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Showing 21 to 40 of 3101 Records
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1949 (11) TMI 20
Issues:
1. Appeal against conviction and sentence by Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay.
2. Validity of proceedings due to lack of sanction under sec. 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
3. Abetment charge against the second Appellant.
4. Petition for special leave to appeal by both Appellants.
5. Granting of leave to appeal by Order in Council.
6. Requirement of sanction for prosecuting a public servant under sec. 161 of the Indian Penal Code.
7. Argument regarding the legality of police investigation leading to trial.
8. Jurisdiction of the Chief Presidency Magistrate in trying the Appellants.
9. Consideration of procedural faults in the case.
Analysis:
The Appellants were convicted and sentenced by the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, for accepting a bribe and abetting the offense. The 1st Appellant's appeal to the High Court was dismissed, citing grounds of invalid proceedings due to lack of sanction under sec. 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code and factual errors. The 2nd Appellant did not appeal but faced an enhanced sentence. Both Appellants sought special leave to appeal to the Privy Council, emphasizing the need for sanction and conflicting judicial opinions on sec. 197's interpretation.
The Privy Council granted leave to appeal to both Appellants. However, the Appellants' argument on the necessity of sanction under sec. 197 was rendered moot by a prior judgment. The Council allowed a new argument on the legality of the police investigation, alleging non-compliance with the Bombay City Police Act. The Appellants contended that the trial and conviction were void due to an illegal investigation, challenging the Magistrate's order authorizing the police inquiry.
The Privy Council determined that the new ground of appeal did not pertain to jurisdiction but rather procedural compliance. While acknowledging potential consequences of procedural faults, the Council held that such errors did not strip the Chief Presidency Magistrate of jurisdiction. Refusing to delve into unargued issues at the High Court level, the Council dismissed the appeal, citing established practice and lack of reference to procedural faults in the appeal petitions.
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1949 (11) TMI 19
Issues Involved:
1. Competency of the Provincial Government to extend the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act.
2. Validity of the Ordinance promulgated by the Governor under Section 88 of the Government of India Act.
3. Repugnancy between the Ordinance and existing laws, specifically the Criminal Procedure Code.
4. Bona fides of the Governor in promulgating the Ordinance.
5. Validity of Sections 23, 24, and the proviso to Section 4(1) of the Ordinance.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Competency of the Provincial Government to extend the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act:
The appellants were initially detained under the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, which was extended by the Provincial Government under the proviso to Section 1(3) of the Act. This extension was challenged and held ultra vires by the Federal Court in Jatindra Nath Gupta v. The Province of Bihar and Others, as it amounted to a delegation of legislative function to an outside authority. Consequently, the extension and the Bihar Act V of 1949, which purported to amend the earlier Act, were declared void and inoperative.
2. Validity of the Ordinance promulgated by the Governor under Section 88 of the Government of India Act:
The appellants contended that the Ordinance under which they were detained was promulgated in contravention of Section 88 of the Government of India Act, making it void and inoperative. The Court held that the Governor's satisfaction regarding the necessity of the Ordinance was not justiciable. The Governor alone must be satisfied about the existence of circumstances necessitating the promulgation of the Ordinance, and this satisfaction was expressed in the preamble of the Ordinance.
3. Repugnancy between the Ordinance and existing laws, specifically the Criminal Procedure Code:
The appellants argued that the Ordinance conflicted with provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, creating new offences and thus required the Governor-General's instructions under Section 88(1) of the Government of India Act. The Court examined whether the Ordinance dealt with matters in the Provincial or Concurrent List and found that it fell entirely within Items (1) and (2) of the Provincial List, concerning public order and preventive detention. The Court concluded that there was no repugnancy between the Ordinance and existing laws, as the Ordinance's provisions were ancillary to maintaining public order, a matter within the Provincial Legislature's competence.
4. Bona fides of the Governor in promulgating the Ordinance:
The appellants questioned the bona fides of the Governor in promulgating the Ordinance. The Court found no material to support this contention, noting that the Ordinance was promulgated following the Federal Court's declaration of the earlier Act's invalidity. The steps taken by the Governor were deemed necessary and not mala fide.
5. Validity of Sections 23, 24, and the proviso to Section 4(1) of the Ordinance:
The appellants challenged the legality of Sections 23, 24, and the proviso to Section 4(1) of the Ordinance. Section 23, which repealed the earlier invalid Acts and Ordinances, was considered superfluous but did not affect the Ordinance's validity. Section 24, a saving provision for actions under the previous Ordinance, was deemed irrelevant to the present case as the appellants' detention was not justified under the old Ordinance. The proviso to Section 4(1), which allowed non-disclosure of grounds for detention if against public interest, was argued to render preventive detention arbitrary. The Court held that preventive detention for public order was within the Provincial Legislature's competence, and the proviso did not make the Ordinance invalid.
Conclusion:
The appeals were dismissed as the Court found no substantial error of law or procedural irregularity leading to a miscarriage of justice. The Ordinance was upheld as valid and within the Provincial Legislature's competence, and the appellants' contentions were rejected.
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1949 (11) TMI 18
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the dealing in forward contracts carried on by the applicants in the Rangoon grain market is a distinct and separate business from the dealing in ready goods of the same commodities.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Distinction Between Forward Contracts and Ready Goods Business:
The primary issue is whether the forward contracts in grains constitute a separate business from the ready goods business. The applicants, an undivided Hindu family, carried on business in grains and rice at Tuticorin and Virudhunagar. They bought grain and rice at Rangoon through their agents and imported them to Tuticorin for sale. During the accounting years 1937-38, 1939-40, and 1940-41, they engaged in forward contracts or "satta" contracts, which resulted in losses larger than the profits from ready purchases and sales.
The Income-tax Officer disallowed the claim to set off these losses against the profits under Section 24(2) of the Income-tax Act, arguing that the forward contract business was distinct and separate from the ready goods business. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Appellate Tribunal upheld this view, stating that the speculation business in differences was distinct from the grains business.
2. Interpretation of "Same Business" Under Section 24(2):
The fundamental question is whether the two lines of business constitute the "same business" within the meaning of Section 24(2) of the Income-tax Act. The court noted that the question of whether the business is the same or not is essentially one of fact, but if there is no evidence to support the finding, it becomes a question of law.
The judgment referenced several cases to illustrate the principle of whether different business activities constitute the same business. For instance, in Scales v. George Thompson and Co., Ltd., it was noted that the test is whether there is any "inter-connection, interlacing, interdependence, and unity" between the businesses. The court also referenced Chidambaram v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, where it was held that businesses carried on at different places by the same person could still be considered the same business if there was financial interdependence and unity of control.
3. Evidence and Findings:
The court found that the applicants' dealings in forward contracts and ready goods were inter-connected and interlaced. The financing of all transactions, whether they related to purchases or forward contracts, was from Tuticorin, and the control of all transactions was under a single management. The court emphasized that the mere fact that the forward contract business could be separated in the accounts did not make it a distinct business.
The court concluded that the forward contracts were not a separate business but were part of the same business of dealing in grains. The judgment pointed out that the applicants had the right to demand delivery under forward contracts, and it could not be said that they did not intend to take delivery from the beginning.
4. Application of Legal Principles:
The court applied the principles from various cited cases to determine that the applicants' forward contracts and ready goods business were part of the same business. The court noted that common ownership alone does not make different lines of business the same, nor does the distinct nature of businesses make them separate. The court also considered the financial interdependence, unity of control, and common management as factors indicating that the businesses were the same.
Conclusion:
The court answered the question referred in the negative, ruling in favor of the applicants. The court held that the dealings in forward contracts carried on by the applicants in the Rangoon grain market were not a distinct and separate business from the dealing in ready goods of the same commodities. The applicants were entitled to set off the losses incurred in forward contracts against the profits from ready goods under Section 24(2) of the Income-tax Act. The applicants were also awarded costs of Rs. 250.
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1949 (11) TMI 17
Issues:
1. Constitutional validity of the Bombay Abkari Act under the Government of India Act, 1935.
2. Interpretation of legislative powers of the Provincial Legislature under List II and List I of the Constitution Act.
3. Conflict between Provincial and Federal legislative powers regarding possession of foreign liquors.
4. Impact of the amendments to S. 14-B of the Bombay Abkari Act on the Federal legislative field.
Analysis:
1. The case involved an appeal challenging a conviction under the Bombay Abkari Act. The appellant argued that the Provincial Legislature lacked power to legislate on the possession of foreign liquors under the Government of India Act, 1935. The High Court upheld the conviction, prompting the appeal to the Federal Court to determine the constitutional question at hand.
2. The history of the Bombay Abkari Act was crucial to understanding the legislative framework. The Act aimed to regulate liquor-related activities in Bombay and underwent amendments to align with the Constitution Act. The appellant contested the amendments made in 1947, particularly the deletion of a proviso in S. 14-B, which restricted or prohibited possession of intoxicants, including foreign liquors.
3. The central issue revolved around the delineation of legislative powers between the Provincial and Federal Legislatures. While List II granted the Provincial Legislature authority over intoxicating liquors, List I included powers over import and export across customs frontiers. The appellant argued that the Act's provisions on possession of foreign liquors could undermine the Federal Legislature's control over imports, jeopardizing customs revenue.
4. The Court rejected the appellant's contention, emphasizing the expansive nature of the Provincial legislative power under List II. It clarified that the Act did not encroach on the Federal field of import regulation. The Court highlighted that the Act focused on possession, not importation or exportation, and upheld the validity of S. 14-B of the Bombay Abkari Act as amended in 1947, dismissing the appeal.
5. The judgment also addressed previous judicial opinions on the extent of Provincial legislative powers concerning intoxicants. It distinguished between degrees of encroachment on Federal powers and emphasized that the validity of legislation should be determined based on the substance of the law rather than the degree of encroachment. The Court's decision reaffirmed the validity of the Act and its compliance with the constitutional division of legislative powers.
In conclusion, the Federal Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Bombay Abkari Act and its amendments, dismissing the appeal challenging the conviction under the Act. The judgment clarified the boundaries of Provincial and Federal legislative powers, emphasizing the importance of interpreting legislative authority in line with the Constitution Act's provisions.
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1949 (11) TMI 16
Issues:
1. Interpretation of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding the power of the High Court in second appeal.
2. Validity of property transactions and ownership rights.
3. Examination of evidence regarding payment of decretal amount.
4. Consideration of compromise agreement and its implications.
5. Proper constitution of appeal to the High Court.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The appellant contended that the High Court of Judicature at Patna exceeded its jurisdiction by reversing factual findings made by the lower appellate Court, contrary to Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The section restricts the High Court in second appeals from questioning findings of fact supported by evidence. The appellant argued that the High Court should not have interfered with the lower court's findings.
2. The case involved the original ownership of a property, which was sold through various transactions. The validity of these transactions, including a sale deed and a deed of relinquishment, was in question. The lower courts had made findings regarding the benami nature of these transactions and the ownership rights of the parties involved. The High Court had to determine the correctness of these findings and whether the transactions were valid.
3. An essential aspect of the case was the examination of evidence concerning the payment of the decretal amount by the judgment debtors. The lower appellate Court had made findings on this issue, which were challenged in the High Court. The High Court had to assess the evidence presented and determine whether the decretal amount had indeed been paid, affecting the ownership rights and possession of the property.
4. The case also involved a compromise agreement between the parties, which was subject to scrutiny by the courts. The lower court had raised doubts about the bona fides of the compromise agreement and its implications on the legal rights of the parties. The High Court had to analyze the compromise agreement and its validity in light of the legal principles governing such settlements.
5. Lastly, a procedural issue regarding the constitution of the appeal to the High Court was raised. The composition of the appeal and the representation of the parties were questioned, particularly after the death of one of the respondents. The High Court had to determine the proper constitution of the appeal and whether it met the legal requirements for adjudication.
In conclusion, the judgment involved a comprehensive analysis of legal principles, factual findings, ownership rights, evidence evaluation, and procedural aspects to determine the rightful ownership of the property in question. The High Court's decision was challenged based on various grounds, including jurisdictional limits, factual inaccuracies, and procedural irregularities, leading to a detailed examination of the case before reaching a final verdict.
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1949 (11) TMI 15
Issues:
Income-tax assessment of Hindu undivided family for the assessment year 1938-39.
Analysis:
The judgment pertains to two references under Section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act concerning the income-tax assessment of a Hindu undivided family. The primary issue revolves around whether a specific sum should be deemed as income taxable in the assessment year 1938-39. The family was a partner in a collieries business, and the dispute arose regarding the treatment of certain amounts received from the collieries. The Income-tax Officer found discrepancies in the account books, including a surplus balance and unposted items. The contention was whether these amounts should be considered as profits of the previous year. The Commissioner of Income-tax argued that the surplus balance should be deemed as profit post the collieries' closure. Reference was made to a judicial decision emphasizing an assessee's right to treat certain monies as income for a particular year based on their accounting method.
The judgment delves into the treatment of sums received in previous years and the discretion of the assessee in allocating them as income for a specific year. The court analyzed the nature of the amounts in question, such as the surplus balance, unposted items, and transferred sums, to determine if they could be classified as profits for the previous year. The court highlighted the importance of the assessee's intention in treating these amounts as income for a particular year. It was observed that the mere detection of income in a specific year does not warrant its automatic classification as income for that year, especially if it had escaped assessment in previous years. The court scrutinized the actions of the Income-tax Officer in deducting a specific amount from the total and concluded that the disputed sum should not be considered as income taxable in the assessment year 1938-39.
The judgment was delivered by Justice Malik, with Justice Seth concurring. The court ruled that the disputed sum could not be deemed as income, profits, or gains of the previous year assessable to income tax in the assessment year 1938-39. The court also awarded costs to the assessee. The decision provides clarity on the treatment of income discrepancies and underscores the significance of an assessee's deliberate allocation of funds as income for a specific year based on their accounting practices.
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1949 (11) TMI 14
Issues:
1. Whether the remuneration received by the managing director from a bank constitutes joint family property.
2. Whether the shares purchased using family funds for qualification as a managing director make the remuneration joint family property.
3. Whether the remuneration earned by the managing director is personal earnings or joint family property.
4. Whether the remuneration received by the managing director is attributable to his personal qualifications or the family's ownership of shares.
Analysis:
1. The primary issue in this case was whether the remuneration received by the managing director from the bank could be considered as part of the income of the Hindu undivided family. The court analyzed that the remuneration was earned by the managing director for services rendered to the bank and was not directly linked to family funds. The court emphasized that unless the earnings are blended with family property, they cannot be deemed as joint family property under Hindu Law.
2. Another aspect considered was the purchase of shares using family funds for qualifying as a managing director. The court noted that although shares were bought using joint family funds, the appointment and remuneration were based on a contract of service between the individual and the bank. The court highlighted that the holding of shares by the manager did not automatically make the remuneration joint family property, especially when the shares were not utilized in the process of earning the remuneration.
3. The court also delved into the nature of the remuneration earned by the managing director, emphasizing that it was a result of a contract of service and personal qualifications, rather than a representation of the joint family. The judges agreed that the remuneration was paid for the specific services rendered by the individual to the bank under a contractual agreement, and it did not constitute joint family income.
4. Lastly, the judgment clarified that the remuneration received by the managing director was attributable to his personal qualifications and the contract with the bank, rather than the ownership of shares by the family. The court highlighted that the family's investment in shares remained intact, generating dividends for the family, and the remuneration was solely for the individual's services, not a result of family funds being utilized.
In conclusion, the court ruled that the remuneration earned by the managing director could not be considered as joint family property, emphasizing the distinction between personal earnings and family assets. The judgment aligned with previous decisions and legal principles, affirming that the remuneration was attributable to the individual's services and qualifications, rather than family ownership of shares.
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1949 (11) TMI 13
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the sale of securities without proper or reasonable notice.
2. Alleged agreement to postpone the sale of securities.
3. Delay in the sale of securities and its impact on the sale price.
4. Validity of the letter of guarantee (Ex. A) and its applicability to subsequent loans.
5. Interest rate applicable to the loans.
6. Liability of the guarantor's estate in the absence of notice of sale.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Sale of Securities Without Proper or Reasonable Notice:
The primary contention of Defendant 1 was that the sale of the shares was unauthorized and without proper or reasonable notice, thus invalid. The court examined Section 176 of the Contract Act, which allows a pawnee to sell the pledged goods after giving reasonable notice of the sale. The court found that the Bank had given reasonable notice through Ex. F, which demanded payment within seven days and indicated the Bank's intention to sell the securities if the payment was not made. The court rejected the argument that the Bank needed to provide detailed information about the date, time, and place of the sale, citing precedents that such detailed notice is not required. The court upheld the lower court's decision that the legal requirements of a valid notice were satisfied.
2. Alleged Agreement to Postpone the Sale of Securities:
Defendant 1 argued that there was an agreement to indefinitely postpone the sale of the securities, and thus, the sale was invalid. The court found no evidence or pleadings to support this claim. The court noted that the memorandum of appeal and the evidence did not indicate any such agreement. The court concluded that the Bank had merely shown indulgence in enforcing its rights and that there was no agreement to postpone the sale. Therefore, this contention was dismissed.
3. Delay in the Sale of Securities and Its Impact on the Sale Price:
Defendant 1 contended that the delay in the sale of securities resulted in lower sale prices and that the Bank should be liable for the loss caused by the delay. The court examined whether the pawnee has the right to choose the time to exercise the power of sale after giving due notice. The court cited precedents that the pawnee is not required to sell the pledged goods within a reasonable time after the notice period expires. The court found that the shares were sold by recognized brokers at prevailing market prices, and there was no evidence to suggest that the sales were imprudent or that the prices fetched were not the highest possible. The court rejected the argument that the delay invalidated the sale or caused a wrongful conversion.
4. Validity of the Letter of Guarantee (Ex. A) and Its Applicability to Subsequent Loans:
The court examined the validity and scope of the letter of guarantee (Ex. A) provided by Defendant 2. The lower court had limited the guarantee's applicability to the first loan (Ex. B) based on the Bank's records, which only listed Defendant 2 as the guarantor for the first loan. The court upheld this finding, noting that the Bank's records did not show Defendant 2 as the guarantor for the subsequent loans (Exs. C and D). Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's decision to limit the liability of Defendant 2's estate to the first loan.
5. Interest Rate Applicable to the Loans:
Defendant 1 and the minor Defendants contested the interest rate claimed by the Bank, arguing that it should be limited to 6% per annum under Act III (3) of 1116. The lower court accepted this contention and reduced the interest rate from the stipulated 10.5% to 6%, thereby reducing the Plaintiff's claim. The court upheld this reduction in the interest rate.
6. Liability of the Guarantor's Estate in the Absence of Notice of Sale:
Defendant 3, representing the estate of the deceased guarantor (Defendant 2), argued that the sale of the shares without notice to the guarantor rendered it invalid against the guarantor's estate. The court found that there was no requirement in law or in Ex. A for the Bank to provide notice of the sale to the guarantor. The court noted that the statutory requirement of reasonable notice applies to the pawnor, not the guarantor. Therefore, the court dismissed this contention and upheld the lower court's decision regarding the liability of the guarantor's estate.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed both appeals (A.S. No. 113 of 1120 by Defendant 1 and A.S. No. 26 of 1120 by Defendant 3) and upheld the lower court's judgment and decree. The sales of the shares were found to be valid and proper, and the counter-claim for wrongful conversion was rejected. The interest rate was correctly reduced to 6%, and the guarantor's estate was held liable only for the first loan. The appeals were dismissed with costs.
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1949 (11) TMI 12
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the sum of Rs. 453 being overdrawings of an employee against his salary should be treated as an irrecoverable loan of the applicants' money-lending business under Section 10(2)(xi) of the Income-tax Act.
2. Whether the sum of Rs. 94,388 paid by the applicants to the Ceylon Government as interest under Section 46 of the Ceylon Ordinance No. 1 of 1938 for default of paying estate duty is allowable as a deduction under Section 10(2)(iii) or 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Overdrawings of Rs. 453 as Irrecoverable Loan:
The first issue pertains to whether the sum of Rs. 453, which represents overdrawings by an employee, can be treated as an irrecoverable loan under Section 10(2)(xi) of the Income-tax Act. The employee, Veerabahu Pillai, took advances while in service, and a promissory note was taken for the amount due. This sum was written off as a bad debt during the accounting period ending 13th April 1943. The deduction claimed was disallowed by the Income-tax authorities and the Appellate Tribunal.
The court held that for an amount to be deductible as a bad debt under Section 10(2)(xi), it must be a loan made in the ordinary course of the money-lending business. The amount in question was an overdrawing and not a loan made in the ordinary course of business. The conversion of the liability into a loan by taking a promissory note does not change the nature of the transaction at its inception. Therefore, the contention that the amount should be treated as an irrecoverable loan was rejected.
2. Interest of Rs. 94,388 Paid to Ceylon Government:
The second issue involves whether the interest of Rs. 94,388 paid to the Ceylon Government for default in paying estate duty can be deducted under Section 10(2)(iii) or 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act. The estate duty was payable under the Ceylon Ordinance and was not paid within the stipulated time, resulting in the liability to pay interest.
The court examined the applicability of Section 10(2)(iii), which allows the deduction of interest paid on borrowed capital for business purposes. The court found that the unpaid estate duty could not be considered as borrowed capital. The liability to pay interest was statutory and not a result of a consensual borrowing act. Therefore, the interest did not qualify for deduction under Section 10(2)(iii).
Regarding Section 10(2)(xv), which allows deductions for expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for business purposes, the court noted that the estate duty was a composite payment covering all properties of the deceased, not just the business assets. Hence, the interest paid on the unpaid estate duty was not an expenditure incurred exclusively for business purposes and did not qualify for deduction under Section 10(2)(xv).
Conclusion:
Both questions were answered in the negative and in favor of the Income-tax Commissioner. The court concluded that the overdrawings by the employee could not be treated as an irrecoverable loan, and the interest paid to the Ceylon Government was not deductible under the relevant sections of the Income-tax Act. The assessee was ordered to pay costs of Rs. 250 to the Commissioner.
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1949 (11) TMI 11
Issues Involved:
1. Entitlement to deduction of Rs. 658 and Rs. 5,049 in the assessment for 1943-44.
2. Applicability of Section 10(2)(xi) and Section 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act.
3. Classification of the amounts as business loss or bad debt.
4. Connection of the debt with the business operations of the assessee.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Entitlement to Deduction of Rs. 658 and Rs. 5,049:
The primary issue was whether the assessee, a bookseller, was entitled to deduct the sums of Rs. 658 and Rs. 5,049 in the computation of his profits for the assessment year 1943-44. The sums were related to joint borrowings with one Lakshmana Ayyar, where the assessee had to repay the entire amount due to Ayyar's business failure. The Tribunal allowed the deduction, but the Income-tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had previously disallowed it.
2. Applicability of Section 10(2)(xi) and Section 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act:
The assessee's advocate argued that the deductions could be justified under Section 10(2)(xi) (bad debts) or Section 10(2)(xv) (business expenditure) of the Income-tax Act. However, the court found that the expenditure did not occur in the year of account and was not laid out wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business in that year, thus Section 10(2)(xv) was not applicable.
3. Classification of the Amounts as Business Loss or Bad Debt:
The court examined whether the amounts could be classified as a bad debt under Section 10(2)(xi). It was contended that upon repaying the joint debt, the assessee became a creditor to Lakshmana Ayyar, and the debt became bad due to Ayyar's insolvency. However, the court held that the debt did not arise from the trading operations of the bookselling business but by operation of law as a surety, making it ineligible for deduction as a bad debt.
4. Connection of the Debt with the Business Operations of the Assessee:
The court emphasized that for a debt to be deductible under Section 10(2)(xi), it must be connected with the trade operations and appear as a trading debt in the balance sheet. The joint borrowing was not a trading debt of the bookselling business but a capital borrowing. The court also noted that the loss did not arise in the course of or as a result of the assessee's business as a bookseller. The business did not necessitate guaranteeing debts of third persons, and thus the loss was too remote from the business to be deductible.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the loss claimed by the assessee did not arise from the business operations and was not sufficiently connected with the trade. Consequently, the deduction claimed was not admissible under Section 10(2)(xi) or Section 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act. The reference was answered in the negative, in favor of the Commissioner of Income-tax, and the assessee was ordered to pay costs of Rs. 250.
Reference Answered in the Negative.
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1949 (11) TMI 10
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the entire profits from the sale of timber accrued or arose to the respondent company and were received by the respondent company outside British India.
2. If the answer to the first question is negative, whether Section 42(3) of the Income-tax Act would apply to profits received in British India or profits that actually accrued or arose in British India.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Accrual and Receipt of Profits Outside British India:
The primary issue revolves around whether the profits from the sale of timber by the respondent company accrued or arose outside British India. The respondent company, incorporated in Cochin State, entered into contracts with the Government of India for the supply of timber. The contracts were formed through tenders submitted by the respondent and accepted by the Government in British India. The crucial documents related to these contracts were not fully available, leading to an incomplete basis for the arguments.
The Tribunal concluded that the contracts were concluded at Chalakudi, outside British India, where the acceptance note was signed. The timber was inspected and certified at Chalakudi, and the goods were delivered f.o.r. (free on rail) at railway stations in Cochin State. The Tribunal held that the profits arose outside British India as the goods were appropriated and delivered outside British India, and the payment was received at Trichur in Cochin State.
The High Court, however, determined that the contracts were concluded in British India when the acceptance note was posted by the Government. Despite this, the performance of the contracts, including inspection, certification, and delivery, occurred entirely at Chalakudi. The right to demand payment accrued at Chalakudi when the goods were appropriated to the contracts. Therefore, the profits were realized in Cochin State, not in British India.
2. Application of Section 42(3) of the Income-tax Act:
Given the conclusion that the profits accrued outside British India, the second issue regarding the application of Section 42(3) becomes relevant only if the profits were deemed to have accrued or arisen in British India. The High Court referenced a prior decision in Baruga Nagayya v. Commissioner of Income-tax, which established that Section 42(3) applies only to profits deemed to accrue or arise in British India, not to those that actually accrued or arose there.
Conclusion:
The High Court answered the first question in the affirmative, confirming that the profits accrued outside British India. Consequently, the second question was rendered moot. The respondent company was entitled to costs, fixed at Rs. 250. The judgment emphasized the need for complete documentation in income-tax matters to avoid reliance on incomplete or inaccurate representations.
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1949 (11) TMI 9
The High Court of Madras acquitted the petitioner in a case involving non-payment of assessment. The court found that the principle of "autrefois acquit" should apply, and the petitioner should not be convicted again for the same offense. The court set aside the conviction, directed the refund of the fine, and stated that the tax would be collected under the previous conviction. Petition allowed.
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1949 (11) TMI 8
Issues:
1. Validity of assessment in a prosecution under Section 15(b) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act.
2. Application of Section 16A to assessments made before and after 1st January, 1948.
3. Right of the accused to dispute the validity of assessment based on turnover before 1st January, 1948.
Analysis:
1. The judgment addresses the validity of assessment in a prosecution under Section 15(b) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act. The court deliberates on whether the assessment's legality and quantum can be questioned in a criminal court. The court opines that Section 16A precludes such questioning if the assessment, turnover, and prosecution are all post-1st January, 1948. The court rejects the argument that Section 16A is ultra vires, emphasizing the legislative power and the conclusive nature of assessments post-1st January, 1948.
2. Regarding the application of Section 16A to assessments pre and post-1st January, 1948, the court clarifies that the accused can dispute the validity of assessment based on turnover before 1st January, 1948. The court rejects the notion that Section 16A restricts questioning only to the legality of assessment, asserting that "valid" encompasses both legality and quantum. The court highlights the accused's right to challenge the assessment's quantum, especially for turnovers before 1st January, 1948.
3. The judgment affirms that an accused retains the right to contest the validity of assessment concerning turnover before 1st January, 1948, in a criminal proceeding. The court emphasizes that the prosecution post-1st January, 1948, does not diminish this right, particularly when the default in tax payment is based on turnover predating 1st January, 1948. The court modifies the lower court's order, allowing the petitioner to challenge the assessment's validity for turnover pre-1st January, 1948, but not for turnover post-1st January, 1948.
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1949 (11) TMI 7
Issues:
Application under section 171 of the Companies Act for leave to implead Janda Rubber Works Ltd. in voluntary liquidation as a party defendant; Dispute regarding Universal Rubber Works ownership and creditor claim; Jurisdiction of the Court in light of Banking Act provisions.
Analysis:
The case involves an application under section 171 of the Companies Act by the Exchange Bank of India and Africa Ltd., in liquidation, seeking leave to implead Janda Rubber Works Ltd., in voluntary liquidation, as a party defendant. The petitioner bank claims to be a secured creditor of Universal Rubber Works, alleging a significant sum due and payable. The dispute centers around the ownership of Universal Rubber Works, with the bank initiating a suit in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay against the firm and its partners, seeking recovery and claiming to be a secured creditor. The liquidator of Janda Rubber Works Ltd. contends that the suit is not bona fide and suggests collusion to protect an individual. However, the court opines that the matter involves multiple questions best addressed in a regular suit rather than under the Companies Act.
The court refers to legal precedents emphasizing the rights of secured creditors to enforce their securities and proceed with actions, particularly in cases involving disputes with the company. Notably, the court highlights the importance of allowing the petitioner to prosecute the suit to adjudicate on the issues between the parties properly. The court rejects the argument that recent Banking Act provisions affect the jurisdiction of the court under section 171 of the Companies Act, deeming it unnecessary to decide on this matter due to the circumstances of the case.
Regarding conditions for granting leave, the court declines to impose restrictions on accessing company records or interfering with the receiver appointed by the Bombay High Court. However, the court orders the petitioner to provide security for costs before impleading the liquidator of Janda Rubber Works Ltd., emphasizing the need for such security due to the bank being in liquidation. Ultimately, the court grants leave to the Official Liquidator of the Exchange Bank Ltd. to implead the liquidator of Janda Rubber Works Ltd., with costs to abide the result of the suit, set at Rs. 150.
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1949 (10) TMI 10
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the detention orders under the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947.
2. Competence of the Provincial Legislature to delegate the power to extend the duration of the Act to the Provincial Government.
3. Validity of the Madras Ordinance No. 1 of 1949 promulgated by the Governor.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Detention Orders under the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947:
The petitioners argued that the detention orders were illegal as they were passed after the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, had ceased to be in force on 12th March 1948. The Act initially came into force on 12th March 1947, and was to remain in force for one year unless extended by the Provincial Government. The Provincial Government extended the Act for one year from 12th March 1948, and again from 12th March 1949, but the petitioners contended that the Act had expired and the extensions were invalid.
2. Competence of the Provincial Legislature to Delegate the Power to Extend the Duration of the Act to the Provincial Government:
The main contention was whether the Provincial Legislature could delegate the power to extend the duration of the Act to the Provincial Government. The Federal Court in Jatindranath Gupta v. Province of Bihar had held that such delegation was invalid. The Court distinguished between conditional legislation and delegation of legislative power, stating that the power to extend the life of an Act is a legislative power that cannot be delegated. The Court concluded that the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, ceased to be in force on 11th March 1948, as the delegation of the power to extend the Act to the Provincial Government was invalid.
3. Validity of the Madras Ordinance No. 1 of 1949 Promulgated by the Governor:
The Governor of Madras promulgated Ordinance No. 1 of 1949 to remove doubts regarding the validity of the continuance of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, and to amend it. The petitioners argued that the Ordinance was promulgated by fraudulent exercise of power as the Governor prorogued the Legislature to clothe himself with the power to issue the Ordinance. The Court found no basis for this allegation, stating that the Governor had the right to prorogue the Legislature and issue an Ordinance if immediate action was necessary.
The Ordinance declared that the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, remained in force from 12th March 1948, and amended the Act by omitting Sub-section (4) of Section 1. However, the Court held that the amending provisions of the Ordinance were of no effect as the original Act had ceased to be in force, and an amending Act cannot revive a dead Act. The Court upheld Section 3(b) of the Ordinance, which validated actions, proceedings, notifications, and orders made under the Act after 12th March 1948.
Conclusion:
The Court concluded that the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, ceased to be in force on 11th March 1948, as the delegation of the power to extend the Act to the Provincial Government was invalid. The amending provisions of the Madras Ordinance No. 1 of 1949 were also invalid, but Section 3(b) of the Ordinance, which validated actions and orders made under the Act after 12th March 1948, was upheld. The petitions were to be heard and disposed of in light of these observations.
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1949 (10) TMI 9
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the sum of Rs. 25,391 should have been ignored or deducted in determining the assessee's income from business for the assessment year 1944-45.
2. Whether the first proviso to Section 24(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act could apply to the assessment made for the year 1944-45.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Deduction of Rs. 25,391 Loss in Determining Income
The primary issue revolves around whether the loss of Rs. 25,391 incurred by the assessee in the Indian States should be deducted from the assessee's income from business in British India for the assessment year 1944-45. The Income-tax Officer initially did not debit this loss, a decision upheld by the Assistant Income-tax Commissioner but later reversed by the Appellate Tribunal.
The court examined Section 24(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, which deals with the set-off of losses under one head against profits under another head. The court noted that this section does not apply to set-offs within the same head, such as business income. The court emphasized that no provision in the Income-tax Act allows for the set-off of losses incurred outside British India against profits earned within British India. The court reasoned that if the profits from business in Indian States are not taxable unless received in British India, the losses from such business should also not be considered.
The court concluded that the loss of Rs. 25,391 should be ignored in determining the assessee's income from business for the previous year, affirming that the assessee cannot claim a set-off or deduction without a specific provision of law permitting it.
Issue 2: Applicability of the First Proviso to Section 24(1)
The second issue pertains to whether the first proviso to Section 24(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, which came into force on April 12, 1944, applies to the assessment year 1944-45. The court referred to the Judicial Committee's decision in Maharajah of Pithapuram v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, which established that the law in force at the time of assessment, not the law during the income-earning year, governs the assessment.
The court cited precedents, including Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Sind Hindu Provident Funds Society and Maharajah of Pithapuram, to support this principle. The court noted that the Finance Act of 1944, effective from April 1, 1944, would govern the assessment year 1944-45. Therefore, the first proviso to Section 24(1), which came into effect after the relevant accounting year, does not apply to the assessment made for the year 1944-45.
Conclusion
The court answered the first question affirmatively, stating that the loss of Rs. 25,391 should be ignored in determining the assessee's income from business. For the second question, the court concluded that the first proviso to Section 24(1) does not apply to the assessment made for the year 1944-45. The assessee was ordered to pay the cost of the reference, assessed at Rs. 400.
Additional Observations
The court highlighted the necessity for fuller statements of the case, including primary facts and the Tribunal's appellate order, to aid in the legal analysis. The court noted that the assessee did not raise objections to the statement of the case, thus the court could not consider new objections raised during arguments.
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1949 (10) TMI 8
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Court of King's Bench to determine the figure of net profit or gain for tax assessment.
2. Allowance for "manufacturing profit" in the assessment of income tax for a corporation operating in multiple provinces.
3. The procedural propriety of raising new grounds of appeal before the Privy Council that were not presented in lower courts.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of the Court of King's Bench to Determine the Figure of Net Profit or Gain for Tax Assessment:
The appellant contended that the Court of King's Bench overstepped its jurisdiction by determining the actual figure of net profit or gain for each year in question and directing the appellant to assess the respondent on that basis. The appellant argued that this action invaded the administrative function of the appellant, who is the responsible Minister. The Court of King's Bench had allowed the respondent's appeal, set aside the assessments, and adjudged the net profit or gain figures, directing the appellant to adopt them. The appellant's counsel asserted that the Court had no jurisdiction to arrive at an actual figure of assessable income or to direct the appellant to adopt it. However, the Privy Council disagreed with this argument, stating that the Judge's order decided the matter within his jurisdiction. The Judge was entitled to decide both the question of law regarding the allowance for "manufacturing profit" and the question of fact concerning the net profit or gain in Manitoba.
2. Allowance for "Manufacturing Profit" in the Assessment of Income Tax for a Corporation Operating in Multiple Provinces:
The core issue was whether the respondent was entitled to an allowance for "manufacturing profit" in Ontario when assessing its profits in Manitoba. The appellant had consistently maintained that no such allowance should be made, arguing that the net profits arising from sales in Manitoba were taxable in Manitoba. The respondent challenged this, asserting that an allowance for "manufacturing profit" should be made. The Privy Council noted that this issue was substantially the same as that decided in the International Harvester Co. case (1949 A.C. 36), where it was held that the net taxable profit should be ascertained after making an allowance for "manufacturing profit" attributed to activities outside the province. Consequently, the Privy Council concluded that the respondent was entitled to such an allowance, aligning with the decision in the International Harvester Co. case.
3. The Procedural Propriety of Raising New Grounds of Appeal Before the Privy Council:
The appellant introduced a new argument before the Privy Council, which was not relied upon in any of the lower courts. The respondent objected to this, highlighting that the argument was not presented in the Courts below, and thus, should not be entertained. The Privy Council acknowledged that the appellant's new ground of appeal was not mentioned in the Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeal for Manitoba, the appellant's Factum for the Supreme Court, or the petition to the Privy Council for special leave to appeal. Despite this, the Privy Council decided to entertain the argument, noting that the respondent was not taken by surprise and that the point had been fully argued before their Lordships. However, they emphasized that this decision should not set a precedent for allowing appeals on new grounds in comparable circumstances. Ultimately, the Privy Council found the appellant's new argument unpersuasive and upheld the decision of the lower courts.
Conclusion:
The Privy Council dismissed the appeal, affirming the jurisdiction of the Court of King's Bench to determine the net profit or gain for tax assessment and recognizing the respondent's entitlement to an allowance for "manufacturing profit." The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.
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1949 (10) TMI 7
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the properties inherited by the plaintiff's husband and his brother from their maternal grandfather were held as tenants-in-common or joint tenants with rights of survivorship.
2. Whether the plaintiff's claim was barred by adverse possession.
3. Whether items 7, 10, and 11 of Schedule A were part of the maternal grandfather's estate.
4. The validity of the decree concerning the division of properties inherited from the maternal grandfather.
5. The validity and effect of a gift and subsequent exchange of property by defendant 1.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Tenants-in-Common vs. Joint Tenants with Rights of Survivorship:
The primary issue was whether the properties inherited by the plaintiff's husband and his brother from their maternal grandfather were held as tenants-in-common or joint tenants with rights of survivorship. The court referred to the ruling in Venkayamma v. Venkataramanayamma, which held that the rule of survivorship applies to property inherited by two brothers from their maternal grandfather when they were members of an undivided Hindu family. However, the court acknowledged that subsequent decisions of the Judicial Committee had practically destroyed the authority of Venkayamma as a legal precedent. The court concluded that the property inherited by the plaintiff's husband and defendant 1 was taken as tenants-in-common, not as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. Consequently, the plaintiff became entitled to her husband's moiety upon his death.
2. Adverse Possession:
The court examined whether the plaintiff's claim was barred by adverse possession. Defendant 1 claimed exclusive enjoyment of the property since the plaintiff's husband's death in 1926 or 1927, while the suit was filed in November 1943. The court emphasized that possession by one co-owner is considered possession by all co-owners unless there is an open and unequivocal denial of the other co-owner's title. The court found no evidence of ouster or exclusion, noting that the plaintiff continued to stay in the family house even after her husband's death. Thus, the court held that the suit was not barred by adverse possession.
3. Items 7, 10, and 11 of Schedule A:
The court determined that items 7, 10, and 11 originally belonged to Ramabrahmam's sister, Kammamma, who had a limited interest as a widow. These properties were conveyed to Ramabrahmam and subsequently to the plaintiff's husband and defendant 1. A reversioner of Kammamma's husband filed a suit, which ended in a compromise decree awarding a third share to the reversioner and the remaining two-thirds to the plaintiff's husband and defendant 1. The court concluded that the ancestral character of these properties was not lost due to subsequent events and upheld the trial judge's decision that the plaintiff's claim must fail regarding these three items.
4. Validity of the Decree Concerning Property Division:
The court analyzed whether the compromise decree concerning the division of properties inherited from the maternal grandfather resulted in a division between the brothers. The court concluded that the primary objective of the compromise was to award a third share to the reversioner and leave the remaining property to the plaintiff's husband and defendant 1. Therefore, the court held that the decree did not result in a division between the brothers concerning these properties.
5. Validity and Effect of Gift and Exchange of Property:
The court addressed the validity of a gift made by defendant 1 of 4 acres of ancestral property to the plaintiff's daughter at the time of her marriage and the subsequent exchange of this property for 5 acres of the suit property. The court upheld the trial judge's finding that the gift was reasonable and valid. However, the court directed that in the division of properties between the plaintiff and defendant 1, the properties in possession of defendant 5 under the exchange deed should be allotted to the share of defendant 1.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed, and the decree of the lower court was set aside except regarding items 7, 10, and 11 of Schedule A. The plaintiff was granted a decree for partition and separate possession of a half share in the remaining properties. The court also provided directions for the division of properties, ensuring that the properties in possession of defendant 5 under the exchange deed were allotted to defendant 1's share. The plaintiff was directed to pay the court fee due on the plaint and the memorandum of appeal to the government and recover proportionate court fees from the contesting defendants.
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1949 (10) TMI 6
Issues Involved:
1. Legal status of the disputed land as a cremation ground.
2. Form and necessary parties of the suit.
3. Mixed question of law and fact regarding the disputed land being a Sarbasadharan cremation ground.
4. Application of Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.
5. Legal doctrines of dedication and lost grant.
6. Customary rights in relation to the disputed land.
7. Evidence supporting the claim of customary rights.
8. Legal relationship between the proprietor and the villagers.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Legal Status of the Disputed Land as a Cremation Ground:
The appellants argued that the disputed area should be legally recognized as a cremation ground of the village, preventing its use for private industry. The respondents contended that the land was validly granted to them by the Zamindar for a rice mill.
2. Form and Necessary Parties of the Suit:
The initial court raised questions regarding the form of the suit and the presence of necessary parties. The Munsiff decided in favor of the appellants, confirming the suit's form and the appellants' right to maintain it in a representative capacity on behalf of the villagers.
3. Mixed Question of Law and Fact Regarding the Disputed Land Being a Sarbasadharan Cremation Ground:
The trial judge framed the issue as whether the disputed land was a Sarbasadharan cremation ground. The appellants' claim was based on the land being used for cremation from time immemorial. The Munsiff found the evidence insufficient to establish a customary right and dismissed the claim of a lost grant. The Additional Subordinate Judge on first appeal found evidence of "dedication" for cremation purposes, while the High Court of Patna reversed this, finding no dedication.
4. Application of Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code:
The appellants argued that the Subordinate Judge's finding of dedication was a fact that could not be disturbed on second appeal. However, the judgment clarified that Issue No. 5 was a mixed question of law and fact, and the Subordinate Judge's conclusion was more a legal proposition than a factual finding.
5. Legal Doctrines of Dedication and Lost Grant:
The Subordinate Judge's conclusion of dedication or lost grant was found defective in law. Dedication in English law implies an irrevocable license for public use, which does not apply to a limited section like village inhabitants. Similarly, the doctrine of lost grant, a legal fiction to support prescriptive rights, does not apply as it requires identifiable grantees, which the fluctuating village population does not constitute.
6. Customary Rights in Relation to the Disputed Land:
The true legal basis for the appellants' claim lies in custom. Customary rights, if established, create a local law binding the land to certain uses. The judgment emphasized that such rights in India are similar to those recognized in England, requiring the custom to be immemorial, certain, reasonable, and continuous.
7. Evidence Supporting the Claim of Customary Rights:
The Additional Subordinate Judge's findings supported the existence of a custom: the land had been used for generations as a cremation ground, the 1901 settlement records supported this use, and there was no abandonment of the user. These findings suggested a village custom that the law could recognize.
8. Legal Relationship Between the Proprietor and the Villagers:
The respondents argued that the proprietor's obligation was only to provide adequate land for cremation, not to reserve any specific land. The judgment rejected this view, finding no factual or legal basis to support it. The immemorial user established a customary right binding the disputed land as a cremation ground.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed, the High Court's decree was set aside, and the Additional Subordinate Judge's decree was restored with a modification to exclude "burial ground" from the order. The respondents were ordered to pay costs to the appellants. The judgment recognized the disputed land as bound by custom to be reserved as the village cremation ground.
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1949 (10) TMI 5
Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Sections 19 and 20 of the Limitation Act to the periods of limitation prescribed for agriculturists under the Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act.
2. Whether Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act applies to special or local laws like the Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act.
3. Interpretation of the term "prescribed period of limitation" under the Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Applicability of Sections 19 and 20 of the Limitation Act:
The primary contention in the appeal was whether the suit was barred by limitation due to the endorsement dated 7th September 1940, given that Sections 19 and 20 of the Limitation Act do not apply to the periods of limitation prescribed for agriculturists under the Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act. The court noted that the law laid down in 22 Mysore Law Journal 27 was against the appellant's contention. The appellant argued that the decision in Kishore Lal Stores v. Jagannath, which was the basis for the decision in 22 Mys. L.J. 27, had been overruled by a later Full Bench decision in Janardhan Eknath v. Ganesh Sadashiv. However, the court found that the decision in 22 Mys. L.J. 27 still stood, and Sections 19 and 20 of the Limitation Act were applicable to suits under the Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act.
2. Applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act:
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act states that where any special or local law prescribes a period of limitation different from that in the Limitation Act, the provisions of Sections 4, 9 to 18, and 22 shall apply only if not expressly excluded by the special or local law. The court acknowledged that the Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act is a special law. However, it was debated whether this Act prescribed a period of limitation different from the Limitation Act. The court analyzed the provisions and concluded that the Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act did not contain a complete body of provisions regarding limitation and thus, the general provisions of the Limitation Act, including Sections 19 and 20, were applicable.
3. Interpretation of "Prescribed Period of Limitation":
The court examined whether the Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act prescribed any period of limitation different from that in the Limitation Act. It was noted that Section 24 of the Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act substituted the period of limitation mentioned in the Limitation Act with a period of six years for certain suits. The court referred to previous decisions, including Keshav Krishna v. Bhagwan Sambhu and Kishore Lal Stores v. Jagannath, and concluded that the Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act did not prescribe an independent and self-contained period of limitation. Instead, it modified the Limitation Act to some extent. Therefore, the court held that the general provisions of the Limitation Act, including Section 20, were applicable to suits under the Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the view that Section 20 of the Limitation Act is applicable to suits mentioned in Section 24 of the Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act. The judgment emphasized the principle of stare decisis and the importance of maintaining consistency in legal interpretations to avoid confusion and unsettlement. The appeal was dismissed, and the previous judgments of the lower courts were upheld.
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