sawhney and will not affect the petition filed by Dr. Leighton.
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1949 (12) TMI 24 - HIGH COURT OF EAST PUNJAB
Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts and Appeals from orders ... ... ... ... ..... ed. In Volume V of Halsbury s Laws of England, Hailsham Edition, page 547, there is a passage that it may be just and equitable to wind up a company where it is carrying on business at a loss and its remaining assets are insufficient to pay its debts. In the present case there is no doubt that the company is carrying on its business at a loss and it has not been proved that it can pay off its debts from the remaining assets of the company. I am satisfied that on the facts which have been proved it is not a company which can carry on its business with any expectations of profit if it can carry on its business at all in the circumstances in which it is placed. For the above reasons I am satisfied that the learned Judge was right in ordering the winding up of the company and I would, therefore, dismiss this appeal. The respondents will have costs of the appeal K.L. Gosain, for the appellants. Shamsher Bahadur, S. Gurdev Singh, Tek Chand and Nand Lal Salooja, for the Respondents.
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