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Case Laws
Showing 241 to 260 of 280 Records
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1951 (2) TMI 20 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sessment during the periods in question, namely, 1941-42 and 1942-43 although the discovery is actually made by the Income-tax Officer at the time when the matter is referred to him for report. He then discovered that these amounts of "income" had been wrongly included in "excess profits" and therefore had escaped assessment. There is nothing to show that this was an erroneous inference arrived at by the Income-tax Officer and the fact that this position was not disputed by the assessee when the matter actually came up for assessment before the revenue authorities indicates that the inference of the Income-tax Officer was correct. The notice thus contained the statement of an existing fact even on the date of the notice under Section 34 of the Act. Therefore there is nothing wrong with the notice at all. So far as the legal aspect of the question is concerned my learned brother has already very fully discussed the matter and I have nothing to add to that.
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1951 (2) TMI 19 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... re of them. The true method of determining as between the partners themselves what belongs to the firm, & what not, is to ascertain what agreement has been come to upon the subject. Lindlay on Partnership, 9th Edn., pp. 409, 416. 62. It is quite clear, therefore, that unless there is an agreement between the partners that a particular property would be the separate property of a partner, there cannot be an entrustment of it to the other partner or partners. In the absence of such an agreement, each partner is interested in the whole of the partnership assets and there cannot be an entrustment of 'a partner's property' as such by one partner to another, because there is no 'property' which can be entrusted. 63. In the case before us there is no evidence that there was an agreement by which the partnership assets were converted into separate property of the partners. Therefore there cannot be a breach of trust, because nothing was or could be entrusted.
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1951 (2) TMI 18 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... amount of dividend declared by the first defendant between the years 1938 and 1943 and ascertain if the first defendant paid the dividend to the second and third defendants or their predecessor Rajani Kanta Mukerjee (deceased.) If it is found that the first defendant paid the dividends to the second and the third defendants or their predecessor the Court will make a decree against defendants Nos. 2 and 3 in respect of the proportionate share of the plaintiffs. If, however, it is found that the 1st defendant did not pay the dividend to the 2nd and the third defendants or their predecessor the Court will pass a decree for the proportionate share of the plaintiffs against the first defendant. On these points the Court will base its decisions upon the materials on the record and further evidence that may be adduced by the parties. 17. The appellants will be entitled to half the costs of this appeal, hearing fee being assessed it 10 gold mohurs. Gopendra Nath Das, J. 18. I agree.
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1951 (2) TMI 17 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... staying proceedings in execution must be set aside, but the petition on which that order was passed will be treated as an application for the appointment of an administrator pendente lite & the court will proceed to deal with the application on the merits, keeping in view the principles indicated above. It will be open to the opposite parties to file an additional petition giving further particulars in support of the prayer for the appointment of an administrator pendente lite if they are so advised. The D. Hs. who are the petitioners before this Court will also be allowed to file objections to the same & be given a hearing. 11. This Rule is accordingly made absolute. The learned Dist. J. is directed to proceed to deal with the question of the appointment of an administrator pendente lite. It is also desirable that the proceedings for the grant of letters of administration should be expedited. 12. There will be no order for costs in this Court. Guha, J. 13. I agree.
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1951 (2) TMI 16 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... oughout been that he was given no particulars at all till the 5th August, 1950. As the petitioners were given only vague grounds which were not particularised or made specific so as to afford them the earliest opportunity of making representations against their detention orders, and their having been inex- cusable delay in acquainting them with particulars of what was alleged. the petitioners have to be released, the rules being made absolute. Ordered accordingly. PATANJALI SASTRI J.--I concur in the order proposed by my learned brother Chandrasekhara Aiyar J. DAS J.--In view of the majority decision in Case No. 22 of 1950 (The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Acharya), I concur in the order proposed by my learned brother. Order accordingly. Petition No. 194 of 1950 Agent for the petitioner R.R. Biswas. Agent for the respondent P.A. Mehta. Agent for the intervener P.A. Mehta. Petition No. 167 of 1950 Agent for the petition R.S. Narula. Agent for the respondent P.A. Mehla.
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1951 (2) TMI 15 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in our opinion the plaintiff is entitled to some interest. The learned counsel appearing for both the parties, at the close of their arguments, left this question of interest to be deter- mined by us and we think that it would be quite fair if we allow interest on the sum of ₹ 30,000 at the rate of 4 per annum from the beginning of September, 1943. It is admitted that the plaintiff's possession of the house ceased by the end of August, 1943. The result is that we allow the appeal in part; the decree made by the High Court is affirmed in so far as it dismissed the claim for specific performance- The plaintiff, however, will be entitled to a money decree for the sum of ₹ 30,000 against the defendants second party with interest at 4 per annum from the 1st of September, 1943, to the date of reali- sation. Each party to this appeal will bear his own costs. Appeal allowed in part. Agent for the appellant R.C. Prasad. Agent for respondents Tarachand Brij Mohan Lal.
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1951 (2) TMI 14 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , subject of course to restrictions contained in Rule 71. Under Rule 71 the matter of registration of a dealer, amendment of certificate of registration or cancellation of registration can be delegated to the Commercial Tax Officer, and it has been so done. Section 20 and Rule 74 make provisions for appeals, revision and review. Section 21 of the Act provides for statement of case to the High Court. Thus there is efficacious and adequate remedy under the Act. It is idle to suggest that by virtue of repeal of Section 18 the petitioner is without any remedy. The petitioner described itself through its pleader as transferee and was registered as dealer as a matter of course. No question whether it was a transferee or not or dealer or not at all arose for determination. There has been no refusal to exercise jurisdiction nor any excess of jurisdiction. The application is wholly misconceived. The petition therefore fails and the Rule must be discharged with costs. Rule discharged.
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1951 (2) TMI 13 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nd found it is obvious that the assessee bona fide believed that his act of accommodation to his customers in keeping up to the terms of the contract entered into with them would not change the real nature of the transaction. If he was able to convert the ingots entrusted to him into brass sheets he would have got exemption in regard to his manufacturing charges. Indeed, as the evidence discloses, and as the accounts show, he later on sold away the ingots entrusted to him after converting them into sheets paying sales tax. He might have been wrong in the view but I cannot say that he omitted the item deliberately with the idea of evading tax. The fact that immediately it was pointed out to him he was ready to make good the defect, is really indicative of his bona fides. I therefore hold on the evidence adduced in the case that the appellant did not wilfully submit an untrue return. The conviction and sentence are therefore set aside and the appeal is allowed. Appeal allowed.
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1951 (2) TMI 12 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... erson being a dealer or not when an application for registration as a dealer is made before him. The petitioners case however stands on a different footing. They are already registered as a dealer. The petitioners purchased the business in May, 1943, and new registration certificate was issued to them on 22nd May, 1943, under Section 17 of the Act. They have not taken any steps to have the registration cancelled. So long as they are registered they are liable to pay the tax. It is submitted by the learned Advocate-General that there is no allegation of demand of justice and its refusal in the petition and this is fatal to the maintainability of the application for mandamus and reliance is placed on the case reported in Surendra Nath Das v. State of West Bengal(1) (Harries, C.J., and Banarjee, J.). This decision is binding on me and I accept the contention. In the result the petition fails and the rule must be discharged with costs. Petition dismissed. (1) 1951 55 C.W.N. 255.
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1951 (2) TMI 11 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Charges – Registration of ... ... ... ... ..... uded from participation in the assets of an unregistered company which is wound up. I think it is in connection with administration and succession actions that the situs of a debt has relevancy. In Cheshire s Private International Law, it is stated at page 595, The fact, however, that a debt possesses a definite situation for some purposes does not necessarily imply that its assignment should be governed by the lex situs. Even apart from that, the provision of law enacted in section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code is an answer to the argument based upon the situation of the debt. In this view of the matter it is not necessary for me to refer to the various decisions cited to us by Mr. Tiruvenkatachari on the question of situs of debt. For the feregoing reasons, the contention urged on behalf of the appellant that the proof of debts of the foreign creditors should be expunged is not acceptable to us. I entirely agree with my learned brother in his conclusions in other respects.
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1951 (2) TMI 8 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Meeting and Proceedings – Power of Company Law Board to Order Meeting to be Called ... ... ... ... ..... eetings called by the quarrelling groups of directors may be invalid, the shareholders should not be exposed to the uncertainties flowing from the situation and the consequent litigation and it should be held that a position has arisen which makes it impracticable for the meeting being called in accordance with the articles. It is true that the impracticability contemplated in the section is as to the calling of a meeting. It appears to me however that the section also contemplates that the court should exercise its powers where it cannot say with reasonable approach to certainty, or even prima facie, that the meeting called in exercise of the powers contained in the regulations will be valid. I think, therefore, that in the circumstances of this case I have the power to call the meeting and if I have the power I have no hesitation in exercising it in order to resolve the conflict and uncertainty which has arisen as the result of the quarrel between the two sets of directors.
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1951 (1) TMI 48 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , & I see no reason to disbelieve it. The pltf. has a bona fide claim supported by written documents. Shortly before the institution of the suit, the defts. have been trying to dispose of the entirety of their Immovable properties at a price which according to their own case is highly inadequate. They have stopped their business & have started doing business in a foreign country & have expressed their wish to migrate there. Under the circumstances I am of the opinion that the pltfs, have made out a case for the orders asked for & there will be an order that the defts. do furnish security to the amount of the pltf's. claim within a fortnight from the date of this order & that in default, the right, title & interest of the defts. in the properties mentioned in Schedule B to the petition be attached before judgment. The ad interim injunction will continue until the attachment is made effective. The costs of this application will be costs in the cause.
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1951 (1) TMI 47 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... o it for its supervision & control of the business from London. The assessee became entitled to receive the income when the sale proceeds actually reached the hands of the Oil Company. It seems to us therefore that in no sense can it be said that its income, profit or gain accrued or arose in India. 15. Mr. Sukumar Mitra on behalf of the assessee has contended himself to this reference by urging before us that the income did not accrue or arise in India. He said that the assessee could be taxed, if at all, under Section 42, & not under Section 4(1). We think his contention is right & in this Reference we hold that the assessee's income did not accrue or arise in India. If the assessee is liable to be taxed, the proper section applicable is Section 42, Indian Income Tax Act. 16. We, therefore, answer the question asked in the affirmative. The assessee is entitled to the costs of this Reference. Certified for two counsel. Arthur Trevor Harries, C.J. 17. I agree.
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1951 (1) TMI 46 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s. Before 1939 the method was rather cumbrous. The total partnership profits were assessed and thereafter each partner was entitled to a refund. There is now no necessity for a refund because the profits are assessed in the hands of each individual partner and therefore the difference in the rates contemplated in Section 48(2) can no longer arise. The amount eventually obtained by Government is precisely the same and therefore it appears to me that we are bound to hold that this amendment in 1939 was purely procedural and merely affected the machinery for collecting the tax rather than the tax itself. It is a more convenient method of collecting the amount which Government obtained in rather more complicated circumstances before 1939. As this amendment was procedural, retrospective effect could be given to it and that being so it appears to me that the view of the Tribunal was right, and therefore I would answer the question submitted in the affirmative. Banerjee, J.-I agree.
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1951 (1) TMI 45 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... held (1) that the unrecorded information was in fact the first information in the case;........& (iii) that the information given by the woman's father not being the first information could not be taken into consideration." A large number of decisions have been read before me by learned counsel on both sides, but I do not think it necessary to refer to them, for, in substance whether a particular information amounts to an F. I. R. or not is essentially a question of fact and in the present case the matter seems to be plain to my mind. I have no doubt that Ex. P. 4 on the basis of which the petnr. was convicted was a statement falling with the mischief of Section 162, Criminal P. C., & therefore not available to be used against him. In this view it becomes unnecessary to deal with the other questions of fact raised by Mr. Nambiar. The revn. petn. is allowed & the petnr. acquitted & ordered to be set at liberty unless he be otherwise lawfully detained.
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1951 (1) TMI 44 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... trust for the deities, but were properties which had been dedicated or given to the deities. The income from such properties cannot be said to be income arising from a private religious trust, as the word "trust" has a definite meaning and dedicated properties are not in the strict sense properties held in trust or properties which are the subject matter of a trust. Once it is held that these properties were dedicated properties then the earlier case to which I have made reference admittedly applies and I would therefore answer the questions Submitted as follows - Question (1) is answered in the negative. Question (2) is answered as follows The last paragraph of Section 4(3)( xii) of the Indian Income-tax Act governs only the word "trust" and does not govern the words "other legal obligation" which appear in Section 4(3) (i ) of the Act. The assessees are entitled to the costs of these proceedings. Certified for two counsel. Banerjee, J.-I agree.
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1951 (1) TMI 43 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a partnership document, dated 1945, between Squire, Hilman and Gilbert and said that in 1945 a different firm was constituted. But it is to be noted that there is no reference of this document in the records except in the schedule to the statement of the case. We do not know how the document came in, but we have no doubt that this document was never discussed before any of the authorities before, and therefore we are not prepared to allow Dr. Gupta to rely on this document in support of his argument. We shall consider this case on the basis that it was the same firm that continued throughout, though there was change in the personnel and that being the case we think that under Section 25(4) of the Indian Income-tax Act there was succession in 1947 when the private company was formed. Therefore, the provisions of that section are attracted and the firm should get the relief in accordance with it. We answer the question submitted to us in the affirmative. Harries, C.J.-I agree.
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1951 (1) TMI 42 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion. The first test would be whether the assessee was charged with regard to a transaction which took place in the ordinary course of business, and the other test would be whether he was charged in his capacity as a trader. If these two tests were satisfied and the Court came to the conclusion that the primary object of incurring the expenditure was to protect the good name of the business then it could be said that the expenditure was wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business. 8. As I have said, the Appellate Tribunal have held in this case that the primary and indeed the sole object of incurring these expenses was the protection of the good name of the business and the stock-in-trade thereof. In my view the Appellate Tribunal were right in allowing this amount as a deduction and that being so the question submitted must be answered in the affirmative. 9. The assessee is entitled to the costs of this reference. Certified for two counsel. Banerjee, J.-I agree.
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1951 (1) TMI 41 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ich the replacement of the Act of 1918 with its basis of taxation as the income of the current year, by the Act of 1922 with its basis of taxation for the assessment year as the income of the immediately preceding year, the accounting year, necessarily involved. A beneficial enactment must no doubt, as is sometimes said, be liberally interpreted; but as I had occasion to remark in my judgment in A.S. No. 138 of 1948 this rule of liberal interpretation of such an enactment does not sanction a construction founded upon the equity of the statute, as it is sometimes called, in disregard of the actual language employed therein. The golden rule of literal construction, as Lord Wensleydale described it in the House of Lords in an early English case, Grey v. Pearson 1857 6 HLC 61 affords in my judgment the safest course to adopt, on the whole, in this rather difficult case; and applying that rule I would concur with my learned brother in answering the reference against the assessee.
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1951 (1) TMI 40 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of ownership, mean to suggest that even where the legal integrity of the business becomes affected by the later transaction of partition between members of the joint family which originally owned it, there is no cessation of the business in the eye of law. In support of his argument Mr. Rama Rao Sahib stressed the following features - (i) that the businesses after partition were carried on in the same premises as those of the head office and its branches as of old; (ii) that the same set of account books continued ; (iii) that the same old goodwill availed the several businesses after partition; and (iv) that the old customers continued connections with them. These are not, even if true, necessarily inconsistent with and sufficiently conclusive against the legal discontinuance of the old business which is the ordinary incident of partition. The position taken up by the Commissioner is absolutely untenable and the question referred must be answered in favour of the assessee.
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